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Abstract
The contribution of Management Control Systems (MCS) in general, and of the Performance 
Measurement Evaluation and Reward System (PMERS) in particular, to the motivation of the 
managers who operate at the middle level of the organisation’s hierarchy has received relatively 
little examination up to date. Most of the available empirical evidence in the area of measurement, 
evaluation and reward of managerial performance tends to focus almost exclusively on executive 
managers operating at the top level. Using an Expectancy-Valence (E-V) model of job behaviour 
as a theoretical framework, this study primarily sets out to investigate the impact of the PMERS on 
middle-level managers’ motivation and subsequent performance. At a second level, it aims to 
examine the relative success of the PMERS to positively influence managerial motivation and 
performance under all environmental conditions, both certain and uncertain.
By means of an analytic questionnaire - which was purposively developed on the basis of 
instruments previously tested and extensively used in practice by other researchers in the field - 
a sample of 225 middle-level managers from a large UK-based financial institution provided data 
for the study. All in all, the analysis of the managerial perceptions gathered regarding the 
company’s PMERS indicate that the managers’ motivation is primarily affected by the extrinsic 
and intrinsic rewards that they perceive to enjoy in the context of their job environment. 
Motivation is specifically related both to the perceived value and to the performance-dependency 
of these rewards. The latter seems to suggest that a key issue affecting the motivational 
effectiveness of the PMERS - and therefore a central design consideration - is the choice of 
rewards to be included in the company’s reward package, as well as the manner through which 
these rewards are eventually allocated to the company’s managerial staff. As to the intervening 
effect of perceived environmental uncertainty, this research provides evidence to show that the 
managers’ perceptions about how uncertain their (internal and external) job environment is have a 
significant adverse impact on their perceptions about the accuracy of the performance measures 
and the attainability of the performance standards that are employed within the PMERS. This 
result implies that the design of the company’s PMERS is better seen as situationally specific, i.e., 
as contingent on the relevant (actual and perceived) conditions of the organisational environment 
for which it is intended.
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Chapter O ne: 
Introduction
1.1 Identification of the Research Area
Management control theorists have consistently pointed out the motivational potential of the 
Performance Measurement, Evaluation & Reward System (PMERS) to influence and direct the 
behaviour of managers who are operating at the middle level of the organisational hierarchy. 
In practice, systems of performance measures, standards and related rewards may be used by 
organisations not only for control but also for motivational purposes, i.e., in order to induce 
middle-level managers to perform at desirable levels. Indeed, incentive systems which attempt to 
link organisational rewards to managerial behaviour on the basis of some pre-specified criteria of 
attained performance have become a common - if not a necessary - ingredient of managerial 
remuneration packages in the 1990s, and this trend appears to be growing (Otley, 1992, 1994). 
Nevertheless, surprisingly little evidence exists on the effects of such incentive systems on the 
managers’ behaviour in the different environments they are implemented, despite the concerns 
expressed by contingency theorists about the ability of these systems to instigate managerial 
motivation and promote managerial efficiency equally well under all environmental conditions, 
both certain and uncertain.
The purpose of the present study is to fill this research void in part, by empirically investigating 
the relative motivational effectiveness of the PMERS under differing environmental conditions. 
Essentially, the objective of this study is twofold : First, to examine the impact of the Performance 
Measurement, Evaluation and Reward System (PMERS) on middle-level managers’ behaviour 
(motivation and performance), and, second, to examine the moderating effect of environmental 
and task uncertainty on the PMERS’s ability to affect managers’ motivation and subsequent 
performance. Deriving from a contingency theory perspective, the research question that is 
addressed in this study is - what is the actual impact of the PMERS on the motivation and 
consequent performance of middle-level managers who are operating within environments of 
differing level of uncertainty ? Environmental uncertainty - in all its shapes and forms - is viewed 
and examined here as an important source of contingency for the design and subsequent 
motivational effectiveness of the company’s PMERS.
l
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1.2 Objectives and Contribution of the Study
Using the above notions as a frame of reference, and adopting right from the start a micro- 
behavioural perspective of analysis, this research ambitiously sets out to investigate and evaluate 
in practice, the role that systems of managerial performance measures and related incentive 
schemes are alleged to play in the motivation of middle-level managers who may operate under 
different environmental conditions. In essence, the prime objectives of this study are
1) to develop a theoretical framework within which the process of motivation through the 
company’s Performance Measurement Evaluation and Reward System (PMERS) can be 
adequately conceptualised and understood, and then, on the basis of this conceptual 
vehicle,
2) to formulate and test a number of hypotheses about
i) the impact of the PMERS on
-  the middle-level manager’s motivation
-  the middle-level manager’s performance
ii) the intervening effect of environmental uncertainty on the above relationship(s).
All in all, if we accept the importance of managerial motivation in today’s complex organisations, 
the contribution of the present research can effectively be seen, first, in the conceptualisation and 
empirical examination of the phenomenon of managerial motivation through the company’s 
formal PMERS and the identification of all the critical PMERS-related factors that are seen to 
directly influence the manager’s motivation and performance, and second, in the appreciation of 
the presumed impact of environmental uncertainty on the eventual motivational effectiveness of 
this PMERS.
It is essentially this understanding of the processes and dynamics involved in the influence and 
direction of managerial behaviour in the performance evaluation and reward context that is thereby 
hoped to allow the generation of some useful insights and recommendations particularly relevant 
to the design and implementation of a PMERS that is expected to fulfil its motivational potential 
in all the environments that is put to use.
2
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1.3 Organisation of the Thesis
Central to the present research endeavour is the realisation that control is fundamentally a 
behavioural issue, and that the ultimate criterion by which any system of control (such as the 
PMERS) should be assessed is behavioural (Emmanuel et al., 1990) ; that is, to what degree does 
such a system succeed in influencing managers to behave in desirable ways, from the 
organisation’s point of view. As such, a review of the - empirical and theoretical - literature in 
relation to the allegedly significant motivational function of performance measures and related 
incentive schemes is given in chapter 2. The chapter is specifically concerned with the theoretical 
and practical considerations associated with designing of a motivationally effective system of 
measures, standards of performance and related rewards, as well as with the functional or 
dysfunctional consequences that different design choices can instigate to the managers’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, the literature addressing the potential impact of the organisation’s environmental 
context in general, and of the environmental uncertainty variable in particular, on the design and 
subsequent motivational effectiveness of the PMERS is also reviewed in chapter 2.
In pursuit of an adequate conceptual and operational definition of motivation, the third chapter of 
this dissertation reviews the most influential motivational theories in the field of applied 
organisational psychology and, based on the Expectancy / Valence Theory, develops a theoretical 
framework that brings together the four main variables under investigation in this study - that is, 
i) the PMERS, ii) managerial motivation, iii) managerial performance, and iv) environmental 
uncertainty. On the conceptual premises of this theoretical model of managerial behaviour, a 
number of testable hypotheses concerning a) the alleged impact of the PMERS on the middle-level 
manager’s motivation and performance, and b) the intervening effect of perceived environmental 
uncertainty, directly on the PMERS, and indirectly on the middle-level manager’s work 
motivation, are derived.
In order to examine the aforementioned hypotheses, an empirical study was undertaken. Chapter 4 
presents the method and methodology that was employed in the present research in order to collect 
the necessary data and conduct the testing of these hypotheses. Apart from the specific anaphora 
to the study’s underlying philosophical and methodological orientation, a detailed account of the 
research design and of the particular research method utilised for the data-collection purposes of 
the study is given. Overall, this is a positive study of a multidisciplinary character, which brings
3
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together principles and concepts from the related, though distinct, areas of management control 
theory and applied organisational psychology. As a result, it has been based on the well- 
established body of existing empirical literature in these two fields, and on a previously developed 
and well-tested survey methodology to operationalise and measure its dependent, independent, and 
intervening variables. Methodologically speaking, these choices have not only rendered the 
present study with a relatively high level of internal and construct validity, but also have increased 
its comparability with a considerable body of relevant literature.
The steps taken, first, to identify, and then to achieve the full co-operation of a corporate partner 
who would be willing to participate in the given research project by providing access to its 
managerial staff for the data-collection requirements of the study are described in chapter 5. 
The main emphasis, however, of this chapter is on the detailed description and analysis of the 
company’s Performance-Measurement-Evaluation-Reward System (PMERS), although some 
peripheral background information on the organisation’s profile, business environment, corporate 
strategy, and organisational structure are provided, mainly to enable the reader to recreate the 
relevant context within which the findings of the study are later presented and interpreted. 
In effect, the participant company is a UK-based financial institution amongst the top 8 of the UK 
banking sector, with over 300 years of experience to the provision of financial services in the 
community, and more than 21,000 staff in its workforce.
Chapter 6, and the accompanying figures, tables and appendices, report the results of the statistical 
analysis (descriptive and inferential) conducted on the data obtained with the questionnaire survey. 
Descriptive statistics on the sample of the 225 managers surveyed, as well as a diagnostic analysis 
of the company’s Performance-Measurement-Evaluation-Reward-System on the basis of the 
managers’ responses to the questionnaire, are firstly presented. Subsequently, the hypotheses 
posed in the research are tested. The statistical testing of the designated hypotheses is carried out 
here in two different ways - i.e., through correlation coefficients that allow to assess relationships 
among variables, as well as through tests that are useful in detecting mean differences between 
sub-samples -, and at two levels - parametric and non-parametric. In sum, the obtained findings 
seem to indicate, first that at least some of the managers’ perceptions about given PMERS 
characteristics have a strong, positive, and significant relationship with managerial motivation, 
and second that perceived environmental uncertainty has a significant adverse effect on some of
4
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these PMERS-related perceptions that appear to impact on the manager’s motivation and 
subsequent performance.
Lastly, chapter 7 draws together the findings of the empirical study and the literature review, first 
in order to highlight the study’s contribution to the existing body of knowledge in the area of 
management control, and then to draw some implications both on a practical, as well as on a more 
theoretical and methodological level. Although no attempt is made to put forward a universally 
‘best’ system design that can apply and operate equally well to all organisations in all 
circumstances, a number of recommendations with regard to the contingent design characteristics 
of the company’s reward package and overall PMERS are made. The need to consider in the 
process of designing a PMERS that is intended for control and motivational purposes,
i) the environmental uncertainty variable and its effect on the PMERS perceived characteristics, 
and ii) the individual differences / preferences factor and its importance for the perceived value and 
overall relevance of the company’s reward package, is specifically underlined. Finally, chapter 7 
closes by indicating some future research avenues and extensions.
5
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Chapter Two: 
Theoretical Background & Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In this second chapter, an overview of the existing relevant literature in the area of 
measurement, evaluation and reward of managerial performance is provided, with 
special reference to the significant role that performance measures and related 
incentive schemes are alleged to play in the motivation of managers. The chapter 
basically consists of three sections of literature review. The first two sections, that 
follow right after this introductory part, discuss the importance of the human factor in 
contemporary organisations, and the critical role of human behaviour and motivation 
in the viability, growth, and development of these organisations. In the third section, 
an attempt is made to discuss both the theoretical and the practical considerations 
associated with the design of a motivationally effective system of measures, standards 
of performance and related rewards. The final sections of the chapter address the 
potential impact of the organisation’s environmental context in general, and of the 
environmental uncertainty variable in particular, on the design and subsequent 
motivational effectiveness of such systems.
6
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2.2 The significance of human behaviour for organisations
The concept o f organisation has always symbolised the efficient, effective and rational allocation 
of resources for task accomplishment. Formally defined, organisations can be usefully seen as 
social arrangements that are concerned with the efficient use of available scarce resources for 
achieving controlled performance in the pursuit of collective goals (Buchanan & Huczynski, 
1997). The decision regarding the optimal amalgam of financial, physical and human resources, 
that combine to determine the organisation’s overall performance and its consequent growth, 
development, and eventual survival, has long concerned both managers and scholars in the field. 
The present research endeavour is intended to focus on the human, behavioural aspects associated 
with such concerns, and particularly with the intricacies of managerial motivation and behaviour in 
complex, contemporary organisations. This study also concentrates on utilitarian organisations in 
Etzioni’s (1961) use of the term. With utilitarian organisations we refer here to commercial 
organisations which base their operation and survival on written and unwritten contracts with 
individuals that undertake certain commitments to advance organisational purposes in return for 
negotiated rewards (Emmanuel et al., 1990). In contrast to normative organisations where 
organisational members are morally committed to commonly accepted aims (moral involvement), 
and coercive organisations where a dominant group determines organisational action by imposing 
its will on other participants through power and coercion (alienative involvement), in utilitarian 
organisations there not necessarily any common interests or agreed goals, instrumental 
involvement on the part of the members is the norm, and therefore the examination of the various 
control and motivation schemes - that are basically employed to ensure that the critical activities 
for the organisation’s success will be carried out - presents added interest.
A definition of motivation is called for at this point. Within the previously delineated 
organisational context, the term can be adequately defined as the social process through which 
some members of the organisation try to influence other members, to work harder, work smarter, 
work more effectively (Buchanan & Huczynski, 1997). Organisations as social arrangements are 
dependent on being able to motivate people to join up in the first place, to stay with the 
organisation, and to perform at acceptable levels. Katz and Kahn (1966) rightly indicate that an 
organisation has the potential to remain viable only so long as its members choose to participate 
and engage in necessary role behaviours. They particularly make mention of three behavioural 
requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for an organisation to be effective, namely that
7
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1. people must be attracted to join and further remain in the organisation
2. people must perform the tasks for which they are hired and must do so in a dependable 
manner, and
3. people must go beyond this dependable role performance and engage in some form of 
creative, spontaneous and innovative behaviour in their work environment.
In a similar manner, March and Simon (1958) emphasise the fact that for any organisation to be 
effective, they must come to grips with the motivational questions of what stimulates human 
behaviour, particularly with regard to the individual’s decisions
1. to join and remain within an organisation, and
2. to put forth energy and effort at the rate and direction demanded by the organisation.
As Steers and Porter (1979) point out, given the ever-tightening constraints placed on 
organisations by an increasingly competitive, rapidly changing, unstable and, thus, uncertain 
environment, management has to look for new mechanisms that can increase its level of 
organisational effectiveness. As they characteristically put it (1979, p.4) “...organisational 
effectiveness becomes to some degree a question of management’s ability to motivate its 
employees to direct at least a reasonable effort toward the goals of the organisation”. In the same 
vein, Lawler (1994) agrees that the ability to influence the motivation of employees is a crucial 
factor in the effective management of any organisation. And although he does not provide an 
explicit definition of ‘organisational effectiveness’, he goes as far as to support that if we are ever 
to have effective organisations, we must understand how to encourage effective individual 
behaviour.
All in all, there seems to be not much ground for disagreement with Emmanuel et al. (1990), that 
organisations consist of people, and can act only insofar as people within them choose to act. The 
way individuals behave within organisations is universally regarded as critical, not only for the 
effectiveness but also for the very existence of these organisations. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that organisation managers and management theorists alike are very much interested in 
theories of human motivation, in the hope that they will discover means of encouraging employees 
- and indeed other managers - to work competently and generally act in a loyal, committed, 
flexible and innovative manner when appropriate.
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2.3 Control and Motivation at the Middle Management Level
A number of authors in the area of management control have repeatedly emphasised the criticality 
of the middle-level management for the overall effectiveness and eventual survival of 
contemporary organisations. Merchant (1989), for example, points out that within the 
decentralised setting, middle-level managers (also found with a variety of alternative labels such as 
company-, sector-, group-, division-, unit-, or area-managers) are given substantial authority to 
initiate, make, or approve many actions that bear significant consequences both to their business 
units and to the company as a whole. On the planning-strategic level, being in the right position to 
possess the most detailed and accurate predictive models, middle-level managers are expected to 
play a substantial, if not decisive, supporting role in operationalising the existing and shaping the 
future business strategy of their unit, assisting top management with strategic decisions such as 
where growth should occur and how it should be achieved. On the operational-administrative 
level, having been delegated the appropriate control and responsibility over local operating 
decisions, middle-level managers are required to use their judgement, intuition, innovation and 
skill in order to make prompt evaluations of the present circumstances, and timely decisions that 
will render their unit and - as a result - the entire company more responsive to the market’s 
ever-changing demands (Emmanuel et al., 1990) ; they are also expected to effectively mediate 
and manage the natural conflicts among the business functions in their unit ; and they are the 
central figures in making the decisions about the critical trade-offs between current and future 
performance in their unit (Merchant, 1989). In a similar tone, Otley (1994) asserts that in the 
current rapidly changing and highly unpredictable business environment, the vital responsibility 
for the mechanisms of organisation adaptation cannot be left anymore to a small team of senior 
managers who develop organisational strategies that will be enacted by others ; rather the 
‘management of change’ increasingly requires the active involvement of lower level managers, 
who, via their ‘empowerment’ in the context of the contemporary organisation, are delegated 
sufficient authority and responsibility for operational, day-to-day decisions and, at the same time, 
are encouraged to contribute to strategic thinking in a bottom-up approach that centres around the 
notions of flexibility, fast adaptation, and continuous learning. To the extent, therefore, that, as 
Donaldson (1984) cautions, “ ...companies succeed or fail in their economic functions at the 
divisional [middle] level” (p. 144), the form and nature of the control systems and processes that 
organisations put into action to make sure that these managers consistently act in the 
organisation’s best interest, as well as the critical success or failure of these systems to essentially
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promote this organisationally desirable (functional) behaviour, are issues that warrant special 
attention and deserve close examination.
Merchant (1989) insightfully argues that most often the control of middle-level managers is 
indirect, in the sense that it involves motivation. His argument is that the critical distance of the 
organisation’s top management from the realities of each individual area / product market within 
which each unit operates, as well as the consequent information asymmetry that inevitably exists 
as a result of this distance between top- and lower-level management, makes the direct monitoring 
and control of the actions of middle-level managers expensive and, occasionally, infeasible. 
In practice, all companies resort to some kind of system of performance measures, standards, and 
related organisational rewards to “ ...motivate their [middle-level] managers towards effective 
performance” (Emmanuel et al., 1990, p.81). Despite, however, the widespread recognition that 
the success or failure of these performance measurement evaluation and reward systems 
(henceforth PMERS, and otherwise referred to as ‘motivational contracts’, in Merchant’s (1989) 
terminology) to effectively motivate managers in the middle and lower level of the organisational 
hierarchy is strictly connected with the organisation’s overall success and survival, little empirical 
evidence exists about the form or efficacy of these systems in practice (Ehrenberg & Milkovich, 
1987). This study aims to fill this research void in part. Adopting a micro-behavioural 
perspective of analysis, that is, by basically concentrating on the individual middle-level manager 
rather than on an organisational or a societal level, it intents to posit and empirically test 
hypotheses about the presumed impact of the three main PMERS elements (i.e., performance 
measures, standards and related rewards) on middle-level managers’ motivation and performance.
2.4 Managerial motivation and the design of the Performance-Measurement- 
Evaluation-Reward System (PMERS)
2.4.1 The motivational potential of the PMERS
Management Control Systems (MCS), and Performance Measures and related Reward Schemes in 
particular, are alleged in the literature to have the potential to influence significantly the behaviour 
of managers who operate at the middle level of the organisation’s hierarchy (Gordon, 1964 ; 
Hopwood, 1974 ; Thomas, 1980 ; Merchant, 1989). Indeed, according to many management 
theorists (e.g. Lawler & Rhode, 1976 ; Anthony, 1988 ; Simons, 1995) the central function of any
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management control system - as well as one of the major aims of the Performance Measurement 
Evaluation Reward System (PMERS) - is motivation, that is, to induce individuals to behave in 
ways which contribute to the overall organisational effectiveness. Macintosh (1994) makes the 
point that management control systems have a lot more to do with the direction of managers’ and 
employees’ behaviour than they do with providing accurate, neutral, and factual accounting data to 
rational, utility-maximising decision makers. In the same theoretical vein, Merchant (1989, p. 10) 
adds that the major challenge of any MCS is to motivate middle-level managers, “to mobilize their 
hearts, minds, and energies...so as to ensure that they act consistently in the corporation’s best 
interest”.
On the whole, there seems to be a general consensus in the management accounting and control 
literature that, systems of measures, standards of managerial performance and related rewards 
constitute the main organisational device, the principal means that organisations employ in order 
to elicit and direct desirable human behaviour at the middle-management level. Particularly in the 
case of the modem, complex, commercial organisation, where top management is notably 
limited in its ability to directly monitor and control the middle-level managers’ actions - basically 
owing to its critical distance from the individual business units and the resulting information 
asymmetry -, control at the middle management level means to a large degree motivating by 
linking organisational rewards to the level of performance achieved, i.e., promising rewards for 
good results (Emmanuel et al., 1990).
2.4.2 The Principal-Agent Model (PAM) : Motivation issues and the role of contracts
Agency Theory in general and the Principal-Agent Model (PAM) in particular provide a useful 
theoretical framework within which the behavioural dimension of the PMERS and its contribution 
to the control and motivation of middle-level managers can be adequately understood. 
The particular model provides the conceptual ground for examining the pivotal role that 
management control processes (such as systems of performance measures and related incentive 
schemes) can play in mitigating underlying motivational problems and subsequent inefficiencies 
within firms made up of self-interested individuals (Baiman, 1990). All in all, the principal-agent 
model of the firm is fundamentally structured upon a description of individual behaviour within a 
multiperson organization (Baiman, 1982), and around the major premise that the answer to all 
kinds of management control issues lies on achieving a commonality of interests between
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principals and their agents. It thereby takes the organisation of the firm - including the allocation 
of tasks and ownership rights - as given and concentrates on the choice of ex-ante employment 
contracts between rational principals and agents, operating in a world of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry (Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994). As such, within the PAM’s research 
agenda special emphasis is typically given on understanding how agency problems arise and how 
they can be mitigated by contractual design, and more generally, by organisational design. 
In essence, the latter constitutes PAM’s primary subject matter (Baiman, 1990).
The principal-agent model asserts that an agency relationship is a contractual relationship that 
exists whenever one party (the principal, or the company’s top management in our case) engages 
another party (the agent, or the middle-level manager here) to perform some service on his behalf 
in an uncertain environment. These contractual relationships (otherwise stated as employment 
relationships) among the members of the firm are of vital importance within the PAM. More 
specifically speaking, within the context of this branch of the agency theory, the firm is viewed 
not as an unit but rather as “a nexus of contracts between self-interested individuals” (Merchant & 
Simons, 1986, p. 188), as an overlapping set of contractual relationships among the principal(s) 
who ‘hires’ the agent(s) for the purpose of delegating authority and responsibility, in order for the 
latter to perform some task (Baiman, 1982). Both the principal and the agent are assumed to be 
rational wealth seeking utility maximisers, motivated solely by their self-interest, whereas, 
in addition, the principal is assumed to be risk-neutral and the agent risk- and work-averse (i.e., 
to prefer leisure to work) (Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994). The rights and responsibilities of these 
members of the firm are specified in the firm’s mutually agreed upon employment contracts, 
which are considered to be optimal functions of the information supplied by the firm’s 
management control and information system (Baiman, 1982) and which, furthermore, have the 
role of bringing the conflicting objectives of the principal and agent into equilibrium (Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972 ; Kren & Liao, 1988). In this sense, the behaviour of the firm within the PAM is 
seen as “ ...the outcome of the process that brings into equilibrium via the agreed upon contracts 
the conflicting self-interests of the principals and agents” (Baiman, 1982, p. 156). Overall, 
the application of the PAM in the particular context of the present study, and the network of 
agency and contractual relationships between top management (principals) and middle-level 
management (agents) is as shown in Figure 2-1.
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Figure 2-1 : Agency and Contractual Relationships between Top- and Unit-Level Management
Efficiency problems within the theoretical framework of agency theory are assumed to arise when 
the cooperative behaviour - which is held to maximise the group’s welfare - is not consistent with 
each individual’s self-interest. Cooperative behaviour stems from the realisation by the firm’s 
individual members - both principals (top management) and agents (middle-level management) - 
that each individual’s welfare is contingent upon the success of the firm as a whole, and that such 
firm’s success is strictly connected with the level of cooperation among the members of the firm. 
Ideally, as Fama (1980, p.289) argues, “the firm can be viewed as a team of individuals whose 
members act from self-interest, but realise that their destinies depend, to some extent, on the 
survival of the team in its competition with other teams”. However, given that within the 
principal-agent model each individual’s actions are theorized to be endogenously derived, solely 
based on his own self-interest, when the individual can make himself better off by deviating from 
the agreed, cooperative behaviour (while at the same time everyone else is acting cooperatively), 
he must certainly be expected to do so. When the employment relationships (the contracts) are 
such that, while everyone else exercise the - mutually agreed upon employment - cooperative 
behaviour, one or more individuals can make themselves better off by deviating from this 
cooperative behaviour (i.e., when the cooperative behaviour is not consistent and self-enforcing 
(Baiman, 1990)), then the following chain-reaction of events is likely to occur :
1. One or more individuals - solely urged from their own self-interest - will deviate from 
the cooperative behaviour, then
 ► = Agency Relationships
= Contracts
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2. other individuals in the group will also find it in their best interest to deviate 
accordingly from the cooperative behaviour.
3. The end result, from this divergence between self-interested and cooperative behaviour, 
is that the whole group will suffer a loss of efficiency and, eventually, all individual 
members of the group will potentially be made worse off.
In effect, according to the PAM and Agency Theory three are the critical factors - the prime 
sources of agency problems in Baiman’s (1990) terminology - that prima facie account for 
inefficiency effects within organizations : the agent’s work-aversion, his risk-aversion (together 
reflecting the per se divergence of interests between the principal and the agent), and the presumed 
information asymmetry. These factors are essentially regarded as the main underlying reasons 
typically preventing the cooperative solution from being achieved. In Baiman’s (1990) words, 
“ ...it is information asymmetry and agent work-aversion and risk-aversion [i.e., the agent’s 
self-interested behaviour] that prevent the simultaneous achievement of the cooperative allocation 
of risk and the cooperative level of production” (p.341), and that effectively contribute to the 
incurrence of additional agency costs (both financial and non-financial) that could otherwise be 
avoided.1
Of primary importance to the solution of the above motivational problems is the role of 
contracts - both written and implicit - as the main expression of the contractual (employment) 
relationships within the PAM, which basically aim at bringing the conflicting interests of 
middle-level and top managers in alignment with the owners’ interests. More specifically, within
1 In the utilitarian organisations of interest, the agency relationship is clearly not cost-free (Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 
1994). The relevant agency costs are defined here as “the sum of the costs of the incentive compensation plan, the 
costs of monitoring the manager’s actions [unavoidable costs] and the remaining costs of actions taken by managers 
that diverge from the preferences of the owners [avoidable costs]” (Kaplan, 1982, p.568). More specifically, 
unavoidable (necessary) costs refer to the costs that are bound to be incurred in order to prevent the agent from 
diverging from his / her contractual obligations to the principal, and essentially include expenses such as the cost of 
the contract itself, the wages, the cost of constructing systems of performance measurement, evaluation and reward, 
in general, all the costs incurred for designing, administrating, reviewing and adjusting the formal control 
mechanisms that attempt to integrate the principal’s interests with the agent’s interests. Avoidable costs, on the other 
hand, refer to the costs that result from the perceived and covert divergence of the agent’s actions from his / her 
contractual obligations, and basically include the losses to the principal whose interests are hindered by the non­
neutral actions of the agent. Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994) remark on the assumption that avoidable and 
unavoidable costs appear to have a reciprocal relationship, in the sense that the existence of avoidable costs leads to 
the revision of unavoidable costs. Conversely, avoidable costs can be potentially minimised or even eliminated if the 
unavoidable costs result from properly and initially designed contracts, suitable performance measurement evaluation 
systems and appropriate incentive schemes. Hence the critical role of the PMERS in the avoidance o f additional 
agency costs within the PAM.
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the context of the principal-agent model, the term contract refers both to the explicit (written) 
agreement between the principal and the agent, and to the implicit bargaining process over 
outcomes, ways of measuring and evaluating performance, as well as the resulting pay-offs (Fama 
& Jehnsen, 1983). As such, contracts can be found to include : management control and 
information systems, performance measures and standards, compensation schemes, allocation of 
duties and allocation of ownership rights (Baiman, 1990). The contract is also assumed to involve 
some degree of delegation of decision-making authority from the principal (top management) 
to the agent (middle-level manager), who will be compensated for the service performed. 
The existence of the contract essentially presupposes that the agent possesses private, superior and, 
presumably, costly information concerning his immediate internal and external environment which 
the principal lacks (that is, the assumption of information asymmetry previously discussed, 
asymmetry that basically results from the critical distance of the principal from the agent’s task 
environment). As such, the main rationale behind the establishment of the contractual relationship 
between the principal and the agent, is that the agent, in possession of this information, is in a 
better position to make the best possible decision, provided that he is motivated to do so. 
By shifting therefore the locus of operating decision-making power further down the hierarchy 
(i.e., the element of decentralisation), and at the same time offering inducements to elicit the 
agent’s decision-making and action-taking contribution (that is, the element of incentive), the 
principal is assumed to seek to place the decision-making authority close to the realities of the 
market place, i.e., closer to where and when the information is generated, so th a t:
1. to reduce risk and uncertainty
2. to reduce inefficiency by preserving timeliness and encouraging entrepreneurship 
(Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994).
To sum up, the framework proposed by Agency Theory and the PAM provides the ground “ ...for 
analysing the interaction of self-interested individuals within an economic context; understanding 
the determinants and causes for the loss of efficiency created by the divergence between 
cooperative and self-interested behaviour (i.e., the loss from agency problems); and analysing and 
understanding the implications of different control mechanisms for mitigating the efficiency loss 
caused by the agency problems” (Baiman, 1990, p.342). Within the particular framework of 
analysis, the concept of contract holds a prominent position. In essence, in the context of the 
principal-agent model, the contracting relationships - in particular, the design of optimum
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contractual arrangements - are seen as fundamental in bringing the conflicting interests and 
objectives of the principal and the agent into equilibrium, and control thereby becomes primarily 
a matter of ensuring that contracts are carried out, and of renegotiating their (the contracts’) 
content whenever necessary (Emmanuel et al., 1990).
Nevertheless, one has to note that both the principal-agent paradigm and the closely related theory 
of contracts within the particular framework are presented with a lack of conceptual depth and 
theoretical clarity as regards human behaviour and the nature of man. To start with, managers’ 
motivational structures are clearly not as simple and monolithic as to allow an alignment of 
interests as readily and as easily as the PAM suggests. As Hopwood (1974) insightfully points out, 
“ .. .the final impact of the attempts to influence managerial behaviour.. .must always be seen as an 
uncertain outcome of a dynamic interplay between the administrative, social, and personal 
pressures which are simultaneously competing for influence and control” (pp. 22-23). Generally, 
any approach that emphasise elements of the formal administrative structure of the enterprise at 
the expense of the prevailing individual characteristics and the patterns of social interaction within 
the organisation, can be realistically criticised to provide a narrow and parochial analysis of the 
complex process that gives rises to human behaviour in the organisational setting. In addition,
(i) the exclusive - almost obsessive - emphasis of the PAM and of the broader socio­
economics model on external positive interventions and reinforcements (most usually in 
the form of monetary incentives) for extrinsic work motivation (e.g., Becker, 1976 ; 
Stigler & Becker, 1977 ; Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984 ; Akerlor & Yellen, 1986 ; Hart & 
Holmstrom, 1987 ; Stiglitz, 1987 ; Coleman, 1990 ; Frey, 1992, 1997),
(ii) their proposed - rather limited - view of people as
-  selfish utility maximisers (the agent is assumed to act in such a way that maximises 
his own personal utility, subject to constraints primarily imposed by income and 
time) (Becker, 1993)
-  opportunists (the agent is expected to take active efforts to minimise work, if that is 
believed to lead to the maximisation of his / her utility) (Williamson, 1975)
-  egoistic wealth maximisers (the agent is taken to be mainly - if  not wholly - interested 
in material values only) (Frey, 1997),
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(iii) their inattention to other ‘inner feelings’ and ‘intrinsic motivators’ that may trigger, direct 
and sustain human behaviour, either independently or together with the extrinsic incentives 
available, as well as
(iv) their inability to recognize the ‘individual differences’ factor, i.e., the fact that different 
people have different needs, reward preferences and personal circumstances at any given 
point in time, and are therefore likely to desire, value, and be motivated by different 
(extrinsic and / or intrinsic) aspects of their job,
render these models essentially inadequate to fully conceptualise and investigate the phenomenon 
of work motivation through the company’s management control systems.
An alternative, much wider framework of analysis that addresses more comprehensively the above 
management control and motivation issues is developed and presented in chapter 3.
2.4.3 Motivational Contracts for Middle-Level Managers
Perhaps inspired by agency theory, Merchant (1989) uses the term ‘motivational contract’ to refer 
to the motivational function of the PMERS within the organisational setting, and considers that 
any motivational contract consists of three necessary - though not individually sufficient - 
elements :
i) a definition of one or more measures o f performance that identify the areas / dimensions 
that are essential for the organisation’s success, and assess the individual’s performance 
in each of these areas,
ii) a description of the standards o f performance that define the organisationally desirable 
level of performance in all these essential areas, and distinguish between deficient, 
acceptable, and superlative individual performance, and
iii) an explication of the process through which the organisational rewards (and penalties) 
are administered to the individual on the basis of his / her accomplishment of the 
predetermined performance targets on the identified performance measures, so as to 
urge him / her towards such accomplishment.
In general, the PMERS - typically defined as a formal control mechanism that seeks to integrate 
the overall company’s objectives and the interests of the company’s middle- and lower-level
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managers (Emmanuel & Mehafdi, 1994) - has traditionally been presumed to affect managers’ 
motivation and performance in the following manner (Gordon, 1964 ; Thomas, 1980) :
1. Middle-level managers desire certain rewards that top management can provide them 
with (e.g., esteem, increased perquisites, salaries, bonuses, promotions, etc.).
2. Top management establishes a number of performance measures that are expected to 
reflect accurately the decision making capabilities of the middle-level manager, and to 
detect possible inefficiencies on his / her part.
3. Middle-level managers are led to understand - either implicitly or explicitly - that the 
receipt of these desirable rewards will be positively correlated with their performance 
and / or the performance of their divisions, as these are measured by the performance 
measures established. It is essentially this linking of the achievement of measured, 
desirable results with incentives for managers that aims to motivate middle-level 
managers to attain the performance targets that have been set, i.e., to ensure not only that 
they will be induced to exert greater effort but also that their effort will be expended in 
the desirable - from the organisation’s viewpoint - direction.
4. Middle-level managers are then left to maximise their self-interest by attaining or 
surpassing the performance standards set by top management, improving simultaneously 
the performance of their divisions and, eventually, the performance of the overall 
company.
Hopwood’s (1973 ; 1974) classic representation of the contribution of the PMERS to the motivation 
of managers illustrates in more detail the mechanics through which a system of properly designed 
performance measures, carefully set performance standards and desirable rewards can influence 
managerial behaviour.
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A : Aspects of behaviour which are necessary for achieving wider organisational purposes. 
B : Aspects of behaviour which managers are likely to concentrate on, in fulfillment of 
their personal goals.
C : Behaviour formally measured by management control systems.
Source : Hopwood, A.G. (1973), “An Accounting System and Managerial Behaviour”, Saxon House Ltd.
I Figure 2-2 : The Measurement-Reward Process
Essentially, Hopwood (1973) adopts a rational, goal-directed, self-interested, utility-maximising 
model of man and thereby maintains that in the absence of any organisational system for relating 
individual efforts to organisational rewards, the aspects of behaviour that individual managers are 
likely to concentrate on in fulfilment of their personal goals (B) do not, generally, correspond with 
those necessary for achieving the organisation’s goals (A). This axiomatic conflict of interests 
and goals between the self-interested middle-level manager and the organisation (Porter et al., 
1975) can nevertheless be bridged through the provision of additional incentives by the 
organisation to the middle-level managers, essentially through the written and unwritten promise 
of rewards for expected results. The ‘goal (in)congruence’ problem (Drury, 1996) can allegedly be 
resolved by the organisation if accurate measures / drivers of desirable managerial performance 
(C) - abstracted from the top management’s conceptions of the overall organisational purposes - 
are constructed, and further linked to the receipt of desirable rewards. The assumption is that, to 
the extent that the organisational rewards offered are attractive enough to offset other incentives
19
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty LITERATURE REVIEW
middle-level managers have to act contrary to the organisation’s best interest, and the related 
performance measures constructed can reflect perfectly what is required to achieve the 
organisation’s wider objectives, the middle-level manager’s behaviour (B) will be guided 
(motivated) by his / her desire to optimise his / her performance with respect to those performance 
criteria (C) so as to obtain the rewards that he / she needs and wants, thereby improving the 
performance of his / her unit (A) and, eventually, that of the overall company (Hopwood, 1974).
In effect, this classical view of the contribution of the PMERS to the influence of managerial 
behaviour centres around the concept of goal congruence. Goal congruence, in any process or 
system (such as the PMERS), refers to the confidence that the actions the system leads people to 
take in accordance with their perceived self-interest, are also in the best interest of the organisation 
(Anthony & Govindarajan, 1998). From this perspective, the central behavioural function - as 
well as the main design consideration - of the PMERS is
• to identify a comprehensive set of organisational goals that can adequately capture and 
reflect organisational success
• to make sure that the goals of the individual members of the organisation are, as far as 
feasible, consistent (or congruent) with the goals of the organisation, i.e., to ensure that 
individuals within the organisation (such as middle-level managers) are induced to act in 
such a way so that when they seek their own personal goals, they help to attain, at the 
same time, the organisation’s goals, as these are prescribed by the PMERS itself.
Within the concept of goal congruence, the emphasis is basically on a set of mutually beneficial 
and, therefore, agreed goals - agreed by and beneficial to both the organisation and the individual 
middle-level manager. These agreed targets (standards of desirable performance) - supposedly 
able to embody all the dimensions of managerial behaviour that are necessary for the 
accomplishment of the organisation’s overall objectives -, together with organisation rewards 
(incentives) that are presumably highly desirable to middle-level managers, can be seen as the 
primary solution to the problems of
-  aligning the individual manager’s self interest with the organisational, corporate objectives,
-  persuading managers to exert higher levels of effort towards the accomplishment of these 
objectives,
-  improving thereby managerial, unit, and organisational performance.
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2.4.4 Breaking down the ideal PMERS-design ; The role and nature of optimal motivational 
contracts
Otley (1987a) argues that “the design of an effective management control system requires three 
main issues to be resolved. First, what are the dimensions o f ‘good’performance and how are they 
to be measured ? Secondly, what are appropriate standards fo r  performance and how are they to 
be established ? Thirdly, how are rewards (or penalties) to be linked to results ?” It is essentially 
the design choices made in relation to these three primary elements (i.e., measures, standards, and 
rewards) which determine whether or not the PMERS’s features fit well with each other and with 
the given environmental, technological, organisational, strategic, and cultural context of the 
company, and come eventually to decide the overall effectiveness of the system to affect positively 
managerial motivation and performance within the organisation.
In practice, not all systems of performance measures and related rewards appear to be equally 
effective in their motivational function. Merchant (1989) contends that some of them fail as a 
result of inherent weaknesses in their design ; others may not work well within the given 
environmental conditions that the organisation has to operate. It is therefore of some significance 
whether the PMERS is appropriately designed and implemented to fulfil its potential contribution 
to managerial motivation and control to the utmost. With the emphasis on the motivational role of 
the system, the following sections address the main PMERS-design issues, exploring the relevant 
theory and empirical research on each of the three primary elements (performance measures, 
standards, and rewards) of the PMERS.
2.4.4.1 Performance Measures
Performance measures are an indispensable part of the PMERS in that they provide an operational 
definition, a basis for the measurement of the manager’s actual performance, that can be compared 
further in the process with what is desired, expected or hoped for by the organisation. Merchant’s 
insightful analysis on ideal motivational contracts (1989) specifies two essential qualities for 
performance measures that are expected to serve their motivational role to the utmost:
a) they must be controllable, and
b) they must be accurate.
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The prescription that performance measures should reflect only what the managers can control is 
widespread in the management control literature. As Emmanuel et al. (1990) point out, the logic 
behind the responsibility-controllability management axiom is disarmingly simple : a manager 
should be held responsible for only the activities which he / she alone can control. To the extent 
possible, the distorting effects of non-controllable, exogenous factors, such as changes in material 
costs and economic conditions, or shocks of random events need to be isolated and filtered out, so 
that the measures are solely responsive to the individual manager’s actions (Magee, 1986). 
In addition to the element of controllability, optimally designed performance measures for 
motivational purposes ought to be accurate, that is, objective and complete (Lawler, 1976 ; 
Lawler & Rhode, 1976). In order to have any discernible positive impact on managers’ 
motivation, measures should be regarded by the managers themselves not only as independently 
verifiable and free of any personal bias (the element of objectivity), but also as capable of 
capturing and reflecting all relevant actions and behaviours (the element of completeness).
The underlying logic behind all the above prescriptions for accuracy and controllability lies in the 
understanding that for any performance measure to have motivational properties, it must be 
accepted by those it is supposed to motivate as a fair and relevant indicator of their performance. 
When the selected performance indicators lack either accuracy (i.e., they are considered 
inappropriate to faithfully capture the whole range of the manager’s real contribution) 
or controllability (that is, they are deemed to hold the manager accountable for the effects 
of factors that he / she cannot control), they are likely to be regarded by the manager as 
uninformative of the effectiveness of the actions that he / she has taken, and the performance 
evaluations made on the basis of these indicators as poor and, therefore, unfair. In that sense, 
companies that implement such measures in order to evaluate and further reward the performance 
of their managers are bound to bear the alternate costs associated with the managers’ frustration, 
consequent loss of motivation, dysfunctional behaviour, and, probably eventually, the 
non-retention of their managerial force (Vancil, 1979 ; Merchant, 1989).
Porter et al. (1975) emphasise the fact that an individual’s reaction to being evaluated and 
rewarded on the basis of a particular measure is very much determined by how much he feels that 
he can affect the measure by his behaviour, i.e., how much control he feels he has over the 
measure. Essentially the whole issue here about the perceived controllability of measures centres
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around the - much documented in the literature of management control - principle of reciprocity 
between responsibility and controllability, and its practical implications. The basic idea behind 
this principle is, in Homgren’s words, that “there should be no responsibility without control” 
(1982, p. 147). In practical terms, the latter means that when surrogate measures are used for the 
evaluation of a middle-level manager’s performance, only the factors that the manager has under 
his complete day-to-day control and influence should be considered. If the purpose is to evaluate 
the divisional manager, then only those variables directly controllable by the manager should be 
included in the performance measure. To the extent that other items beyond the manager’s control 
are incorporated in the measurement process, the measures are destined to be deemed 
non-controllable by the manager, and therefore of little - if  any - positive motivational use. In such 
circumstances, dysfunctional behaviour on the part of divisional management - who may engage in 
a range of undesirable activities classified in the literature as ‘smoothing’ (that is, the altering of 
the timing and flow of data without changing the underlying transactions being reported), 
‘biasing’ (i.e., transmitting only data that are perceived to be favourable), ‘focusing’, ‘gaming’, 
‘filtering’, ‘falsifying’, etc. (Bimberg et al., 1983 ; Simons, 1995) in order to manipulate actual 
performance or reports of actual performance, - can only be seen as a rational reaction to the 
imperfect performance measures used (Emmanuel & Otley, 1985). There is an abundance of 
examples of managers embarking on non-neutral activities in order to ‘beat’ a perceived unfair 
control mechanism, particularly when significantly valued rewards are attached to this control 
mechanism (see, for instance, Argyris, 1952, 1964, 1971a, 1990 ; Ridgway, 1956 ; Berliner, 1961 ; 
Dearden, 1962, 1969 ; Mumford & Banks, 1967 ; Hofstede, 1968 ; Lowe & Shaw, 1968 ; Schiff & 
Lewin, 1968 ; Likert & Seashore, 1968 ; Pettigrew, 1970 ; Hopwood, 1972, 1973 ; Merchant, 
1985, 1990 ; Umapathy, 1987 ; Simons, 1989 ; Keller, 1989 ; Bruns & Merchant, 1990 ; 
Holloway, 1990 ; Simons & Weston, 1990 ; Yin, 1992). It is on these behavioural grounds that a 
number of management control theorists argue strongly for the use of separate measures that make 
clear the distinction between the individual performance of the manager and the economic 
performance of his / her unit (e.g., Solomons, 1965 ; Samuels, 1970 ; Thomas, 1971, 1980 ; Amey 
& Egginton, 1973 ; Shillinglaw, 1977 ; Homgren, 1982 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990 ; Drury, 1996). 
It has nevertheless to be noted that implementing the responsibility / controllability principle in 
practice is not a simple task. In the real, complex and uncertain world, where there are only a few 
factors that are under the absolute and exclusive influence of a single person, the task of 
determining which elements are truly controllable by a given manager and which are not becomes
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insurmountable (Emmanuel & Otley, 1985). Indeed, as Kaplan (1982) argues, the more the time 
horizon shortens, the more difficult it becomes to identify items that can be attributed solely to one 
individual. Under these circumstances, it is fair to say that, deciding on what to include and what 
to exclude in the performance measurement and evaluation process becomes more a matter of 
personal opinion about how far does the manager’s responsibility extends.
To sum up, for motivation to be present, the necessary condition is that the individual feels that his 
behaviour has the potential to influence the measure, and through that, his reward level. In the 
situation where the performance measure(s) is not seen as influenceable, or is seen as highly 
affected by factors beyond the individual’s control, there is little chance of the individual seeing a 
direct connection between his behaviour (what he does), his evaluated performance (what the 
control system thinks he does), and his rewards (what he gets for what he does), and, as a result, it 
is highly improbable that there will be any positive impact on his motivation by the given 
combination of measure-reward (motivation loss). Furthermore, when measures which are felt to 
be uncontrollable are used, people are likely to become frustrated and resentful to the extent that 
they are willing to tamper with the measures so that they can produce invalid data which will help 
them achieve their personal goals (dysfunctional behaviour).
Similar dysfunctional behavioural consequences may also occur when measures are perceived as 
too subjective. An individual maybe induced to distort - or, alternatively, ignore - the performance 
measurement system, if he believes that the process through which his performance is measured 
and evaluated is ambiguous or negatively biased. Subjective (so-called ‘soft’) measures that rely 
largely on the personal judgement of the superior can be effective motivators under certain 
conditions, particularly when there is i) a high level of trust between the superior and the 
subordinate, and, ii) confidence on the part of the subordinate that the superior is capable of 
making an accurate and informed judgement about his (the subordinate’s) actions. However, in 
most cases, the lack of measurement verifiability and objectivity results in the measures being seen 
by the individual as invalid indicators of accomplishment, and most usually breeds dissatisfaction 
and dysfunctional behaviour (Merchant, 1989 ; Simons, 1995).
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From a motivational perspective, then, it seems justified to support that the use of
i) “hard”, objective in nature, and
ii) controllable measures in the performance measurement and evaluation process
reduces the risks and the pertinent costs associated with perceived unfairness and the resulting 
frustration, and enhances the measurement system’s motivational scope.
Simons (1995) also advocates the use of complete measures of performance for motivational 
purposes, that is, measures that are inclusive of all the behaviours and results which need to be 
performed and achieved. If we agree with Porter et al. (1975) that the work behaviour of any 
individual is two-dimensional, in that it can be looked at both in terms of the activities the person 
performs, and in terms of the actual results that these activities produce, then we would expect 
from any appraisal system that intends to effectively fulfil its control and motivational function to 
ideally employ performance measures that disaggregate and evaluate the work effectiveness of the 
individual in both these dimensions. To the extent that the measures employed are incomplete, 
i.e., fail to take account of both the individual’s results and his activities, the chances that they will 
properly direct work behaviour are rather slim. Exclusively focusing on either activities or results 
is bound to produce undesirable behavioural consequences because it causes individuals to 
emphasise that which is measured to the exclusion of that which is not measured (Porter et al., 
1975). A performance measurement and evaluation system that measures only results (what the 
individual has accomplished in his work) can be often found to motivate employees to behave in 
ways which assure good scores on the results measures, but which are dysfunctional from the point 
of view of organisational effectiveness, in the sense that certain activities are likely to be left 
undone (displaced motivation). Similarly, a system which focuses on only the activities the person 
engages in (how the individual has gone about his work) can just as well fail on a number of 
counts, as it tends to motivate the engagement in specific activities, but not the accomplishment of 
goals through these activities. Nevertheless, one should point out the practical difficulties 
involved in capturing accurately and completely managerial performance with any type of 
performance measures, particularly given the high level of uncertainty and dynamism in the 
current business environment and the increasingly important role of interdependencies within 
contemporary organisations. With the trend towards much flatter organisational structures, within 
which teams rather than individuals are expected to make the right decisions and take the 
necessary actions, the impact of task interdependencies on performance measures is today even
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more stronger, and the degree of difficulty in discerning, measuring, and evaluating the manager’s 
individual performance correspondingly much higher. It is essentially such concerns about the 
inherent incompleteness and inaccuracy of any single performance measure - i.e., concerns about 
any measure’s (in)ability to capture accurately the full range of dimensions of (both short- and 
long-term) managerial performance (see, for example, Drucker, 1964 ; Hopwood, 1974 ; 
Mintzberg, 1975 ; Sillinglaw, 1977 ; Vancil, 1979 ; Parker, 1979 ; Hirst, 1981 ; Merchant, 1989 ; 
Drury, 1996) -, that have led management control theorists and practitioners alike to advocate the 
extension of the managerial performance evaluation process both in terms of the dimensions 
measured and the time periods covered (Emmanuel et al., 1990). They uniformly recognise the 
multidimensionality and complexity of managerial performance, and they warn that the non­
inclusion of any pivotal (quantitative or qualitative) performance dimensions in the measurement 
and evaluation process entails significant motivation repercussions for middle-level management, 
in that such omissions may obscure and underestimate the importance of these dimensions in the 
eyes of the middle-level managers. Simply put, they draw attention to the problem of displaced 
motivation, i.e., to fact that, to the extent that the measures used reflect only some of the critical 
factors of managerial accomplishment, there is the danger that the managers will concentrate on 
only the variables measured to the exclusion of the other important factors that determine the 
long-term viability and success of a business unit and of the company as a whole.
On these premises, a large body of literature in the area of management control has been devoted 
to identifying possible ways of getting around these inherent measurement weaknesses so that to 
enhance the contribution of performance measures to the control and motivation of middle 
managers. One avenue that has been explored (e.g., American Accounting Association, 1971 ; 
Parker, 1979 ; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987 ; Singleton & Green, 1993 ; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 
1993, 1996) refers to the complementation of the performance measurement system with a variety 
of financial and non-financial, quantitative and qualitative indicators that can reflect - to the extent 
possible - the full range of key variables that contribute to the company’s short- and long-run 
objectives, so as to improve the perceived and actual completeness and accuracy of the PMERS, 
and thereby its overall effectiveness as a motivational device. Kaplan’s and Norton’s (1992, 1993) 
balanced scorecard - a comprehensive framework for translating the organisation’s strategic 
objectives into a coherent set of performance measures that aims at providing managers with a fast
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but all-embracing view o f  the business from four distinct perspectives (financial, customer, 
internal and innovation, as depicted in Figure 2-3) - certainly represents a step in this direction.
H ov/d'jwc look to shareholders?
httrw do 
custom fr-fs 
se-e utT
GM li Measures
What 
roust we 
e*ed at?
Coals Measure? Goals
Goa it Measures
Can w e  continue to improve and 
create value?
Source : Kaplan, R.S. - Norton, D.P. (1992), “The Balanced Scorecard-Measures that Drive 
Performance”, Harvard Business Review.
Figure 2-3 : The Balanced Scorecard
Another stream of management control literature advocates the integration o f non-quantitative 
monitoring and personnel devices into the PMERS, with the intention o f complementing the 
performance measurement process already in place. In this theoretical vein, effective two-way- 
communication performance appraisal interviews (Kikoski, 1999) and frequent face-to-face 
performance evaluation meetings (Emmanuel et al., 1990) between the middle-level manager 
and his / her superior are seen as essential management tools that can expand the scope o f the 
performance measurement system and add to its completeness and equity.
All in all, the preceding discussion typifies a number o f ideal qualities o f optimally designed 
performance measures for motivational purposes. Figure 2-4, drawing from Sim ons’ 
diagrammatic representation o f characteristics o f diagnostic control measures (1995, p.77),
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summarises these ideal qualities, but primarily emphasises the resulting negative behavioural 
consequences that occur when - as often in practice - performance measures lack one or more of 
these ideal attributes.
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dysfunctional behaviour
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/
^  Ignore
Nature of Measure ?
Subjectivex.
Motivating only if trust 
is high - otherwise the 
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dissatisfaction, and 
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behaviour
1 Figure 2-4 : deal Qualities and Behavioural Consequences of Performance Measures
Empirically speaking, most of the available research evidence in the area of measurement,I
j evaluation and reward of managerial performance - coming either from the academic or the
j professional field - tends to focus almost exclusively on executive managers operating at the top
level of the organisational hierarchy, and therefore does not apply directly to the issue of
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middle-level manager motivation. As Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987) note, . .surprisingly little 
evidence exists on the extent to which compensation policies [for middle-level managers] vary 
across firms and more importantly, on the effects of pursuing alternative compensation strategies” 
(p.l). In any case, the type of data existing are not readily available for the study of the form or 
effectiveness of the systems used to motivate middle-level managers, mainly because what is 
known about the motivating effects of top management reward-for-results contracts are not 
generalisable to middle-management levels. Both the underlying philosophy and the consequent 
design choices, as well as the ultimate effects of these motivational devices on managerial 
behaviour are quite different for the two organisational levels (Merchant, 1989), most probably 
reflecting the fundamental differences in their respective job roles and status within the 
organisation (Uyterhoeven, 1972).
Nevertheless, there is some evidence indicating that both the perceived technical imperfections of 
the performance measures employed, as well as the way in which these measures are utilised in 
practice within the PMERS, have various negative psychological consequences on managers’ 
individual and social behaviour. Early research into the behavioural effects of management 
control systems - as well as the subsequent body of literature that emerged as an extension of these 
early research endeavours - provide (mainly case) evidence of managers engaging in dysfunctional 
behaviour as a response to the way their performance was evaluated and rewarded through the 
company’s PMERS (Briers & Hirst, 1990). Argyris (1952) in his seminal study on the different 
alternative performance evaluation styles and their behavioural effects first reported that the 
excessive emphasis on and the inflexible and uncompromising use of incomplete and inaccurate 
performance indicators led to a number of dysfunctional consequences for the organisation, 
including increased tension, frustration, resentment, suspicion, fear, mistrust, and potentially 
deterioration in the managers’ long-run performance. More specifically, he found that where too 
much pressure was exerted on achieving bottom-line (most usually accounting, profit-oriented) 
results, managers tended to respond in a number of undesirable ways : either they would attempt to 
shift the blame for their problems to their peers and superiors causing a deterioration in 
interpersonal relationships ; or they would experience increased tension (as a manifestation of 
internalising the pressure) and, eventually, frustration, which in the long term tended to reduce 
managerial effectiveness due to the tendency of frustrated managers to, for example, forget things, 
become apathetic and indifferent, make slow decisions, or even withdraw socially. In a study
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that was carried out in a European context to investigate the conditions under which budget 
control mechanisms could be used to promote positive attitudes in managing task performance, 
Hofstede (1968) concluded that too much stress on earnings measures and financial results led to a 
feeling by the managers involved that the performance appraisal process was unjust. The latter 
can be seen as a natural reaction on the part of the managers to a perceived as unavoidably 
incomplete and uncontrollable performance evaluation system. On the other hand, too little 
emphasis on the budget control system was found to result in the system being of little relevance 
and motivational value. At the end, Hofstede suggested - in much the same spirit as Emmanuel et 
al. (1990) - that the appropriate balance may be obtained by good upwards communication from 
one’s subordinates, and by using the accounting performance measures in a supportive and flexible 
manner, that will allow the subordinates adequate scope for initiative and creativity. Similar 
conclusions were reached by Hopwood (1972, 1973, 1976) in his study on the effects of different 
performance evaluation styles on managerial behaviour. Hopwood contended that accounting 
performance measures may never be technically adequate because they are an incomplete 
reflection of managerial performance ; they can only approximately represent an organisation’s 
economic cost function ; they reflect aspects of performance which are not necessarily controllable 
; and they myopically emphasise only the short-term dimension of the manager’s performance. 
Hence, he argued that persistence on such imperfect performance measures will have only adverse 
behavioural consequences. The empirical evidence of Hopwood’s (1972, 1973) studies were 
consistent with his propositions, indicating that a rigid style of evaluation emphasising the 
absolute necessity of meeting short-term financial results was associated with feelings of injustice 
about the performance evaluation process on the part of the manager, as well as with widespread 
worry and tension on the job, poor relations with superiors and colleagues, manipulation in data 
reporting, and undesirable decision making behaviour from the company’s point of view ; 
a non-accounting style of performance evaluation within which accounting data played a relatively 
unimportant part consistently failed to encourage an active involvement with the financial aspects 
of the organisation. It was only the profit-conscious evaluation style, under which the accounting 
information were used with some care and in a rather flexible manner, with more emphasis put on 
the attainment of long-term, company-wide objectives, that succeeded in drawing the managers’ 
attention to critical financial parameters, avoiding at the same time the various undesirable 
consequences that are associated with rigid styles of performance evaluation. In agreement with 
the above findings, Kenis (1979), in a study examining inter alia the motivational effect of two
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different supervisory styles, discovered that a flexible evaluation style (with a moderate emphasis 
on accounting, profit-oriented performance indicators) was positively related to managerial 
motivation and performance ; in contrast, a more punitive style (with a higher stress on accounting 
data), although positively related to managers’ motivation, it was also positively related to job 
tension and negatively related to all measures of managerial performance employed in the study. 
Similarly, Lowe and Shaw (1968), Schiff and Lewin (1968), and Onsi (1973) provided case 
evidence to support the view that the excessive emphasis on budget (accounting-oriented) results 
are likely to lead to dysfunctional behaviour on the part of the managers involved, in the form of 
misrepresenting data about their planned performance (i.e., building slack into performance 
targets) or in the form of transmitting misleading data about their actual performance (invalid data 
reporting). In effect, only Otley’s (1978) replication and extension of Hopwood’s (1972, 1973) 
work produced results contrary to the ones already reported, showing that rigid performance 
evaluation, conducted largely on the basis of financial performance indices, appeared to be an 
effective management style, which, although it led to an asymmetric preoccupation with the short 
term at the expense of the long term, it had little impact on job-related tension or on information 
manipulation. These findings, however, may need to be seen as an artefact of the different setting 
in which the Otley (1978) study had been conducted. Indeed, this study has since stimulated a 
large body of subsequent research that attempted to find an explanation for these apparently 
conflicting results, particularly examining the environment within which the organisation, the unit, 
and the middle-level manager are operating as a potential moderator of the effects of evaluation 
style on managerial motivation and performance (see subsequent section 2.4.5 for a review of this 
literature). Seen as a whole, however, the above reported findings are quite indicative both of the 
undesirable behavioural side effects that are likely to follow the inflexible use of inherently 
incomplete and inaccurate measures in the performance evaluation situation, and of the potential 
avenues of getting around these measurement weaknesses in the motivation and control context.
2.4.4.2 Performance Standards
The role that standards of performance are said to play within motivational contracts is vital. 
Typically, the standard-setting process (alternatively referred to as goal- or target-setting process) 
is an integral part of the overall performance-measurement-evaluation-reward system, through 
which reference points (benchmarks of expected performance) are provided against which the
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manager’s actual performance is evaluated further in the process. Merchant (1989) prescribes two 
all-important attributes of performance standards for motivational purposes :
a) they must be challenging, and
b) they must be preset.
Drury (1996) rightly emphasises that “if we accept that the setting of targets can increase 
[managerial] motivation, we must then consider at what level of difficulty the targets should be 
set” (p.628). The specifications for establishing performance standards that provide managers 
with the right amount of challenge derive basically from the organisational behaviour research. 
Locke (1968), in a study that is widely regarded as a milestone in the investigation of human goal- 
directed behaviour, stresses the importance of goals as major determinants of work motivation and 
performance. His Goal-Setting theory basically holds that
i) specific goals result in greater effort (i.e., higher level of motivation) than do more general 
goals,
ii) moderately difficult goals (when accepted) result in greater effort than do easier goals, and
iii) feedback results in higher effort than does the lack of feedback 
(Locke, 1968 ; Locke & Latham, 1990).
A substantial body of affiliated literature emphasises the criticality of deciding on the level of 
difficulty of predetermined standards by demonstrating the profound impact that perceived goal 
difficulty has on employees’ motivation. The general conclusion of these studies is that optimum 
motivation occurs when targets are perceived to be moderately difficult ; when goals are deemed 
to be either too easy or too difficult, motivation tends to reduce (Stedry, 1960 ; Stedry & Kay, 
1966 ; Hofstede, 1968 ; Lawler, 1973 ; Carroll & Tosi, 1973 ; Hopwood, 1974), and the likelihood 
of dysfunctional behaviour increases (Porter et al., 1975).
Atkinson’s seminal work on achievement motivation (1964) clearly indicates that challenging, 
attainable standards are best suited for motivational purposes. Apparently, people who see 
themselves as having about a 50:50 chance of successfully attaining moderately difficult targets, 
tend to exhibit a stronger desire (motivation) to perform well in their tasks and achieve the 
relevant goals set, presumably because this task accomplishment becomes associated with feelings 
of achievement and competence (Porter et al., 1975). As long as an individual perceives that there
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exists a reasonable probability of achieving a demanding target then, this target is expected to 
motivate him / her ; if, however, either of these two necessary conditions is not met, i.e.
i) either the target itself is not challenging enough, or
ii) the probability of attaining the target is regarded low, 
the motivational impact of the target will fall dramatically.
In essence, the effect of goal difficulty on managerial motivation is appropriately reflected in the 
inverted U-shape curve of Figure 2-5 (adapted from Simons (1995)).
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Figure 2-5 : Goal Difficulty and Motivation
Goals which are too easy (less than challenging) to obtain can have a negative effect on motivation 
and can lead to underperformance, simply because when individuals are faced with goals that are 
too easy, they are content to achieve these low goals. People can reach such targets with less than 
maximum effort, or, alternatively, they can slack off after they reach the target (Merchant, 1989) - 
in any case, they will not strive to their potential (motivation loss). On the other hand, targets that 
are excessively difficult can lose their motivational value, or even induce dysfunctional behaviour, 
if they are seen as unattainable (Locke et al., 1988). When employees feel that the standards on
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the basis of which their performance is evaluated are unreachable or virtually impossible to obtain, 
they tend to perceive these performance standards as unrealistic and, thus, unfair, and they are 
likely to i) either give up pursuing these targets (motivation loss), or ii) compensate for the 
perceived unfairness of the targets by deliberately distorting the PMERS in order to make it appear 
as if the targets have been met (dysfunctional behaviour). Such non-neutral behaviour may take 
the form of the frustrated manager sending invalid data through the evaluation system in order to 
make his / her performance look better, or even him / her engaging in dysfunctional activities in 
order to achieve the difficult goals. In other instances, goals which are seen to be too difficult, can 
end up motivating poor performance. When faced with very difficult goals, individuals often 
embark on a kind of implicit bargaining with the organisation, restricting their performance so that 
it falls well below the set goals, in order to convince the organisation that these goals are much too 
difficult (Porter et al., 1975). Essentially, all these manifestations of dysfunctional behaviour are 
to be seen as rational reactions from the managers involved to a perceivably imperfect, and as a 
result, unfair control mechanism. A number of management control theorists (e.g., Argyris, 1952 ; 
Hofstede, 1968 ; Hopwood, 1973 ; Onsi, 1973 ; Collins, 1978 ; Merchant, 1981, 1983 ; Brownell, 
1982 ; Brownell & Hirst, 1986 ; Bottger & Hirst, 1988 ; Simons, 1995 ; Lau et al., 1995, 1997) 
have suggested that one way to prevent or minimise the de-motivating consequences of the 
perceived unfairness of standards is to include the subjects of the control system themselves 
(that is, the middle-level managers in our case) in the standard-setting process, i.e. to promote a 
situation where superiors and subordinates set goals jointly. Participation by subordinates in the 
standard-setting process, wherever possible, can allow more reasonable performance targets 
and the perception of reasonable performance targets, basically helping the targets become 
‘internalised’, accepted by the managers as their own targets, and therefore making them more 
suitable for motivational purposes. The underlying argument here is that the central consideration 
in setting motivational performance targets is to ensure that these targets will be accepted as 
relevant by the managers they are intended to motivate, and, in this sense, what is really critical 
about the standards of performance that are set is not how high or low they are in reality, but how 
attainable they are perceived to be by the managers that are expected to reach them. In effect, it is 
the manager’s perception about the attainability of these targets that is recognised as what really 
matters for the targets to become accepted, and thus motivationally effective. Hence, allowing the 
subordinate manager to participate in the process of setting the targets against which his 
performance will be later evaluated may be a useful method of improving the communication
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channels between top- and middle-level management (Hofstede, 1968), and ensuring that these 
performance targets will be accepted by the manager they are supposed to motivate (Emmanuel et 
al., 1990). In practice, however, the implementation of such joint goal-setting is not without 
problems. High participation in the setting of standards of desired performance provides middle- 
level managers with the chance to negotiate for and come up with targets that are easier to accept 
and ‘internalise’, but also with the opportunity to introduce slack in (bias) their performance 
standards when they have the incentive to do so (Lowe & Shaw, 1968 ; Schiff & Lewin, 1968 ; 
Dunk, 1989). It is for these reasons that the majority of the scholars in the area of management 
control advocate a more sensible and selective implementation of participation in the standard- 
setting process, with due consideration to the various contingent organisational, environmental and 
cultural job-related factors and psychological parameters of the managers involved, such as the 
subordinate’s personality (Brownell, 1981), the superior’s personality (Licata et al., 1986), the 
organisation’s structure (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975), and the difficulty of the task performed 
(Mia, 1989), so that the potential positive contribution of participation to the managers’ acceptance 
of and commitment to organisational goals is fully realised (Drury, 1996).
Whether centrally imposed or set in a more democratic, participative manner, as far as the 
difficulty of standards is concerned, the message from the literature appears to be straightforward. 
To motivate the best possible level of actual performance, the (budget or other) performance target 
must be set at the highest level of difficulty the middle-level manager will accept, i.e., at a level 
slightly above that which will, on average, be attained by the manager (Emmanuel et al., 1990). 
An interesting implication of the above conclusion is that the target level which is expected to 
have the maximum positive motivational impact on the manager’s performance is unlikely to be 
achieved much of the time by the manager. Conversely, a target that is usually achieved by the 
manager can essentially be seen as a target that has not utilised its full motivational potential, as it 
motivates in all likelihood a relatively lower level of managerial performance. In this sense, if 
performance standards are to be set at a level that will motivate managers to achieve maximum 
performance, deviations from these standards are to be expected. As Drury (1996) notes, the 
practical repercussions of the latter for the measurement and evaluation of managerial performance 
are significant. Given that motivationally effective performance standards should not be expected 
to be attained all the time, it is essential that the deviations from these standards are not used by 
top management as a punitive device. Such practice in the performance evaluation process is more
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likely than not to encourage middle-level managers to either attempt to obtain lower targets by 
either under-performing or by deliberately negotiating easily attainable standards, or attempt to 
reach the targets by any means, even if this implies dysfunctional behaviour on their behalf with 
short- and long-term negative consequences for the company as a whole. Obviously, the attitude 
of senior managers to adverse variances is critical to the successful operation of a truly motivating 
PMERS. If middle managers are strongly criticised and penalised whenever their performance is 
even slightly below the standard set, there is little doubt that, eventually, less adverse variances 
will be reported. However, as Emmanuel et al. (1990) point out, the means by which this will 
have been achieved will be less than desirable and overall performance is likely to be reduced 
rather than increased in the long run. From a purely motivational perspective then, to motivate the 
best level of actual performance, demanding targets should be set and small adverse variances 
should be regarded as a healthy sign and not as something to be avoided. If targets are always 
achieved with no adverse variances, this most probably indicates that the standards of performance 
used are too loose to motivate the best possible results (Drury, 1996). Nevertheless, one should 
recognise that in practice companies may have other, non-motivational reasons for allowing the 
setting and use of more (or less) achievable targets. As Merchant (1989) convincingly argues, the 
motivation of managers is neither the sole function of performance standards (other functions that 
they may serve include planning and forecasting, control, and communication and co-ordination) 
nor the only consideration of top management within organisations. In essence, Merchant’s point 
centers around the conflict between the reporting, planning, control, and motivational uses of 
performance targets and the level of difficulty of these targets. In practice, the tight performance 
targets that are ideally required for motivational purposes as emphasised in the previous 
paragraphs, are bound to be inappropriate for, say, internal corporate resource planning or external 
results reporting purposes. For example, tight budget-targets that are unlikely to be achieved are 
most unsuitable for cash budgeting and for harmonising the company plans in the form of a master 
budget (Drury, 1996). It is on these premises that Stedry (1960) suggests the development and use 
of separate sets of performance targets for planning and for motivational scope. To the extent that 
performance targets of different level of difficulty are critical for different purposes within the 
organisation, what needs to be acknowledged is that it is highly unlikely that one set of targets can 
meet all the reporting, planning, control and motivational requirements of the organisation at the 
same time.
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Apart from the critical issue of how difficult the predetermined goals should be, another 
consideration that bears significant consequences for the motivational effectiveness of 
performance standards is arguably their level of specificity. Open-ended goals of ‘do your best’ 
type are not usually desirable, as empirical research on this area has unequivocally shown that 
motivation is reduced when goals are not specific (Meyer et al., 1965 ; Tosi, 1975). Individuals 
seem to respond better to clearly stated, specific targets. As Donaldson concludes, “Goals must be 
boldly stated and clearly defined [if they are] to influence organizational behavior” (1984, p. 139). 
On the whole, the conclusions of a review of more than 100 studies in the organisational 
psychology literature by Locke et al. (1981) serve to sum up everything mentioned so far about the 
optimal form the target should take in order to realise a maximum motivational impact : i) 
specific, and ii) challenging goals appear to induce better performance than medium, easy, do- 
your-best, or no goals.
Merchant (1989) finally adds a last necessary element on the ideal configuration of performance 
standards that are intended for motivational purposes - they ought to be preset, that is, they 
should be set before, and not after or during, the measurement period. The rationale for this 
recommendation is based on the realisation that the majority of people are innately goal-oriented, 
often to the extent of responding to the challenge of trying to meet a performance standard as long 
as the standard exists, even when the organisation in which they are working does not give them 
any monetary rewards for that achievement. Such managers are found to judge their personal 
success by how well they achieve a predetermined goal, and they put a great deal of effort in their 
job in order to improve their chances of being successful in attaining it. In this sense, preset 
standards of performance appear to have an extra motivational potential that is related to the 
intrinsic satisfaction that can be gained from attaining a preset target (Emmanuel et al., 1990). 
Furthermore, little doubt exists that performance standards that are constantly being revised 
throughout the measurement period - or are set after the period’s end, for that matter - are bound to 
be seen with scepticism by those who are evaluated on the basis of these standards, may be 
regarded as inconsistent and unfair, and can conceivably bear negative behavioural side-effects 
associated with the manager’s frustration, such as loss of motivation and opportunistic behaviour 
on his / her part (Merchant, 1989).
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Summarising, the best results on managers’ motivation and subsequent performance are likely to 
be obtained when performance standards are :
(1) preset - set before the measurement period
(2) specific - explicitly stated and clearly defined
(3) challenging - demanding, but not impossible to attain
(4) internalised - accepted by those they are designed to motivate.
On the empirical level now, the majority of the studies examining the behavioural effects of the 
target-setting process and of the targets set themselves have been experimental. Reviews by Locke 
et al. (1981) and Locke and Latham (1990) report over 400 laboratory and quasi-laboratory studies 
conducted, studies that include experiments with loggers (e.g., Latham & Baldes, 1975), 
maintenance employees (Frayne & Latham, 1987), truck drivers (Latham & Saari, 1982), 
engineers and scientists (Latham et al., 1978). However this evidence can hardly be regarded as 
generalisable in organisations ; it may be erroneous to assume that the relationships found to exist 
in such controlled settings will hold true within companies. As Emmanuel et al. (1990) point out, 
more reliable evidence about the effects of setting targets for managers can only be obtained from 
longitudinal field studies that have been carried out in real organisational contexts - although, as 
the authors admit, only a handful of these exist. Nevertheless, taken at their face value the 
research evidence from these psychological studies seems to suggest that the best results on 
managers’ motivation and subsequent task performance should be obtained by setting clear, 
specific and challenging goals, with ‘challenging’ meaning sufficiently high both to have a 
motivational impact and to be accepted (‘internalised’) at the same time by those who work under 
them as being attainable targets.
In more pertinent empirical studies conducted in organisational settings, Stedry and Kay (1966) 
and Chow (1983) provided evidence that setting specific difficult targets leads to higher task 
performance than setting specific moderate or easy targets. In his study on the budgetary process 
within organisations, Hofstede (1968), based on case evidence from six manufacturing plants, 
attempted to identify - among others - the conditions under which targets can have a high degree of 
relevance to managers, and thus act as an important motivational device. His conclusions 
concerning the budget-targets difficulty were similar to those reached by Stedry and Kay (1966) 
and Chow (1983). Up to the point where the target is no longer accepted, the more demanding the
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budget target, the better the results achieved. Demanding targets are also seen as more relevant 
than less difficult targets, but negative attitudes result if they are seen as too difficult. Carroll and 
Tosi’s (1973) findings of a study examining the effectiveness of a MBO (Management-By- 
Objectives) system, indicating that difficult goals led to reduced effort (particularly so in the case 
of managers who were less mature, experienced, and self-confident), are consistent with the above 
notions. Kenis (1979) in a survey-based research also found that the use of tight yet attainable 
budget standards appeared to lead to the higher motivation and actual performance, whereas 
Stedry (1960), in a study that was intended to be a simulation of the budgetary situation, 
demonstrated, first, that the formulation of a specific target generally improved performance, 
and second, that the best overall performance was reached when high targets were set. 
More recent experimental and survey research with managerial samples (e.g., Waller & Chow, 
1985 ; Hirst & Lowy, 1990 ; Lindquist, 1995) unanimously reports a positive relationship between 
standard tightness and managerial performance as well. Overall, it seems safe to conclude here 
that the evidence coming from this small number of empirical studies conducted in a managerial 
performance evaluation context is in accordance with the findings of the numerous experimental 
studies carried out in the field of applied organisational psychology. Superior task performance is 
essentially motivated when the performance standard is set at an attainable, yet somewhat 
demanding (i.e., challenging) level.
2.4.4.S Organisational Rewards
The final link in the management control cycle is to connect the achievement of desired results - 
measured in relation to a predetermined set of performance measures and standards - with 
incentives for managers, so that they are motivated to achieve the performance targets that have 
been set (Emmanuel et al., 1990). The allocation of rewards to individuals by organisations 
differentially, on the basis of the results of performance evaluations, is alleged to strongly 
influence the manager’s behaviour within the organisation, and help ensure that effort on his / her 
part is devoted in organisationally desirable directions. Vancil (1979) usefully distinguishes three 
main categories of rewards whose purposeful giving and / or withholding by organisations is 
thought of as having some influence on managerial motivation and performance. In practice, 
managers at the middle level of the organisational hierarchy enjoy basically three types of rewards:
(a) they derive some pleasure (satisfaction) from managing an entity of their own,
(b) they enjoy the power and status that accompanies their position,
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(c) they earn various monetary rewards.
These monetary rewards come in many different forms and combinations in the companies’ 
reward plans, however they can effectively be divided according to the basis on which they are 
allocated to managers into two further sub-categories :
i) performance-related monetary rewards - i.e., rewards such as cash bonus awards and 
fringe benefits that are distributed to the manager on the basis of the attainment of some 
target on a predetermined performance measure that the manager can influence, therefore 
making the receipt of reward more under the manager’s control.
ii) market-based monetary rewards - that is, rewards that basically aim to directly link the 
interests of the management with those of the shareholder by varying the manager’s 
compensation directly with the company’s stock price, e.g., stock options and stock 
appreciation rights.
Organisations use in practice a wide range of alternative combinations of these rewards to develop 
increasingly sophisticated compensation programmes, which they most usually attempt to link to 
their performance measurement and evaluation systems with the hope that they can derive some 
motivational value from them.
Porter et al. (1975) identify the necessary conditions that must exist in order for this rewarding of 
work effectiveness to motivate job performance. According to their analysis, to be effective in a 
motivational sense the rewards distributed by organisations must be
a) important, attractive to those they are supposed to motivate, and
b) directly, clearly and expressly linked to the type of performance that is to be motivated.
It is both intuitively and empirically well-founded that the impact of any given organisational 
reward on the individual’s motivation depends, at least to some extent, on the perceived value 
(attractiveness) of the reward to the individual. Clearly, it makes sense that the more attractive a 
reward is, the more it can motivate people to behave in certain ways in order to obtain it. 
The overall attractiveness of a reward to the individual, and thereby its motivational effectiveness, 
is said to be related both to the size and the nature of the reward (Merchant, 1989), as well as to its 
timeliness, as rewards long separated in time from the performance they are intended to reinforce 
are likely to lose much of their perceived value and incentive effect (Costello & Zalkind, 1963).
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However, as it is emphatically argued in the organisational psychology literature, the attractiveness 
(importance) of any reward is more wisely seen in relative terms, specifically in relation to the 
individual’s present needs, and, in like manner, the motivational potential of the reward is better 
evaluated on the basis of whether or not, and to what extent, is the reward expected (by the 
individual) to satisfy these needs of his. In this sense then, with respect to the motivational 
ramifications of how much (size of reward), when (timing of reward provision), and what 
(nature of reward) is to be promised to employees to maximise their motivation, organisations’ 
reward policy seems straightforward. Organisations should employ those rewards that satisfy their 
employees’ needs, in order to maximise
i) the perceived attractiveness (perceived value) of their reward-package, and, by that means,
ii) the motivational effect of this reward-package.
Though this may sound simple, in practice it is not easy to do, for the most part because there are 
large individual differences in the degree to which the different rewards available are valued by 
different individuals2 (Porter et al., 1975). The perceived value and motivational impact of each of 
the various reward forms tend to vary substantially and in meaningful ways, possibly depending on 
the manager’s individual needs, reward preferences and personal circumstances (Emmanuel et al.,
2 Indeed, there is a great deal of psychological research on the importance (attractiveness) of different rewards, 
although only a small fraction of studies have been conducted in real organisational contexts with managerial 
samples. Reviews of this literature (e.g., Herzberg et al., 1957 ; Lawler, 1971) unanimously conclude that, altogether 
these studies show that significant and comprehensible individual differences exist in the importance people assign to 
different rewards. A closer look into more relevant studies setting- and sample-wise indicates that there is evidence 
showing some systematic reward taste patterns among employees operating at different hierarchical levels within the 
organisation. For example, it appears that managers in general consider monetary (extrinsic) rewards as less 
important than do lower-level employees (e.g., Centers & Bugental, 1966 ; Kahn, 1958 ; Ronan, 1970). Similar 
patterns are also apparent between lower- and higher-level managers. Porter (1961) reports that pay is rated second 
in importance by lower-level managers but only fourth in importance by middle-level managers, whereas evidence 
exists to show that for top-level managers the perceived value of such monetary rewards is even smaller (Lawler & 
Porter, 1963). Other empirical studies indicate that managers in the middle level of the organisational hierarchy are 
not as interested in the stability of their short-term income (after their base salary is assured) (Eaton & Rosen, 1983) - 
they are probably much more interested in other, more intrinsic type of rewards, such as protecting their domain of 
autonomy and improving their prospects for promotion (Emmanuel et al., 1990). However, these very general 
patterns seem to fade when one considers the evidence that show significant differences in the reward preferences 
between managers who operate in autonomously run units versus managers who operate in more centrally 
administered divisions (Brazeal, 1996), between managers who work in the private sector versus managers who work 
in the public sector (Khojasteh, 1993 ; Karl & Sutton, 1998), between managers who come from different cultural 
backgrounds (Pennings, 1993 ; Nessim & Tanuja, 1998), differences that do not refer only to the managers’ 
preferences for extrinsic or intrinsic rewards but also to their more specific preferences for particular forms of 
rewards. These findings, especially when considered vis-a-vis the previously mentioned large body of empirical 
evidence from the field of psychology that indicates that reward tastes vary systematically also between individuals 
of different gender, age, intelligence, personality, educational and family background - i.e., a multiplicity of personal 
factors over which the organisation has little or no control -, come to underline the difficulties involved in developing 
a reward package that can accommodate the individual preferences of all the company’s managers.
41
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty LITERATURE REVIEW
1990). For some people, extrinsic (tangible, directly provided by the organisation) rewards such as 
immediate cash awards and salary increases are clearly first in importance, while others are much 
more interested in intrinsic (intangible and more self-administered) rewards such as increasing 
their domain of influence and responsibility or getting recognised for their achievements. 
In addition, similar rewards may also be highly valued by different people for quite different 
reasons ; for instance, pay and promotion, the two most typical rewards offered by organisations, 
are important to some people because they simply increase their income, to others they are 
important because they come to symbolise other, more intangible goals such as personal growth 
and success, or status (Armstrong & Murlis, 1988). To make things even more complicated, the 
research that has been conducted on the importance of rewards suggests that the value people 
attach on the available rewards tends not to be static, but it rather changes over time as the 
individual’s circumstances, tastes, and needs change, so that what is valued today by a person may 
not be valued at a later time by the same person (Porter et al., 1975). Designing therefore a reward 
system that can offer to each individual manager in the organisation the exact rewards that he / she 
values at the time so that to maximise the reward package’s motivational effect is clearly more 
complicated than it first sounds.
Of equal motivational importance to what rewards are to be administered, is considered in the 
literature the issue of how the organisation is going to distribute those rewards to its employees. 
There is hardly any doubt that the way in which organisational rewards are dispensed through the 
PMERS has a significant influence on the behaviour of individuals within the organisation. 
Porter et al. (1975) emphasise that the effectiveness of any chosen set of rewards as motivators of 
performance depends, apart from their perceived attractiveness, also on the employees’ perception 
about whether or not these rewards are tied to the performance they (the rewards) are intended to 
motivate. Stated more simply, no matter how more or less valuable (attractive) the company’s 
reward package is, unless it is quite explicit in prescribing that the administration of the rewards 
available is closely related to the evaluation of people’s performance, it should not be expected to 
effectively motivate people towards desirable performance. Clearly, the offering of rewards by the 
organisation acquires motivational properties to urge people towards effective performance, 
only when people perceive that the only way to obtain the rewards offered is by attaining the 
organisationally required performance. From a motivational perspective then, the better the 
PMERS manages to establish and reinforce the employees’ belief about a direct link between their
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performance and the rewards they receive, the stronger its potential impact on their motivation 
is likely to be.
On these behavioural grounds, a number of management control theorists (e.g., Ronen & 
Livingstone, 1975 ; Porter et al., 1975 ; Kopelman & Reinharth, 1982 ; Merchant, 1989) stress 
the importance of incorporating in the PMERS rewards which are performance-dependent,
i.e., administered on the basis of the managers’ individual performance. Others (for example, 
Armstrong & Murlis, 1988) go a step further to point out that having a differential reward system 
that is based upon merit is not enough from a motivational point of view. They argue that unless 
the managers in question are well informed and aware of the way in which rewards and 
performance are related within the PMERS, no positive effect should be expected on their 
motivation, even if the rewards they receive are related with their individual performance in 
actuality. Essentially, if we accept Hamner’s (1974) line of argument about the formation of 
human behaviour within organisation, namely that
i) people compare their own performance to that of their peers to determine how well they 
are performing themselves (“Social Comparison Theory”, Festinger (1954)),
ii) people compare the rewards they receive to the rewards received by their peers in order to 
determine the relative value of their own rewards (“Equity Theory”, Adams (1965)),
then it is clear that, apart from the necessary strong link between individual performance and 
rewards in the PMERS, the openness and transparence of the company’s reward system is also 
critical motivationwise. In effect, making reward information public so that all employees identify 
a strong connection between high performance and high reward, is seen as a vital step for the 
establishment of the motivationally important perception that performance and rewards are related, 
essentially the final link in substantiating the credibility of any merit-based reward system 
(Lawler, 1981).
To sum up, the rewards organisations utilise in order to motivate their managers’ job performance 
need to possess in theory the following two necessary characteristics, if they are to fulfil 
effectively their motivational potential:
(1) they must be sufficiently valuable - attractive enough to the managers they are supposed 
to motivate, so that to offset and override other incentives managers may have to act 
contrary to the organisation’s best interest (Merchant, 1989)
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(2) they must be performance-dependent - perceived by the managers as being administered 
differentially, on the basis of their evaluated performance, so as to effectively direct 
managers towards the organisationally desirable performance when they strive to obtain 
the (presumably attractive) rewards offered.
It has nevertheless to be stressed at this point that the proponents of performance-related rewards 
appear to assume that extrinsic, financial rewards is the raison d ’etre of managerial performance 
(e.g., Wilson, 1973 ; Opsahl & Dunnette, 1979 ; Foulkes, 1985 ; Jensen & Murphy, 1988). 
However, this belief in the absolute importance of extrinsic rewards contradicts many major 
motivational theories (Lewis, 1991) which posit that there are multiple and differing motivational 
factors affecting human behaviour (Herzberg et al., 1959), among them intrinsic motivators such 
as the need for achievement (McClelland et al., 1953 ; McClelland, 1961), the needs of 
competence and self-determination (White, 1959 ; Deci & Ryan, 1985) or the feelings of self- 
fulfilment, worthwhile accomplishment, self-esteem, or mere joy one gets from performing an 
activity (Mitchell & Albright, 1972 ; Turney, 1974). Others (e.g., Deci, 1972 ; Amabile, 1983) go 
further to suggest that the excessive emphasis on external rewards and their use within 
motivational contracts in a manner that resembles the carrot-and-stick approach will probably be 
experienced as controlling and may even undermine the motivational power of such intrinsic 
rewards. They argue that particularly in the managerial setting, where these intrinsic rewards are 
much more evident, such an explicit emphasis on extrinsic rewards that are administered on the 
basis of individual performance is seen as misplaced and potentially dangerous, as it risks not only 
missing out on other, more intrinsically-oriented motivation opportunities, but also negatively 
affecting managerial motivation through the explicit use of extrinsic rewards (Hunt, 1992). 
In this sense, reward-for-performance compensation plans for middle managers - which, by the 
way, were initially developed to motivate performance in simple repetitive manufacturing jobs 
which had failed to stimulate intrinsic motivation (Lawler, 1971 ; Hackman & Oldham, 1980) - 
may be out of place, failing to address the multiple intrinsic motivational drivers (such as 
achievement, recognition, advancement, decision autonomy, power, and the work itself (Herzberg, 
1968)) that can positively affect managerial motivation and performance.
Overall, it seems that the literature does not provide clear-cut directions for the design of reward 
schemes for managers at the middle management level. Most of the literature on organisational
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incentive practice is heavily prescriptive (e.g., Armstrong & Murlis, 1988 ; Lawler, 1990 ; 
Foulkes, 1991), and the experts disagree both on their theoretical position of how such reward 
systems are to be designed, as well as on their trust on and interpretation of the available empirical 
evidence coming from the field. Some argue that the commonly found in practice reward-for- 
performance compensation plans are based on false premises about what actually activates, 
sustains and directs human behaviour, and as a result cannot deliver long-term performance 
improvement (see, for instance, Amabile, 1979, 1983 ; Kohn, 1993, 1993a). Others disagree, 
maintaining that the motivational benefits associated with performance-based reward schemes far 
outweigh the disadvantages of such systems (e.g., Murphy, 1989 ; Lawler, 1990 ; Stewart, 1993 ; 
McAdams, 1993 ; Rose, 1997 ; Abernathy, 1998).
On the empirical sphere, the question of whether performance-dependent rewards are 
motivationally effective in practice is difficult to answer and currently under debate in the area of 
management control. On the one hand, there is a substantial amount of evidence coming from the 
field of applied psychology that clearly supports the proposition that tying individual performance 
to rewards results in increased motivation and performance. In an attempt to summarise this 
literature, Lawler (1994) admits that much of the available evidence comes from experimental 
studies of poor methodological quality and of limited generalisability in the managerial setting, 
basically because in the majority of the cases little effort was made to control for the relevant 
extraneous variables involved and also because sample-wise most of these studies involve 
populations that bear little resemblance to managers. Notwithstanding these acknowledged 
limitations, his conclusions after reviewing this body of research are worth mentioning :
(i) Individual performance-based reward schemes appear to have the greatest positive effect on 
people’s motivation and subsequent performance. Even the most conservative results seem 
to suggest that individual-incentive plans can increase performance by 10 to 20 percent.
(ii) Group- and / or organisation subunit-based reward schemes often do not lead to as high 
performance as individual-incentive plans, however they generally appear to be better at 
motivating individual performance than fixed reward schemes that make no attempt to relate 
the distribution of rewards to performance.
(iii) Company-wide reward schemes seem to exaggerate the advantages and disadvantages 
inherent in group-based incentive schemes ; that is, they appear to facilitate co-operation 
among organisation members more than group- and individual-incentive plans, but they fail
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to motivate individual performance to the extent that group- and individual-based schemes 
do, most probably because they break down even further the perceived connection between 
individual performance and the administration of rewards.
Some authors, however, are not convinced of the applicability of these findings in a managerial 
performance evaluation context. They argue that in the main, psychological studies of motivation 
have used simple repetitive task behaviours to infer motivational influences, most usually 
assuming that higher task motivation equates with higher individual performance, and therefore 
that, to the extent that performance-contingent rewards have a positive motivational effect on task 
motivation, will also lead to greater organisational performance. However, they caution that to 
extrapolate from simple repetitive tasks to prescriptions for managerial reward for far more 
complex organisational work may be misleading.
Nevertheless, other more relevant studies in the field of applied organisational psychology 
(in their vast majority, survey-based studies, with managerial samples) have also reported a 
definite tendency for managers who believe that their job effectiveness has a significant impact on 
the rewards they receive to exhibit relatively higher levels of work motivation and performance 
(Lawler, 1966 ; Lawler & Porter, 1967 ; Porter & Lawler, 1968 ; Gavin, 1970 ; Schuster et al., 
1971 ; Wofford, 1971 ; Lawler & Suttle, 1973). Furthermore, findings of a significant positive 
correlation between managerial task performance and performance-related incentive mechanisms, 
as these are reported in the empirical research on the effects of standard-based incentives on 
managerial behaviour in the area of management control (see, for instance, Rockness, 1977 ; 
Chow, 1983 ; Waller & Chow, 1985 ; Dillard & Fisher, 1990 ; Kren, 1990), provide support to the 
above conclusions.
As to the question of whether more valuable (attractive) rewards have a greater motivational effect 
on the manager’s behaviour, the available empirical evidence is rather mixed and inconclusive. 
On the one hand, a number of studies (e.g., Porter & Lawler, 1968 ; Pritchard & Sanders, 1973 ; 
Pecotich & Churchill, 1981 ; Nakanishi, 1989) have concluded that, in general, the greater the 
importance attributed by the manager to the rewards offered, the higher the manager’s job 
motivation and performance tends to be. On the other hand, other studies report either very weak
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positive (see, for instance, Hackman & Porter, 1968) or even negative correlations (e.g., Jorgenson 
et al., 1973) between the perceived value of rewards and managerial motivation and performance.
In the last three sections, an attempt was made to address a number of theoretical and practical 
considerations with regard to the design of motivational contracts for middle-level managers. 
All in all, there is a widespread recognition in the literature of the motivational potential of 
well-designed combinations of performance measures, standards and rewards to influence and 
direct the behaviour of managers operating at the middle level of the organisational hierarchy. 
However, there is also great awareness of the pitfalls that are associated with ill-designed systems 
of performance measurement, evaluation, and reward. According to Merchant (1989), the ideal 
motivational contract has six primary characteristics :
1. performance measures that are congruent with the overall corporate goals,
2. performance measures that are controllable by the middle-level managers,
3. performance measures that can accurately and completely capture the performance of the 
middle-level managers,
4. performance standards that are preset and challenging,
5. rewards that are meaningful, but at minimum cost,
6. it is simple to understand, and easy to communicate and administer.
Even though such ideal contracts are impossible to design and implement in their entirety for 
higher level, managerial jobs, they are useful as standards by which one can evaluate the 
motivational contracts companies actually use. In practice, it seems that the design of motivational 
contracts for middle-level management is more of a struggle to find the right balance between the 
different trade-offs the designer must make in order to accommodate by degree all the above ideal 
contract qualities in the PMERS. And although this design task is relatively straightforward for 
lower level jobs, designing a suitable control and motivational mechanism that can be 
implemented uniformly to all the company’s middle managerial staff, irrespective of whether they 
operate in conditions of high / low task complexity, high / low environmental uncertainty, high / 
low incidence of uncontrollable events, is certainly a challenge. As Simons (1995) concludes, 
failure to strike the right balance in the PMERS design can result - as repeatedly emphasised in the 
preceding sections - in limited control of factors and processes that are critical for the
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organisation’s success, in dysfunctional behaviour on the part of those being under the 
management control system, and / or in them totally ignoring the control system altogether.
2.5 Environmental Uncertainty and the PMERS : The Design of Motivational 
Contracts in Different Environments
2.5.1 The Contingency Theory of Management Control Systems
A number of management control theorists (e.g., Thompson, 1967 ; Galbraith, 1977 ; Waterhouse 
& Tiessen, 1978 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990 ; Simons, 1995), based on what is termed in the area of 
management accounting and control a contingency theory perspective, have emphatically 
expressed their doubts about the ability of the PMERS to instigate managerial motivation and 
promote managerial efficiency equally well under all environmental conditions, both certain and 
uncertain. In accordance with the fundamental premise of contingency theory that there is no one 
universally appropriate management control system (MCS) that applies equally to all organisations 
in all circumstances, they maintain that the PMERS needs to be specifically designed and 
implemented to fit the needs and specific circumstances of the organisation for which it is intended 
(Otley, 1980).
Overall, the contingency theory perspective in the management control systems literature basically 
emerged as an extension of the contingency theory of organisations in the field of organisational 
behaviour (Bums & Stalker, 1961 ; Chandler, 1962 ; Woodward, 1965 ; Lawrence & Lorsch, 
1967; Thompson, 1967 ; Perrow, 1967, 1970 ; Pugh et al., 1976a, 1976b, 1977) to argue that, just 
as with different organisational forms, different management control systems will be more 
functionally appropriate than others in different circumstances, and, in this sense, the central 
design consideration for every system of control (such as the PMERS) should be how well the 
system fits the particular set of environmental, technological, and strategic circumstances within 
which it has to operate. Within a contingency theory perspective, therefore, the emphasis with 
regards to the design of any management control system is on identifying the most important - 
specific to each organisation - contingent variables (environment, strategy, structure, technology, 
culture, etc.) and achieving an appropriate matching between these variables and the particular 
features of the organisation’s control system. Simply put then, the contingency theory of
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management control systems represents an attempt to identify the most appropriate control system 
for a given set of circumstances (Otley, 1995a).
Throughout the years contingency theorists have attempted to identify and examine the specific 
features of the organisation’s context that may have (or, more prescriptively, should have) an 
effect on particular features of the organisation’s management control system design. Many 
studies have focused on the relationships between management control system and contingency 
variables such as technology (Daft & Macintosh, 1978, 1981 ; Fry, 1982), organisation size 
(Williamson, 1970 ; Child, 1975 ; Merchant, 1984), organisation structure (Baumler, 1971 ; Child, 
1972 ; Hopwood, 1972 ; Otley, 1978 ; Merchant, 1981 ; Jones, 1985) and environment 
(Khandwalla, 1972 ; Gordon & Miller, 1976 ; Hayes, 1977 ; Amigioni, 1978 ; Otley, 1978 ; 
Pfeffer, 1978 ; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978 ; Gordon & Narayanan, 1984 ; Govindarajan, 1984) 
which have been invoked to explain why management and accounting control systems have been 
found to differ from one situation to another. On the whole, three major classes of contingent 
factors have been identified : i) the environment, ii) organisational structure, and iii) technology 
(Emmanuel et al., 1990). Relevant features of an organisation’s environment affecting 
management and accounting control system design that have been suggested include its level of 
uncertainty (unpredictability), the degree of competitiveness faced in the market place and the 
degree of hostility exhibited, as well as the number and level of complexity of the different 
product-markets in which the organisation operates. Organisational structure factors that have 
been considered to be important include size, interdependence, decentralisation and resource 
availability - all of which have been hypothesised to result in differences in the design of a 
management control system. Technology factors that have been suggested include the nature of 
the production process, its degree of routineness, the amount of task variety, and how well means- 
end relationships are understood within the company.
2.5.2 The Environment as a Contingent Factor : The Intervening Effect of Environmental 
Uncertainty on the Design and Motivational Function of the PMERS
Particularly with regards to the effect of the environment on the organisation’s management 
control system design, a number of distinct - though related - theoretical formulations have been 
expressed within the general framework of contingency theory. In one of the early attempts to 
formalise such environment-MCS contingency relationships, Gordon and Miller (1976) identified
49
PMERS, Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty______________________ LITERATURE REVIEW
three main environmental characteristics that are hypothesised to affect the design of the 
organisation’s control systems, namely dynamism (i.e., the rate of change within the environment), 
heterogeneity (that is, the number of different product-markets the organisation serves), and 
hostility (i.e., the intensity of the competition faced by the company). According to Gordon and 
Miller, a high level of dynamism, or rate of change, will require frequent control reports 
incorporating both financial and non-fmancial information, and which emphasise forecasts rather 
than past actual results ; a high degree of heterogeneity, or a high number of different product 
markets served, will lead to a decentralised management control system with quasi-autonomous 
responsibility centers ; similarly, in the face of severe competition or market hostility, there will be 
a need for a more sophisticated management control system that is capable of incorporating non- 
financial information about critical threats (Emmanuel et al., 1990).
In a similar vein, Amigioni (1978) developed a theoretical framework within which he attempted 
to assess the appropriateness of different management control tools, ranging from financial 
accounting and ratio analysis, through financial simulation models and responsibility accounting, 
to strategic planning devices. Further, he identified two major contingent variables, namely the 
degree of structural complexity of the organisation and the degree of turbulence (or instability, 
variability) in its environment. In Amigioni’s view, whereas increasing structural complexity 
leads to the addition of new control tools to those already in use, environmental discontinuity will 
often require the replacement of such tools, which have now become obsolete, by new ones.
Drawing on Thompson’s (1967) analysis of the effect of the environment on organisational 
structure, Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978) conceptualised the environment as having two important 
dimensions that affect the design of the organisation’s management control system - the simple vs. 
complex dimension, and the static vs. dynamic dimension. They argued that when the environment 
is more simple and static (i.e., more certain and predictable) over time, centralisation of the 
decision making authority constitutes an easy and cost-effective mode of organisational control, 
and procedure specification provides an important means of both defining and limiting the 
authority of organisation members at the managerial level, facilitating, as such, the exercise of 
control at that level. Under such circumstances, Waterhouse and Tiessen predict that management 
control systems will be structured around performance measures and standards that are linked to - 
well specified in advance - through-put procedures, standard cost variance analyses, and routine
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accounting-based control reports. In more uncertain and unpredictable (that is, more complex and 
dynamic) environmental conditions, however, where the procedures become difficult - if not 
impossible at the extreme - to specify and document, primarily due to the high incidence of 
unexpected and novel events, such direct control measures are infeasible to be implemented ; 
instead, in such conditions, more subtle forms of managerial control that focus on the 
decentralisation of the decision making authority to organisation members in the periphery, on 
planning and internal resource allocation, on monitoring (both financial and non-financial) outputs 
which result from organisation members’ actions, and on the selection, socialisation, and 
professionalisation of organisation members, are seen as more appropriate by Waterhouse and 
Tiessen (1978). The latter draws parallels with Becker and Gordon’s (1966) contingency argument 
that in situations where the interaction between an organisation and its environment is highly 
complex, top management would need to rely on the “...self-regulation of professionals” (p.329) 
for the coordination and control of its middle-level managers, as opposed to more formal types of 
control.
Other alternative theoretical conceptualisations of the environmental factor documented in the 
literature include concepts such as environmental ‘stress’, ‘restrictiveness’ and ‘aggressiveness’, 
all of them reflecting different attempts to capture various critical aspects of the organisation’s 
environment such as the availability of opportunities and the extent to which the firm is 
manipulated or controlled by other organisations such as competitors, suppliers, customers and 
government bodies (Khandwalla, 1977 ; Pfeffer, 1981). But on the whole, one can safely argue 
that the major underlying factor appears to be environmental uncertainty (unpredictability) in all 
its guises (Otley, 1995a).
In a more recent conceptual attempt, Emmanuel et al. (1990) provided an interesting contingency 
theory framework that recognises the pivotal effect of the environmental uncertainty variable on 
the organisation’s management control system. Starting from the premise that the nature of the 
predictive model at the manager’s disposal is central to every control process, they make a 
fundamental conceptual distinction between :
-  programmed decision making situations, where the manager taking the decision has a 
detailed and accurate predictive model that allows him to specify the means that should be 
used to achieve the desired result, and
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-  non-programmed decision making situations within which predictive models are only 
implicit and imperfect and the manager although he is able to identify the desired ends, is 
unable to specify the necessary means for the achievement of these ends.
On the grounds of this basic distinction between programmed and non-programmed decision 
making - which, should be noted, although is described in dichotomous terms, it is in fact posited 
as a continuum ranging between the two extreme points described - they suggest that the type of 
the decision making situation of the manager affects substantially the type and nature of the system 
that is appropriate for managerial control.
In more detail, Emmanuel et al. (1990) argue that in the programmed decision making scenario, 
the application of traditional management accounting techniques for motivational purposes are 
largely justified and, indeed, can be quite effective in motivating managerial performance. 
In a manner consistent with March and Simon (1958), they maintain that in conditions of relative 
environmental stability and certainty, lower-level managers are typically expected to execute 
centrally decided, largely programmed decisions about well-defined, independent, structured 
and repetitive tasks.
Under these circumstances, where
i) procedures at the middle managerial level are highly specified,
ii) means-end relationships are well understood,
iii) the information asymmetry between top- and middle-level management is comparatively low,
iv) the ability of the controllers to anticipate middle-level managers’ behaviour is correspondingly 
higher,
v) the generation and use of data for planning and control purposes is relatively straightforward, 
in that managerial behaviour is clearly easier to predict, observe and measure,
the joint effect of carefully set performance standards, properly designed performance measures 
and desirable rewards is expected to constitute an effective means of motivating middle-level 
managers to exert increased levels of effort and energy towards the accomplishment of the 
organisation’s wider objectives (Hopwood, 1973).
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However, in more uncertain and unpredictable environmental conditions, where
i) the understanding of cause-effect relationships is less clear and definite,
ii) the non-programmed decision making and action taking is much more frequent and largely 
unavoidable - mainly due to the high incidence of unexpected and novel events -, and
iii) the level of task interdependency is substantially higher,
the information asymmetry between top- and middle-level management is likely to be higher, and 
thus, the ability of the organisation to specify and document in advance, either procedures and 
desirable behaviours for its middle-level managers, or their exact domain of authority and 
responsibility, is necessarily limited. Emmanuel at al. (1990) assert that in this more uncertain and 
dynamic context, the application of conventional systems of performance measures and related 
incentive schemes for managerial motivation and control is problematic, and their impact on 
middle-level managers’ behaviour is rather ambiguous. They point to the difficulties involved in 
devising under these circumstances measures that can capture and reflect accurately and 
completely the middle-level manager’s performance, and to the potential danger of non-neutral 
behaviour that can be instigated when highly desirable rewards are linked to such inappropriate 
performance measures. They conclude that the matching of the organisation’s management 
control system to the organisation’s environment, strategy, and structure should be a major 
consideration both when designing and when implementing such systems in practice, and thereby 
make a case for a contingency approach to the design and application of the company’s PMERS 
and overall MCS, so that they can maximise their potential contribution to the motivation of 
managers operating at the middle level of the organisational hierarchy.
On the premises of the above contingency frameworks, a number of studies have thereof attempted 
to isolate the environmental uncertainty variable in order to i) examine its potential impact on the 
company’s PMERS, and ii) investigate the possible adverse consequences that uncertainty 
may have on the behaviour of organisation members within the performance evaluation context. 
The great majority of these studies have basically hypothesised that uncertainty is likely to limit 
the feasibility (or the effectiveness) of certain types of controls, primarily due to the lack of unity 
and clarity of goals, and the limited knowledge of cause-effect relationships, both of which are 
incorrigibly associated with uncertain environments (Hartmann, 1997). As such, a number of 
studies have attempted to discuss the effect of uncertainty on the two major elements of the 
performance measurement and evaluation process, that is, the effect of uncertainty on performance
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measures and standards. Govindarajan (1984), for example, concerned with the effect of 
uncertainty on standards of performance, notes that “performance evaluation presupposes 
[the existence of] targets - either explicit (e.g. budgets) or implicit. To arrive at a priori targets 
that can serve as valid standards for subsequent performance evaluation, however, one must be 
able to predict the conditions that will exist during the coming year” (p. 128), a task that is 
formidable in the face of high uncertainty. In a similar vein, Galbraith (1977) maintains that, “the 
basic effect of (environmental) uncertainty is to limit the ability of the organisation to preplan or 
make decisions about activities in advance of their execution” (p.36). In that sense, the more 
uncertain, dynamic and unpredictable is the environment, the more difficult is to predict the 
conditions that will exist in the future and, as such, the more difficult it is to come up with 
satisfactory targets (standards of desirable performance) that can provide the basis for performance 
evaluation. Others are more concerned with the impact of uncertainty on performance measures, 
pointing out that uncertainty makes it difficult for performance measures to judge ex-post whether 
good (or poor) managerial performance is the result of good (or poor) effort on the part of the 
manager, or rather the result of (un)fortunate, (un)lucky circumstances that the performance 
measures were not able to detect (e.g., Govindarajan, 1984 ; Brownell, 1985). The evaluation of 
managerial performance within the PMERS relies fundamentally upon a detailed knowledge about 
outcomes associated with given managerial actions, or in other words, knowledge about 
cause-effect relationships. Thompson, however, argues that under uncertain conditions “causal 
actions often have multiple effects which ramify in different directions and varying distances into 
the future” (1967, p.85) and, thus, the consequences of these actions cannot be accurately 
predicted and anticipated. To the extent that the organisation’s environment is characterised by 
high level of uncertainty, the cause-effect knowledge will be incomplete and, therefore, the ability 
of the PMERS to measure and evaluate managerial performance will be limited.
The impact of uncertainty specifically on accounting-based performance measures has been the 
focus of attention of a fair amount of studies in the area of management control. For example, 
Hirst (1981) contends that accounting performance measures, which, by definition, are internally 
oriented and focus on individual task performance, will be inappropriate in situations of high 
uncertainty where the effect of task and process interdependencies is significant, as they will not 
be able to capture and reflect information about how managers’ performances interact and 
combine, and will eventually provide a rather incomplete picture of the managers’ efforts. Similar
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arguments are put forward by Govindarajan and Gupta (1985), Merchant (1990), and Ross (1995). 
Some other authors have extended the completeness argument mentioned above to formulate 
hypotheses about how uncertainty also affects the relevance of accounting performance measures 
(Govindarajan, 1984 ; Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985). As Hartmann (1997) points out, the central 
argument concerning the accounting performance measures’ relevance is that in circumstances of 
high uncertainty, where other than financial factors determine an organisation’s long-term 
viability, financial performance that typically emphasises short-term performance, is not a good 
indicator of real managerial effectiveness. In circumstances of high uncertainty then, the argument 
goes, accounting performance measures will be perceived as less relevant - and therefore of little 
motivational value - in the managerial performance evaluation context.
As to the question of “what happens when such incomplete and inaccurate performance evaluation 
mechanisms are implemented in conditions of high environmental uncertainty ?”, a number of 
studies in the management control literature, basically following a line of reasoning first drawn by 
Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978), have attempted to detail the dysfunctional behavioural 
consequences that would follow such a practice. Some of them predict that the use of 
inappropriate measures of performance in environments characterised by a high level of 
uncertainty will enhance the middle-level managers’ job-related tension (e.g., Imoisili, 1989), or 
reduce their subsequent performance (e.g., Govindarajan, 1988 ; Brownell & Dunk, 1991); others 
predict that in highly uncertain environments, where the undesirable characteristics of performance 
measures (i.e., perceived uncontrollability, incompleteness, irrelevance) are exaggerated, superiors 
will be reluctant to utilise such measures and will emphasise the use of other measures of 
managerial performance (e.g., Merchant, 1984 ; Govindarajan, 1984). In some cases, these two 
kinds of hypotheses about the effect of uncertainty in the performance evaluation context are 
combined. Merchant (1984), for example, predicts both a decrease in the use of results-oriented 
performance measures by superiors, and an increase in dysfunctional consequences when such 
performance measures are used, in the presence of high uncertainty.
On the empirical level, although there is hardly any study examining the direct effect of 
environmental uncertainty on the managers’ perceptions about the PMERS - with the exception of 
the Hays’ (1977) study that provided evidence of the same performance measures being perceived 
as less (more) appropriate by managers facing high (low) levels of environmental uncertainty -,
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there is some evidence, albeit inconclusive, about the alleged adverse consequences of uncertainty 
on the behaviour of managers within the performance evaluation context. In a study in which the 
mediating role of environmental uncertainty was particularly addressed, Govindarajan (1984) 
found no direct connection between different evaluative styles, reward systems, and managerial 
effectiveness until the intervening effect of uncertainty was taken into account. Under conditions 
of high uncertainty, a correlation between more subjective methods of performance evaluation and 
managerial effectiveness was identified, essentially providing support to the argument that 
effective management controls are contingent upon the matching of the management control 
system in use and the environmental circumstances surrounding the organisation / unit. 
In a similar vein, the studies by Brownell (1987), Govindarajan (1988), and Mia and Chenhall 
(1994) presented results that appear to confirm the interaction effect of environmental uncertainty 
on the relationship between the use of accounting performance measures and managerial 
performance. Also Hirst (1983), in his study of the dysfunctional consequences arising from the 
reliance on accounting performance measures in highly uncertain task environments, was able to 
demonstrate a significant interaction of the level of uncertainty and the use of accounting-oriented 
performance measures affecting the managers’ job-related tension. His results showed that under 
conditions of high (low) uncertainty, a greater reliance on accounting performance measures 
resulted in higher (lower) levels of job-related tension, suggesting that accounting performance 
measures would be appropriate under conditions of low uncertainty and inappropriate under 
conditions of high uncertainty. The linking of desirable rewards to such performance measures 
may presumably exaggerate these patterns.
However, other studies have provided evidence that contradict the above conclusions about the 
combined effect of environmental uncertainty and management control systems on the behaviour 
of organisation members (Hartmann, 1997). First, the findings about the interaction effect of 
uncertainty and reliance on accounting performance measures on job-related tension reported by 
Hirst (1983) could not be replicated by a number of subsequent studies (e.g., Brownell & Hirst, 
1986 ; Imoisili, 1985, 1989 ; Brownell & Dunk, 1991 ; Lau et al., 1995 ; Ross, 1995). In addition, 
Merchant (1984), Brownell (1985) and Lau et al. (1995) did not find any evidence of the 
uncertainty factor affecting the relationship between the use of accounting performance measures 
and managerial performance, as Brownell (1987), Govindarajan (1988), and Mia and Chenhall 
(1994) did.
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All in all, if something is quite evident from the literature review attempted in the last two 
sections, this is the recognition that the environment within which the organisation operates is an 
important factor that may influence both the design and the use of the organisation’s management 
control system, as well as the subsequent behaviour (i.e., motivation and performance) of the 
managers who are working within this environment and under the given management control 
system. Despite, however, the apparent agreement on the importance of the environment and the 
environmental uncertainty factor, both the empirical findings and the theoretical propositions put 
forward by the various authors have not yet produced any consensus as to what particular 
configurations in the management control system’s design apply in different environmental 
conditions. Indeed, as Otley (1980) points out, apart from a substantial body of agreed opinion 
within the contingency theory literature that there is no universally ‘best’ design for a management 
control system, few practical guidelines are given as to the impact of the different contingent 
factors on the design of the organisation’s control system and on manager’s behaviour. 
Overall, the available empirical studies provide confounding signals as to the links between 
specified contingencies and appropriate control systems characteristics.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, an attempt was made to provide an overview of the literature in the area of 
measurement, evaluation and reward of managerial performance, with particular emphasis on the 
motivational function of the PMERS. Throughout this literature review, implicit was the 
realisation that control is fundamentally a behavioural issue, and that the ultimate criterion by 
which any system of control (such as the PMERS) should be assessed is behavioural (Emmanuel 
et al., 1990); that is, to what degree does such a system succeed in influencing managers to behave 
in desirable ways, or, conversely, how successful it is in not encouraging managerial actions which 
are contrary to the overall corporate objectives, whether in the short or in the long term. On these 
premises, in the earlier parts of the chapter both theoretical and practical considerations with 
regard to the design and the use of such systems of measures, standards of performance and related 
rewards were discussed to some length. In the later parts of the chapter, the theoretical proposition 
that there is no universally appropriate management control system that can be applied in all 
circumstances was considered, and the suggestion that the design of any control system is 
situationally specific was put forward. Within such a contingency theory perspective, the role of
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environmental uncertainty as a critical factor that can critically affect the design of the company’s 
PMERS, and through that, its motivational effectiveness was discussed and further assessed in the 
light of the available relevant empirical evidence. On the whole, this literature review has 
hopefully highlighted that the both the design and the implementation of any system of 
performance measures, standards and related rewards is a complex issue. In practice, it seems that 
the design of motivational contracts for middle-level management is a continuous effort on the 
part of the system’s designer first to strike and then to maintain the right balance between the 
different ideal qualities of the PMERS (measures’ accuracy and completeness, standards’ clarity 
and attainability, rewards’ attractiveness, etc.), given the environmental context within which the 
system is assumed to operate. It is evident, however, that despite the recognition of the necessity 
and criticality of these motivational contracts for middle-level managers, and the numerous 
prescriptions about how they ought to be designed and implemented in practice, the empirical 
evidence on their motivational effectiveness under different environmental conditions is yet 
sparse. It is essentially this research void that this study attempts to partly fill.
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Chapter Three : 
Theory Development Concept Formation 
& Hypotheses Formulation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter draws on previous literature in the area of Applied Organisational 
Psychology in order to develop a theoretical framework that can bring together the four 
main variables under investigation in this study - that is, 1) the PMERS, 2) managerial 
motivation, 3) managerial performance, and 4) environmental uncertainty. The early 
parts of the chapter refer to the various attempts to operationally define the term 
motivation, as well as to the theoretical background behind the different motivational 
theories. The subsequent sections review the most influential theories of motivation, 
with particular emphasis on the process theories of motivation, the Expectancy / 
Valence theory, and the Porter and Lawler model on the basis if which the theoretical 
framework of the present study was developed. The late parts of the chapter examine in 
depth the expectancy model employed and the hypotheses deriving from it, whereas at 
the end the rationale for choosing the particular framework as the study’s conceptual 
foundation is discussed.
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3.2 Motivation ; Operational Definitions
Etymologically speaking, the origins of the word motivation can be traced back to the Latin 
word “movere” which means to move (Collins English Dictionary, 1991). Within the field of 
Psychology, the term generally refers to the “ ...constant, never ending, fluctuating and complex 
process” (Maslow, 1954, p.69) through which human behaviour is activated.
Generally speaking, organisational psychologists have been mainly interested in the investigation 
of work motivation because of the alleged predicting ability and relationship of motivation with 
work performance and satisfaction, as well as because of its potential to contribute to the 
improvement of the jobs’ design that can motivate and satisfy employees. Diachronic attempts to 
provide an adequate and complete description of the process of motivation have brought about a 
wide range of operational definitions and models, which admittedly present a number of 
conceptual differences that basically reflect the distinct theoretical traditions and underlying 
assumptions upon which these definitions are based (Madsen, 1965). In an early attempt, Murphy 
(1947) saw motivation as the “general name for the fact that an organism’s acts are early 
determined by its own nature and natural structure” (p.991). Young (1961) argued that “the 
concept of motivation is exceedingly broad...and...[its] two most important aspects are the 
energetic aspect and...the regulation and direction [aspect]” (p.24). In his view the term refers to 
the process of arousing action, sustaining the activity in progress, and regulating the pattern of that 
activity. In a similar manner, Atkinson (1958 ; 1964) demonstrated that the function of arousal is 
closely related to the situational function, defined motivation as the contemporary (immediate) 
influences on the direction, vigour, and persistence of human action, and identified the study of 
motivation with the analysis of the factors that direct the individual’s behaviour. Hebb (1955 ; 
1958) seems to agree with Young and Atkinson about the central role of drive and arousal in the 
determination of motivation when he points out that “without a foundation of arousal, the cue 
function cannot exist...arousal...is synonymous with a general drive state” (p.249), and sees the 
drive as some process that provides energy of movement, although it may not determine what the 
movement will be. Jones (1955) asserts that motivation is concerned with how behaviour gets 
started, energised, sustained, directed, and stopped, and with what kind of subjective reaction is 
present in the organism while all this is going on. In a more behaviouristic spirit, Bindra (1959) 
underlined the goal-directed aspect of behaviour, and on these conceptual grounds motivation was 
defined, by Vroom (1964) as “...the process governing the choices made by persons or lower
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organisms among alternative forms of voluntary activity” (p.6), and by Schneider (1985) as the 
energising and directing effort toward the attainment of objectives and outcomes.
In more recent definitional attempts specifically addressing job behaviour, Steers and Porter 
(1979) argue that the concept of motivation is a highly complex phenomenon that affects and is 
affected by a multitude of factors in the organisational milieu, fundamentally pertaining to 
questions of i) what energises human behaviour, ii) what directs or channels such behaviour, and
iii) how this behaviour is maintained or sustained. Similarly, Berry and Houston (1993) contend 
that motivation accounts for the arousal, direction and persistence of human behaviour, and thus 
within the work setting attention needs to be drawn to what activates human behaviour 
(why individuals work), what channels such a behaviour (why they do a particular kind of job) 
and in what way such a behaviour is maintained (why they continue working at the same job 
usually for long periods of time or why they decide to quit their job). Likewise, Jewell (1998) 
claims that motivation pertains to the “various forces that produce, direct and maintain effort 
expended in behaviour” (p. 188), and Campbell and Pritchard (1976) - in perhaps the most 
elaborate definition available - maintain that “...[work] motivation has to do with a set of 
independent / dependent variable relationships that explain the direction, amplitude, and 
persistence of an individual’s behaviour, holding constant the effects of aptitude, skill, 
understanding of the task, and the constraints operating in the environment” (p.65). From the 
above literature review it becomes apparent that four components are present in virtually all of the 
definitions expressed - arousal, amplitude, direction and persistence -, although the relative 
importance attached to each of them clearly varies according to the different theoretical position 
that the different researcher decides to adopt and examine the phenomenon of motivation from.
Before proceeding to examine the main theories of motivation, it is worth noting that for almost 
every motivational theory expressed, there is a corresponding proposition of how these theories 
ought to be classified (Katzell & Thompson, 1990). One of the most prominent and widely 
accepted classifications has been offered by Campbell, Dunnette, Lawler, & Weick (1970) who 
differentiated between the substantive or content theories and the mechanical or process theories 
of motivation. Prior to considering each of these theories in some detail, the following section 
provides a brief overview of the theoretical background of the field of motivation, drawing from 
various areas such as personality, learning, and social psychology.
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3.3 Theoretical Foundations of Motivational Theories : Then and Now
It is beyond the scope of this study to account for the historical context of the theories of 
motivation, however, a brief historical reference will enable the reader, first, to appreciate the 
philosophical and conceptual basis of the different motivational theories and thereby the sources of 
their major similarities and differences, and second, to become aware of the fact that most of the 
motivational concepts that preceded the empirical work in motivation were formed long before the 
emergence of the twentieth century.
From a historical point of view, the roots of motivational concerns were dated back to Greek
•  t V iphilosophers, theologians of the medieval era, English associationists of the 19 century and other 
more recent thinkers and physiologists. As Cofer and Appley (1964) mention, Empedocles’ and 
Anaxagoras’ notion of dualism represents the earliest position of motivation, which later received 
its complete formulation by Plato and Aristotle. According to the notion of motivational dualism, 
human beings - in contrast to animals - were seen to be motivated not only by biological needs and 
desires but also by spiritual forces which, in combination with the aforementioned physical 
factors, caused the arousal, direction and persistence of human behaviour (Korman, 1974). 
Rationality and free will were therefore the dominant motivational concepts at that stage, in direct 
contrast to the later emphasis on terms such as needs and drives. However, it has to be noted that 
even at that point free will was not perceived as totally unaffected by bodily and environmental 
factors, a view shared by Descartes (1649) who, in essence, tried to link will with physical 
processes.
tliDuring the 19 century English associationists (otherwise referred to as utilitarians) widely used 
the principle of hedonism according to which the desire for pleasure and the realisation of 
pleasurable outcomes - and, conversely, the aversion for pain and the realization of unattractive 
outcomes - were perceived to be the primary motivators of behaviour. The central assumption of 
the hedonistic doctrine, i.e., that human behaviour is fundamentally directed toward outcomes that 
provide pleasure and away from those that produce pain, can be detected behind most of the 
contemporary conceptions of motivation (Atkinson, 1964), and its influence on modem 
psychology has been extensive (Vroom, 1964 ; Vroom & Deci, 1992). Bentham’s ‘hedonic 
calculus’ indicated the conscious process that people followed so as to estimate the pleasures and 
the pains of their behavioural outcomes. Hence, the notion of rational decisions formed the basis
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on which a new, cognitive-oriented, incentive-centered, type of motivational theory was formed 
(Campbell & Pritchard, 1976). Deriving from this theoretical tradition, which is fundamentally 
structured upon the premise that the content of mind is acquired through experience, the notion of 
associations of events influenced the learning element of almost all the subsequent motivational 
models developed thereafter.
The next significant conceptual advance beyond hedonism was made by Thorndike (1913) in his 
Law of Effect. Thorndike put forward the proposition that of several responses made to the same 
situation, those who are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the individual will, 
other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, so that when it (the 
situation) recurs, they (the responses) will be more likely to recur ; those which are accompanied 
or closely followed by discomfort to the individual will, other things being equal, have their 
connections with that situation weakened, so that when it recurs, they will be less likely to occur. 
Moreover, the greater the satisfaction or discomfort, the greater the strengthening or the weakening 
of the bond is expected to be. Hence, Thorndike’s Law of Effect introduced for the first time the 
concepts of learning and past events into the theorisation of motivation, basically maintaining that 
cognition and previous stimulus-response connections can explain how present behaviour is 
directed toward satisfying events and away from painful ones. In essence, by strongly emphasising 
the impact of learning, Thorndike made an important step toward the development of a testable 
theory of motivation (Lawler, 1994).
Further in the course of philosophical and scientific progress, the psychology of motivation was 
also influenced by the Darwinian revolution and the major growth in physiology. The perspective 
of evolutionary theory (Darwin, 1859) cast doubt on the dualism assumption and put forward the 
major hypothesis that the motivational processes for both humans and animals could be directly 
attributed to instincts and, by implication, should be studied through them (Hall & Lindzey, 1957).
Overall, the work on motivation in the field of psychology has been dominated by two different 
views of the nature of man. The first that has its origins in the writings of Freud and the 
neo-Freudians represents man as being driven by inherited, conflicting, unconscious drives that 
cause him to behave in instinctual and, at times, self-destructive ways ; the second that can be 
traced back to the work of Plato, Aristotle, and more recently to the work of Descartes, Hobbes,
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and Spinoza sees man as rational and aware of his goals, and as behaving in those ways that he 
feels will help him achieve these goals of his (Lawler, 1994). In essence, all theories of motivation 
in the field of psychology stem from either the one or the other philosophical paradigm.
3.4 Theories of Motivation : The Content and the Process
Both general and more specific theoretical formulations have been utilised through the years for 
the study of work motivation. As Berry and Houston (1993) point out, the former are able to cover 
a vast range of behavioural events and are adjusted to fit the work setting, while the latter - though 
more limited - are focused directly on aspects of work motivation. Despite the general or the 
specific orientation of the theories, most of the available theoretical models seem to be clearly 
dichotomised both in terms of their focus and in terms of the research questions they set out to 
address. Hence, according to Campbell and Prichard’s (1976) conceptual framework, motivational 
theories can be distinguished with regard to whether they focus on the content of the motivational 
structure or the process of motivation. Content theories aim to identify the variables that exert 
influence on behaviour, and address questions relating to the needs that people strive to satisfy 
through their work and to the type of rewards that are more attractive to them. In their great 
majority, these theories and their proponents (Freud, Murray, McDougall, Maslow) have their 
roots in the clinical approach. On the other hand, process theories and those who defend them 
(e.g., Hull, Spence, Tolman etc.) are much more experimentally oriented, and are mainly 
concerned with trying to specify the processes and the dynamics that force a person to make 
choices, to expend varying amounts of effort, and to persist toward the attainment of a set goal.
The following sections attempt a literature review of the various theories of work motivation, 
with the intention of presenting a total picture of the contributions made by the different areas in 
the field of psychology. In this attempt, the dichotomisation of motivational theories into content 
and process has been maintained and, as a consequence, the related concepts (such as instincts, 
drives, needs, motives, incentives, goals, values, expectancies, etc.) and their operational 
definitions have been discussed within the content / process continuum.
As such, the following first part of this review focuses on the content of motivation and the nature 
of human needs.
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3.4.1 The Content of Motivation
The emergence of the motivational concept of needs was inevitably influenced by Darwin’s 
proposition that human and animal behaviour is aroused and directed by instincts. In essence, 
the notion of needs derived from the theory of instincts according to which people are generally 
motivated by their innate impulses. Notwithstanding the vagueness of the term instinct (Troland, 
1928), it was initially adopted by James (1890) who argued for the existence of various instinctive 
tendencies such as the instincts of locomotion, imitation and sympathy etc. McDougall (1908), in 
his instinct-motivation theory, perceived instinct as “...an inherited or innate psychological 
disposition” (p.30). In contrast to James’ mechanistic view of instincts, McDougall insisted on the 
purposive as well as the goal directed nature of the term. Having also departed from the absolute 
rationality of human beings, Freud’s (1925) theory of motivation proposed two basic instincts - 
sex and aggression - as determinants of the arousal, direction and rigor of human behaviour. Since 
these unconscious, pleasure-oriented, instinctive urges were seen as responsible for much of 
motivated behaviour, the term unconscious motivation was coined.
Despite its initial acceptance, the instinct theory of motivation has received severe criticism 
through the years (Hilgard & Atkinson, 1967). As Levinson (1981) points out, although 
organisation behaviour was initially discussed and examined within a psychoanalytic context, the 
psychoanalytic/ Freudian approach has exerted little influence on the investigation of motivation in 
organisations ever since, primarily because it was originally developed with the intention of 
explaining patterns and cases of maladaptive behaviour. And although the idea of inherited 
instincts was dismissed in the end, Murray’s (1938) articulation of the need theory of motivation 
gave a second wind to this approach. Murray saw instincts as being essentially learned, and he 
thereof introduced the concept of psychological needs as the individual’s primary driving force, a 
concept that eventually became one of the most pervasive in the field of work motivation and one 
that still is very instrumental in theories that view the person as being pulled towards the 
attainment of attractive outcomes (Deci, 1992). He went on to conceptualise and put forward 
twenty needs (such as the needs for achievement, affiliation, aggression etc.) as potential 
behavioural motivators, which, although have been extensively used in the contemporary literature 
of organisational psychology, lacked empirical backing at the time.
65
PMERS, Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty THEORY & HYPOTHESES
The work of Murray was complemented by Maslow’s (1943, 1954, 1970) Need-Hierarchy theory, 
a theory that also focuses on the content of the motivational structure and constitutes one of the 
most popular models of work motivation ever expressed. Having drawn from clinical 
observations, Maslow claimed that within human creatures a multitude of universally applicable 
physiological, safety, love, esteem and self-actualisation needs exist, needs that influence human 
behaviour. According to his theory, when one of these needs is present the individual will be 
motivated to the behaviour that will lead to the need being satisfied. Furthermore, Maslow stated 
that the aforementioned needs do not have an equal effect. In his view, both physiological and 
psychological needs exist in a hierarchical order of prepotency with higher-order needs emerging 
only after the satisfaction of the lower-order ones. In essence, there is a hierarchy of needs in 
which certain needs will dominate other needs until they are met, and once they are met they will 
no longer have any motivating effect (Lyne, 1995). Moreover, within Maslow’s motivational 
framework need gratification is theorized to reduce motivation except in the case of the 
self-actualisation need where satisfaction is seen to be constantly increasing. As Howell (1976) 
comments, the implications of Maslow’s theory for managers in the workplace are significant, 
since if top managers are aware of their subordinates’ needs, they can identify their goal-objects 
and make the appropriate group interventions that will motivate them. What is more, 
the organization can benefit from the gratification of its employees’ lower needs since - according 
to the theory - it is possible thereafter to motivate them indefinitely through their self-actualised 
needs. Nevertheless, Wahba and Bridwell (1975) point out some of the weaknesses of this 
theoretical framework when they claim that Maslow’s explanation about needs’ activation and 
gratification cannot be easily interpreted and his propositions regardless of their humanistic appeal 
receive little empirical support. Indeed, there is empirical evidence which, contrary to Maslow’s 
assertions, shows that some satisfied needs become more important over time as compared to 
other unsatisfied ones (Hall & Nougaim, 1968 ; Lawler & Suttle, 1972). In addition, the accuracy 
and completeness of the proposed list of needs has widely and repeatedly been questioned.
A modified version of Maslow’s need hierarchy theory has been proposed by Alderfer (1969, 
1972). His ERG model postulates only three levels of needs (Existence, Relatedness and Growth), 
with the unsatisfied higher needs giving rise to the lower ones (what Alderfer refers to as 
frustration / regression process), and the possibility that two needs are activated at the same time. 
Nevertheless, Alderfer’s admittedly more flexible theory of motivation does not really overcome
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the weaknesses that the Maslow model presents, in the sense that it is equally - and perhaps 
inherently - inaccurate and incomplete as far as the choice of needs is concerned, whereas it also 
lacks supporting evidence.
The role of needs in motivation was also highlighted by Herzberg (1968), who looked at the 
content and satisfaction in the workplace and came up with the Two-Factor theory. In his theory 
of motivation, he essentially divided the factors that affect behaviour into two broad categories. 
These are the motivating factors (that include job-related variables such as achievement, 
recognition, a challenging job, promotion, responsibility, etc.) and the hygiene factors 
(e.g., company policies, work conditions, interpersonal relations, job security, salary, etc.). 
Hygiene factors are assumed to reduce job satisfaction and motivation, whereas motivating factors 
have the potential to increase the individual’s job satisfaction and his / her motivation. In effect, 
the theory is built around two major premises :
i) there is a significant relationship between job satisfaction and motivation ; where job 
satisfaction is high, motivation will be high and vice versa.
ii) the factors that have a significant effect on job satisfaction - and thereby on work 
motivation - are quite different from those which have a negative effect.
In Herzberg’s view, the hygiene factors - which basically serve the biological needs - can only 
cause less dissatisfaction, while it is the motivating factors, which are associated more with 
intrinsic needs for achievement, that can lead to higher level of satisfaction and motivation.
Overall, the major contention of the Two-Factor theory is that motivation to work is expected to 
increase only when the motivating factors are present in the work situation ; removing negative 
hygiene factors will have only a limited impact on motivation, as the strong and critical motivating 
effects arise from the motivating factors themselves. However, the existence of the hygiene 
factors are seen as a constraint on the effective working of the motivating factors, and need 
therefore to be eliminated or reduced to the extent possible (Lyne, 1995). All in all, the fact that 
motivation is seen as a product of universally common individual needs is noted as one of the 
theory’s weak points, whereas the evidence indicating that all factors contribute to both 
satisfaction and dissatisfaction (Dunnette, Campbell & Hakel, 1967) casts doubts on the model’s 
internal validity and reliability. On top of that, the possibility that the two-factors division 
proposed and confirmed by Herzberg is an artifact of the individual characteristics, sex
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differences, and the organisational environment within which the particular research took place 
cannot be ruled out (Miner & Dachler, 1973).
McClelland’s (1961) concept of needs was used in a less deterministic way. In the same 
theoretical vein with Maslow’s (1943, 1954, 1970) Need-Hierarchy theory he also proposed a 
hierarchy of factors which motivate behaviour, however, his hierarchy was much less rigid 
involving only three needs : the need for achievement, the need for power, and the need for 
affiliation. Originally, McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lower (1953) focused on and examined 
the motivational role of the specific need for achievement within the organisational setting, on the 
basis of which high achievers were expected to be more motivated to accomplish some internal 
standards of excellence than low achievers. They claimed that the achievement needs can become 
strong motivators in individuals whose personality is such that they have a strong need to achieve, 
particularly if the work circumstances have the appropriate characteristics to bring out the 
maximum motivating effect (e.g., opportunities to take responsibility, environment within which 
the employee receives credit and recognition for taking initiative, etc.). In a similar way, power 
motivation and affiliation motivation may be particularly effective for certain individuals, 
operating under the right conditions. Worth noting is the point that both the need for achievement 
(nAch), and the needs for power (nPower) and affiliation (nAff) are conceived within 
McClelland’s framework as acquired and learned, and thus may be increased - with obvious 
motivational benefits for the organisation - through training (McClelland & Winter, 1969). 
In addition, McClelland suggested that all three needs can occur at the same time, although one 
may be dominant over the others at any point in time. In other words, different people are likely to 
respond differently to the three aforementioned needs, simply because different people - or the 
same people at different times - may have a different order of needs in the hierarchy.
Overall, the content approach has accounted for the discovery, placement and importance of needs 
and has attempted to identify the specific factors that influence employees’ behaviour. As they 
concentrate on input and not interaction, the proponents of this approach have diagnosed what 
rewards people desire, which needs are to be satisfied, and which incentives are the most powerful 
(Campbell & Prichard, 1976). However, content theories’ implicit, but clearly erroneous, 
assumptions that
1) all people are alike, sharing by and large the same needs,
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2) all situations are alike,
3) there is ‘one best way’ to motivate people,
have led to the underestimation of the individual’s role. As Fumham, Forde and Ferrari (1999) 
showed, the reliability of using a content theory may be seriously affected by workers’ individual 
differences. Regardless of their global motivational character, other personal and situational 
factors (e.g., nature of work, organisational position, culture, etc.) may have an equally significant 
part to play in the motivational process together with the gratification of the individual’s needs. 
An overview of the most influential need theories is presented in Figure 3-1.
Maslow’s 
Need-Hierarchy Theory
Alderfer’s 
ERG Theory
Herzberg’s 
Two-Factor Theory
McClelland’s 
PAA Theory
Self-actualisation needs 
(advancement, growth)
Growth needs
Motivators
Achievement needs
Self-esteem needs 
(achievement, responsibility, 
approval, recognition, status)
Social needs 
(acceptance, affection, 
belonging, interpersonal
Relatedness needs Affiliation needs
Safety needs 
(security, working conditions, 
freedom from fear) Existence needs Hygiene Power needs
Physiological needs 
(salary, food, drink, shelter)
Figure 3-1 : Classification o f  Need Theories
3.4.2 The Process of Motivation
Essentially, the development of process theories of motivation represents a shift in the focus 
of scientific enquiry in the field of organizational psychology, a movement away from the 
identification of specific factors that are believed to be associated with high degrees of motivation 
in most individuals, towards more general formulations that allow different people to be motivated 
in different ways (Emmanuel et al., 1990). That is, process theories of motivation fundamentally 
recognize that individuals differ in a number of variables which “in a dynamic state affect the 
individual’s behaviour and motivational force” (Steers & Porter, 1979, p.210), and it is therefore
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the investigation of the interaction between these independent variables - and their combined 
effect on motivation, the main dependent variable - that constitutes their main subject matter. 
Drives, reinforcements and expectancies are some of the independent variables employed within 
the different process models that have been developed through the years to explain (predict) 
differences in dependent variables such as choice, effort and persistence in the work situation.
The term drive was first coined by Woodworth (1918) and it was later used in Hull’s (1943) 
Drive-Reduction theory, which basically posited that drive states derive from tissue needs, 
generate behaviour, and their reduction has the potential to reinforce learning. Hull saw the 
motivational force as the multiplicative function of drive and habit (Effort = Drive X Habit), 
though later the incentive factor was added to the formulation. However, to the extent that within 
the particular motivational model behaviour modification was seen to be accomplished through the 
reduction of primary needs, there were a few - if any - practical implications for the management 
of motivation in the organisational context (Vroom & Deci, 1992).
Having also drawn upon Thorndike’s (1911, 1913) law of effect, Skinner’s (1953) Operant theory 
emphasised the consequences of positive and negative reinforcements on behaviour, and simply 
stated that employees’ behaviours are likely to be repeated when they lead to positive outcomes. 
The role of rewards (and penalties) is fundamental within reinforcement theory as they are the key 
factors that are seen to cause behaviour to be repeated (or averted), provided that positive (or 
negative) reinforcement follows the expression of the particular behaviour that is intended to be 
encouraged (or discouraged). Although Skinner’s Operant theory has been only implicitly 
motivational, it has nevertheless been frequently applied in organisational settings (Hammer, 
1974), since it provides, first, a number of insights on how behaviour can be directed and 
controlled through reinforcements in practice, and second, a set of testable research hypotheses 
(predictions) about effort and task choice in the work situation. Deci (1975), however, criticises 
the behaviourists for being partial in their approach to motivation management, in the sense that 
they advocate a purely external (extrinsically-oriented) reward system which, although can gratify 
the individual’s lower order needs, it totally disregards the motivational scope of its higher order 
needs. In effect, within this school of thought intrinsic rewards are largely ignored, and humans 
are thereby viewed as passive responders to the external environmental stimuli (Mitchell, 1974a).
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On top of the previous psychological approaches to motivation, the more recent, cognitive-based, 
process theories have seen the individual’s behaviour as being determined by the beliefs, 
anticipations and expectations that he / she holds about future events. Within the cognitive camp, 
expectancy theory, equity theory and goal setting theory seem to hold the most prevalent positions.
3.4.2.1 The Cognitive Perspective
The process by which motivation is activated is clearly illustrated in Adams’ (1965) Equity theory, 
which basically maintains that individuals’ work behaviour is affected by their thoughts, opinions 
and feelings as these are shaped by the particular environment within which they have to operate. 
Adams’ theoretical framework is fundamentally structured upon the concept of cognitive 
consistency (Festinger, 1957 ; Heider, 1958) and on the social comparison processes (Festinger, 
1954) on the basis of which behaviour is seen to be motivated when inconsistency generates 
tension or dissonance, and a restoration of consistency is subsequently sought. Within the 
organisational context, the previous notions were transformed into Adam’s social driven and 
comparative process theory. According to his view, behaviour is motivated by the perceived 
equity (or inequity) of the social comparison, since employees have a tendency to relate the value 
of outcomes they receive (salary, bonus, recognition, job status, personal fulfilment, etc.) to the 
inputs (expended effort, skill, experience) they commit, and compare this outcome / input ratio of 
theirs to the ratio of others. In more detail, from an Equity theory perspective the individual’s 
motivation in the workplace is seen to be mainly influenced by his / her preconceived ideas of 
what constitutes an equitable reward for the job that he / she performs, and what he / she actually 
receives, compared to those around him. When the normative expectations of the person making 
these social comparisons are violated - i.e., when he finds that his outcomes and inputs are not in 
balance in relation to those of others -, feelings of inequity are likely to result, and the person is 
expected to be motivated to take (desirable or undesirable) actions in order to restore equity, or at 
least reduce the level of inequity (Steers & Porter, 1979). This perceived inequity can be of two 
forms, which both are thought to lead to adverse motivational consequences. If the individual 
perceives an unfavourable inequity, dissatisfaction leading to anger, frustration, and motivation 
loss occurs ; if the inequity is perceived to be favourable, chances are that the individual will 
experience feelings of guilt. In any case, the perceived inequities are theorised to lead to 
motivational effects, with the individual being assumed to be motivated to remove or reduce the 
( tension that is caused by the perceived inequity. Additionally, these motivational effects on the 
i
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individual are hypothesised to be directly proportional to his / her felt dissatisfaction with 
the inequities perceived (Lyne, 1995). Overall then, within Adam’s conceptual model of 
organisational behaviour, employees’ motivation is seen to largely depend on their perceived 
fairness of the work situation and, by implication, on the appropriate tailoring of the job 
parameters to fit the individual’s perception of fair (Mowday, 1983).
Locke’s (1968) Goal Setting theory, within which goals are considered to be the primary 
determinants of motivation and their attainment as being inherently rewarding and motivational, 
also falls within the domain of cognitive psychology. The theory’s formulation makes explicit 
how effort and choice are governed by the individual’s goals and intentions. In accordance with 
Locke’s basic hypothesis, individuals who set high goals - or consent to high goals already 
established by others -, are likely to put in more effort in their job and exhibit a relatively higher 
job performance than individuals who set or are willing to accept low goals. However, as Howell 
(1976) points out, the definition of and distinction between high and low goals has always been 
problematic. Additionally, the fact that some people are more motivated and perform better when 
they set high goals (Garland, 1983) has been openly questioned and challenged by Mowen et al. 
(1981), who showed out that the efficacy of high-standard goals is dependent on the control 
system under which employees operate.
The above literature review serves to demonstrate the point that most of the goal-directed theories 
have been mainly concerned with the process of motivation rather than the specification of its 
content. They are therefore naturally placed under the umbrella of the process theories of 
motivation, which primarily focus on the individual’s reactions to environmental (contextual and 
situational) variables, particularly considering the interactive effects between them (Steers & 
Porter, 1979). Overall, while content theories stress individual characteristics with particular 
emphasis on the critical role of needs in the determination of work behaviour, process theories 
seek to cope with the complexity of several job aspects and their influences on the individual’s 
motivation. Despite, however, the justified attention paid to work-related variables (e.g., system 
of performance evaluation, system of rewards and incentives, organizational climate, leadership 
style, etc.), it has to be admitted that process theories tend to overestimate such factors, to the 
extent that individual parameters (such as the individual’s needs, beliefs and attitudes) are largely 
overlooked. An alternative, more balanced, integrative approach, which has generated the greatest
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amount of empirical research among the various cognitive theories of motivation, is provided by 
the expectancy theory that is presented in the following section.
3.4.3 The Expectancy Theory of Motivation
3.4.3.1 Conceptual Underyinnims
The Expectancy-Valence (E-V) theory has proved to be one of the most comprehensive, 
cognitive oriented, process theories. Deriving from Tolman’s (1932) cognitive-based model of 
motivation and Lewin’s (1936) motivational analysis of social behaviour, the expectancy model 
can be seen as a behavioural version of the rational choice model in economic decision making 
(Singer & Coffin, 1996), which, in line with classical economic theory, basically predicts that 
individuals always act to optimise the expected value (or valence) of the rewards that they expect 
to receive (Nadler & Lawler, 1977 ; Ferris, 1977). Overall, within the context of expectancy 
theory of motivation individuals are presumed to act as rational decision makers whose behaviour 
is guided by an analysis and weighting of the potential costs and benefits of alternative courses of 
action. This analysis is held to be based
(i) on the individual’s preferences (valences) among the different resulting outcomes, 
preferences that believed to relate to the individual’s needs,
(ii) on some sort of forward-looking beliefs (expectancies) about these outcomes, 
beliefs that are thought to be formed on the basis of the individual’s previous 
experiences (Porter & Lawler, 1968).
More specifically, through the prism of expectancy theory individuals are mainly seen as reasoning 
beings that have expectations and beliefs about their future actions, as well as preferences among 
the various outcomes of these future actions. Accordingly, human behaviour is viewed as the 
outcome of the interactive processes between the individual’s characteristics and his / her 
perceptions of the environment within which he / she operates.
In general terms, the theory is basically structured upon four major assumptions / building blocks 
with regard to the causes and mechanics of human behaviour. : rationality, preference, expectation 
and cognition. Within a ‘utility maximisation’ spirit, and fundamentally based upon a definition 
of man as goal oriented, need satisfying, and as one who interacts with his environment in a 
“rational” manner (Wanous, 1972), E-V asserts that people within organisations are motivated to 
perform an action when they perceive that the consequences of this action are favourable to them ;
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that is, when they expect that the activity in which they engage will provide them with goals and 
outcomes that they need and, subsequently, value. In work situations in the organisational setting, 
individuals are faced with a number of possible behaviours, essentially with a number of choices 
to perform at different levels of effectiveness. The major postulate of expectancy theory is that, in 
such situations, people must be expected to behave in the way they think it will have the most 
favourable results for them, i.e., in the way they expect to maximise the potential benefits and 
minimise the potential costs associated with the situation. This criterion is assumed to govern their 
choices among alternative courses of action within organisations. Hence, individuals within the 
expectancy model are not seen as inherently motivated or unmotivated ; motivation largely 
depends on the situation they are in - situation that is itself determined by the structures provided 
by the organisation (such as the organisation’s PMERS) - and how this situation is perceived to fit 
or not to fit their own personal needs (Nadler & Lawler, 1977).
Another fundamental - though implicit - assumption of E-V theory is that human behaviour in the 
organisational context is primarily conscious and goal-directed. Individuals are seen as largely 
autonomous beings that make conscious, well-calculated decisions about their behaviour in their 
job on the basis of their own needs, preferences and expectations of what the world is like today 
and is likely to be in the future. In effect, they are assumed to consider all the alternative plans of 
action, to use their ‘mental maps’ to decide upon the optimal course of action, and to eventually 
choose the behaviour that is more likely to lead them closer to attractive and gratifying outcomes 
(rewards) and away from undesired ones (penalties).
Of equal importance to the expectancy model of motivation is the premise that organisational 
behaviour is jointly determined by both individual and environmental factors. Essentially, 
individuals are seen to respond (rationally) to their work environment, drawing upon their 
psychological profile (attitudes, needs, expectations, values personality traits) as it has been 
developed by their past experiences. In this sense, the interaction of environmental, job-specific 
variables (supervisor’s style, performance evaluation system, reward system, etc.) with the 
individual’s personal characteristics is crucial within the expectancy framework, as different 
environments are likely to affect similar people in a totally different way, and different people may 
behave differently under similar environmental conditions. This assumption, deriving from the
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alleged variation in human needs, desires and goals, significantly contributes to the individualistic 
nature of the model.
3.4.3.2 Basic Theoretical Formulations and the Porter & Lawler Model
The relevance of expectancy theory for the examination of work motivation was first demonstrated 
in the work of Georgopoulos, Mahoney, and Jones (1957), and later in the models presented by 
Vroom (1964) and Lawler and Porter (1967) who both saw motivation as a function of the 
employee’s expectations that his behaviour will lead to valuable (for him) outcomes.
Classified as a process theory of motivation, expectancy-valence theory is typically concerned with 
specifying the processes and the dynamics involved in the determination of the individual’s 
motivation and performance, and thereby posits in its classic version (Vroom, 1964 ; Lawler & 
Porter, 1967) that the motivational force on the individual to perform at a particular level of effort 
is a joint function of two types of perceptions, namely :
i) the perceived value (valence) that he / she assigns to the various outcomes and 
rewards associated with his / her job (V), and
ii) the perceived probability (expectation or expectancy) that effort on his / her part will 
lead to these outcomes / rewards (E->R).
Notationally, the latter can be expressed as follows
M = f  [V (E -R )l (1) MotivationalForce = Valence X Expectancy
What is suggested by the above mathematical notation is that that Motivation (M) is determined by 
the interaction of two prime variables, namely :
-  the V or Valence (Perceived Value) of Rewards (R). which is conceptually defined as the 
degree of desirability, or the degree of attractiveness (preference) the individual places on 
the Rewards (R) that he / she expects to receive in the context of his / her job, that is, the 
strength of his / her positive or negative affective orientation towards the particular rewards. 
Based on Lewin’s use of the term (1935 ; 1938), this valence-of-rewards variable in the
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model refers to the manager’s anticipated (perceived) satisfaction associated with the 
various possible rewards or outcomes associated with his / her work.
-  and the (E~»R) or Effort-Rewards Expectancy, that is defined as the degree of subjective 
expectation (belief) that the individual has concerning whether or not the expenditure of his 
/ her Effort (E) will actually lead to the attainment of the valued Rewards-Outcomes (R) 
that are associated with his / her job. In essence, this variable refers to the manager’s 
subjective probability estimate regarding the perceived likelihood that the various, possible 
rewards that he / she desires will follow from putting forth certain levels of effort.
Overall, expectancy theory makes a simple - though attractively logical - prediction about human 
motivation (i.e., the intention to expend energy) in the workplace, on the basis of which the 
individual is expected to be motivated only when he / she
(i) perceives that the intended effort on his / her part will lead to a particular 
outcome
(ii) considers that outcome to be attractive to him / her.
Stated differently, from an expectancy theory perspective the motivational force on the individual 
to expend a higher amount of effort is greater,
(i) the more the individual believes that his / her effort will suffice for the attainment 
of specific outcomes / rewards (effort-rewards expectancy)
(ii) the more the individual values these outcomes / rewards (valence of rewards).
Worth emphasising at this point is the multiplicative aspect of the model, as depicted in 
equation (1). This multiplicative combination of the terms that are hypothesised to determine the 
individual’s motivation follows from the recognition that unless all variables (valences and 
expectancies) are present in some degree, there will be no motivational force on the individual. 
In other words, each variable alone is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for motivation. 
If a person highly values the rewards potentially available in his / her work environment, but, at 
the same time, he / she believes that their attainment is in no way dependent on his / her effort 
expenditure, then this person’s motivation is expected to be zero. In like manner, even if a person 
believes that his / her intended effort is likely to lead to the aforementioned rewards, he may still 
experience a low level of motivation if these rewards have very low value for him.
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A number of alternative expectancy models have been developed through the years on the basis of 
the above central theoretical formulation (e.g., Atkinson, 1958 ; Edwards, 1954 ; Peak, 1955 ; 
Rotter, 1955 ; Vroom, 1964). And although in their totality they admittedly provide the most valid 
and comprehensive approach for the understanding of motivation and of the factors that affect it 
(Lawler, 1973 ; Nadler & Lawler, 1977), they have been rightly criticized
* for their ahistorical nature, that is, for the fact that all expectancy theory predictions 
about motivation are formed in terms of expectations and perceptions of future 
consequences with no regard to the individual’s previous reinforcement history 
(Miner & Dachler, 1973),
* for their unreasonable assumption about the individual’s unlimited cognitive ability,
i.e., the assumption that the individual consciously and purposefully considers all the 
possible courses of action before he chooses the optimal one that is likely to maximise 
his ‘pleasure’ and minimise his ‘pain’ (March, 1972 ; Belcher, 1980), as well as
* for their overemphasis on extrinsic rewards, i.e., their one-sided approach to motivation 
through purely external incentives and their failure to recognise the motivational 
importance of potentially critical concepts such as drives, needs, intrinsic rewards, etc. 
(Halachmi & Holzer, 1987).
Porter and Lawler (1968) have acknowledged these inherent weaknesses and have attempted to 
address them in their work on motivation. Their model of organisational behaviour represents a 
refinement and extension of expectancy theory, essentially a more integrative approach to the 
investigation of the phenomenon of motivation in the workplace, which incorporates such issues 
as role perception, traits, extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, and the question of equity. In effect, this 
extension of the expectancy-valence model is a comprehensive, “over-arching” framework 
(Cooper & Makin, 1984) that provides the ground within which many of the dominant theories of 
management and motivation (such as Barnard’s (1938) concept of the equilibrium between 
contributions and inducements, Maslow’s (1954, 1970) Need theory, Adams’ (1963, 1965) 
Equity theory, and Hackman’s et al. (1975) Job-Design model) together with their relevant 
influential principles (such as the principles of reinforcement, goal-setting, job enrichment and 
enlargement, intrinsic and extrinsic motivators, job satisfaction, etc.) can be usefully fitted.
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All in all, Porter and Lawler’s (1968) model - graphically depicted in Figure 3-2 below - has been 
characterised by Campbell and Pritchard (1976) and others as the least complex and most 
comprehensible of the E-V models available.
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Source : Porter, L.W. - Lawler, E.E. (1968), “Managerial Attitudes and Performance”, Homewood, 111.: 
Irwin-Dorsey.
| Figure 3-2 : The Porter and Lawler Model
In essence, the model provides a set of clear-cut predictions about
a) the determination of the individual’s work motivation [4]
b) the determination of the individual’s job performance [7].
With regard to the determination of motivation, the model postulates in its central expectancy 
theory core that an individual will select the behaviour to engage in and the level of effort to be 
exerted on the basis of the subjective probability estimate that effort will lead to certain 
outcomes / rewards (E->R) and the value (V) that he or she places on these outcomes / rewards 
(Ferris, 1977). Effort here refers to the amount of energy the individual is willing to expend in a
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given situation, and is the variable in the model that most closely corresponds to the motivational 
component in typical discussions of the motivation of performance (Lawler & Porter, 1967), the 
variable that is basically intended to provide an explanation of how hard an individual works, 
rather than how effectively the individual performs.
All in all, the assumption is that at any particular point in time,
i) people have differing preferences among the various outcomes that are potentially 
available to them
ii) people have different expectancies about the likelihood that an action (effort) on their part 
will lead to certain outcomes
iii) the actions a person chooses to take are determined by the expectancies and the 
preferences that person has at the particular point in time. (Lawler, 1994).
It is therefore two factors - “antecedent attitudes” in Lawler and Porter’s terminology (1967, 
p. 122) - that are seen to determine the effort [4] a person puts into his/ her job (i.e., his / her work 
motivation), namely:
- the momentary belief about the likelihood that a particular act will be fulfilled by a 
particular outcome / reward (effort-reward expectancy) [1]
- the person’s affective orientation toward the particular outcome / reward (reward valence) [2] 
(Vroom, 1964).
In relation to the establishment and revision of the individual’s perceptions and anticipations, 
the model introduces - in a dynamic, circular sense - the notion of feedback loops that run from the 
individual’s past behaviour experiences back to the present determinants of his / her motivation 
(Nadler & Lawler, 1977). Although it is right to say that there is a certain degree of stability to the 
perceived expectancies and reward valences over time for a given person, it is also clear that these 
factors / determinants of the person’s motivation can and do change, mainly on the basis of various 
situational and contextual parameters of the environment with which the person interacts 
(Lawler & Porter, 1967). As such, the individual’s perceived effort-reward (E->R) probability [2] 
is assumed within the model to be directly influenced, apart from the given actual situation itself, 
by a number of other factors such as the communication of other people’s perceptions of the 
person’s situation, the person’s self-esteem [3] (which essentially denotes the individual’s beliefs 
about his / her ability to deal with and control the environment in which he / she operates (Argyris,
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1964 ; Rotter, 1966)), and his / her previous personal experience in similar situations, that is, 
his / her past task successes (or failures) and the rewards (or penalties) that did or did not follow 
these successes (or failures) [feedback loop a] (Lawler, 1973). The latter factor essentially 
highlights the importance of cognition (learning) in the establishment of the person’s (E->R) 
expectancy within any given situation (Graen, 1969). The exact manner by which outcomes 
acquire their preferential value (or valence) (V) is unspecified in the model, however, at least one 
way is suggested by the feedback loop [b] from ‘Satisfaction’ [9] through the ‘Degree to which the 
reward is perceived to satisfy needs’ [10] to the ‘Value of Reward ’ [!]• What is implied here by 
Porter and Lawler is that rewards acquire valence as a function of their ability to “satisfy”. 
In addition to the felt satisfaction with the reward (i.e., how much the individual thinks that the 
particular reward satisfied his / her personal needs in the past (Maslow, 1954)), the perceived 
equity of a reward (Adams, 1965) was later proposed to influence the reward’s subsequent 
anticipated value (V) (Lawler, 1994).
As far as the individual’s job performance is concerned, Lawler and Porter (1967) define it 
as “ .. .the amount of successful role achievement” (p. 131), and posit it to be a joint function of the 
individual’s ability to perform the job, his / her role perceptions with respect to the job, and his / 
her motivation to perform the job (Ferris, 1977). The underlying notion here is that effort 
(motivation) is not synonymous with performance (accomplishment). The other variables, which, 
in addition to motivation [4], are theorised to affect task performance [7] are
(1) the person’s ability [5], that is, the individual’s “...relatively stable, long-term 
characteristics (e.g., intelligence, personality traits, manual and psychomotor skills, 
etc.)...his / her currently developed power to perform” (Lawler & Porter, 1967, p. 129), 
essentially, his / her “ ...potential for performing some task which may or may not 
eventually be utilized” (Vroom, 1964, p. 198). In effect, these ability and trait patterns 
are seen as ‘boundary conditions’, as an upper limit on the level of the individual’s 
performance.
(2) the person’s perception of his / her role [6], i.e., his / her definition and understanding of 
the “ ...kinds of activities and behaviours in which he feels he should engage so as to 
perform his job successfully... effectively, the more situationally-specific perceptions that 
determine the direction in which the individual applies his effort” (Porter & Lawler,
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1968, p. 24). Under the influence of drive theory, Lawler (1971) further maintained that 
this perception is basically learned through previous experience.
The above theoretical proposition about the determinants of the individual’s performance gives 
rise to a number of seemingly logical and intuitively sound working hypotheses. First, it suggests 
that for an individual with low ability, incremental increases in motivation are likely to yield 
smaller increases in job performance than when ability is high (Galbraith & Cummings, 1967). 
Second, it implies that a high level of motivation would have little effect on performance if the 
individual lacks a proper understanding of his / her job requirements (Lawler & Porter, 1967).
With regard to the relationship between performance [7] and rewards, the Porter and Lawler model 
maintains that the individual’s performance has the potential to generate rewards, and, further, 
usefully recognises the existence of two types of rewards : intrinsic and extrinsic. On the one 
hand, intrinsic rewards [8a] are basically the rewards that are seen to satisfy the individual’s 
higher-order needs (in the Maslow (1970) sense), tend to be administered by the individual to 
himself / herself and thereby result automatically from and have a direct relationship with his / her 
performance, and are essentially intrinsically satisfying (e.g., feelings of achievement, recognition, 
and self-actualisation). On the other hand, extrinsic rewards [8b] - most usually associated with 
pay, salary raises, year-end bonuses, fringe benefits and promotion - are thought of as satisfying 
more basic, lower-order needs, as being administered by external sources and agents (such as, 
the organisation, the supervisor, the PMERS, etc.), and, therefore, as having a more sporadic kind 
of relationship with the individual’s performance. That is to say that, in contrast to intrinsic 
rewards, extrinsic (externally administered) rewards do not always follow successful task 
achievement.
Lastly, the model postulates that the result of the attainment of a reward [8a,8b], as well as the 
individual’s perceptions of the relative value of the obtained reward, lead to the individual 
experiencing a positive or a negative affective response, that is, a level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction (9) (Pritchard & Sanders, 1973 ; Nadler & Lawler, 1977). Porter and Lawler (1968) 
refer to satisfaction as a ‘derivative variable’, in the sense that its meaning and / or value is 
believed to be determined by the individual’s comparison between what he / she considers as an 
equitable reward and the actual reward that he / she receives in the context of his / her job. To the 
extent that the perceived equitable reward exceeds the actual reward, the individual is likely to be
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dissatisfied ; if the actual reward exceeds the perceived equitable reward, the individual is 
expected to be satisfied. The larger the difference between these two values, the greater the degree 
of dissatisfaction or satisfaction is assumed to be (Adams, 1963, 1965). In this sense, within the 
context of the Porter-Lawler model job satisfaction largely depends on the match between 
expected and obtained rewards. Satisfaction, in turn, has a general positive or negative impact on 
the future decisions the individual will make with respect to the value of promised rewards 
(the latter is highlighted in Figure 3-1 by the feedback loop b, connecting “Satisfaction” with 
“Value of Reward”, as was discussed earlier). Since individuals are theorised to have the capacity 
to remember pleasant and unpleasant experiences (the hedonistic aspect of expectancy theory), 
and to attach these memories to particular contexts and stimuli, it is assumed that the individual 
will anticipate future, pleasant and unpleasant, outcomes and choose among (i.e., be motivated 
toward) his / her behaviour alternatives accordingly (the cognitive aspect of the theory). 
Hence the important role of satisfaction in the model.
Overall, the basic proposition put forward by the Porter and Lawler framework is that, apart from 
the relatively stable role of ability in the determination of performance, a number of antecedent 
attitudes / perceptions influence the individual’s performance, primarily through the other two 
determinant variables of performance, i.e., the individual’s motivation and his / her role 
perception. Two types of perceptions - namely, the perceived value of rewards, and the perceived 
probability that rewards depend on effort - are involved in determining the individual’s effort 
(motivation), which together with the individual’s understanding of his / her role (a particular type 
of perception in its own right) are seen to exert a joint effect on the individual’s subsequent task 
performance. Thus, according to the model, if the intention is to modify performance, one way to 
do it is though changing the individual’s job attitudes, specifically his / her perceptions about i) the 
value of the rewards that he / she receives, ii) the relationship between the effort that he / she 
expends and the rewards that he / she receives, and iii) the job role that he / she performs. These 
three types of attitudes are considered within the model to be the most crucial antecedent attitudes 
of effective job performance (Lawler & Porter, 1967).
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3.4.4 The Expectancy Model of PMERS-Directed Behaviour
This section draws on the discipline of Applied Organisational Psychology in general, and on the 
previously reviewed literature in the area of Expectancy theory in particular, in order to develop a 
theoretical framework that can relate the four main variables under investigation in this study - 
PMERS, managerial motivation, managerial performance, environmental uncertainty -, and form 
the conceptual basis for the hypotheses proposed and summarised at the end of the section. 
Without losing sight of the primary aim of the particular research endeavour - which is to examine 
the effect of the PMERS on the behaviour of middle-level managers who are operating under 
differing conditions of environmental and task uncertainty -, the following paragraphs attempt to 
provide a detailed account of the way in which the aforementioned variables have been 
conceptually defined within the proposed model.
The expectancy framework upon which this research is structured has its conceptual roots in the 
work of and the expectancy-theory models put forward by Vroom (1964), Porter & Lawler (1968), 
and Jiambalvo (1979). Adopting a micro-behavioural perspective of analysis and basically 
building on the well-developed literature on Expectancy / Valence theory, Jiambalvo (1979) 
proposed his Evaluation model of Directed Job Effort, in essence a convincing explanatory theory 
about the impact of the PMERS on the manager’s behaviour. Starting from the basic premise that 
the PMERS is the major organisational mechanism that links rewards with managerial motivation 
and performance, that is, the main motivational device that organisations use in order to induce 
their managers to increase the effort they expend in performing their tasks, he conceptualises the 
PMERS as a 3-step sequential process - parallel to the three stages identified in Hopwood’s (1974) 
Measurement-Reward Process - that basically involves :
(1) defining the dimensions and standards of the job on the basis of which managerial 
performance is to be assessed
These evaluation dimensions, that essentially are general categories of job-related 
behaviours, are an effective means of ‘operationalising’ the complex concept of 
managerial behaviour into a system of measures and standards of managerial performance, 
a system that is typically abstracted from the top management’s conceptions of the overall 
organisational purposes.
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(2) assessing managerial performance along the determined evaluation dimensions 
Measurements of the manager’s actual performance on the predetermined evaluation 
dimensions (as these have been established in the previous step) are taken, and 
comparisons with the organisationally desirable performance standards on these 
dimensions are made in order to reveal the manager’s overall contribution to the 
organisation’s goals.
(3) dispensing rewards to managers based on the overall performance evaluations
A number of carefully selected rewards are finally awarded to the managers on the basis 
of their overall performance evaluation, i.e. on account of their contribution to the overall 
organisational goals as this is assessed by the established system of standards and 
measures of performance.
On the basis of the above conceptualisation of the PMERS, and always within an expectancy 
theory perspective, the theoretical model that is presented below principally maintains that the 
motivational force that is exerted by the PMERS on the manager’s intended behaviour is mainly 
influenced by the manager’s subjective beliefs (‘expectancies’) and preferences (‘valences’) 
concerning the consequences of his / her actions as he / she comes to interact with the Formal 
System of Performance Measures and related Rewards of the organisation within which he / she 
operates. Structured upon the conceptual premises of the typical expectancy-theory formulation as 
these were discussed in detail in section 3.4.3.2,
M = f  [V(E--R)] (1)
but purposefully modified in order to incorporate the motivational impact of the PMERS, 
the analytical framework that underlies the present study brings together its three central 
behavioural variables of interest (i.e., the PMERS, the middle-level manager’s motivation, and his/ 
her subsequent performance) by fundamentally positing that the manager’s motivation to perform 
is jointly determined by five variables / managerial perceptions about the PMERS, namely :
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—> the manager’s subjective belief about whether or not he / she can actually reach the 
organisationally desirable standards of performance - as defined by the PMERS - if  
he puts effort to i t ; that is, his / her perception concerning his / her ability to perform 
at the organisationally desirable level as this is identified by the PMERS 
(Perception about the Attainability of Standards or Effort-Performance (E->P)
Expectancy)
-» the manager’s subjective belief about whether or not his / her actual performance is 
reflected completely in and captured accurately by the PMERS’s measures, i.e., 
his / her perception regarding the ability of PMERS to capture and evaluate his / her 
actual performance in an accurate and just way
(Perception about the Accuracy of Measures or Performance-Evaluated Performance 
(P->EP) Expectancy)
—» the manager’s subjective belief about whether or not the rewards he / she receives 
are effectively contingent on his / her PMERS-evaluated performance, that is, his / 
her perception about the efficacy of the PMERS to reward equitably and fairly his / 
her actual performance
(Perception about the Dependency of Rewards on Individual Performance or 
Evaluated Performance-Rewards (EP->R) Expectancy)
-* the manager’s subjective belief about the value of the extrinsic rewards that are 
distributed to him / her by the PMERS
(Perception about the Value of Extrinsic Rewards or Extrinsic Valence (EV))
—» the manager’s subjective belief about the value of the intrinsic rewards that are 
associated with his / her job
(Perception about the Value of Intrinsic Rewards or Intrinsic Valence (IV)).
Notationally then, a manager’s level of motivation may be expressed as a joint function of the 
above five expectancy variables / managerial perceptions about the PMERS :
M = f  [(EV (E*P) (P-»EP) (EP-*ER)) + i v ]  (2)
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Overall, the above model of managerial motivation1 attempts to draw attention to the fact that for a 
well-designed PMERS - an ideal motivational contract in Merchant’s (1989) terminology - to fulfil 
its motivational role and potential, it must not only possess in reality, but also be perceived by 
those it is suppose to motivate as possessing, a number of necessary attributes, specifically :
i) performance standards that are attainable,
ii) performance measures that are accurate and complete, and
iii) rewards that are, first dependent on the manager’s evaluated performance, and 
second highly valued by the manager they are supposed to motivate.
In addition to this central proposition - which essentially constitutes the model’s main link with 
management control theory a number secondary but equally important notions derive from the 
above theoretical conceptualisation of managerial motivation.
• According to the behavioural model underpinning this study, managerial motivation is 
basically determined by the manager’s subjective beliefs about a number of perceived 
characteristics of the Performance-Measurement-Evaluation-Reward System (PMERS). 
The emphasis here is certainly on the importance of perceptions. Although the objective 
reality may have a quite instrumental role in establishing these critical (from a motivational 
point of view) perceptions, eventually, as Porter et al. (1975) point out, what actually exists 
does not really matter as far as the motivation of managers is concerned ; managers will 
respond to what they think it exists. In Nadler and Lawler’s words, “ .. .it is the perceptions 
of people that determine their motivation, not reality” (1977, p.32).
• Secondly, the model that appears in equation (2) insightfully incorporates the possibility of 
the manager’s motivation being driven by factors other than the organisational (extrinsic) 
rewards (EV) that are administered through the company’s PMERS. The inclusion of the 
variable IV (Value of Intrinsic Rewards) in the model puts forward the notion that 
motivation may also be triggered by a second type of rewards that are not provided by any 
external agent, but they are rather seen as being intrinsic (self-administered) to the 
person’s own behaviour (Porter & Lawler, 1968). On that matter, Jiambalvo (1979, p. 440)
1 A revised version of the Porter and Lawler Model, that incorporates the critical effect of the PMERS on the 
motivation of managers, is presented in Appendix A.
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mentions that “although the evaluation process is thought to affect [motivation] directly, 
some job behaviours may be rewarding in themselves without being tied into the 
performance-reward system of the organisation”, whereas a number o f other researchers in 
the management control literature (e.g., House, 1971 ; Ronen & Livingstone, 1975 ; 
Rockness, 1977 ; Brownell & Mclnnes, 1986) have also emphasised and incorporated in 
their expectancy models the motivational value of intrinsic rewards, such as the feeling of 
satisfaction and fulfilment that an individual experiences when he / she accomplishes a 
goal or a set target in his / her work. Particularly therefore in the context of the middle- 
level manager’s task environment, where feelings associated with goal achievement, 
recognition and self-actualisation from one’s job are highly relevant, intrinsic factors can 
arguably have a significant motivational potential and need, therefore, to be specifically 
considered. As such, the expectancy model of managerial behaviour adopted here posits 
managerial motivation to comprise of two separate, but equally important, components :
- Extrinsic Motivation, stimulated by external forces [(EV (E->P) (P->EP) (EP->R))], and,
- Intrinsic (self-directed) Motivation [IV] .
• Particularly with regards to the extrinsic component of managerial motivation [(EV (E->P) 
(P->EP) (EP->R))], the model recognises the central motivational role of the PMERS in 
the organisational setting - as well as the fact that in this context the manager’s perception 
about whether or not his / her effort will result in desirable rewards passes through the 
PMERS - and thereby departs from the typical expectancy theory formulation by breaking 
down the basic expectancy component (E->R) into three separate individual expectancy 
variables / managerial perceptions that essentially correspond to the motivational efficacy 
of the PMERS in the three major stages of the typical performance evaluation and reward 
process (i.e., the setting of performance standards (E->P), the evaluation of managerial 
effectiveness through performance measures (P->EP), and the allocation of organisational 
rewards on the basis of the manager’s evaluated performance as compared to the 
predetermined standards (EP->ER)). Essentially, the model acknowledges Jiambalvo’s 
basic notion that the PMERS is “the major organisational mechanism linking 
(the manager’s) effort and rewards” (1979, p.437), as well as his argument that the 
motivational potential of the PMERS is largely dependent on its sequential nature. 
The latter is conceptually established by the multiplicative aspect of the model, as depicted
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in equation (2). This multiplicative combination of the terms that are hypothesised in the 
model to determine PMERS-directed (extrinsic) motivation follows from the recognition 
that unless all variables (valences and expectancies) are present in some degree, there will 
be no motivational force exerted by the PMERS on the manager. In other words, each 
variable alone is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for motivation by the PMERS. If 
a manager highly values the rewards potentially available by the PMERS, but, at the same 
time, he / she believes that their attainment is in no way dependent on his / her performance 
as it is measured and evaluated by the PMERS, then this manager’s PMERS-exerted 
motivation is expected to be zero. Likewise, even if a manager believes that the 
aforementioned rewards are really provided on the basis of his / her PMERS-evaluated 
performance, he may still experience a low level of PMERS-directed motivation if these 
rewards have very low value for him. This last realisation comes to highlight vividly the 
critical effect that the sequential nature of the PMERS can have on its motivational 
potential. If any of the individual linkages between
Performance -Evaluated Performance —►Reward
are perceived to be weak by the manager, the PMERS cannot be expected to fulfil its 
motivational role.
On the basis of the previously expounded conceptualisation of managerial motivation in the 
performance evaluation situation, it is now possible to derive a number of testable hypotheses 
about
i) the first-level effect of the PMERS on the managers’ motivation and performance, and
ii) the second-level (intervening) effect of uncertainty on the PMERS-^motivation relationship.
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3.4.5 Derived Hypotheses
With respect to the alleged effect of the PMERS-related perceptions on the middle-level 
manager’s motivation and performance, the present study puts forward the following hypotheses :
Hypotheses 1-6 : PMERS-related Perceptions, Motivation and Performance 
The motivational force on the individual middle-level manager - as exerted extrinsically 
by the PMERS and intrinsically by other job-related factors - to expend a higher amount 
o f effort (energy) is likely to be greater
-  the more the manager believes that he /  she is able to attain the standards o f performance 
that are established within the PMERS (E-^P - Motivation relationship) (HI)
-  the more the manager believes that his /  her actual performance is captured accurately and 
evaluated equitably by the measures employed by the PMERS
(P-^EP - Motivation relationship) (H2)
-  the more the manager believes that the rewards that he /  she receives by the organisation 
are contingent on his /  her PMERS-evaluatedperformance
(EP-^ER - Motivation relationship) (H3)
-  the more the manager values the extrinsic rewards that are administered to him /  her 
through the PMERS (EV - Motivation relationship) (H4)
-  the more the manager values the intrinsic rewards that are associated with his /  her job  
(IV - Motivation relationship) (H5).
The higher the manager’s level o f motivation, the higher his /  her level performance is likely 
to be (H6).
As regards the intervening effect of perceived (environmental and task) uncertainty, directly on the 
antecedent PMERS-related perceptions / determinants of the middle-level manager’s motivational 
force, and indirectly on his / her work motivation, the following hypotheses are proposed :
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Hypotheses 7-8 : Uncertainty. PMERS-related Perceptions and Motivation 
The higher the level o f uncertainty the manager perceives in his /  her work environment, 
the less confident he /  she is likely to be about the possibility o f  attaining the standards o f  
performance as these are established within the PMERS 
(Uncertainty - E-^P  relationship) (H7).
The higher the level o f uncertainty the manager perceives in his /  her work environment, 
the less convinced he /  she is likely to be about the ability o f  the measures within the PMERS 
to capture accurately and evaluate properly his /  her actual performance 
(Uncertainty - P-^EP relationship) (H8).
The higher the level o f uncertainty the manager perceives in his /  her work environment, 
the lower h is/her level motivation is likely to be 
(Uncertainty - Motivation relationship) (H9).
3.5 Justifying the Theoretical Choices
Throughout this research endeavour, a micro-behavioural perspective of analysis has been 
adopted. That is to say that, this research is concerned primarily with analysis at an individual 
level rather than at either an organisational or a societal level. In consequence, a variety of 
concepts, mainly borrowed from the prior literature and research on human behaviour at the micro- 
(individual- or small group-) level, have been brought together with management accounting and 
control issues.
The main reason behind this choice to focus on the individual manager and to give special 
emphasis on the decisions that he / she takes lies on the researcher’s conviction that management 
control systems can not be developed in isolation, but must be designed on the basis of the 
expectations of how people within organisations will use and react to them. If management 
accounting systems are to be of any use to organisations fulfilling their control and motivation 
function, they must be related primarily to the manner in which the individual manager is observed
90
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty THEORY & HYPOTHESES
to work within these organisations. As Emmanuel et al. mention (1990, p .l) “historically, 
accounting information systems have been designed on the basis of highly mechanistic models of 
organisational functioning” that fail significantly to recognise, understand and incorporate the 
totality of human nature. Behavioural scientists have strongly and repeatedly criticise both 
accountants and management control system designers for concentrating exclusively on the 
technical excellence and sophistication of their systems and for not giving sufficient consideration 
to the impact of these control systems on human behaviour (e.g., Frey, 1992). Indeed, they have 
argued that this inattention to behavioural consequences may lead to the application of 
management accounting and control techniques that frequently do not achieve improved 
performance, and that ultimately may even hinder the accomplishment of the organisational 
objectives (Drury, 1996). Recently, distinguished academics in the field of management 
accounting and control have stressed that it is time to examine this important gap (e.g., Otley, 
1995b), time to lay emphasis upon questions such as :
• What is the effect of management control systems on individuals ?
• How are individuals expected to react under particular management control systems, and 
what is the effect of individual differences ?
• How do changes in the contextual environment - in combination with the given 
management control system of the organisation - influence the behaviour of individuals 
operating within this organisation ?
Fundamentally, the starting point of this study is that the design of a management control system 
is”. . .a complex and ill-understood activity precisely because it involves an attempt to control - and 
motivate - a complex network of self-controlling human beings” (Emmanuel et al., 1990, p. 12). 
In that sense, an awareness of the real complexity of human motives, needs, preferences, beliefs 
and expectations is clearly a necessary precondition if we are to acquire a wide understanding of 
how these management control systems can be effectively utilised to influence managerial 
behaviour within organisations, an awareness that can essentially be attained only through a micro- 
behavioural perspective of analysis. At its very outset, therefore, this study consciously and 
purposively posits the individual manager as its central focal point, and sets forth to throw some 
light to the complex phenomenon of managerial motivation via the PMERS, by giving special 
emphasis on the issue of human nature and on the human actors themselves. In effect, this 
research takes into account Vagneur, Wilkinson and Berry’s (1995) suggestion that the
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“integration of recent advances and well tested theory from the behavioural literatures would be 
useful” (p.5) and, accordingly, draws on the discipline of applied organisational psychology in 
order to come up with a behavioural model that can provide a sound conceptual basis for its needs.
Organisational psychology is the branch of psychology that is concerned with the study of 
behaviour in work settings and the application of psychological principles to changing work 
behaviour (Riggio & Porter, 1990). In essence, organisational psychology, by identifying the 
individual as the unit of analysis and the organisational situation as its setting (Landy & Trumbo, 
1980), constitutes the middle ground between the science of psychology and the management 
techniques and practices for influencing human behaviour in the work place. It represents the 
most direct attempt to apply the basic psychological laws and methods of human behaviour in the 
organisational setting in order to :
i) identify, explain and understand the causes of individual behaviour in organisations
ii) predict how certain conditions - or the modification of these conditions - can affect the 
behaviour of the individual
iii) direct individual behaviour so that both the organisation’s and the individual’s goals 
can be achieved.
Primarily based on the underlying philosophy of individual differences, i.e. on the notion that a 
comprehensive understanding of organisational behaviour can only be attained from an analysis of 
the differences among individuals, organisational psychology not only recognises the significance 
of the human characteristics of the person (such as his / her needs, preferences, perceptions, 
feelings, motives, abilities, attitudes etc.) for understanding, predicting and controlling the 
organisational behaviour of the individual, but also provides both the scope and the research tools 
for examining these human characteristics as important variables affecting the individual’s work 
motivation and performance.
Emerging from the field of organisational psychology, the Expectancy theory of Motivation - and 
Jiambalvo’s (1979) model of Directed Job Effort in particular - has been chosen as the most 
relevant theoretical context within which the particular issue of interest of this research endeavour 
(i.e. the motivational effect of incentive schemes and performance measures on manager’s 
behaviour) can be fully investigated. Fundamentally built upon the central assumption that human 
behaviour is to a considerable degree conscious, purposive and goal-directed, and that the
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individual’s actions are mainly influenced by the expectations he / she holds about future 
outcomes, Expectancy theory (commonly referred to also as E-V theory from the first letters of its 
two critical components, Expectancy and Valence) is essentially a rational, cognitively-oriented 
theory of motivation that has retained a prominent position in the psychological literature for quite 
some time as a well-developed, thoroughly tested, and therefore, reasonably valid model of the 
causes of work behaviour.
Overall, in its basic tenet the E-V model developed for the needs of the present research suggests 
that
1. most behaviour is consciously goal-directed (Lawler, 1994);
2. in general, every manifestation of human behaviour is most appropriately seen as a function of 
the person interacting with the environment he / she exists in [B = f  (P,E)] (Lewin, 1935) ;
3. people have many conscious - often complex and competing - goals, expectations of how they 
will achieve these goals, as well as affective reactions to the outcomes that they perceive will 
help them achieve these goals ;
4. in the organisational setting of interest, people are motivated to perform an action when they 
believe that this action will provide them with rewards / outcomes that they need and, 
subsequently, value (Vroom, 1964) ; stated differently, the motivational force on a person to 
perform any given action in his / her work environment basically depends upon two - related 
to each other - questions that the individual asks himself / herself:
—» “If I expend the effort, will I actually get the reward ?” (effort-to-reward expectancy or (E->R)) 
—> “Is the reward offered, a reward I value ?” (perceived valence of reward or V).
5. in the particular context of managerial performance evaluation and reward, and given the 
central motivational role of the PMERS as the main organisational mechanism that combines 
standards, measures and rewards to influence managerial behaviour, the manager’s motivation 
is jointly determined by five types of managerial perceptions about the PMER process, namely 
-» his / her perception about the Attainability of Performance Standards (E->P)
(“If I expend the effort, will I reach the organizationally desirable standards of performance ?) 
-» his / her perception about the Accuracy of Performance Measures (P->EP)
(“If I attain the performance targets, will this be reflected in my performance evaluation ?)
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—> his / her perception about the Performance-Dependency of Rewards (EP->R)
(“If achieve a positive performance evaluation, will I actually get the rewards offered ?)
—> his / her perception about the Value of the Extrinsic Rewards he / she receives (EV)
(“Are the extrinsic reward offered, rewards that I value ?)
—> his / her perception about the Value of the Intrinsic Rewards associated with his job (IV) 
(“Are the intrinsic rewards of my work, rewards that I value ?).
The choice to employ an expectancy model for the theoretical and conceptual needs of this study is 
by no means accidental. There are a number of distinct characteristics associated with it that seem 
to promote the particular framework as the most suitable for the purposes of this research. More 
specifically speaking:
(1) Expectancy theory provides a very logical, simple, and thereby convincing explanation of 
how people are actually activated. In effect, the cognitive nature of the expectancy model - 
which is its main distinctive feature from the other theoretical frameworks within the field 
of organisational psychology - does a good job of capturing the essence of motivation, 
basically by introducing the concept of intended energy expenditure. The particular 
theoretical framework is effectively structured around the notion of current estimates on the 
part of the individual, concerning the chance of obtaining different types of - more or less - 
valued rewards. Drawing special attention to the elements of i) anticipation of future events 
and ii) cognition (learning), the model succeeds in offering a simple - yet compelling - 
description of the internal process through which the individual decides whether or not to 
engage in a particular behaviour, that is, in expectancy theory terms, whether or not to 
‘convert’ his / her energy to effort.
(2) The underlying logic of Expectancy-Valence theory is not only clear and understandable, 
but it also seems relevant to the nature of the problem under investigation within this 
research. The given terminology and concepts of the theory appear quite fitting for the 
examination and understanding of the complexities of human behaviour, motivation and 
performance in the managerial setting. As Porter and Lawler (1968) point out, the elements 
of rationality and expectations within the expectancy model seems to closely resemble the 
kinds of cognitions that influence managerial performance, and, therefore, the theory 
appears most appropriate for realistically explaining the behaviour of managers. Overall, 
within the expectancy framework adopted in this study, managers - regarded as ‘rationally’
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thinking and behaving human beings - are assumed to make choices of behaviour in their 
work environment primarily on the basis of some forward-oriented expectancies, 
expectancies that in turn, are seen as being based upon the manager’s previous experiences.
(3) Expectancy theory is structured upon a much more realistic view of man than most of the 
literature in the field of management accounting and control. Although in agreement with 
the - mainstream in organizational psychology - view of individuals as organisms capable 
of delaying gratification and dealing with abstract concepts (a view that is not recognised 
by other theoretical models that alternatively propose views of individuals that are driven 
by basic biological needs that need to be satisfied), the expectancy model also rejects as 
unrealistic the ‘economic view of the nature of man’, which, in short, presumes an 
unlimited ability of human beings to ‘calculate’ and become fully aware of all possible 
alternative behaviours and outcomes before they eventually make rational, optimal 
decisions based on clear-cut preferences among these outcomes. It alternatively puts 
forward an alternative view of man that seems to be closer to reality : The man as a 
“satisficer” and limited in his rationality. According to this view, which is strongly 
advocated by theorists such as Simon, March and Cyert (see, for example, Simon, 1957 ; 
March & Simon, 1958 ; Cyert & March, 1963), man’s behaviour is more toward satisficing 
than toward optimising. That is, people generally look for a course of behaviour that is 
satisfactory or ‘good enough’ and when they find it, they act. They do not continue to 
search until they have considered all the possible alternative behaviours and all of the 
outcomes associated with these behaviours so that they can choose the optimal one, simply 
because it is beyond their cognitive response capacity and computational ability to consider 
adequately all the complexities of the real world in making their decision. Rather, because 
of the difficulty in arriving at an optimal strategy, people - making their decisions in 
“bounded rationality” (Simon, 1957) - seem to be oriented more toward satisfactory 
alternatives than toward optimal ones. This is essentially why in many cases their 
behaviour does not always appear to be rational to observers. Following this theoretical 
tradition, man in this study is seen as basing his actions, his behaviour, on his subjective - 
and most usually limited - perceptions, perceptions that are seen to be based both on his 
own individual characteristics and on the characteristics of the situation he is in.
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(4) Expectancy theory also greatly facilitates the incorporation of motives like status, 
achievement, and power into a theory of attitudes, motivation and performance. 
The particular theoretical framework insightfully distinguishes between two kinds of 
outcomes, the extrinsic and the intrinsic rewards (see, for instance, Lawler & Porter, 1967), 
recognising as such a second form of reward that can potentially be used as an additional 
(or alternative) effective motivator in the process of directing managerial behaviour.
(5) Lastly, expectancy theory is rightly considered to be a behavioural version of the rational 
choice model in economic decision making (Singer & Coffin, 1996), a model that is 
thought of as providing a fairly adequate of the capitalistic reality. The major postulate of 
the theory that behaviour is determined by conscious choices of rational individuals that are 
basically motivated by their self-interest, is consistent with the assumptions underlying the 
theory of capitalistic economy, which is our main field of interest.
The particular version of expectancy theory that is utilised in this study - i.e., a properly revised 
version of the model of Directed Job Effort proposed by Jiambalvo (1979) - presents a number of 
distinctive qualities that make a strong case for its employment:
-  Departing from the typical expectancy theory applications, this model is appropriately 
modified so as to incorporate and specifically address the motivational impact of the 
Performance Measurement Evaluation Reward System (PMERS), which is actually the 
prime subject matter of this research endeavour.
-  In addition, the special attention drawn by the expectancy model employed in the present 
study to the sequential nature of the PMERS and to the importance that this sequentiality has 
for the system’s motivational effectiveness, helps highlighting the role of the various 
factors - as well as the role of the critical linkages among these factors - that need to be 
considered in the process of motivating individual managers through the company’s formal 
system of performance measures and related rewards.
All in all, the chosen theoretical framework seems to provide the necessary depth of behavioural 
analysis that is required for the investigation of the motivational dimension of the PMERS. 
Starting from the fundamental realisation that the explanation of the behaviour of people in work 
situations has to be sought in an examination of the individual - the focal point of the model - and 
his / her basic psychological processes, the particular conceptual framework establishes a sound
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theoretical platform within which the effect of the PMERS on middle-level managers’ motivation 
can be fruitfully examined.
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Chapter Four: 
Research Method & Methodology
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the research method and methodology of the study in two major 
parts. In the first part, the methodology adopted throughout this research is initially 
addressed, and, subsequently, a detailed account of the particular research design, 
as well as of the method employed in the study is given. The specific data-collection 
techniques that were utilised for the needs of this research endeavour are also 
thoroughly discussed. The second part attempts to put forward the rationale on the 
basis of which the particular methodology and method were selected, with particular 
emphasis given on the advantages that they allegedly carry. Finally, in this second 
section, an attempt is also made to refer to the consequent limitations stemming from 
these research choices made in method and methodology.
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4.2 Method and Methodology
4.2.1 The research methodology adopted
At its outset, this research adopts a more positivist methodological paradigm. Fundamentally it is 
structured upon the ontological position that reality is external and objective (Easterby et al.,1996), 
and that the patterns and regularities that are exhibited in society are not simply random (Rose & 
Sullivan, 1996). In this sense, this study is primarily faced with the task of identifying the causal 
explanations and the fundamental laws that underlie these regularities in human social behaviour. 
Essentially, lying closer to the objectivist end of the subjective-objective continuum put forward 
by Morgan and Smircich (1980), the present research exercise takes on a methodological approach 
that is principally based on the ontological assumption that the social world is an evolving process, 
concrete in nature, but ever-changing in detailed form. Everything is seen as interacting with 
everything else, making as such the endeavour to find determinate causal relationships between 
constituent processes an extremely difficult task. At best, the world expresses itself in terms of 
general and contingent relationships between its more stable and clear-cut elements, and is seen as 
rather ‘fluid’, creating opportunities for those with appropriate ability to mould and exploit 
relationships in accordance with their interests. Within this ontological context, human beings are 
seen as existing in an ongoing interactive relationship with their contextual world, influencing and 
being influenced by it. The process of exchange that operates between the individual and his / her 
environment is essentially a competitive one : the individual is seen as seeking to interpret and 
exploit the environment to satisfy important needs, and hence survive. Accordingly, the 
relationships between the individual and the environment express a pattern of activity necessary 
for the survival and the well being of the individual. In turn, this organismic (alternatively termed 
as open system) view of the world gives rise to a corresponding epistimological framework 
that fundamentally emphasises the importance - and ideally proceeds on the basis - of monitoring 
this dynamic exchange process, i.e., the manner through which the phenomenon of interest 
changes over time in relation to its context (e.g., Bums & Stalker, 1961 ; Emery & Trist, 1965).
Following the tracks of the classic empirical social sciences research, and on the premises of the 
theory-testing, hypothetico-deductive approach, this study begins with theory - seen as a form of 
selective focusing, a means of separating out from a complex, confusing world those elements of 
social reality that warrant special attention and investigation -, and then aims, on the basis of the 
selected theory, to deduce and further test hypotheses about relationships which ought to exist
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if  the theory is correct. It is specifically within this positivist methodological context of theory 
statement, concept operationalisation, and hypothesis testing via prediction and empirical 
observation, that the present research endeavour progresses.
In effect, this study seeks to investigate the intricate phenomenon of motivation at the managerial 
level through the company’s formal system of performance measures and related reward schemes. 
Towards this end, a conscious choice has been made, right from its start, to place and further 
investigate the particular management control issue of interest (i.e., managerial motivation through 
the PMERS) through the lens of a relevant theoretical context (that is, E-V Theory) that gives the 
social phenomenon of interest meaning from the viewpoint of a particular discipline, that of 
Organisational Psychology. Starting from this theory - that has been intentionally chosen so as to 
provide us with a basic meaning system, a language with which to comprehend, examine, and 
discuss the given research issue - a number of hypotheses have been derived, hypotheses that can 
be seen as logically emerging questions following from the theory itself, which, if answered, can 
provide us with a reasonably clear understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. In this 
sense then, this can be seen as a multi-disciplinary study, that is, as one that attempts to integrate 
prior theoretical and empirical work from both the fields of Organisational Psychology and 
Management Control in order to examine the research question in hand. On the whole, in the 
course of this study, and within the selected methodological path :
•  An initial research problem has been identified in the body of the Management Accounting 
and Control literature - particularly associated with the area of the measurement, evaluation 
and reward of managerial performance - and, furthermore, has been considered from an 
Organisational Psychology-perspective in order to be formulated into a set of more specific, 
conceptual propositions.
•  The theoretical concepts that form the propositions have been initially clarified, then given a 
status as dependent, independent or intervening variables and, subsequently, have been 
operationally defined, i.e. they have been made amenable to measurement by being 
transformed from abstract, diffuse notions into pragmatic, directly observable and 
measurable indicators. Having decided upon the operational definitions of the concepts
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involved, each conceptual proposition o f the previous stage has been usefully restated in 
testable terms in order to develop a set o f research hypotheses.
•  On the basis of the concept operationalisation, and by means o f observation, relevant data 
have been rigorously collected, processed and analysed in an attempt to falsify the stated 
hypotheses, that is, in an attempt to reach a conclusion about whether or not (and to what 
extent) the results obtained lend support to the hypotheses.
•  Finally, an effort has been made, so that the conclusions drawn from the findings, as well as 
any further insights gained in the overall process o f the study, are brought to bear on the 
initial research problem.
Essentially, this research has chosen to follow the underlying logic o f empirical social science 
research, termed by Mann (1981) as ‘socio-logic’. According to M ann’s point o f view, while there 
is not one methodology, there is a similar underlying logic to the process o f social research - one 
‘socio-logic’ - that should be evident in any research endeavour regardless o f the choices made in 
method and methodology.
THEORY
(1) Concept Formation
?' I ff  ' J  h  I ^ ' 1 ' *;«' I* ? I(4) Causal Inference
EMPIRICAL
GENERALISATION
TECHNICAL
METHODS HYPOTHESES
(3) Editing 
Coding 
Analysis ,
Research Design
Data Collection Techniques
.OBSERVATIONS
Source : After Mann, M. (1981), “Socio-logic”, Sociology.
Figure 4-1 : The logic o f  social research  or ‘socio -lo g ic ’
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As illustrated in Figure 4-1, socio-logic refers, in essence, to the knitting together of and the 
constant interplay between theory, concept formation, hypotheses derivation, operationalisation, 
observation, data collection and analysis, causal inference, and back to theory again, and it is 
within this overall logic that this study generally aims to proceed. If one wants to be more 
accurate, the present research particularly concentrates on the deductive, theory testing part of the 
socio-logic chain process shown in Figure 4-1, that essentially starts from the formulation of 
hypotheses and is completed with the empirical generalisation of the findings of the research to 
wider populations and settings, as, perhaps more relevantly, the figure below depicts.
THEORY / HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION
TESTING OF THEORY THROUGH 
OBSERVATION OF THE EMPIRICAL WORLD
OPERATIONALIZATION - translation of abstract 
concepts into indicators or measures 
that enables observations to be made
FALSIFICATION AND 
DISCARDING OF 
THEORY
CREATION OF, AS YET 
UNFALSIFIED 
COVERING LAWS THAT 
EXPLAIN PAST, AND 
PREDICT FUTURE 
OBSERVATIONS
Source : Gill, J. - Johnson, P. (1991), “Research Methods for Managers”, Paul Chapman Publishing.
Figure 4-2 : The process of deduction I
4.2.2 The Desien of the Research
4.2.2.1 Research Objective
Formally stated, the prime objective of this study is to investigate the effect of the Performance 
Measurement, Evaluation and Reward System (PMERS) on middle-level managers’ behaviour
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under different environmental conditions. In simpler terms, this work is an explanatory piece of 
research that is interested in the consequences of the PMERS on the motivation and performance 
of middle-level managers who are operating within diverse business environments.
Essentially, the main purpose of this research is to examine, on an empirical basis, the presumed 
relationship(s) between:
i) a number of ‘antecedent’ managerial perceptions (attitudes) concerning the Performance 
Measurement Evaluation Reward System (PMERS)
ii) the manager’s perceptions about the Uncertainty that he / she is faced with in his / her 
internal and external environment
iii) the manager’s Motivation and subsequent Task Performance.
Diagrammatically, the latter can be depicted as follows.
Middle-level Managers’ 
Perceptions about the 
Environmental 
Uncertainty >
Middle-level 
Managers’ 
Perceptions about the 
PMERS
Middle-level
Managers’
Motivation
Middle-level
Managers’
Performance
Figure 4-3 : The relationship under investigation
4.2.2.2 The Hypotheses under Test
Any hypothesis is nothing more than an untested theoretical statement (Rose & Sullivan, 1996), 
or a prediction (Greene & D’Oliveira, 1982), about the nature of the relationship(s) (most usually 
of association or causation) between concepts within a given theory.
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As Rose and Sullivan (1996) point out, the testing of any predicted hypothesis in a scientific 
manner presupposes, in the first place,
i) a precise statement of the supposed relationship between the concepts under investigation, 
as well as,
ii) a precise statement of the data which would need to be collected for the hypothesis testing 
to take place.
In this study, two different sets of testable hypotheses are identified ; one examines the impact of 
the PMERS on managers’ motivation and performance, and the second addresses the intervening 
effect of environmental uncertainty on this relationship. In more detail, the first set of hypotheses 
refers to the alleged impact of the manager’s perceptions about the PMERS on his / her motivation 
and performance. These hypotheses basically propose a positive relationship between each of 
these PMERS-related managerial perceptions and the manager’s motivation, as well as a positive 
relationship between the manager’s motivation and his / her performance.
Hypotheses 1-6 : PMERS-related Perceptions, Motivation and Performance
HI : Middle-level managers who believe that they are able to attain the standards of performance - 
as these are established within the PMERS -, will experience a higher level of motivation 
than those middle-level managers who do not maintain this belief.
H2 : Middle-level managers who believe that their actual performance is captured accurately and 
evaluated equitably by the measures employed within the PMERS, will experience a higher 
level of motivation than those middle-level managers who do not maintain this belief.
H3 : Middle-level managers who believe that the rewards they receive by the organisation are 
contingent on their PMERS-evaluated performance, will experience a higher level of 
motivation than those middle-level managers who do not maintain this belief.
H4 : Middle-level managers who value highly the extrinsic rewards that are administered to 
them through the PMERS, will experience a higher level of motivation than those 
middle-level managers who do not value these rewards.
H5 : Middle-level managers who value highly the intrinsic rewards that are associated with their 
job, will experience a higher level of motivation than those middle-level managers who do 
not value these rewards.
H6 : Middle-level managers who experience a high level of motivation, will exhibit a higher 
level of job performance than those middle-level managers who experience a low level of 
motivation.
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The second set of hypotheses attempts to capture the presumed intervening effect of environmental 
uncertainty, as perceived by the manager himself, directly on his perceptions about the PMERS, 
and - to the extent that these PMERS-related perceptions are seen as determining the manager’s 
motivation - indirectly on his motivation and subsequent performance. Essentially, with respect to 
the motivational effectiveness of the PMERS under conditions of environmental uncertainty and 
unpredictability, this study examines the following hypotheses :
Hypotheses 7-9 : Environmental Uncertainty, PMERS-related Perceptions and Motivation
H7 : Middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a high level of environmental 
uncertainty, will regard the PMERS-defined standards of performance as less attainable, 
than those middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a low level of 
environmental uncertainty.
H8 : Middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a high level of environmental 
uncertainty, will regard the PMERS-employed measures of performance as less able to 
capture accurately and evaluate properly their actual performance, than those middle-level 
managers who believe that they are faced with a low level of environmental uncertainty.
H9 : Middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a high level of environmental 
uncertainty, will experience a lower level of motivation than those middle-level managers 
who believe that they are faced with a low level of environmental uncertainty.
4.2.2.3 Variables Identification : Dependent. Independent. Intervening and Extraneous Variables 
Strictly speaking, a variable is a qualitative or quantitative entity that can take on different values. 
In the social sciences in particular, the term most usually refers to measurable attributes which are 
fixed for each person or other social entity, but which are observed to be at different levels, 
amounts, or strengths across samples and other aggregate groups (Rose & Sullivan, 1996).
Variables - which are, in essence, the basic means of measuring theoretical concepts in a way that 
renders these concepts amenable to observation and analysis - are often classified, for 
convenience, as independent, dependent, intervening and extraneous with :
-  the independent (also referred to as explanatory or experimental) variables being the 
elements or phenomena whose characteristics or variations notionally shape and determine 
(i.e. ‘cause’ changes in) the dependent variable(s)
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-  the dependent variables being the elements or phenomena whose characteristics or 
variations are to be understood, explained or predicted by reference to the presumed 
influence (‘effect’) of the independent variable(s)
-  the intervening variables being the elements or phenomena whose characteristics or 
variations can provide an explanation for the observed relationship between the 
independent and the dependent variables
-  the extraneous (otherwise termed as confounded or uncontrolled) variables being the 
‘free-floating’ elements or phenomena which are confounded with the independent 
variable(s) of the study and can therefore affect the obtained results producing serious 
misinterpretations if their impact is not controlled for.
Although this independent-dependent-intervening-extraneous categorisation is best illustrated in 
experimental studies where the cause-effect relationships are clear-cut, with the independent 
variable being directly and systematically manipulated by the experimenter so that the effect on the 
dependent variable can be observed, many research-design scholars contend that the above 
variable identification should be maintained even if the study is non-experimental. As Spector 
(1981, p .11) indicates, “ ...it is the supposed relationship among the variables [as defined by the 
study’s theoretical framework] that determines variable type and not the experimental [or non- 
experimental, for that matter] nature of the study”. The variables involved in the present study can 
be classified as follows :
Dependent Variables ; The phenomenon whose variation this research primarily seeks to 
understand and explain is
a) Managerial Motivation, and
b) subsequent Managerial Performance
at the middle level of the organisational hierarchy. As such, these two factors (i.e., middle-level 
managers’ motivation and middle-level managers’ performance) constitute the study’s main 
dependent variables.
Independent Variables : On the basis of the expectancy model of managerial behaviour 
underlying this research (see Chapter 3 - Theory Development, Concept Formation and 
Hypotheses Formulation), five factors can potentially explain the changes in the dependent
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variables of interest (that is, managerial motivation and subsequent performance). These causal 
variables, whose alleged (both isolated and combined) influence upon the identified dependent 
variables is essentially the main issue under investigation in this study, refer to a number of 
managerial perceptions about the company’s formal Performance Measurement, Evaluation and 
Reward System (PMERS), specifically :
a) the manager’s subjective belief about whether or not he /sh e  can actually reach the 
organisationally desirable standards of performance, as these are defined within the PMERS 
(E-* P or Effort-to-Performance Expectancy)
b) the manager’s belief about whether or not his / her actual performance is captured accurately 
and evaluated equitably by the measures employed by the PMERS
(P-^EP or Performance-to-Evaluated Performance Expectancy)
c) the manager’s belief about whether or not the rewards he / she receives by the organisation 
are contingent on his / her PMERS-evaluated performance
(EP-» ER or Evaluated Performance-to-Extrinsic Rewards Expectancy)
d) the manager’s affective orientation (perceived preference) towards the extrinsic rewards that 
are administered to him / her through the PMERS
(EV or Valence (Perceived Value) of Extrinsic Rewards!
e) the manager’s affective orientation (perceived preference) towards the intrinsic rewards that 
are associated with his / her job
(IV or Valence (Perceived Value) of Intrinsic Rewards).
These five PMERS-related managerial perceptions represent the basic independent variables of the 
study.
Intervening Variable : Lastly, the factor whose variation is assumed throughout this research to 
have a significant moderating effect on the relationship between the identified independent and 
dependent variables (i.e., the relationship between the aforementioned PMERS-related managerial 
perceptions and the manager’s motivation and performance) is the intervening variable of 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty.
On the whole, all the proposed relationships between the study’s independent, dependent, and 
intervening variables are depicted in Figure 4-4 :
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This study represents an attempt to investigate the influence of the
INDEPENDENT on the DEPENDENT VARIABLES
VARIABLES
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Figure 4-4 : The relationships between the nominated variables I
4.2.2.4 The Basic Research Design Approach : A Correlational Field Study
Most usually, the choice of which particular design to use is, to a large degree, dictated by a
number of different factors such as
• the type and nature of the research problem under investigation,
• the form of the questions that are to be answered in the process of this investigation 
(i.e., whether these questions are ‘applied’ or ‘theoretical’),
• the audience we want the results to be presented to and assessed by,
• restrictions on the access to certain field research settings, and / or
• restrictions on the number of subjects available to participate in the study.
In principle, the central point of any research design, is to provide “ . ..suitable frames of reference 
so that an appropriate context is provided in which relevant data can be collected, reliable and 
valid results can be obtained, and relatively unambiguous statements can be drawn. The aim is to
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move our conclusions about causal processes from the realm of the plausible and possible to the 
convincing and compelling” (de Vaus, 1996, p.34). In a similar tone, Galbraith and Cummings 
(1967) point out that the primary concern of the research design, apart from operationalising the 
concepts, is to eliminate alternative explanations of results brought about by implicit assumptions 
in the statement of the hypothesised propositions. The control over these alternative explanations, 
they argue, begins with the selection of the sample and continues throughout the course of the 
research. Particularly with explanatory studies such as this one then, that are mainly interested in 
developing conclusive explanations of the patterns in the data collected, paying careful attention to 
research design is an important way of ensuring that other possible alternative explanations of the 
data are eliminated and of giving, as such, more confidence to the validity and reliability of the 
findings of the study.
For the purposes of this particular research project, a correlational, cross-sectional design was 
chosen. The correlational design adopts a ‘purely observational’ approach in examining the 
phenomenon of interest. What the latter implies is that, in distinct contrast to the experimental 
method which is largely characterised by the direct manipulation and control of variables by the 
experimenter, in a correlational field study the investigator attempts to assess the impact that 
changes in one variable have on another by simply observing what happens when these variables 
change ‘naturally’ (i.e., without the intervention of the researcher) in the population of interest. 
Overall, the correlational, cross-sectional approach seeks a general, though partial, nomothetic 
explanation of what causes some phenomenon by looking at variation in that variable across a 
class of cases, and looking for other characteristics which are systematically linked with it. 
Ultimately, it aims to draw causal inferences by a careful comparison of the various characteristics 
of cases (de Vaus, 1996). Typically, in such a research design, measurements are taken on a 
carefully selected group of individuals or social entities at one single point in time, and 
relationships are then determined among the measures (Spector, 1981). In this sense, the 
correlational, cross-sectional study is seen as quite suitable for establishing whether two or more 
variables tend to be related (associated) at a fixed point in time.
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4.2.2.5 Further Research Design Considerations : Research Site. Sample Selection, and 
Data Collection Procedures 
The actual research design of the present study initially involved the identification of a single large 
organisation, with a considerable number of geographically dispersed organisational units 
(or, alternatively, a wide variety of functional / product areas), which employed uniformly - all 
along its organisational structure - a formal system of measures to evaluate and reward the 
performance of its middle-level managers. The underlying logic behind this central research 
design consideration was that, in order to test the study’s designated hypotheses there was a need
i) to isolate and control the effect of the PMERS by maintaining the PMERS-variable 
constant. To be able to collect comparable data and draw any valid and reliable 
conclusions about the middle-level managers’ PMERS-related perceptions and their effect 
on the managers’ motivation and performance (hypotheses 1-6), the same system of 
performance measures and incentive schemes would have to apply to all middle-level 
managers examined.
ii) to arrange that there is some variation in the Environmental Uncertainty-variable.
To consider the impact of uncertainty on the middle-level managers’ PMERS-related 
perceptions and motivation (hypotheses 7-9), these perceptions needed to be examined 
both in the presence and in the absence of environmental uncertainty.
Overall, the intention was, first, to secure access to a diversified organisation within which 
a uniform PMERS would be employed for the assessment and reward of its middle-level 
managers’ performance, and, subsequently, to collect data from different cross-sections of middle- 
level managers (presumably experiencing different levels of uncertainty in their internal and 
external environment) on their
-  perceptions about the actual Performance Measurement Evaluation and Reward Process 
(i.e., the study’s independent variables)
-  perceptions about the Environmental Uncertainty they feel they are exposed to
-  (that is, the study’s intervening variable)
-  Motivation and Performance (i.e., the study’s dependent variables),
so as to investigate the extent to which variations in middle-level managers’ motivation and 
subsequent performance could be explained by the variations in the managers’ PMERS- and 
Environmental Uncertainty-related perceptions, as prescribed by the hypotheses of the study.
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In the event that more than one organisations with the aforementioned characteristics could be 
identified and gained access to, a series of comparative case studies was intended, in the totality of 
which overall patterns of managerial behaviour in different performance evaluation settings could 
be examined.
Towards this end, by mid-June 1999, a number of 40 companies were initially targeted as potential 
case studies from the Financial Times UK’s Top 100 list on the basis of two main criteria :
* they all had to be large, highly diversified organisations, with a considerable number of 
organisational units (or a wide variety of functional / product areas), so as to provide a 
relatively large and heterogeneous sample of middle-level managers exposed to different 
environments and varying degrees of environmental uncertainty
* they all had to employ a uniform system of performance measures and incentive schemes 
to measure, evaluate, and reward the performance of their middle-level managers 
throughout their organisational structure, so that cross-manager comparisons with 
respect to their motivation and subsequent performance could legitimately be made 
within each company.
These 40 selected companies were contacted, through their Finance Director and their Chief 
Executive Officer (or their Chairman) in each case, first by letter (see Appendix B) and at a later 
stage through the telephone in order to ascertain any interest on their behalf in taking part in the 
research. As shown in the table below, out of the 40 companies contacted, only one expressed a 
definite interest in the study. Twenty-two companies (55% of the companies contacted) kindly 
declined to participate in the project for various reasons (the most popular one being their 
corporate policy of not taking part in independent studies), whereas 17 companies (42.5%) did not 
respond within the next fifteen days after the first contact letter and had to be followed up through 
the telephone - with no positive result, nevertheless, in any of these seventeen cases.
i l l
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Allied Domecq Pic y ?
Asda Group Pic X
Associated British Foods Pic y X
Astrazeneca Pic y X
Bank Sigma y !
Barclays Pic X
Bass Pic X
Boc Group Pic y X
Boots Company Pic y X
British Aerospace Pic y 7
British Land Company Pic y ?
Cable & Wireless Pic y y 7
Cadbury Schweppes Pic y X
CGU Pic y X
General Electric Company Pic v' y X
Granada Group Pic y ?
Great Universal Stores Pic y X
Halifax Pic y ?
Hanson Pic y y X
Hilton Group Pic y ?
HSBC Holdings Pic y y X
Imperial Chemical Industries y y 7
Invensys Pic y y X
Kingfisher Pic y y X
Legal & General Group Pic y y X
Lloyds TSB Group Pic y y ?
National Westminster Bank y y ?
P&O Steam Navigation Com. y y ?
Pilkington Pic y y ?
Rank Group Pic y y ?
Reckitt & Colman Pic y y X
Reuters Group Pic y y ?
Rio Tinto Pic y y ?
RMC Group Pic y y ?
Scottish & Newcastle Pic y y X
Shell Transport & Trading y* y ?
Slough Estates Pic y y X
Smithkline Beecham Pic y y X
Unilever Pic y * y X
Whitbread Pic y X
Table 4-1 : Searching for a corporate p artner
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Ultimately, the data-collection requirements of this research were met by this one company - a 
large UK financial institution (see Chapter 5 - Exposition of the Case Study for more details on the 
participant company) - which offered access to its middle-level managerial staff. An analytic 
questionnaire was initially put together on the basis of scales previously developed and used in the 
literature (see section 4.2.2.7 for more details on the instrument used for the data-collection 
purposes of the study), later discussed with a team of executives from the company’s Human 
Resource Division, and subsequently pilot tested, first by six academics in the Department of 
Accounting and Finance of the University of Glasgow1, and then by a number of 5 middle-level 
managers in the company’s premises. In the process of the pilot testing, apart from some minor 
points relating to the content of (i.e., the terminology used in) the some of the questions and 
the overall layout of the questionnaire, the issue of response confidentiality and anonymity 
was particularly and thoroughly discussed, and the decision was made to de-personalise the 
questionnaire by leaving out any question (e.g., name, age, gender, etc.) that could be used to 
identify the participant managers. The view shared both by the researcher and by company’s 
managers taking part in the pilot testing of the questionnaire was that this de-personalisation of the 
instrument would substantially enhance both the rate and the truthfulness of the responses.
Eventually, the questionnaire was corrected in line with the comments made during the pilot tests 
and, by the end of August 1999, 290 of these questionnaires, accompanied by a cover letter 
explaining the objectives of the study, a reply-paid self-addressed envelope, and a letter of support 
by the company, were distributed through the company’s internal mailing system to a sample of 
middle-level managers throughout the organisation. It should be noted at this point that the sample 
of the study is not random in the strict statistical sense, as the selected focal group was 
intentionally designed to consist of middle managers who presented a number of necessary 
characteristics / requirements for sample selection and participation in the research. Specifically, 
in order to take part in the study, the managers in the chosen company had to
1 At the first stage of the pilot testing process in the University of Glasgow, an electronic version of the questionnaire 
(in an Excel format) was tried out. This questionnaire format presented a number of distinct advantages, associated 
with the entry and analysis of the data (excel macro-commands were used to consolidate the responses on each 
variable), as well as with the administration of the questionnaire (the electronic version of the instrument could be 
sent and received fast and cost-free through the e-mail). Nevertheless, the idea of administering this electronic 
version of the questionnaire was given up at the end, mainly on the grounds of the potential difficulties that may have 
been encountered by managers that were not quite familiar with computer information technology (use of 
spreadsheets, e-mails, etc.), and the adverse impact that this could have on the questionnaire’s response rate.
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i) come from the middle-level of the organisation’s hierarchy, as prescribed by the research 
question under investigation,
ii) be evaluated and rewarded by the same PMERS, so that cross-manager comparisons with 
respect to their motivation and subsequent performance could legitimately be made,
iii) come from diverse (functional or product) areas, so that a relatively large and 
heterogeneous sample of managers exposed to different environments and varying 
degrees of environmental uncertainty could be secured for intra-sample, sub-group 
(high- vs. low-uncertainty group) comparisons,
iv) have at least two years working experience in their current managerial position, so that 
the opinions they would express, both with regards to the company’s PMERS and with 
regards to the level of uncertainty in their working environment, could be deemed valid.
Furthermore, as it was revealed later in the feedback sessions with the company’s executives 
where the study’s results were reviewed and discussed, the large majority of the managers in the 
sample were selected from a pool of managers participating in the company’s management 
development programme, that is, a scheme that provides managers with a history of or / and a 
potential for high job performance the opportunity for additional training and further development. 
In this sense, the representativeness of the sample of this study may be seen as somewhat limited, 
mainly owing to the fact that the given sample apparently comprises, for the most part, 
of managers that have exhibited in the past (or are expected to exhibit in the future) relatively high 
task performance.
While, as mentioned earlier, the questionnaire pack included a corporate letter of support 
encouraging cooperation in the research, the respondents were straightforwardly informed that 
participation was entirely voluntary. In addition, explicit assurances of anonymity and response 
confidentiality were provided through the cover letter that accompanied the questionnaire to all 
managers taking part in the project (see Appendix C). In the end, data for the study was collected 
from a total of 225 completed questionnaires that were returned - directly from the participant 
managers to the researcher’s forward address in the reply-paid envelopes provided - within 
approximately 5 weeks from the day of their administration to the company, yielding a fairly 
adequate, almost 78%, overall response rate.
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4.2.2.6 The Research M ethod: An Analytic Questionnaire Survey
As pointed out previously, the type of questions which are to be answered in a research project 
(that is, the research’s subject matter), as well as the form of information which need to be 
obtained in order to answer these questions, frequently limit the choice of available methods that 
can be used in a study. To the extent that the present study focuses on managerial attitudes and 
perceptions, the choice to use a self-administered questionnaire as the basic data collection 
instrument appears to be largely justified here. In fact, there is a strong research tradition and a 
correspondingly large body of empirical literature both in the area of management control 
and in the field of applied organisational psychology that have utilised questionnaire survey 
methodologies to examine research issues analogous to the ones considered in this study.
Generally speaking, questionnaire surveys are considered to be not only one of the most commonly 
used, but also one of the most effective means of ascertaining the prevalence and measuring the 
occurrence (the frequency) of certain behaviours, attitudes, opinions, preferences, and beliefs in 
the social field (Rossi, Wright & Anderson, 1983 ; Fink, 1995). In fact, many researchers 
emphatically express the view that the best way to find out what people do, like and believe is to 
actually ask them (e.g., Weisberg, Krosnick & Bowen, 1989). Although there may be other ways 
to find out about a belief or a behaviour, it is often quite difficult to determine the frequency of 
that belief or behaviour without asking the people involved what they really think, feel, and / or 
do. Especially in studies such as this one where subgroup differences are of primal interest, that is, 
studies particularly interested in comparing the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of different 
groups of people (say, highly motivated middle-level managers vs. lowly motivated middle-level 
managers), the questionnaire survey - basically due to a number of important advantages that it 
presents over other research methods (see section 4.3 for a thorough discussion of these 
advantages) - can be a very useful tool in the scientific investigation of such social phenomena.
All in all, respondents in the participant company provided data for this research by completing a 
questionnaire that essentially comprised of 5 main sections, (see Appendix D) : The first section 
offered a brief introduction to the subject matter of the research project and also required the 
participants to fill in some basic information with regard to their position in the company and the 
number of years they have occupied that position. In section 2 of the questionnaire respondents 
were asked to provide information concerning the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that were
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associated with their job in the organisation, whereas section 3 required them to provide specific 
information with respect to the formal system the company used to measure, evaluate, and reward 
their job performance, that is, the company’s formal PMERS. Finally, in sections 4 and 5 of the 
questionnaire the participants were asked to make a subjective assessment, first of the level of 
their own motivation and performance on their job, and second of the level of uncertainty that they 
perceived to be present in their external and everyday task environment. The instruments used in 
each section to provide measures for the different variables in the study were consistently based on 
7-point scales so that to allow the comparison of the scores of each respondent in each individual 
variable. In addition, each section of the questionnaire purposively began on a separate page, 
mainly in order to discourage respondents from comparing their scores across the different 
sections. At the end of each section, respondents were specifically instructed to move on to the 
next section.
The following sections present in more detail the way in which the theoretical concepts of this 
research (i.e., all the dependent, independent and intervening variables identified in section 
4.2.2.3) were operationalised and measured within the questionnaire that was employed for its 
data collection requirements.
4.2.2.7 Variable Operationalisation and Measurement
Typically, the process of operationalisation and measurement refers to the set of rules and tasks we 
use to link the language of theory (non-observable concepts) to the language of applied 
research (observable measures) (Rose & Sullivan, 1996). The basic, underlying idea behind any 
operationalisation / measurement attempt always is, first to create a number of constructs 
(measurable indicators) which relate to the abstract theoretical concepts of the study, and then to 
measure these constructs. In that sense, variables can be seen as these ‘invented’ constructs which 
serve to bridge the gap between theory and applied research, and must be therefore defined in such 
a way as to
(a) correspond to the concepts identified in the study’s theory and hypotheses
(b) be directly observable and measurable.
The next paragraphs attempt to describe how ‘the ladder of abstraction’ (de Vaus, 1996) has been 
descended in this study, that is, how each of the designated variables of this research has been 
operationalised and further measured within the framework of the questionnaire employed.
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Independent Variables : The PMERS-related Perceptions
In expectancy theory research, the measurement of valence and expectancy variables requires 
obtaining statements from the individual whose behaviour is being studied as to his / her personal 
beliefs, preferences and estimations. Following this precedent, all the independent variables in the 
study - that is, all valences and expectancies appearing in the expectancy model of managerial 
motivation that underlies this research (see Chapter 3 - Theory Development. Concent Formation 
and Hypotheses Formulation) - were measured through a questionnaire, which was developed 
mainly on the basis of an instrument utilised in prior behavioural accounting research (Ferris, 
Dillard & Nethercott, 1980) and pretested in a study by Ross and Ferris (1979). All in all, the 
questionnaire respondents (i.e. the selected middle-level managers) were required to provide 
answers to a series of questions that aimed to reveal their very own personal beliefs and attitudes 
about the formal PMERS of the company.
Obtaining a list o f  expected Outcomes-Rewards : In the first place, middle-level managers were 
asked to identify possible outcomes-rewards (both intrinsic and extrinsic) that they themselves 
believed to be associated with their job performance. The common practice here is to provide 
subjects with a pre-selected list of possible outcomes - usually generated on the basis of the 
researcher’s own intuition and knowledge of the area, or otherwise compiled from previous 
research - and then have the subjects express their perceptions (i.e., their valences and 
expectancies) about these outcomes. In its most elegant form, however, expectancy theory 
requires that these expected outcomes are obtained directly from the particular individual 
whose behaviour is under examination (Hackman & Porter, 1968 ; Mitchell & Biglan, 1971). 
It is particularly these beliefs which are idiosyncratic to the individual himself / herself that are 
presumed, within the framework of Expectancy Theory, to strongly influence behaviour. 
Indeed, in an earlier empirical study, Matsui and Ikeda (1976) found that self-generated outcomes 
were, not only more effective as a means of obtaining expectancy theory measures, but also more 
relevant to the subjects examined than standard, pre-selected outcomes. As such, in the second 
section of the questionnaire, each middle-level manager was initially asked to generate his / her 
own set of expected outcomes-rewards which he / she associated with his / her job.
Obtaining measurements of Valences ('EY. IV) : In the same second section of the questionnaire, 
middle-level managers had to use a seven-point, verbally anchored response scale and react
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evaluatively to the job outcomes (which they themselves had previously identified) as a means of 
obtaining estimates of valence for each job outcome. The selected scale ranged from 
‘unimportant’ (1) to ‘extremely desirable’ (7), and the items were the job outcomes themselves. 
In this sense, the response of each subject was taken to indicate the perceived value (valence) that 
he / she placed on each of the outcomes. Eventually, the total EV- and IV-scores (that is, total 
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Valence scores) for each middle-level manager were calculated as 
averages, first by summing together all of the manager’s individual valence scores for the extrinsic 
(intrinsic) job outcomes that he / she had identified, and then by dividing this sum by the number 
of extrinsic (intrinsic) outcomes identified to calculate the manager’s average extrinsic (intrinsic) 
valence score.
It should be noted here that there is some disagreement in the literature about how valences ought 
to be conceptualised, operationalised, and measured. In stating the basic E-V theory propositions, 
Vroom (1964) conceptually defined as valence of an outcome the anticipated affective orientation 
associated with that outcome, or, more simply put, the satisfaction (positive valence), indifference 
(no valence), or dissatisfaction (negative valence) felt from the anticipation of obtaining that 
outcome. Within the Porter and Lawler (1967 ; 1968) expectancy model, the valence (or perceived 
value) of an outcome conceptually refers to the attractiveness of that outcome to the individual. 
An outcome is positively valent when a person prefers attaining it to not attaining it ; it has a 
valence of zero when a person is indifferent to attaining it or n o t; and, the outcome has a negative 
valence when a person prefers not attaining it to attaining it. In the relevant empirical literature, 
valence is found to be measured in various modes, most usually in ‘important-unimportant’ scales 
(see, for instance, Lawler, 1968 or Wanous, 1972), sometimes in ‘attractive-unattractive’ or 
‘desirable-undesirable’ ones (e.g., Lawler & Suttle, 1973 or Turney, 1974), while occasionally 
some combination of the two scales is used (see, for example, Mitchel & Nebeker, 1973). 
Although in theory the valence measures should ideally range from positive to negative values - 
reflecting the possibility that some outcomes may have aversive qualities and therefore negative 
value for the individual -, traditionally, the great majority of the studies have used (5-, 7-, or 9- 
point) scales with only positive anchors (Mitchell, 1974 ; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996). Several 
authors have attempted to compare the different valence operationalisations empirically (Schwab 
et al., 1979 ; Ilgen et al., 1981 ; Pecotich & Churchill, 1981 ; Tubbs et al., 1991). However, the 
results of these studies show that the differences in the operationalisations do not always cause
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consistent effects. In the absence of any substantial empirical evidence that supports any particular 
mode of operationalising the valence variable then, and given the focus of the study on positively 
valued (PMERS-related) rewards, the employment of the all-positive, 7-point, ‘unimportant- 
extremely desirable’ scale that was used here is judged as - at least - acceptable, and is consistent 
with Ferris, Dillard and Nethercott (1980).
Obtaining measurements of Expectancies (E-^P), (RVEPh (EP-^ER) : The third section of the 
questionnaire was constructed to allow middle-level managers to reveal their subjective beliefs 
(expectancies) about the formal Performance Measurement Evaluation and Reward System 
(PMERS) of the company in which they operated. Subjects were presented this time with another 
scale, on which they were to indicate their personal judgements regarding three critical 
PMERS-characteristics (i.e., i) the attainability of performance standards, ii) the accuracy of 
performance measures, and iii) the dependency of organisational rewards), all three allegedly 
related to the motivational effectiveness of the PMERS. Essentially, scores for the three relevant 
expectancy variables - as these are identified in the model of managerial motivation that 
substantiates this study (see Chapter 3 - Theory Development. Concept Formation and Hypotheses 
Formulation) - were obtained by having each respondent rate on a seven-point, verbally anchored 
response scale, ranging from ‘never’ (1) to ‘almost always’ (7), how often he / she felt that
• putting ‘a great deal’ of effort into his / her job actually led to the attainment of the 
performance standards as these were defined within the company’s PMERS 
(E-*P) (Perceived Attainability of Performance Standards)
• his / her actual performance on his / her job was reflected accurately and equitably by the 
performance measures employed in the company’s PMERS
(P-*EP) (Perceived Accuracy of Performance Measures)
• the organisational rewards that he / she received actually depended on his / her evaluated 
performance as this was assessed by the company’s PMERS
(EP-^ER) (Perceived Dependency of Organisational Rewards).
With the particular needs of the present study in mind, and following Mitchell’s (1974) 
recommendations of how this term should be operationalised, each of the above expectancy 
variables is understood as a perceived probability - that is, as the subjective estimate (i.e., the 
likelihood) of how often one event A leads to another event B - and a conscious attempt is made
119
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
to measure it as such. Conceptualising and further measuring the expectancy variables of the 
present study in terms of a perceived probability of one phenomenon leading to another - rather 
than as the perceived cause and effect relationship between two phenomena, which is the 
alternative in the psychological literature (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996) - seems to be more 
appropriate for the type of expectancies that we are interested in here. In addition, this 
operationalisation seems to be closer to the conceptual definition of expectancies as this is 
provided by Vroom (1964) and Porter and Lawler (1967 ; 1968), who both defined expectancy as 
the individual’s perceived probability (or subjective expectance) concerning the likelihood that an 
action or effort will lead to an outcome ; it is also consistent with a number of empirical studies in 
the field of expectancy theory (e.g., Sheard, 1970 ; Lawler & Suttle, 1973 ; Mitchell & Nebeker, 
1973).
Dependent Variables
Obtaining measurements of Managerial Motivation : Consistent with the mainstream practice in 
expectancy theory, managerial motivation is regarded throughout this research as being most 
directly reflected in the manager’s effort, that is, how hard he / she is trying to perform his / her 
tasks. In general, effort refers to the amount of energy the individual expends in a given situation, 
and is typically seen in expectancy theory literature as the variable that most closely corresponds to 
the motivational component that is presumed to affect performance (Lawler & Porter, 1967). 
In this theoretical vein, and by taking into serious consideration Porter and Lawler’s position that 
"... what is commonly called ‘motivation’ should be highly related to measures of effort” (1968, 
pp.21-22), managerial motivation was measured within this study as the amount of effort 
middle-level managers put into their jobs.
Effort itself can be potentially measured in a number of different ways. For certain, limited types 
of tasks, especially in laboratory-type settings, objective physical measurements can be obtained. 
In typical managerial jobs, however, where such measurements are of limited relevance, the use of 
more subjective means of measuring effort, such as self-reports or reports of others, are highly 
recommended (Lawler & Porter, 1967). In effect, scores for the managerial motivation (effort) 
variable were obtained here by basically having the middle-level managers themselves rate the 
amount of effort - that is, the level of energy or, alternatively, the amount of motivational force, 
in expectancy-theory terms - that they expended on their job (self-reports). More specifically,
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the fourth section of the questionnaire - following Porter and Lawler (1968) - utilised a 
self-reported measure of managerial motivation that required each respondent (that is, each 
selected middle-level manager) to rate on a seven-point, verbally anchored response scale of 
‘low’ (1) to ‘high’ (2), the amount of effort he / she put into his / her job in relation to others with 
similar management duties in the organisation. Clearly, the measure of motivation employed in 
the present study is not a ‘hard’ measure of the energy the middle-level manager directs toward the 
various aspects of his / her job. Rather, it is a self-reported perception of his / her effort and 
motivation. And although this approach of operationalising and measuring the motivation variable 
is common and well established in the field of applied organisational psychology, it does raise 
some questions, both about the construct validity of the particular measure, and about the overall 
generalisability of the obtained findings. Initially, the intention was to obtain also a second 
measure of each middle-level manager’s level of motivation by having some other qualified 
observer (such as the middle-level manager’s immediate supervisor) rate in a similar fashion the 
amount of effort that the middle-level manager expended on his / her tasks, but unfortunately 
no such access was granted by the participant company.
It has to be noted at this point that the operationalisation and measurement of the work motivation 
variable has always been a bone of contention within the expectancy theory literature. In his 
seminal work on the theoretical formulation of expectancy theory as applied to organisational 
work behaviour, Vroom does not provide any particular guidelines about how to operationalise 
and measure the motivation variable. He is content to simply point out that “ .. .the only concept in 
the [expectancy] model that has been directly linked with potentially observable events is the 
concept of force [where] behaviour on the part of a person is assumed to be the result of a field of 
forces [expectancies and valences] each of which has direction and magnitude” (1964, p. 20). 
Force, however, is just a metaphor. In the literature, motivation is mostly operationalised in terms 
of ‘effort’, but a number of other operational definitions are variously employed ; the ‘intention’, 
‘preference’ or ‘choice’ to engage or not to engage in some form of voluntary behaviour are only 
some of the proposed indicators of motivational force (Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996).
Even to the extent that effort is accepted as the most valid operationalisation of the motivation 
variable, a number of related methodological issues still remain unresolved. Effort, particularly 
cognitive effort, has been notoriously difficult to measure in any empirical research in the past
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(Abemethy et al., 1999). Mitchell (1974), for example, discusses at length the difficulties 
involved in even defining - both on a conceptual and on an operational level - the particular term. 
Organisational Psychology is yet without any clear specification of the meaning of effort for that 
matter and, consequently, there is no operationalisation of the variable that possesses even a 
modicum of construct validity (Campbell & Pritchard, 1979). Aside from the overall conceptual 
vacuum, or perhaps because of it, self, peer and superior ratings of overall effort - the most 
frequently used measures of motivation - are each beset by a number of problems. For example, 
the peer or the supervisor simply may not know how the individual expends his / her energy during 
his / her d ay ; and even if the individual were observed constantly, the question “by what indicator 
does an individual signal a high effort or a low effort input ?” remains difficult to answer.
Self-ratings of effort present their own limitations. Although verbal self-reports seem to be most 
closely related to the conceptual definition of motivational force as provided by Vroom (Van 
Eerde & Thierry, 1996), their overall validity as measures of motivation is questionable, since the 
same individual provides ratings of the independent variables (i.e., expectancies and valences) and 
the dependent variable (that is, effort). Clearly, there is a high risk here that the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables is spuriously inflated by common 
respondent bias and by shared variance in measurement error when these variables are measured 
simultaneously (Horn, 1980). Without any intention to underestimate the above methodological 
limitations associated with the measurement and operationalisation of the main variables within 
the expectancy model of managerial motivation adopted, this study, after seriously considering the 
available empirical evidence in the literature, adopted the recommendations of those researchers 
who have attempted to theoretically, methodologically, and empirically appraise the motivational 
model itself (e.g., Heneman & Schwab, 1972 ; Miner & Dachler, 1973 ; Mitchell, 1974, 1982 ; 
Pritchard & Campbell, 1976 ; Campbell & Pritchard, 1979 ; Schwab et al., 1979 ; Wanous et al., 
1983 ; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996).
Obtaining measurements of Managerial Performance : Managers’ job performance has 
traditionally been measured in the field of management control in two ways :
-  Objectively, where objective, tangible, generally quantifiable indices are employed to 
measure managerial performance (e.g. Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), or
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-  Subjectively, where performance is measured on the basis of appraisals and / or ratings 
of the manager by other individuals (such as his / her peers, supervisors or subordinates) 
or by himself / herself (i.e. self-appraisals and self-ratings) (e.g. Merchant, 1981).
Allegedly, both measurement strategies carry different advantages and disadvantages. An 
objective performance measure - relative to a subjective one - has the important advantage that it 
can be easily confirmed by other researchers (Govindarajan, 1984). On the other hand, subjective 
measures of managerial performance have the potential to take into account less tangible aspects 
of performance that are quite important to the success of the organisation and, therefore, they can 
often be found to have greater overall relevance for the organisation’s goals than do certain 
objective measures covering, perhaps, only minor or peripheral aspects of the manager’s job 
(Lawler & Porter, 1967). Moreover, objective measures of managerial performance are 
more susceptible to reflecting both - and thereby confounding - actual efficiency and successfiil 
manipulation of the performance data, hence concealing the real contribution of the manager 
(Hopwood, 1972). For the purposes of this particular study, measures of a more subjective nature 
were employed to obtain data of managerial performance, since it was considered that many 
performance dimensions critical to the middle-level manager’s job profile are not amenable to 
objective, quantitative measurement.
Following the example of a number of empirical studies in the management control area 
(e.g., Swieringa & Moncur, 1972 ; Milani, 1975 ; Hayes, 1977 ; Kenis, 1979 ; Merchant, 1981 ; 
Govindarajan, 1984), middle-level managers’ performance was measured here on the basis of a 
self-rating method. Further, as urged by Steers (1975), it was decided to undertake self-ratings of 
managerial performance along a multiplicity of dimensions rather than on any single performance 
dimension. As such, in the fourth section of the questionnaire, the previously used, nine-item 
self-rating measure developed by Mahoney, Jerdee and Carrol (1963 ; 1965) was employed in a 
seven-point, Likert-scaled form to provide scores for the managerial performance variable. 
This instrument asked each middle-level manager to use a verbally anchored response scale 
ranging from Tow’ (1) to ‘high’ (7), and - in a manner consistent with Lawler (1968) - to rate 
himself in relation to others with similar management duties in the organisation,
• firstly on his performance on each of the eight separate sub-dimensions of managerial 
activity identified in the scale (planning, investigating, co-ordinating, evaluating, 
supervising, staffing, negotiating, and representing), and
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• secondly on his overall job performance, bearing in mind that different managerial positions 
are likely to require different mixes of the eight sub-dimensions.
Just as with the measurement of the managerial motivation variable, a second subjective measure 
of each middle-level manager’s level of performance was intended here by having the manager’s 
superior rate how well his / her subordinate performed in his / her job, but again no such access 
was granted by the participant company.
The existing literature provides substantial support for the use of the Mahoney et al. (1963 ; 1965) 
performance scale that constitutes the prime measure of managerial performance in this study. 
Heneman (1974) argues that the eight performance dimensions of the instrument are behaviourally 
meaningful and applicable to managerial functions across organisations, whereas Govindarajan 
(1986) provides evidence of the measure’s reliability as well as of its construct and criterion- 
related validity. Additionally, Brownell (1982) points out that the particular self-rating measure 
has the advantage of overcoming the problem of superiors’ tendency “to evaluate on only one 
cognitive dimension” and, furthermore, has the ability to “clearly capture the multidimensional 
structure of performance without introducing the problem of excessive dimensionality” 
(pp. 17-18).
Concern has occasionally been expressed in the literature regarding the use of self-reported 
measures to assess performance, mainly on the grounds that respondents tend to be too lenient on 
themselves, thereby resulting in a small range in the scores being observed (Parker et al., 1959 ; 
Prien & Liske, 1962 ; Mia, 1989). Other researchers however have found support for the 
proposition that managers’ self-ratings of performance are much less biased than researchers 
typically have given them credit for (Kirchner, 1965 ; Nealy & Owen, 1970 ; Venkatraman & 
Ramanujam, 1987). For example, Heneman (1974) reports a very high correlation between 
superior and self-ratings in situations where the subordinate is guaranteed anonymity and 
understands that the objective of data collection is scientific research and not his personal 
performance evaluation from the organisation’s perspective. On a more theoretical level, 
Thornton (1980) advocates the self-rating approach to measuring performance, particularly in 
studies that use a cognitive basis, such as expectancy theory, for measuring motivation. 
He comments : “Cognitions are an intervening variable between motivational force and objective 
performance, and should be carefully studied” (p. 269). Otley and Pierce (1996) recognise the
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potential problems of response bias and non-response bias (related to the overstatement or 
understatement of the responses by the respondents, or their failure to respond at all, according to 
their own personal self-interest) when self-reported measures are employed. They however argue 
that the likelihood of such bias can be considerably reduced when a guarantee of respondent 
anonymity and response confidentiality is provided.2
To assess the construct validity of the performance measure in the present study (see Appendix E 
for a full review of the tests run to assess the validity and reliability of the instruments used), 
the overall effectiveness dimension was regressed on the eight individual performance 
sub-dimensions, and the eight-dimensional model was found to be significant (F=20.07, p<0.001), 
explaining over 43% of the variance in the overall effectiveness dimension (coefficient of 
determination = 0.4310). This result is consistent with Mahoney et al.’s (1963, 1965) findings and 
developmental work on the particular measure, and suggests that the overall rating captures a 
relatively large proportion of the variation in managerial performance as measured by the eight 
dimensions. Consequently, in line with Brownell (1982, 1985), Brownell and Dunk (1991), and 
Abemethy and Stoelwinder (1995), the overall effectiveness dimension was used as a single-item 
overall rating of job performance for the data analytic purposes of the study.
Intervening Variable
Obtaining measurements of Environmental Uncertainty : The vast range of conceptual treatments 
of environmental uncertainty which can be found in the literature has resulted in a diverse set of 
measures used in empirical work. The present research focuses on middle-level managers’ 
perceptions of the uncertainty in their internal and external environment rather than on any 
‘objective’ measures of such uncertainty. This approach is consistent with the empirical studies of 
Dill (1958), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Duncan (1972), as well as with the conceptual 
arguments of Angyal (1941), Thompson (1967), Weick (1969), Downey and Slocum (1975) and 
Downey et al. (1975).
2 An attempt was made in the present research to complement the subjective, self-reported method used in measuring 
managerial performance with a more objective, ‘hard’ measure which could provide some validation to the middle- 
level managers’ self-reports of their own performance. The participant company was contacted and the possibility of 
gaining access to the company’s internal performance evaluation personnel reports was enquired, but unfortunately 
no such data could be made available to the researcher given the company’s confidentiality policy on such sensitive 
performance evaluation information.
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Two instruments were employed in this study in order to develop measures of the environmental 
uncertainty variable. Principally, the uncertainty the manager sees evident in his / her task 
(internal) environment was measured here through the refined, nine-item, seven-point Likert scale, 
developed by Withey, Daft and Cooper (1983). This scale is fundamentally based on Perrow’s 
model of task uncertainty (1967 ; 1970) which has directed much of the conceptualisation of task 
uncertainty in the literature, and is, in essence, a two-dimensional view of internal environmental 
uncertainty, capturing, in particular, task variability (or number of exceptions) and task 
analysability. Perrow describes the variability dimension in terms of the frequency with which 
unexpected and novel events occur in the process of performing one’s tasks, whereas the task 
analysability dimension refers to the extent to which work can be reduced to programmable, 
mechanical steps (Macintosh, 1981). On these conceptual premises, the fifth section of the 
questionnaire invited the selected middle-level managers to provide answers (on seven-point 
scales) to a series of nine questions / statements - five of them related to the variability dimension 
and four related to the analysability one - about the level of uncertainty they associated with their 
job. A weighted measure of the task uncertainty variable was then obtained for each respondent 
by averaging his / her scores on the two dimensions to finally produce a composite task uncertainty 
score. This measurement approach of averaging or summing (empirically equivalent) the 
individual scores on the nine items of the Withey, Daft and Cooper (1983) scale in order to obtain 
a composite score of task uncertainty for each respondent has been employed in the past by a 
number of researchers in the area of management accounting and control (e.g., Brownell & Hirst, 
1986 ; Gresov et al., 1989 ; Lau et al., 1995 ; Lee, 1998). Our preference for the particular 
measure lies mainly on the following grounds. First, there is general agreement in the literature 
that this particular instrument performs better than previous measures on tests of convergence, 
discrimination and internal consistency. Second, Withey et al. (1983) have shown the scale to be 
reliable and capable of differentiating work units with varying tasks and task uncertainty in a 
somewhat better way than most of the previous scales. Last but not least, the content of items that 
comprise this instrument closely reflects Thompson’s (1967) definition of perceived task 
uncertainty, a conceptual definition that has been largely embraced throughout this study.
In the present research, the reliability of the task uncertainty measure was estimated using 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (Cronbach, 1951) for internal consistency of the scale. This was 
equal to 0.75 for the nine-item instrument (see Appendix E, Table E-l), which essentially meets
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Nunnaly’s (1967, 1978, 1981) standards for acceptable inter-item reliability.3 In addition, 
the construct validity of the particular measure was assessed by factor analysis (using varimax 
rotation).4 The factor analysis yielded two factors with an eigen-value greater than one, together 
explaining over 63.6% of the observed variability. This result, however, is not surprising, 
given the two-dimensional nature of the particular construct.
In order to complement the Withey et al. (1983) instrument which provides measurements of the 
managerial perceptions about the level of uncertainty encountered in the task (internal) 
environment, measures of the middle-level manager’s perceptions about the uncertainty stemming 
from the external environment in which he / she operates were obtained here on the basis of 
Gordon’s and Narayanan’s “perceived environmental uncertainty” scale. Mainly constructed upon 
Khandwalla’s (1972 ; 1977) seminal work, this measure was tested by Gordon and Narayanan 
(1984) and found to perform well in terms of construct validity and reliability. The particular 
ten-item, seven-point Likert scale is basically designed to tap respondents’ perceptions about the 
predictability and stability in various aspects of their units’ industrial, economic, technological, 
competitive and customer environments. Hence, in the fifth and last section of the questionnaire 
each middle-level manager was required to provide answers to an additional series of ten 
questions/ statements that basically attempted to capture the level of environmental uncertainty 
that he / she identified with his / her unit operating within all these distinct environments. 
A simple average of responses to these ten items of the scale was eventually computed and 
interpreted as an overall index of perceived environmental uncertainty for each respondent.
The environmental uncertainty measure had an estimated internal reliability of 0.64 (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for the ten-item scale, which was judged to be satisfactory using Nunnally’s (1967, 1978, 
1981) criterion cited above. The factor analysis conducted showed that the ten items in the 
instrument loaded on three factors with an eigen-value greater than one, all three together
3 According to Nunnally (1967, 1978, 1981), in most cases, measures of modest reliability (0 .65  - 0 .70) will suffice. 
Alpha coefficients below 0.50 should be treated with caution. For strictly clinical testing purposes, on the other hand, 
Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991) argue that coefficients of 0.85 or above may be required.
4 Factor analysis was employed in this study as a method of testing instrument homogeneity. A number of scholars in 
the area of research method and methodology (e.g., Carmines & Zeller, 1979 ; Pedhazur & Pedhazur, 1991 ; 
Oppenheim, 1992 ; Cortina, 1993 ; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994 ; Brownell, 1995) argue that, apart from coefficient- 
a that is a useful measure of an instrument’s reliability, an estimate of the instrument’s homogeneity (that is, the 
extent to which an instrument measures a single attribute) is also necessary. They further advocate the use of factor- 
analytic methods as a test of an instrument’s unidimensionality, and thereof its homogeneity.
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accounting for over 50.5% of the explained variance in the underlying variable (see Appendix E, 
Table E-4), a result that casts some doubts on the unidimensionality and the homogeneity o f the 
particular scale used.
On the whole, in order to test the hypotheses designated in Section 5.2.2.2, nine variable measures 
were employed. The empirical literature relating both to expectancy theory and to environmental 
uncertainty theory was carefully investigated in order to identify those instruments that enjoy 
general acceptance from researchers in the field. Consequently, all variables in the present 
study were purposely measured by scales that are based on instruments that have been 
previously developed and tested in practice, but never applied together in a single study. 
Table 4-2 summarises the mode o f measurement for each o f the variables.
Variables Instrument
>: <'V ;* V - ;
Self-Rating Supervisor
Rating
EV \ Ferris et al. (1980)IV \ Ferris et al. (1980)( E - P )  \ Ferris et al. (1980)
(P~*EP) / Ferris et al. (1980)
(EP+ER ) / Ferris et al. (1980)
Motivation Porter & Lawler (1968)
Performance Mahoney et al. (1965)
Task Uncertainty Withey et al. (1983)
External Uncertainty Gordon & Narayanan
X
X
Objective
Measure
N o te s  : S  =  carried out as nlanned
X =  intended but not implemented
Table 4-2 : V ariables and M easures
4.3 Assessing the Research Method and Methodology Choices
The following paragraphs attempt to address the strengths and the limitations associated both with 
the overall research design and the particular method employed in this study, in an effort to 
provide some insights to the logic behind the methodological choices made here.
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4.3.1 The Research Design : A Correlational Field Study
The methodological core of this research endeavour is its correlational, cross-sectional design. 
This research design typically involves picking different samples (sections) of respondents, all the 
samples together providing, through comparison, evidence of relationships between variables or 
evidence of causes of change (Krausz & Miller, 1974). Given that the main purpose of this study 
is to test empirically (that is, to confirm or reject) relationships between variables that derive from 
the theoretical framework selected, the chosen correlational design appears, at first sight, to serve 
the purposes of the present research effort.
The choice of design is basically governed by a number of distinct features that characterise the 
correlational approach. To begin with, the format of the correlation study makes it possible to 
look at a relatively large number of variables at the same time, and this is a crucial factor as far as 
this research is concerned. Particularly with studies in field settings such as this one, where a high 
level of control over subjects is difficult to acquire and the access to and co-operation of the 
organisation is limited, correlational designs seem especially attractive, mainly due to the 
simplicity and ease in their administration (Spector, 1981).
However, the correlational, cross-sectional design that has been utilised in this research bears a 
number of limitations that need to be acknowledged, the major one of which is its inadequacy to 
prove directly the existence of cause-effect relationships between the variables that it identifies. 
Based primarily on an observational approach of investigating the phenomenon of interest, 
the correlational study does not attempt to exert any manipulation or control over the variables 
being investigated, and, as a result, it can never prove that a causal relationship exists between 
these variables. As all variables of interest are typically measured simultaneously in such a 
correlational design, the cross-sectional data that are obtained can go only as far as demonstrating 
a relationship among the identified variables, the existence of which may theoretically or 
intuitively suggest causality, but can never empirically establish it. In effect, when employing a 
correlational, cross-sectional design, the kind of evidence we obtain shows that there exists a 
measure of association between the identified variables, i.e., evidence that two or more variables 
(say, PMERS-related perceptions and managerial motivation) tend to be related at a fixed point in 
time. But while an association is a necessary condition of causation, it is not a sufficient condition, 
so that while the presence of a correlation might suggest the existence of a causal relationship,
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it does not provide by itself a basis for inferring causation (Krausz & Miller, 1974). In that sense, 
the results of the present study cannot realistically conclude anything with respect to the existence 
of causal relationships between the specified dependent, independent, and intervening variables, 
or, for that matter, with respect to the direction of causation between these variables.
A similar threat to a study’s internal validity when such research designs are employed is related to 
the difficulty to control the impact of other variables that are not measured but may co-vary with 
the variables of interest (Abemethy et al., 1999). Unlike an experiment, in cross-sectional survey 
work, it is not possible to reduce the impact of many of these variables by random assignment to 
treatment groups (such as high- and low-motivation groups) and then observe the impact of the 
variables of interest (e.g., PMERS-related perceptions). Therefore, the possibility that other 
extraneous variables - related, for example, to the profile of the respondents (such as, their age, 
gender, experience, attitude to work, etc.) - may account for the observed relationship between the 
identified dependent and independent variables of the study can never be fully ruled out. Although 
such internal validity threats as those identified in the last two paragraphs are largely unavoidable 
when using a cross-sectional survey method, they nevertheless need to be acknowledged. 
In Abemethy et al.’s (1999) view, the only way to minimise these threats is for the researcher to 
invoke a defensible theoretical framework (in order to counter claims about the existence and 
direction of causality), and, to the extent possible, to take care in identifying and controlling for 
other, extraneous variables.
Another serious shortcoming associated with the particular correlational design employed in the 
present research is instrument reactivity. In studies like this which make use of one single 
procedure for collecting data (i.e., the self-report questionnaire), common method variance is 
of particular concern. Indeed, it is an established principle of measurement that instruments react - 
to a smaller or a larger degree - with the things they measure (Spector, 1981), however, 
particularly in correlational research designs where a single method of data collection is utilised, 
subjects’ response tendencies and biases when responding to requests for self-reports cannot be 
directly controlled. Essentially, participants in the present study may have reported attitudes and 
behaviours in a manner that is more consistent than they are in reality, and this tendency towards 
consistency may potentially have enhanced the correlation coefficients of the study, threatening,
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as such, its internal validity (that is, the degree of confidence that the observed results in the study 
are actually and solely due to the effect of the factor(s) under investigation).
Hawthorne effects also cannot be excluded from the present correlational, cross-sectional research, 
for much the same reasons as instrument reactivity. The selected middle-level managers, that 
constitute the main focal group of the study, are quite aware of their participation in a research 
project, and the possibility that they distort their responses for a number of reasons including a 
desire to look good or provide ‘good’ data for the study cannot be eliminated altogether. Clearly, 
the latter introduces an additional potential threat to the study’s internal validity.
4.3.2 The Research Method : An Analytic Questionnaire Survey
Data for the present study were basically collected by means of a questionnaire survey. This 
analytic questionnaire was designed to obtain measurements of
-  managerial perceptions about the PMERS,
-  managerial motivation,
-  managerial performance, and
-  perceived environmental uncertainty
in the way prescribed in previous sections (see section 4.2.2.6).
The analytic survey was chosen as the most suitable method given the particular characteristics 
and ends of the present research endeavour. One strong argument for the employment of a survey 
in the stage of the data collection of this study was the long tradition in expectancy theory research 
to measure dependent and independent variables by use of questionnaires that are administered to, 
and answered by either the individual whose behaviour is examined, or by some other, qualified 
observer. Clearly, such choices, regarding the operationalisation / measurement approaches 
employed in the field, are naturally dictated by the way concepts such as effort, motivation, and 
performance are defined within the theoretical context of expectancy theory, as well as by the type 
of questions that are to be answered by such research projects. It seems that it is particularly the 
explicitness and clarity of the model of managerial behaviour that underlies this work - common 
characteristics of most expectancy-theory models utilised in psychological research in the 
organisational setting - that call for a more structured, quantitative research method. In this sense, 
a conscious choice was made here to follow the common practice in expectancy theory, employ as
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the study’s data-collection vehicle a questionnaire that is largely based on well-established and 
tested measures, and generally conduct this research in a way that will render the obtained results 
comparable to those obtained in previous studies.
From a methodological point of view, the questionnaire survey carries a number of important 
advantages. As Gill and Johnson (1991) point out, survey research occupies a variable, 
intermediate position somewhere between ethnography and experimental research, in the sense 
that it takes the logic of experimentation out of the laboratory and into the field so as to 
assess relationships among predetermined variables. The particular research method is most 
usually characterised by a relatively structured nature, mainly stemming from the ‘a priori’ 
delineation of the theory under test, the explicit construction and statement of the hypotheses that 
are to be tested, and the identification, operationalisation and measurement of carefully selected 
dependent, independent and extraneous variables. To the extent that highly structured, closed- 
response, pre-coded questions were largely used in the stage of data collection, providing the 
responders with a uniform, standardised stimulus, and thereby enabling the collection of data in a 
form of answers that
(i) were comparable for the majority of the respondents
(ii) lent themselves more readily to quantitative analysis and interpretation,
the chosen survey-based research can be considered to ‘score’ high in terms of internal validity 
and reliability. Indeed, there are strong reasons to believe that the chosen research method, mainly 
due to its structured nature and the statistical control over the variables, has provided this study 
with a relatively high degree of confidence that the conclusions regarding the identified 
relationships among the variables are warranted (the element of high internal validity). At the 
same time, and for much the same reasons, the present study can be safely regarded as consistent 
over time and easily replicable - partially or totally - for similar research endeavours in the future 
(the element of high reliability) (Gill & Johnson, 1991).
In addition to the above mentioned strengths, another serious advantage associated with the 
questionnaire survey is that, being principally an observational, on-the-field method, it allowed 
this research to take place in a natural setting, increasing, as such, the ecological validity (i.e., 
the study’s degree of confidence that the obtained results and conclusions can be generalised to 
social contexts and / or environments other than those in which the data has been collected) and,
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in consequence, the overall degree of external validity (generalisability) of this study (Krausz & 
Miller, 1974). Admittedly, the ability to make broad generalisations from a single study to 
different populations (population validity), settings (ecological validity) and times (temporal 
validity) is always necessarily limited (Abemethy et al., 1999), particularly so when the study 
draws data from a single research site as is the case here. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
respondents to the present study were organisational participants acting within their actual social 
context certainly adds to this research’s external validity.
Lastly, the special care that was specifically given in measuring the study’s identified variables 
with instruments which have been previously developed and extensively tested in practice - 
therefore enjoying the general acceptance of researchers in the field - provides some confidence 
about the study’s constmct validity (that is, the extent to which the constructs of theoretical 
interest have been successfully operationalised and measured in the research). In effect, no one 
can ever claim to have developed and employed perfect measures that completely eliminate all 
possible random error, noise and bias in the process of variable operationalisation and 
measurement. Particularly in social science research, where we are dealing with abstract 
theoretical constructs, such an exercise is invariably doomed to imperfect outcomes, as Abemethy 
et al. (1999) point out. In the end, all that the present work can maintain is that all efforts have 
been made to utilise prior research practice and experience and measure this study’s theoretical 
constructs as reliably as their conceptual definitions allowed.
All in all, it is worth noting here that the analytic survey was basically chosen as the most 
appropriate method, primarily on the grounds of the above mentioned research qualities, that is, its 
strength in internal validity and reliability. It is the researcher’s strong contention that these 
research qualities essentially promote the selected analytic survey design as the single method that 
can simultaneously combine two critical research features, namely :
-  the investigation of the phenomenon of interest (that is, the potential contribution of the 
formal system of performance measures and related incentive schemes to the positive 
motivation of middle-level managers) in its natural context
-  a relatively high level of control over the identified dependent, independent and 
intervening variables.
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Notwithstanding the fact that the analytic survey - that has been adopted as the primary data 
collection method in this study - gains in terms of internal validity and reliability for the previously 
discussed reasons, it has to be mentioned that it does so only to the expense of its ecological 
validity. Gill and Johnson (1991) point out that traditionally analytic survey research is considered 
to be relatively low in terms of ecological validity. The use of a fairly stringent, standardised 
method of gathering data tends to reduce the amount of variability among people participating in 
the study, results in data that can be readily analysed in a quantitative mode at the second stage of 
the data analysis, and generally adds to the reliability and internal validity of the research. 
However, this intended high degree of structure and control in collecting and analysing data in the 
present study, although conferring strengths, appears to create what is termed within research 
methodology theory as ‘artificiality’, that is, a relative lack of naturalism.
In the present study, despite the fact that the first stage of the data collection took place in the 
natural setting of the phenomenon of interest (i.e., the questionnaires were sent to the selected 
company and were subsequently completed by middle-level managers operating in that company), 
the overall ecological validity may have been adversely influenced by the high level of 
standardisation of the data-collection instrument itself. Essentially, what needs to be recognised 
here is that there is a high probability that the research participants may have been “.. .constrained 
or impelled by the rubric of the self-completion questionnaire” (Gill & Johnson, 1991, p. 123), 
and may have been led to make statements which, although fitting into the conceptual and 
theoretical proforma of the research, have given them little or no opportunity to articulate the ways 
in which they themselves personally conceptualise and understand the matters of interest. Clearly, 
to the extent that the - almost - exclusive use of close-ended questions may have prevented the 
respondents from providing important information which is unusual or unexpected, there is a 
possibility here that the quality (amount, type, detail and accuracy) of the information gained may 
have suffered. For example, although a considerable amount of data about the motivational 
impact of specific technical characteristics of the company’s formal PMERS were obtained here, 
little insight was gained on the complex network of relationships and the dynamic interplay 
between the other (more subtle and informal but equally powerful) administrative, social, and 
personal mechanisms that are simultaneously competing for influence and control within the
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organization (Hopwood, 1974).5 In effect, making data-collection and data-analysis procedures 
more standardised and controlled can certainly help results to be more reliable and internally valid. 
However, at the same time, it can adversely affect the degree to which these results are equally 
valid, applicable, and generalisable to other, more ‘natural’, contexts and settings. It is usually for 
these reasons that survey research is often considered to ‘score’ low in terms of ecological validity.
To compensate for this artificiality, mainly created by the standardisation of the data-collection 
instrument, two main measures were taken in the course of this research. First, the pre-coded 
questions in each section of the questionnaire were complimented with a small number of 
open-ended questions, with the hope that while the former would provide the factual information, 
the latter could provide the more attitudinal responses and the replies to the ‘why’ and ‘in what 
way’ probings. These open-ended, narrative-answered questions were expected to offer here a 
much more direct window into what the actual actors (i.e., the selected middle-level managers) 
were really thinking about the intricacies of the issue under investigation (that is, managerial 
motivation through the company’s PMERS). Fowler (1995, p. 178) remarks on the value of open- 
ended questions in social survey research by saying that “...when the reasoning behind a 
conclusion, a behavior, or a preference is of interest, the best way to learn about it is to hear the 
respondents’ own words”.
A second effort to increase the study’s ecological validity involved an attempt to collect data from 
a secondary source, data that could enrich and provide triangulation for and authentication of 
the findings that emerged from the questionnaire survey. The participant company was contacted 
about the possibility of organising a forum-like event, where the study’s quantitative results could 
be presented and discussed with a larger cross-section of participants and non-participants in the 
research, and useful feedback on these initial findings could be provided. Thus, by the end of 
August 2000 (that is, almost one year after the administration of the questionnaire), two closed 
presentation sessions took place - the first one in the company’s headquarters with a selected team 
of 5 top executives, and the second one in a more ‘open’ event attended by a focus-group of 15 
managers from the company’s Human Resource Division -, during which the research’s main
5 Indeed, the possibility that the questionnaire employed for the data-collection requirements of the study may have 
failed to unveil the existence and role of a more informal, underlying process and culture o f evaluating and rewarding 
managerial performance within the company was specifically mentioned during the feedback sessions with the 
company’s executives, where the study’s findings were presented and discussed.
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findings and implications were initially introduced and subsequently discussed. In essence, this 
more qualitative data that emerged from these presentation and feedback session was expected to 
help confirm (or contradict) the quantitative results obtained through the questionnaire in the 
study, and thereby help elaborate further on the explanations offered. Abemethy et al. (1999) 
mention that, particularly in cross-sectional survey research, both data- and method-triangulation 
has much to offer. In their point of view, the use of multiple methods and / or multiple sources of 
data in survey-based studies can not only improve the study’s overall generalisability, but also 
enhance the interpretation of the results coming from the survey method itself. On the whole, 
both the complementation of the pre-coded questions with open-ended questions in the 
questionnaire, and the attempt to triangulate by collecting additional data of a more qualitative 
nature have endowed this research with some ‘flavour’ of naturalism. Nonetheless, the overall 
ecological validity of the present study is still considered to remain low, mainly as a result of the 
exceeding number of pre-coded questions included in the data-collection instrument, and the 
particular emphasis given on the quantitative data that come from these pre-coded questions 
throughout this study.
From a broader point of view, the usefulness of questionnaires in unveiling the ‘true’ meaning 
social actors give to particular phenomena within their immediate social context has been 
extensively criticised in recent years. A detailed philosophic discussion of the complex topic of 
social reality will not be attempted here, but it is worth noting that the traditional view that 
questionnaires can be regarded as adequate means of finding out the truth about some situation or 
pattern of behaviour is currently in dispute. For example, Abemethy et al. (1999, p.7) argue that 
when questionnaires are used to capture complex constructs that are capable of taking on multiple 
“layers / shades of meaning”, they typically encounter serious interpretive difficulties, particularly 
when there is no opportunity for additional follow-up or probing questions. Davies goes a step 
further when he points to the direction of “...a growing body of evidence which suggests that 
answers to questions are acts of cognitive constmction rather than merely degraded versions of the 
tmth. This evidence derives from the suggestion that the answers people give serve important 
functions for that person (such as self presentation, preservation of self-esteem, apportioning 
blame or credit), and that the answers the person offers reveal, first and foremost, something about 
the way that person thinks, and about his / her motives and intentions, rather than merely providing 
a blurred window on the tmth” (1997, pp. 82-83). The point made here is that social actions are
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the actions of conscious people who make choices, have memories, wills, goals, intentions and 
values which motivate their behaviour, and, to the extent that survey research is likely to neglect 
the role of these characteristics of human nature as important sources of action, it is - at least - 
questionable whether it is truly capable of getting at the meaningful aspects of this social action.
All things considered, there is not much doubt that, given the complex nature of the phenomenon 
of interest of this study - that is, the motivational impact of the formal PMERS on middle-level 
managers’ behaviour -, objections regarding the research choices discussed in the last two sections 
will arise. Some may criticise the use of structured questionnaires for data collection, with the 
assertion that the managers’ responses to ‘closed’ questions cannot provide a truly deep 
understanding of the issue under investigation in all of its behavioural proportions. Others, 
considering the large number of potential extraneous variables that might exist between, and 
impinge upon, the relationships hypothesised in this research, may question the appropriateness 
and ability of purely statistical methods of analysis to unravel such a complex pattern of 
interaction. This may argue for a more phenomenological methodology that can explore the 
phenomenon of interest in all of its complexity and holistic quality.
However, given
i) the main purpose of the study, which was to develop and test a contingency argument 
about the effect of the environmental factor on the motivational effectiveness of the 
PMERS,
ii) the relatively large number of variables whose relationships this study set out to 
investigate,
iii) the related time and resources constraints, and
iv) the limited access that the participant company allowed for the research’s data-collection 
requirements,
the analytic questionnaire survey was chosen as the most relevant and cost-effective research 
method, and as the one that appeared to best fit the specific needs of this work.
That is not to say that the structured questionnaire that has been employed here is regarded as a 
faultless data-collection instrument. On the contrary, a genuine attempt was made throughout this 
chapter to document all of its - potential and actual - methodological limitations. In the final 
analysis, however, it seems safe to conclude that all the previously discussed ‘strengths’ and
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‘weaknesses’, concerning both the actual method and the overall research design utilised in this 
work, represent a trade-off between the precision that comes from a high degree of control and the 
loss of ‘real-life’ richness. Eventually, such choices depend largely on the purpose of the research, 
the conclusions which are expected to be drawn from it, and the conditions under which the 
research is actually carried out (Greene & D’Oliveira, 1982). Overall, although it is quite unlikely 
that the philosophical stances adopted and the research methods employed in this study will be 
universally accepted by the whole academic community in the field of management accounting 
and control, given the constraints of the problem’s definition, and the very nature of the theoretical 
(expectancy) framework assumed, the method and methodology chosen here are seen as highly 
justified.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, an attempt was made to address the method and methodology that were adopted in 
this study. In the early sections of the chapter, the underlying philosophical and methodological 
roots of the study were thoroughly discussed, and specific details with regard to the particular 
method employed for the data-collection purposes of this research endeavour were also provided. 
On the whole, largely due to its multidisciplinary character, the present research had the 
opportunity to build on a well-established body of existing empirical literature, and therefore made 
a conscious effort to employ previously developed and well-tested methodology to operationalise 
and measure its dependent, independent, and intervening variables. From a methodological point 
of view, that has potentially rendered the study with a relatively high level of construct validity and 
comparability with a considerable body of relevant literature. In the latter parts of the chapter, the 
rationale for the choices in method and overall research design was examined, whereas an attempt 
was also made to refer to the advantages and disadvantages that derive from these choices.
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Chapter Five : 
Exposition of the Case Study
5.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to provide the reader with background information on 
the organisation that provided the data for this study. Although some peripheral 
information on the profile, business environment, corporate strategy, and 
organisational structure of the selected company are given, the main emphasis still is 
on the detailed description and analysis of its Performance-Measurement-Evaluation- 
Reward System (PMERS). Hence, the intention throughout this chapter is to provide a 
relevant context within which the discussion of the obtained findings can later take 
place.
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5.2 Groundwork for the case study
Without much doubt, one of the largest obstacles to the completion of studies such as this one is 
the difficulty in securing access to an organisation for the data-collection requirements of the 
research. Obviously, data availability determines not only the quality but also, eventually, the 
overall success or failure of any study. As such, achieving the full co-operation of a corporate 
partner which would be willing to participate in the given research project by providing access to 
its managerial staff, has been a matter of concern throughout this research endeavour - particularly 
owing to the fact that the author’s connections with the corporate world have always been limited.
With such considerations in mind, in June 1999 preparations started in order to identify an 
organisation that would be, first, supportive in aiding the researcher to gather the empirical data 
required, and second, suitable for the kind of research questions that were to be asked and 
answered in the course of the study. At this initial stage, two main restrictions applied in the 
search for a corporate participant, namely th a t:
i) the company should ideally be a large, highly diversified organisation, with a considerable 
number of organisational units (or a wide variety of functional areas), so as to provide a 
relatively large and heterogeneous sample of middle-level managers exposed to different 
environments and varying degrees of environmental uncertainty, and
ii) the company should employ a uniform system of performance measures and incentive 
schemes to measure, evaluate, and reward the performance of all of its middle-level 
managers throughout its organisational structure, so that cross-managers comparisons with 
respect to their motivation and subsequent performance could legitimately be made.
In addition to the above restrictive parameters imposed by the nature of the research problem in 
hand, the resource and time constraints associated with the study urged the decision to first 
consider the possibility of finding a corporate partner within the UK. As such, by mid-June 1999, 
a number of 40 companies, appropriately selected from the Financial Times UK’s Top 100 list to 
meet the aforementioned necessary requirements, were contacted by letter in order to ascertain any 
interest on their behalf in taking part in the research - of these, one expressed a definite interest. 
[The method that was followed in order to sample and approach these companies in the study, as 
well as other similar research method and methodology considerations, are discussed in full detail 
in Chapter 4 - Research Method and Methodology!. Later in the same month, an appointment with
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the Human Resources Director of the interested company (which will henceforth simply be 
referred to as Bank Sigma) was arranged, in which, in a rather friendly atmosphere, a number of 
important issues regarding the specifics of the research were discussed, among which were :
• the researcher’s motivation for the study,
• the project’s characteristics, such as the data-collection methodology, the size and the profile of 
the intended sample, and the time requirements that the company would have to commit itself to 
if the decision was made to participate in the study,
• confidentiality and anonymity considerations, both for the company and for the participating 
managers,
• the potential benefits to the company from taking part in the research.
After the passing of a stressfully long, almost two-weeks’ period, on the 21st of July 1999, the company 
eventually notified the researcher in writing, through its Human Resources Director, that it was willing 
to take part in the study. In the same letter, two executives from the company’s Management 
Development Division were also designated as the immediate contacts with who the researcher was 
advised to cooperate for the fiirther organisation and administration of the project. The contribution of 
these two individuals has been invaluable, not only to the planning and execution of the data-collection 
process, but also to the composition of this case study, as much of the data on the basis of which the 
case study was built - particularly with regard to the company’s PMERS - was provided by them.
It is worth-mentioning at this point, that an element of good fortune was certainly involved in securing 
access to the particular organisation, in that, as it will be discussed later, at the time that it was contacted 
(June 1999) and during the stage of data-collection (August 1999 - September 1999), the particular 
company was at the late stages of organizing, first, the reshuffling of its organisational and management 
structure, and second, the introduction of a newly-designed PMERS for the assessment and reward of 
its managerial staff, both of which were eventually completed by April 2000. Being in a re-organisation 
phase of revising its management structure and its management control systems, the company in 
question was clearly interested in obtaining an independent, in-depth diagnosis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of its then performance measurement and incentive system in use, and therefore willing to 
allow access to its managerial staff for the data-collection requirements of the study. Indeed, as far as 
the timing of the contact is concerned, this proved to be ideal for the needs of the present research, 
providing the researcher with the unique opportunity to gather managerial perceptions about a PMERS
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which, although had already been replaced, it had been replaced sufficiently recently to allow the 
collection of valid attitudinal data about it.
5.3 Review of the case study
5.3.1 Company Profile
Bank Sigma is a leading, publicly held since 1986, UK-based clearing bank, with its headquarters 
in the northern part of the United Kingdom.1 Bringing over 300 years of experience to the 
provision of financial services in the community, the Bank comprises today of four principal 
subsidiaries, the majority of which are located in the UK, and employs more than 21,000 staff in 
total within the group. Its branch network presently counts some 350 high street branches and 
regional offices, predominantly covering the northern UK geographical sector, that offer an 
extensive and growing range of retail and wholesale banking services to the Bank’s professional, 
business and personal customers. Over the years, the Bank has rightly earned a reputation as a 
highly respected organisation, and is widely recognised as an innovative and forward thinking 
player in the financial services sector. Basically owing to its strategic management of technology, 
it is today one of the largest providers of direct banking services in the UK, and among the world 
leaders in electronic banking, offering a full range of corporate and personal banking products 
through intermediaries and direct delivery channels.
The Bank’s continuous progress and growth is vividly reflected in its financial performance. In 
the fiscal year 1999, Bank Sigma had total revenue from interest and investment of £4,132 million, 
and its net income totalled £557 million - reporting, as compared with the previous year’s £3,857m 
total revenue and £51 lm  net income, a 7.2% and a 9% increase respectively -, that essentially rank 
the bank amongst the top 8 of the UK banking sector. In other financial highlights for the year to 
28th February 1999, operating profit before bad debt provisions (£ 1,097m, from £954m in 1998), 
pre-tax profit (£l,012m, from £742m in 1998), post-tax profit (£581m, from £532m in 1998), and 
retained profit (£376m, from £35lm in 1998), all rose to all-time record levels, whereas, at the
1 Information for this case study have been collected from Bank Sigma’s annual accounts, as well as from newspaper 
and journal articles, which have not been referenced in order to preserve anonymity and confidentiality. Likewise, 
the quotes and statements extracted from the open questions of the questionnaire and used in this case study have 
also not been referenced, so that to preserve the anonymity of the participant middle-level managers.
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same time, operating expenses increased by 7.8% to £l,056m (1998 - £980m), maintaining the 
Bank’s income growth well above its expense growth. (A 10-year summary of financial data is 
presented in Appendix F). Although the Bank’s modest UK market share (marginally reaching the 
2% mark) and its relatively weak position in terms of assets (ranking 73rd within the EU) are 
unlikely to cause delusions of grandeur in the near future, its current cost : income ratio 
(historically among the lowest in the UK banking industry, improved from 50.7% in 1998, to 
49.1% in 1999) and its persistent growth in assets (total assets rose to £59,796m in 1999, from 
£54,697m in 1998 - an underlying growth of 9.3%) are both very encouraging signs for the Bank’s 
prospects. Overall, it is fair to say that Bank Sigma is today rightly regarded as a fairly successful 
competitor within the British banking industry, no matter what performance criteria are used. 
(Appendix G provides a comparative analysis of Bank Sigma and its 5 main rivals in the UK 
banking sector).
5.3.2 Business Environment, Corporate Strategy, and Organisational Structure
Admittedly, the business context within which Bank Sigma operates today fits the paradigm of an 
extremely volatile and highly uncertain world. In fact, the banking industry and its environment 
have undergone a radical transformation in the last twenty years or so, largely as a result of two 
factors,
i) the broad movement towards deregulation of the banking and financial services sector 
world-wide,
ii) the advent of information technology and the effect of technological innovations in the 
field.
The increasingly diminishing, both in number and in importance, regulatory and technological 
barriers have mainly brought about a constantly growing in size and sophistication - but clearly 
highly fragmented in the different target markets - costumer base. At the same time, however, 
they have resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of competitors and in level and intensity of 
competition over market shares, prices, and profit margins in the particular industry. All the 
above, in combination with the inherent difficulty to meaningfully differentiate the offered 
product, portray an overcrowded, highly competitive, rapidly changing and thus uncertain business 
environment.
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Within this volatile environment that clearly offers many opportunities but also hides many 
threats, Bank Sigma has constantly tried to find and use shortcuts to implement its basic strategic 
principle, which is effectively summarised in the words of one of the Bank’s executive directors as 
“...to steadily grow in a cost-effective manner” (Bank Sigma GM, Branch Banking, June 1995).
In the early years of its development, the Bank basically concentrated on low-cost, high-margin 
retail financial services, exclusively targeting its local, within-close-proximity, clientele, however, 
the last 30 years have been marked by a rapid geographical and functional expansion of the Bank’s 
operations, an expansion that has been principally achieved through a series of carefully planned 
and decisively executed strategies. Overall, the Bank’s top management has so far consciously 
adopted a strategy of careful organic growth rather than a more aggressive, acquisition-centered 
strategic approach, which has essentially been implemented along the following four major axes :
(i) the successful exploitation of available specialist ‘niche’ activities, such as the UK oil and gas 
field financing or the funding of senior debt for management buy-outs in Britain,
(ii) the careful segmentation of its corporate market and identification of its specific costumer base - 
realising its inability to service all the sectors of the market with the resources available to it, 
the Bank has selected and concentrated on those customer segments that it could most efficiently 
and profitably service, aiming mainly at the middle and lower end of the corporate market (i.e., 
small- and medium-sized businesses),
(iii) the clever market expansion of the Bank’s retail operations in the UK, both via a strategically 
positioned skeleton network of a dozen or so branches and regional offices in the major UK 
provincial cities, but most importantly via a number of alternative non-branch initiatives that 
included
-  joint exercises with building societies, offering bank accounts linked to building 
society accounts
-  contractual link-ups with major UK retailers based on credit card provision,
that is, business projects that can provide ready, low-cost access to selected customer markets, 
accelerate the achievements of profitability and pay-back, and simultaneously reduce the 
start-up costs and risks associated with new commercial ventures,
(iv) the ongoing emphasis on the strategic management of modem technology, and the innovative 
application of I.T. for the differentiation of its existing financial products and services and 
the introduction of new ones in its core retail and corporate markets through low cost delivery 
routes. (Typical examples include the Bank’s continuous development of novel electronic
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direct banking services, that incorporate leading-edge mainframe computer technology and 
state-of-the-art telecommunication networks to allow customers to control their bank 
accounts from a home- or office-based computer terminal ; or the introduction of products 
such as ‘smart’, multi-function credit cards with sufficient memory to hold and process 
security number, balance, credit limit, and previous transaction record information of all the 
possessor’s accounts).
As a result o f the consistent and vigorous implementation of the above strategy, Bank Sigma not 
only achieved sustained organic growth in a relatively short period of time, but also managed to 
do so in a more cost-effective way than the great majority of its competitors, essentially by 
avoiding the added costs and risks that are associated with the investment in property assets 
required for the development of an extensive branch-network infrastructure. Thus, apart from 
gaining a considerable share of its market in the last few years, the Bank has at the same time 
succeeded in building up a cost-based competitive advantage, maintaining - as mentioned in the 
previous section - an overall cost structure well below those of the rest of the UK clearing banks 
operating in a more traditional, branch-orientated, philosophy.
Today, in the doorstep of the 21st century, Bank Sigma has managed to establish itself as a 
low-cost, low-risk, high-tech banking business and create a sustainable competitive position in the 
UK banking industry. On a strategic platform that emphasises building upon established, 
successfully tested practices - “...more o f  the same, but better”, as recently (November, 2000) 
proclaimed by its deputy governor -, the Bank continues to grow its business organically with 
careful, calculated steps :
“Our current strategic philosophy is to seek extensions to our business portfolio in 
national markets where we are already established and to move into new territories 
only with products where we have extensive experience. We do not want to enter 
unfamiliar geographic areas with untested products. What we are really aiming at is 
to first sustain, and, i f  possible, to go on and enhance our competitive position 
through efficiency and the exploitation o f technology” (Bank Sigma CEO, June 1995).
In recent years, the Bank’s top management team has considered the adoption of a more direct, 
acquisition-oriented strategy and has, in fact, proceeded with it on a small-scale basis both within
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and outwith the UK, however, it remains ambivalent about the desirability of such a strategic 
choice to date. In a recent interview (April 1997), the Bank’s CEO explained :
“We can certainly see some sense in it - acquisition would provide more customers 
more quickly than organic growth. However, we can also see some snags in it. One 
snag patently is that the market gives us a lot o f credit fo r having a clear-cut strategy 
which we have implemented quite effectively. That strategy clearly would be 
somewhat blurred i f  we suddenly acquired a lot o f branches through the length and 
breadth o f the UK”.
Within these environmental and strategic parameters, Bank Sigma was organised until recently - 
that is, up to the reshuffling of its organisational structure that took place during 1999-2000 - in a 
ffee-form multidivisional structure, similar to the one diagrammatically illustrated in the 
organisational chart of Figure 5-1. More specifically, the Bank was structured around 6 primary 
operating divisions, each of them run by a managing director in charge. These divisions were 
regarded as semi-autonomous units, largely self-contained and independent of one another, in the 
sense that each organisational sub-unit had been delegated the necessary authority to determine its 
own strategy and to make the necessary decisions with regard to its day-to-day operations, 
subject to some loose accountability to the centre. On the whole, this organisational structure 
recognised the divisions as distinct businesses, in effect, as separate subsidiaries, with the Bank’s 
top management maintaining a mere supervisory role. The underlying philosophy behind the 
decentralised model adopted within Bank Sigma was clearly reflected in the words of the Bank’s 
CEO at the time :
“In contrast to most o f our competitors who have systematically drawn the decision­
making authority into the centre, we have left a lot o f that authority with both the 
branches and the principal subsidiaries. We have intended to keep a very devolved 
structure. We like, wherever possible, that decisions should be made in the 
community to which they relate. A good manager is a villager, he has a totality o f 
knowledge, and i f  you've got some bad news in your business, you lre much better to 
take initiative and go and tell about it, because the likelihood is that he will actually 
pick it up on the grapevine ” (Bank Sigma CEO, June 1995).
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Figure 5-1 : BANK SIGMA - Organisational Structure j
The managing directors responsible for the each division’s business functions had to report 
straight to an Executive Management Board. The role of this management board within the given 
organisational structure and management approach - one of the innovations that was first 
introduced back in the late 1970s - was, and still is quite distinct from the role of the Bank’s 
traditional Board of Directors, essentially highlighting the top management’s intention to separate 
the strategic from the operational function within Bank Sigma. Primarily consisting of senior 
professional bankers, this particular body was purposively established to thrust the everyday 
responsibility for running the organisation onto the bankers, leaving the Board of Directors to 
wrestle with more strategic issues, although open channels of communication between the two 
boards have always been maintained “...so that the Board o f Directors has a very good idea o f 
what are the principal issues that the full-time management is occupied with ” (Bank Sigma CEO, 
May 1990). Essentially, the Executive Management Board provides until today a forum for open 
expression and discussion of ideas when it meets every two weeks, and is unanimously described 
by directors and general managers alike as the Bank’s “engine of progress”, as it is seen to enable
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the Bank to make quick and relevant operating decisions, and, at the same time, to alleviate the 
workload and the scope of responsibility of the Board of Directors. Indicative of the role of the 
Management Board is the comment of the Bank’s CEO back in May 1989 :
“ When I  first took over, I  was conscious that banks were very hierarchical 
organisations with a steep management triangle. I  deliberately set out to flatten the 
triangle because I  knew that the ideas that were needed did not lie within myself, but 
within the people around me
Other ‘trademark’ characteristics of the Bank’s organisational philosophy have diachronically been 
the relative compactness of its top management team, which during the past twenty years has 
consistently comprised of a small Head-Office staff and a cadre of no more than twelve senior 
managers, as well as the informal and interpersonal character within which this top management 
team is said to hold its meetings. This structural arrangement and management orientation have 
been purposefully intended to facilitate a particular flexible style of strategic management at Bank 
Sigma, that can usefully enhance the Bank’s ability to respond more timely to environmental 
changes by evading the usual bureaucratic barriers associated with more extended top- 
management boards.
Recently (Januaryl999), and as part of the drive to improve operating efficiencies, the Bank’s top 
management decided the adoption of a new organisational structure for managing the business 
activities of Bank Sigma and its subsidiaries. This restructuring integrates all the Bank’s 
existing lines of business together, realigning them under four distinct, customer-facing, operating 
divisions - the Personal Banking Division, the Business Banking Division, the Corporate Banking 
Division and the Structured Banking Division - all of which are supported by a central Services 
Division.
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Figure 5-2 : BANK SIGMA - The Revised Organisational Structure
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According to the Bank’s official announcement, this new, more ‘flat’ organisational structure, 
which, for the time being overlays, but before long will supplant the previous structure of 
subsidiary company management and control, “...is intended to facilitate growth in the personal, 
business, corporate and structured markets both by allowing a more focused, market-driven 
approach to business development and through the provision o f products and services tailored 
specifically to meet customers’ demands...and also...to permit the employment o f well-tested 
business practices across Bank Sigma, thereby improving the operational efficiency o f the 
Operating Divisions and the Service Division” (Bank Sigma Press Release, April 1999). 
Presumably with an eye for a larger-scale merger and acquisition strategy in the future, this 
structure, which is organized on the basis of the different type of markets and clients the Bank 
serves rather than on other geographical or regional criteria, is designed to improve Bank Sigma’s 
efficiency in entering and operating in a multiplicity of diverse markets, by accommodating a more 
‘across-the-board’ management approach - although it is certain to require additional efforts and 
organizational arrangements with respect to the coordination of the different divisions.
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5.3.3 Performance - Measurement - Evaluation - Reward - System (PMERS)
The importance of the individual manager and the critical role of “innovation champions” within a 
supportive organisation are highlighted within Bank Sigma. The Bank’s chief executive officer 
underlines :
“The energy and inventiveness which our management staff, at all layers o f the 
organisation’s hierarchy, demonstrates, is essential to every facet o f  the Bank’s 
business. When I  became chief executive, I  soon discovered that there is an 
enormous amount o f latent talent in the organisation. I  was not sure whether 
everybody realised it was there, but I  was convinced that i f  those skills and abilities 
were to be made good use o f we had to ‘champion the champions 
(Bank Sigma CEO, June 1995).
Aware of the fact that it has to operate in a tight labour-market environment, in which 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to attract and retain, from a finite supply of talent, the 
high-performing, key individuals that essentially drive a bank’s profits as well as its reputation, 
the Bank, according to the assertions of its chief personnel manager, “...has established and 
maintained a climate o f meritocracy, in which performance against agreed standards is 
the primary basis fo r  reward - whether pay, promotion, or simply praise” (Bank Sigma 
Chief Personnel Manager, April 1997).
5.3.3.1 Performance Appraisal System
The formal appraisal process through which the annual performance of the Bank’s appointed staff 
is reviewed and evaluated is essentially an actual performance-against-agreed objectives system. 
The process is well established - in place since the early 1970s - and simple in principle.
Setting objectives and standards for evaluating the managers’ performance:
At the beginning of the appraisal year, each manager meets with their appraiser (in most cases that 
is their immediate supervisor, either their line manager or their divisional co-ordinator), and 
through a negotiation process, he / she agrees in writing (see Appraisal and Development Review 
(ADR) form, part 1, in page 152) one-year-span plans covering the following :
• the targets (objectives) that the manager shall try to achieve over the course of the year 
(answering the question “what do I have to achieve in the next 12-month period ? ”)
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• the standards of performance for each of the agreed objectives
(answering the question “how do I / you know that I fiiave met the objective set ? ”)
• the particular actions the manager is required to take in order to achieve these objectives
• the time-scale for the attainment of the agreed objectives.
The identified targets, which are to be measurable, preferably - but not necessarily - in quantified 
or in time-scale terms, need to be appropriately selected so) as “...to reflect [the company’s] major 
corporate strategic objectives ”, according to the Bank’s booklet of guidance notes for managerial 
performance evaluation. In effect, the whole standard-setting process has intended to be really a 
top-down / bottom-up approach, that involves the line mamagers identifying the organisation’s key 
business objectives as they apply to their division, and tlhe middle-level managers ‘translating’ 
(i.e., narrowing down) these wide company objectives iinto more specific operational targets, 
straightforwardly applicable to their own job-roles.
“I  think that the most important contribution o f the ADR process is its use as a mechanism o f  
setting objectives /  targets against which actual results can be later measured” remarks Manager A 
on the standard-setting function of the Bank’s PMERS. “Siure, such systems are never going to be 
perfect and are always subject to individual judgement, but overall I  am happy with it - it gives you 
the chance to participate in and thereby establish more realistic targets fo r  the year coming” 
(Bank Sigma Middle-level Manager, September 1999).
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BANK SIGMA CONFIDENTIAL I SP8SVR
APPRAISAL AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW Year under review 1908/99
Personal No. Name Grade Date entered $rade
Branch/Department Date appointed
Job Title (Detail main duties performed during the Appraisal Year) 
Assistant Manager, Quality and Communication
1. OBJECTIVES FOR YEAR_________  ' _______________________
To be completed by  (he Appraiser and Given to Job Hofderin advance of the Appraisal interview
KEY OBJECTIVES ACHIEVEMENT AND COMMENTS
| PERSONAL GOAL • |
Report prepared by Position Date
Contributory sources Appraisal Interview date
Appraiser's signature Confirmed by (signature)
Appraiser's Manager's comments
ADRFOfcM’l
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Monitoring and evaluation o f managerial performance
The monitoring and evaluation of the managers’ performance is carried out in a two-stage process 
throughout the year. Initially, the achievement of the agreed objectives is addressed in an interim 
performance review at the half-year point where, in a face-to-face meeting between the manager 
and his / her appraiser, the progress towards the targets is discussed and assessed at a first level. 
This interim review has been purposefully introduced as an integral part of the overall 
performance measurement and evaluation process in order to basically ensure a more regular, 
on-going dialogue about the manager’s performance other than that at the salary-review time at 
year-end. Hence, in this first meeting the manager’s progress up to that point is addressed, 
any particular problem areas thus far are identified and discussed, and the targets set are revisited 
and, if considered absolutely necessary, even revised.
The evaluation of the manager’s annual performance is completed with a second assessment 
interview at the end of the year. At that stage, in a second meeting between the manager and his / 
her appraiser, a thorough discussion takes place at which the overall progress made towards 
meeting the agreed targets is reviewed. At the end of this meeting, the appraiser assesses the 
manager’s effectiveness in his / her work, firstly by evaluating him / her on a number of individual 
attributes, and secondly by giving him / her an overall performance rating that is supposed to 
capture and reflect the totality of his / her job performance (see ADR form, part 3, in page 111). 
For the great majority of the Bank’s managerial staff, then, the formal performance evaluation 
process concludes with a ‘tick in the box’ assessment of the manager’s work effectiveness on a 
traditional trait-rating measure. It is essentially this overall rating, combined with a similar type 
self-assessment by the manager himself / herself of his / her own yearly performance (see ADR 
form, part 2, in page 155), that eventually determine the manager’s progression through the 
company’s grading structure, as well as the amount and type of rewards to be awarded to him / her 
as discussed in the following section.
To sum up, managerial performance within the Bank’s measurement package is evaluated 
and rewarded on the basis of 12 - largely qualitative - indicators / attributes of managerial 
performance, that have been presumably selected to represent the manager’s overall effectiveness 
in his / her job as this is reflected in the overall performance indicator. The time scale of the 
performance evaluation normally covers a 12-month period. However, worth mentioning is the
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fact that neither the relationship between the individual performance indicators and the aggregate 
performance measure (i.e., the manner through which the individual indicators are weighted) 
nor the exact way the rewards are dispensed in relation to the manager’s evaluated performance 
are specified in advance or communicated to the stuff. To the extent that the ADR process is 
standardised across Bank Sigma, particularly in the context of uncertain, rapidly changing 
environmental conditions, both the measures weightings and the subsequent reward distribution 
are likely to be left to the discretion of the middle-level manager’s appraiser. Given the anyway 
qualitative nature of the performance indicators within the ADR, the latter is more than certain to 
occasionally result in some loss of measurement objectivity and verifiability.
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Personal No.
ASSES
(s«e ADR
Name
CONFIDENTIAL
Year under review 1997/98
DUAL ATTRIBUTES
r guidance ©f the *oopo of the
To be completed by the Appraiser and given to Job Holder In advance ot the Appraisal interview.
ATTRIBUTE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Commitment 1o Customer CareAJser Service
Approach to Morftelirtgi’Selling
Business tmsgirvitwn arid Initiative
Attitude to Change
Professional Competence
Administrative Competence
Problem Solving
Decision Taking
Communicating Verbally
In Writing
Leadership
Relating to People
-
APPRAISER'S COMMENTS:
OVERALL PERFORMANCE RATING a 2 3 4 6 -6
± PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN .
To be completed by the Appraiser during or Immediately after the Appraisal tntervieyv
What actions do you propose to 
late to improve the .Job Holder's 
performance
What actions has the Job Holder 
agreed to lake to improve their 
performance?
What training or development is 
recommended, if any, to enhance 
the Job Holder's performance?
4.2  FUTURE CAREER ' n m i
What training or development is 
recommended, If any, to further 
the Job Holder's future career?
ADA.ro RW
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Personal No. Name
CONFIDENTIAL
Year under review 1997/98
To be comi
Oualificabotvs □
Holder and given to the Appraisers advance of the Appraisal interview 
ACIBS MCIBS j j ACIB (Errand? j~7~ j Oegw.'Equiv: MBA
2.1 To what extent do you consli
2 .2  Are there any aspects of your Job you feel are wasteful, Inefficient or uneconomic?
2 .3  What additional knowledge, skill or experience would enable you to do your present job better?
2 .4  What do you see  as your next possible job? How would you prefer to see  you career developing 
_______thereafter?___________________________________________ ■ ________ _____
2.5 Personal factors which may Inhibltyour 
desire to move within the U.K. or abroad
2.6 Community Involvement, Sports/hbbbies
2.7 Self assessment of individual Attributes
(see ADR Operating Manual for guidance on Ihe of the foUmtf ng Individual attributes)
ATTRIBUTE 1 2 3 A 5 6 7 8
Commitment lo Customer CareAteer Service
Approach to Martcpllngi'Selling
Business Imagination and Initiative
Attitude 1o Change
Professional Competence
Admlrx&traltve Competence
Pfobtem Sofaing
Occiskxi Taking
Conmminlcallng Vwbafy
In Writing
Leadership
Relating to People
A U rrU K N V I
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Throughout the years, the Bank’s managerial staff have had their own various reactions to the way 
their performance is evaluated and rewarded within the Bank’s formal management control 
system. One particular area, however, that seems to baffle the majority of the Bank’s managers is 
the accuracy and equity of the performance measurement and evaluation process. For example, 
Manager B comments with regard to the PMERS’s completeness and its ability to clearly 
distinguish between high- and low-performers :
“I  believe that the performance measurement system is inherently flawed in that it 
fails to separate and reward very strong from mediocre performance. In addition, 
the ADR has always focused on a limited range o f job dimensions and never really 
captured every aspect o f performance. In my opinion, the whole evaluation process is 
poor, with its main focus being on the overall performance rating and really little 
else. Let alone the fact that the system makes no effort to accommodate the different 
rules that apply when working in distinctly different environments. Within such a 
context, it is virtually impossible to measure and reward individual contribution 
fairly on a cross-divisional basis, and I  think this is basically the reason why the 
current performance appraisal system has little credibility amongst s ta ff ’
(Bank Sigma Middle-level Manager, September 1999).
Manager C, on the other hand, is more concerned with the subjective nature of the performance 
appraisal system, and the inadequate informational basis for performance evaluation :
“My personal opinion is that we are a large, highly bureaucratic organisation and not 
a meritocracy. Overall, I  would say that the whole performance evaluation process 
is very much dependent on the subjective view o f the assessor, i.e., the line manager.
There is insufficient management information available fo r  effective performance 
measurement and assessment, and in most cases the evaluations are carried out at a 
distance, without any factual evidence, by an individual who visits the division no 
more than 3 times per year. I f  I  had to evaluate the present system, I  would say that 
its main weaknesses are its subjectivity and its inconsistent application from the one 
year to the other” (Bank Sigma Middle-level Manager, September 1999).
Manager D goes a step further to offer some recommendations with respect to the design of the 
PMERS, recommendations that he / she considers instrumental for the improvement of the
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system’s credibility and motivational im pact:
"Up until now the degree o f subjectivity has been too high in our system. What is 
required today is a new performance appraisal system which includes objectives 
that, at the very least, aim to be S.M.A.R.T. - Specific, Measurable, Achievable, 
Realistic, and Time-based. This will most certainly reduce the level o f subjectivity in 
the evaluation and reward o f individual performance, and will increase the 
confidence in the system ” (Bank Sigma Middle-level Manager, September 1999).
A last noteworthy feature of the Bank’s formal appraisal system is its commitment to meet 
identified development needs that emerge from the performance evaluation process. Both the 
managers and their appraisers are specifically required to discuss and identify development needs 
and career aspirations and to record them (see ADR form, part 4, in the next page). Subsequently, 
and as a matter of the Bank’s corporate policy towards the creation of an environment and a 
culture of continuous improvement, these evaluations are expected to be followed up through 
communication, training, and internal consultancy by the Bank’s Human Resources Division and 
its Management Development Unit.
With reference to Bank Sigma’s dedication to the ongoing training and development of its 
managerial staff, Manager E observes :
“I  have the feeling that the great majority o f the Bank’s managers genuinely 
appreciate the amount o f time, effort, and finance the Bank expends to assist 
us learn and develop further both at a professional and at a more personal level.
The Management Development Programme that is in place, provides the opportunity 
to increase both the number and level o f skills and expertise you have, thereby 
improving your promotion and career prospects, and helping you ‘grow’ as an 
individual at the same time ” (Bank Sigma Middle-level Manager, September 1999).
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Personal No. Name
CONFIDENTIAL
Year under review
To be completed by the Appraiser during or immediately after the interview.
Which one of the following best reflects the Job Holder's current readiness for promotion?
Ready now 
Within 1 year 
Within 1-3 years 
After 3 years
Unlikely in the foreseeable future
Indicate the reasons underlying your choice:
Promotable in Current area? YES
To which of the area(s) of the Bank is the Job Holder best suited?
NO
If no, give reason
BRANCH BANKING DEPARTMENTS
Large Corporate Business Type of Work:
Corporate/Professional
Small Business/Personal
Predominantly Personal Possible D ep artm en ts):
Farming Area
New Branch Situation
Comment on your se*ectkm(3) with duo consideration being given to the Job HoWef* ability to move wilhin the U.K. or abroad
in the li^ht of 5,1 and 5,2 assessments what do you consider coufd be the Job Hewer's next appointment?
An indication Of the Job Mower's longer range potential should be given.
To be com pleted b y  Job Holder after the Appraisal Interview
Signature _____________________________  Date
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5.33.2 Rewards Package
Bank Sigma applies a reward scheme to all o f its appointed managerial staff 011 a uniform 
eligibility basis, subject to the manager having met the sole requirement o f  having occupied his / 
her current position for a reasonable amount o f time (no less than 6 months). The Bank’s 
incentive package includes a range o f  rewards, some allocated on the basis o f the manager’s 
individual performance, some dispersed on the basis o f the Bank’s overall performance, others 
simply deriving from the occupation o f the managerial post. More specifically speaking, the 
Bank’s reward package includes :
-a Annual Cash and Stock Bonus Awards : Cash and stock bonus awards are two of the 
principal ways in which individual job  performance is rewarded in the Bank. Both o f these 
performance-related rewards are distributed at year-end, on the basis o f  the evaluation o f the 
manager’s annual performance against his / her agreed and assigned targets. W ithin Bank 
Sigma, each division holds its own pot of cash and shares for bonus distribution, with the 
division manager having being delegated the authority and responsibility to decide upon its 
allocation among the division’s managerial staff. Fundamentally, managers whose overall 
performance rating (see ADR form, part 3) is at least fully satisfactory - that is, managers who 
receive a overall rating o f 1, 2 or 3 - are expected to receive some amount of annual bonus, 
which is most usually given out in cash-form up to £3,000, and the rest in company shares.
— > Salary Increase : In its attempt to further reward individual contribution, the Bank has 
established a pay-rise scheme that is also dependent on the evaluation o f the m anager’s annual 
performance. The allocated award structure is solely based on the m anager’s overall 
performance rating (see ADR form, part 3), and ranges from a 3.5% to a maximum o f  5% rise 
in his / her basic taxable salary. This performance-related salary increase is paid according to 
the following schedule :
1*4 j, ^  - •'
3 3.5%
2 4.0%
1 5.0%
Table 5-1 : BANK SIGMA - The Performance Related Pay-Rise Scheme
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-» Executive Stock Options Scheme : Just like with the two previous incentive plans, this is a 
performance-related reward scheme, which however applies only in cases of really 
outstanding individual performance. In effect, according to this scheme managers who have 
demonstrated an exceptionally high performance throughout the year (that is, managers whose 
overall performance rating in part 3 of the ADR form is at the range of 1 to 2) are given the 
option of an additional 1000 company shares that are provided at a premium price. 
Essentially, these executive stock options are awarded on the same basis as the annual bonus, 
i.e., their distribution is closely linked to the manager’s overall performance as this is 
evaluated within the ADR process during the year.
-» Profit Sharing Scheme : To complement its performance-based schemes which ensure that 
individual contribution is matched by reward, the Bank has developed and implemented an 
additional reward scheme that emphasises the importance of co-operation and collective effort
in the generation of company results. Bank Sigma’s profit sharing scheme is based on the
achievement of a predetermined level of corporate profit, and applies uniformly to all the 
Bank’s managerial staff Subject to achieving this corporate profit target in the financial year 
ended, all appointed managers receive close to the mid-year point a maximum payment of 
15% increase on their salary, either in the form of distributed stock, or as a cash-payment, or 
as a combination of the two.
—> Stock Options : Stock options constitute the Bank’s main long-term compensation device,
used not only to motivate the performance, but also to improve the retention rate of its
managerial staff. On the basis of Bank Sigma’s stock options scheme, all managers invariably 
- regardless of their job performance - are once every year granted the opportunity to purchase 
company stock at a stated price, at a future date. As such, every September, being eligible 
through his / her employment contract, each of the Bank’s managers is invited to buy shares 
up to £3,000 (£250 per month) at a premium price, with an option of a 3-, 5-, or 7-years 
arrangement.
Fringe Benefits Package : To ensure a balanced set of organisational rewards, Bank Sigma 
offers to all its employees who have reached the managerial level a range of fringe benefits 
that include :
0 private health cover 
0 non-contributory pension
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0 eligibility for preferential banking (subsidised mortgages, low-interest loans, etc.)
0 company car 
0 subsidised holidays.
Some of these fringe benefits are contributory - that is, they are provided at some cost to the 
manager - while for others, such as the basic pension scheme, the Bank assumes the full cost 
of the benefit.
To sum up, Bank Sigma’s PMERS appears to be fundamentally structured upon a three-stage 
appraisal and development review process, which commences at the beginning of the year with an 
agreement between the manager and his / her supervisor upon the objectives for the forthcoming 
year, continues with an interim review of the manager’s progress towards the agreed targets at the 
half-year point, and concludes at year-end with a comprehensive evaluation of the manager’s 
annual performance by his / her supervisor. Individual pay and career progression, as well as the 
receipt of the (performance-related) organisational rewards available, is largely based upon this 
annual appraisal and development review which basically assesses the manager’s performance 
against the agreed work objectives. The Bank’s chief personnel manager briefly comments on the 
role of the PMERS within the organisation :
‘'The performance review system aims to give managers and their supervisors a clear 
framework for making plans, and for discussing and rewarding the progress towards 
these plans ; to ensure that this is done in a fair and consistent manner ; and to 
provide line and personnel managers with useful information about the skills and 
abilities o f the s ta ff’ (Bank Sigma Chief Personnel Manager, April 1997).
However, a number of middle-level managers within the Bank express their reservations about the 
system’s reward equity and subsequent motivational effectiveness. For example, Manager F is 
seriously concerned with the performance dependency of the reward package within the PMERS, 
as well as with the meaningfulness of some of the rewards offered :
“Indeed, there is a performance evaluation and reward infrastructure in the Bank 
which appears to be objective, but as far as I  am concerned, individual performance 
is very loosely linked to reward. In my opinion, the distribution o f rewards within 
the system is not equitable, in that both poor and top performers enjoy the same 
amount o f profit share - which is, by far, the biggest element o f reward - and the
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bonus element is, after tax, nice but not meaningful in any real sense. Even in cases 
where good performance is recognised by getting 'a good overall m ark’, this is very 
rarely translated into salary level - the real difference in pay award fo r  an ‘average ’ 
and *above average’ performance is invariably less than 1%. In general, I  feel that 
a large number o f the company’s major benefits are made available to all staff 
outwith the PMERS, and, as a result, the system does not contain any significant 
element o f reward fo r  individual contribution. On top o f  that, the fact that the Bank’s 
fringe benefits package does not allow any room for flexibility and personal choice is 
certainly a minus - not all the benefits included in the package are relevant to all 
staff” (Bank Sigma Middle-level Manager, September 1999).
5.3.3.3 Looking at the future : The introduction o f a new PMERS
Very recently, perhaps as a response to the managers’ criticisms, but more likely following as a 
natural consequence of the reshuffling in its organisational structure (see Figure 5-2 - The Revised 
Organisational Structure). Bank Sigma introduced a new system for the measurement and 
evaluation of managerial performance. According to the Bank’s declarations, the new system aims 
to :
* provide a direct link between remuneration, managers’ skills and work behaviours, and 
corporate objectives
* encourage staff development and flexibility, while improving motivation and 
performance
* provide a fair reward system that can support a more meritocratic environment
* rationalise the Bank’s grading structure by redefining the grading levels, and by clearly 
specifying the required conditions for progression through the company’s hierarchy
* offer the Bank’s managerial staff new career paths in a flatter organisational structure.
At the development stage of this new performance appraisal system, the Bank involved most of its 
UK managerial staff (middle-level, line, division, and senior managers, altogether around 1000 
people) in an attempt to first identify and then validate all the main managerial tasks that are 
undertaken on a daily basis by its individual managers bank-wide. Based on this extensive list of 
tasks, a range of role profiles were put together, detailing a number and a level of necessary 
personal and technical (task-based) competencies for every single managerial position within the
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company. It is now on the basis of these role profiles, and on the competencies-dimensions of 
expected managerial performance that apply to each role, that the Bank’s managers will be 
evaluated and rewarded in the future.
“The focus has shifted to how managers apply their skills and knowledge, and how these Jit both 
with the ‘micro ’ operative business processes and with the wider 'macro ’ corporate strategies ” 
says the Bank’s chief personnel manager, among the key members of the project team that 
designed and implemented the new system. “We believe that the new appraisal framework will 
provide a more relevant and accurate basis fo r  individual performance assessment and reward, by 
evaluating and paying staff fo r the way they perform their jobs, rather than just the outcome” 
(Bank Sigma Chief Personnel Manager, October 1999).
Although not yet quite completed, a revised remuneration package for the Bank’s appointed staff, 
that will sit alongside the new performance measurement and evaluation system, is currently under 
development. With a growth strategy in mind, and its new organisational structure already in 
place, Bank Sigma’s intention clearly is to establish a PMERS that can be easily implemented 
‘across the board’, so as to accommodate these strategy and structure choices.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, a descriptive case study of the organisation which provided data for this research 
was presented. Although the intention never was to produce a full account of the company’s 
dealings, some information concerning the business environment in which the company operates, 
as well as details about its corporate strategy and organisational structure were provided in the 
early sections of the case study, so that the reader can recreate a relevant context within which the 
findings of the study can be later presented and interpreted. However, with the main focus of the 
research always on systems of management control and motivation, the latter parts of this case 
study were fully concentrated on the description of the mechanics of the company’s PMERS, and, 
to some extent, on the reactions of the members of the organisation to it.
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Chapter Six ; 
Data Analysis & Results
6.1 Introduction
This chapter contains the statistical analysis (descriptive and inferential) of the data 
obtained with the questionnaire survey. In its early sections, a preliminary descriptive 
analysis of the data is presented, providing in the first place univariate statistics on the 
sample of the 225 middle-level managers surveyed, and subsequently attempting a 
diagnostic analysis of the company’s PMERS on the basis of these summary statistics. 
The latter sections of the chapter are primarily concerned with the statistical testing of 
the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, drawing particular attention 
to the process and underlying logic of the analyses conducted. Overall, the focus in 
this chapter is equally on the description of the basic approach to data analysis adopted 
in the study, and on the presentation of the results obtained from this data analysis ; the 
interpretation of the findings and their implications constitute then the subject matter 
of Chapter 7.
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6.2 D esc rip tiv e  A n aly sis
6.2.1 Sample Characteristics
The 225 managers in the sample have held their current managerial positions for an average of
3.03 years.1 Taken as an indication o f the respondents having a reasonably high level o f 
experience in their job, this summary statistic provides some confidence about the validity o f the 
data collected in the study. To the extent that the majority o f the collected data refers to managers’ 
perceptions (either about the company’s PMERS, the level o f uncertainty in their environment, 
or their motivation and performance on their job), it has been considered essential right from the 
start o f this research - and was therefore identified as one o f the major sampling criteria in the data 
collection process - that the respondents would be in their position long enough to be able to 
express well-informed opinions about the above variables. Figure 6-1 below presents the 
frequency distribution o f the ‘position experience’ variable.
Position Experience
120  -------------
Less than 1 year Between 3 and 5 yrs
Between 1 and 3 yrs Over 5 years
E x p e r ie n c e  (in y e a r s )
Figure 6-1 : Frequency distribution o f  the ‘Position Experience’ variable
1 A more representative average for the 'position experience’ variable was calculated after excluding the ‘outliers’, that 
is, the extreme cases in the sample. After leaving out the managers with more than 15 years or less than 6 months in 
their present job, the mean experience is only marginally below the 2.5 years point (2.48), thereby providing further 
support to our argument about a relatively high level o f position experience of the subjects surveyed. In addition, 
comparison-of-means tests were run for differences between the group of the less experienced managers (position 
experience < 1 year) and the rest of the sample in order to assess the potential moderating effect of inexperience on 
each of variables identified in the study (see Appendix H). These tests reveal no significant mean differences in any of 
the designated variables between the two groups, and therefore the total sample of the 225 managers is subsequently 
used the data analytic purposes of the study.
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The division o f  the total sample over product / functional areas and hierarchical roles within the 
organisation is presented below. Table 6-1 contains data both about the absolute number and 
about the proportion o f respondents that reported to work in the specific area within the particular 
managerial role. On the whole, this overview o f the sample provides an indication that the 
sampling criteria employed in the study - that basically aimed at securing a relatively large, and
at the same time, heterogeneous cross-section o f experienced middle-level managers, exposed to
,  • • • • 2 different environments and varying degrees o f environmental uncertainty - were effective.
Product /
Functional
Area
Position in the Organisational Hierarchy
D irectors Sen ior M an ag ers  A ssocia te  D irectors M a n a g e rs  Total
Absolute % of Total Absolute % of Total Absolute % of Total Absolute % of Total Absolute % of Total 
Num ber, Sample ^Num ber., Sample Number ^.Sample NurpbejL Sample ^N u m b e r Sample |
C o rp o ra te  B anking 
B u sin ess  Banking 
S truc tu red  Banking 
Direct Banking 
P e rso n a l B anking 
Support S e rv ice s  
F inance  & A ccounting 
C u sto m er S erv ice  & 
M arket D evelopm en t 
H um an R e so u rc e s  
O ther 
Total
18
11
8
3
4  
4 
7
4
3 0
94
8 .0% 
4,9%  
3,6%  
1,3% 
1,8% 
1,8% 
3,1%
2 ,2%
1,8%
13,3%
41,8%
1
20
32
,4%
,9%
3,1%
,9%
8,9%
14,2%
4
30
56
1,8% 
2 ,7%  
,9%
1,3%  
1,8%
1,3%
1,8% 
13,3%
24 ,9%
2 3
4 3
2,7%  
,4% 
1,8% 
1,8%
2 ,2%
10 ,2%
19,1%
22
18
10
9
7 
18  
17
13
8
1 0 3
2 2 5
9,8%
8 ,0%
4,4%
4,0%
3,1%
8 ,0%
7,6%
5,8%
3,6%
45 ,8%
100 ,0%
Table 6-1 : Segmentation o f Sample over °roduct / Functional Areas & Hierarchica Roles
As expected given the sample o f the present study, the level o f (self-reported) motivation and 
performance within the total sample o f 225 managers surveyed appear to be rather high 
(mean motivation = 5.97 and mean performance = 5.62, in a scale o f  1-7). Frequency distributions 
o f the ‘motivation’ and ‘performance’ variables are presented below, in the histograms exhibited 
in Figures 6-2 and 6-3 respectively.
2 The large number of directors (n=94) in the total number of 225 middle-level managers surveyed raised some doubts 
about the representativeness of and potential bias in the given sample. Nevertheless, both the parametric and the 
non-parametric tests that were run to reveal any such hidden biases in the data collected (see Appendix I) indicate 
that there are no significant differences in any of the variables in the study between the group of the directors and the
rest o f the sample.
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Motivation
<d
CD03c
0 3
E
o
z
>oc033
cr<D
1,00 2,00 
Motivation
120
100
101
80
60
40
20 Std. Dev = ,92 
Mean = 5,97
N = 225,000
3,00 4,00 5,00 6,00 7,00
Figure 6-2 : Frequency distribution  o f  the ‘M o tiva tion ’ variable
Perform ance
140
130
120
100
0 3
40
Std. Dev = ,70 
M ean = 5,62 
N = 225 ,00
cr
1,00 2,00 3,00 4,00 6,005,00 7,00
Perform ance
Figure 6-3 : Frequency distribution  o f  the ‘P erfo rm ance’ variable
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6.2.2 PMERS Diagnostic Analysis
The summary statistics obtained on the expectancy variables of the study can be used to carry out 
a first-level diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of the selected company’s PMERS in 
motivational terms. According to the expectancy model of motivation that has been applied in this 
research, for any PMERS to be able to extrinsically stimulate managerial motivation and 
performance, it must be perceived by those it is supposed to motivate - that is, the managers 
themselves - as being reasonably adequate in all three stages of its sequential process, i.e. equally 
adequate in
i) setting standards of performance that are seen as attainable (E-* P)
ii) evaluating the attainment of these standards through performance measures that are 
perceived as accurate and equitable (P-+-EP)
iii) administering rewards that are deemed desirable (EV), and dependent on this 
performance evaluation (EP-*ER).
The relevant descriptive statistics in the total sample of 225 revealed that the performance 
standards which are set within the company’s PMERS are perceived, on average, as sufficiently 
attainable (mean perceived attainability of standards (E-> P) = 5.22, in a scale of 1-7) by the 
company’s managerial staff. On the other hand, it seems that the performance measures employed 
by the company in order to evaluate and further reward its managers’ performance are seen 
by the managers themselves as less capable of accurately capturing and reflecting actual 
managerial performance (mean perceived accuracy of measures (P -*  EP) = 4.14). As far as the 
rewards offered by the organisation are concerned, these appear to be perceived, on average, 
as fairly highly desirable (mean perceived value of total reward package (EV) = 5.57), however 
they are regarded as being less strongly related to the managers’ PMERS-evaluated performance 
(mean perceived dependency of rewards (EP-^ER) = 4.19). Figures 6-4, 6-5, 6-6 and 6-7 below 
present the frequency distributions of these expectancy variables.
3 A detailed descriptive analysis of the company’s reward package, providing reward-specific information about the 
most frequently mentioned, the most valuable, and the most performance-dependent rewards as these are perceived 
by the managers in the sample, is presented in Appendix J.
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All in all, if one wanted to make an assessment of the motivational effectiveness of the company’s 
formal PMERS on the basis of the expectancy-theory model adopted, in light of the above 
evidence he would predict that the system is most likely to fail to fulfill its motivational potential. 
As mentioned earlier, the particular model places substantial emphasis on the sequential nature 
of the PMERS and on the importance of the linkages between each single stage of the
process, in the sense that any perceivedPerformance Measurement->Evaluation->Reward
deficiency in any one stage of this process is essentially considered enough to break down 
the PMERS chain and compromise the system’s overall impact on the individual’s motivation 
and subsequent performance (Jiambalvo, 1979). To the extent therefore that the present system is 
perceived by the company’s managers to fall short in
i) measuring accurately and equitably managerial performance, and
ii) linking the administration of organisational rewards to the evaluation of individual 
performance,
it should not be expected to effectively perform its motivational function.
If this is the case, however, it immediately becomes critical to the underlying conceptual logic of 
this research to provide an alternative explanation for the relatively high level of motivation and 
performance of the managers in the sample. Given the design limitations of the company’s 
PMERS as these were cited in the previous paragraphs, an alternative source of motivation for the 
managers surveyed may be sought in the high value that they, on average, attach to the intrinsic 
rewards associated with their jobs in the organisation (mean perceived value of intrinsic rewards 
(IV) = 5.90).4 Indeed, this interpretation of the data is logically convincing, as well as consistent 
with the expectancy-theory model adopted in the present study which specifically emphasizes the 
role of intrinsic (self-directed) motivation [IV] in complementing the extrinsic component of total 
motivation [EV (E-*P) (P -*EP) (EP -+ER)].
4 Descriptive statistics with regard to the type and perceived value of the most frequently mentioned intrinsic rewards 
as they were identified by the 225 managers in the sample, are presented in Appendix K.
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Table 6-2 reports summary descriptive statistics (number o f cases N, minimum and maximum 
value, mean, standard deviation, and kurtosis) for all the variables measured in the study.
---------------- - - - - - - - i___J
Position Experience 225 '  33 i 3,03 4 07 21,503
E-->P Expectancy 225 2,00 7,00 5,22 1,42 ,140
P-->EP Expectancy 225 1,00 7,00 4,14 1,48 -,433
EP-->ER Expectancy 225 1,00 7,00 4,19 1,23 -,370
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 225 2,33 7,00 5,57 ,84 ,846
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 218 4,00 7,00 5,90 ,64 -,311
Motivation 225 3,00 7,00 5,97 ,92 ,519
Performance 225 3,00 7,00 5,62 ,70 1,235
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 225 2,00 7,00 4,82 ,88 ,850
Task Uncertainty 225 1,89 7,00 4,56 1,07 -,313
Valid N (listwise) 217
Table 6-2 : D escriptive S tatistics - Ail variab les
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6.3 Inferential Analysis
6.3.1 Description of the Data Analysis Methods
The type of research questions considered in this study, as well as the nature of the data gathered 
through the questionnaire survey administered, suggest that the data should be analysed in ways 
that basically allow to determine if there exist consistent and statistically significant relationships, 
first amongst the managerial perceptions data themselves, and then between them and the 
managers’ motivation and performance data. Accordingly, a twofold approach to data analysis has 
been adopted here that involves testing the hypotheses designated in Chapter 3, firstly by using 
correlation coefficients to assess the degree of relationship between the variables identified in each 
hypothesis (i.e., testing for relationships), and secondly by dividing the sample into high and low 
groups on the basis of one variable and then comparing the mean scores of these high and low 
groups on the second variable (that is, testing for group differences).5
More specifically, for all the hypotheses to be tested, correlation tests (both the typical Pearson’s r 
correlation coefficients, and their non-parametric equivalent, the Spearman correlations) were 
initially run in order to determine the strength, direction and significance of the relationship 
between the two variables identified in the hypothesis. Subsequently, the commonly used t-tests 
(unrelated), as well as their non-parametric alternative, the Mann-Whitney tests (recommended by 
Siegel and Castellan (1988) as the most appropriate for large-sized sample groups (m>25, n>25)), 
were also run in order to confirm the obtained relationships. Again, for each hypothesis that was 
to be tested, three groups (i.e., a high, a medium, and a low group) were formed on the hypothesis’ 
independent variable, and then comparisons of means were run between the high and the low 
group in order to detect statistically significant differences in the level of the dependent variable
5 It has to be noted that the particular approach to data analysis followed in the present study is, in essence, an across- 
individual analysis. Mitchell (1974b), however, in his review of the empirical literature in the area of expectancy 
theory specifically indicates the need for within-individual analyses, primarily on conceptual and methodological 
grounds. Here, a within-individual analysis would have required that comparisons be made across motivation and 
performance evaluations, so as to examine whether or not different PMERS-related and environmental uncertainty 
perceptions actually lead t o significantly different levels of motivation and performance for the aggregate population 
of the 225 middle-level managers surveyed. Kopelman (1977), on the other hand, compared the within- and across- 
individual approaches, noting that the within-individual method was only slightly superior in predicting work effort 
(i.e., motivation). A within individual analysis performed by Parker and Dyer (1976) also resulted in a level of 
predictive accuracy consistent with the findings of most across-individual studies. These results, together with the 
practical difficulties involved in performing a within-individual analysis, led to the adoption of an across-individual 
analysis in the present study.
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among these two extreme groups.6 The underlying logic of this high group-versus-low group 
comparison method is that, provided that the groups are properly formed on the basis of the 
independent variable, the larger the mean difference between the groups on the dependent variable, 
the stronger is considered to be the relationship between this dependent and the independent
n
variable of the hypothesis.
The decision was made in the present study to use both parametric and non-parametric statistical 
techniques in testing the hypotheses put forward. Despite the long tradition in the area of 
expectancy theory of utilising mainly parametric statistical approaches for hypothesis testing, it 
was difficult to justify here the use of such techniques merely on grounds of research 
conventionality. Strictly statistically speaking, the use of parametric tests is warranted only when 
a number of necessary requirements about the collected data can be safely assumed to have been 
met, such as that
i) the data are measured, at the minimum, on an interval scale (i.e., assuming an interval level 
of measurement)
ii) the data have been drawn from approximately normally distributed population(s) (that is, 
assuming a normal distribution of the data used)
iii) the data used come from populations which have roughly the same amount of variability 
(i.e., assuming homogeneity of variance in the sample groups or in the conditions 
compared) (Greene & D’Oliveira, 1982).
Even if we accept the normality and the equal variances assumptions to be valid in this particular 
research - assumptions that are anyway very difficult to prove in practice (Miller, 1984) - the data
6 The same analysis for group differences was run once more, after defining the groups according to the ‘cut point’ 
method. A numeric cut point (close to the median) was first identified for each hypothesis’ independent variable and 
then used to separate the two groups for the comparison ; all scores below the cut point formed the low-group and 
all scores at the same level or over the cut point formed the high-group. These additional tests for group differences 
yield, in every case, virtually the same results as the initial comparison-of-means analysis does (see Table 6.5 
below).
7 It should be noted that the t-values and the correlation coefficients used here are statistically comparable measures, 
since both are estimates of the proportion of variance accounted for. As Hays (1963) points out, t-values, like 
correlation coefficients, indicate the proportion of the total variance in one variable that can be accounted for by 
knowing the other. Thus, by comparing two t-values that are based upon samples of similar size, it is possible to 
determine which of two relationships is stronger ; a larger t-value reflects the fact that a stronger relationship exists 
between the two variables upon which it is based, than exists between the two variables upon which the smaller t- 
value is computed. The main advantage, however, that the high-versus-low comparison approach presents, is that it 
makes fewer and less stringent statistical assumptions about the data - for instance, it does not require, as the 
correlation coefficient method does, that both variables be measured on equal interval scales.
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gathered here refer to human perceptions and, although they have been purposefully measured so 
as to have some quantitative meaning, they can hardly be regarded as ‘natural’ interval-level data 
in the strict definition o f the term ; rather, they seem much more o f  an ordinal nature. To the 
extent then that there are reasonable concerns about possible departures from the assumptions 
necessary to use parametric statistical procedures, it has been considered sensible in this study to 
also test the proposed hypotheses through non-parametric (otherwise called distribution-free) 
techniques, which have the advantage o f not making numerous stringent assumptions about the 
population from which the data have been sampled (Siegel & Castellan, 1988), with the hope that 
the same conclusions will be reached by both types o f tests. As such, the sections that follow 
present the findings from the data analysis conducted by systematically reporting both the 
parametric and the non-parametric test results.
6.3.2 Hypotheses Testing
Tables 6-3 and 6-4 report the correlation coefficients (both parametric and non-parametric) 
among the different variables identified in the hypotheses posed and tested in this research. 
Next, the Mann-Whitney and t-test analysis, performed to re-examine these hypotheses at a second 
level, is presented in Table 6-5.
Matrix of Pearson's r Correlations
IB I
Motivation ! 000
E -> P  Expectancy ,008 1,000
P~>EP Expectancy ,036 ,627*’ 1,000
EP~>ER Expectancy ,132* ,067 ,138* 1,000
Value of Extrinsic Rewards ,139* -.067 -,071 ,239*’ 1,000
Value of Intrinsic Rewards ,167*' -.147* -,138* ,090 ,079 1,000
Performance ,506*' ,049 ,096 ,052 ,144* ,099 1,000
External Environmental 
Uncertainty ,058 -.382*' -,425*’ ,118* ,203*’ ,143* -,044 1,000
Task Uncertainty ,075 -,264*’ -.314*’ ,101 ,143* ,111 ,085 ,592*’ 1,000
‘ Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
“ •Correlation is significant at the O'.Oi level (1-tailed).
Table 6-3 : P earso n ’s r C orrelations
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Matrix of Spearm an Correlations
Motivation 
E~>P Expectancy
1.000
,015 1,000
P~>EP Expectancy ,044 ,537*' 1,000
EP-->ER Expectancy ,125* ,106 ,166*’ 1,000
Value of Extrinsic Rewards ,165*’ -.008 -.029 ,210*' 1,000
Value of Intrinsic Rewards ,156* -.145* -.129* ,063 ,060 1,000
Performance ,445*’ ,111* ,144* ,029 ,160*’ ,074 1,000
External Environmental 
Uncertainty ,082 -.248*' -,324*' ,107 ,174*’ ,114* -.074 1,000
Task Uncertainty ,048 -,129* -.209*' ,074 ,099 ,101 ,063 ,431*' 1,000
'  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
"■Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).
Table 6-4 : Spearm an C orrelations
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6.3.2.1 Determinants o f managerial motivation : The impact o f the PMERS-related perceptions 
on managers ’ motivation and performance (HI. H2. H3. H4. H5 and H6)
In this first section, the six hypotheses that refer to the determining effect of the manager’s 
PMERS-related perceptions on his motivation and subsequent performance are examined.
Perceived Attainability o f Standards (E  ~}P) and Manaserial Motivation
Hypothesis 1 predicted a positive relationship between the manager’s perception about the 
attainability of the performance standards set within the PMERS (E->P), and his / her motivation 
(M), stating th a t:
HI : Middle-level managers who believe that they are able to attain the standards o f  
performance as these are established within the PMERS, will experience a higher 
level o f motivation than those middle-level managers who do not.
The results of the tests run do not offer much support to HI. Neither the Pearson (Table 6-3) nor 
the Spearman correlation coefficient (Table 6-4) calculated to test this hypothesis reveal any 
significant relationship between the perceived attainability of standards (E->P) and managerial 
motivation (M). Similarly, no statistically significant difference is detected in the level of 
motivation between the high-(E->P) and the low-(E->P) group of middle-level managers by the 
Mann-Whitney and the t-tests run (Table 6-5). Hence, HI is rejected. There is no evidence of the 
manager’s perceptions about how attainable the PMERS-identified performance standards are, 
significantly affecting the manager’s motivation.
Perceived Accuracy o f Measures (P~^EP) and Managerial Motivation
The second hypothesis concerning the determination of managerial motivation predicted a 
positive relation between the manager’s perception about the accuracy of the performance 
measures employed by the PMERS (P->EP), and his / her motivation (M). Hypothesis 2 thus 
stated:
H2 : Middle-level managers who believe that their actual performance is captured 
accurately and evaluated equitably by the measures employed within the PMERS,
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will experience a higher level o f motivation than those middle-level managers who 
do not.
None of the parametric and non-parametric analyses performed and presented in Tables 6-3, 6-4 
and 6-5 produce results that can support Hypothesis 2 about the relationship between the 
perceived accuracy of measures (P->EP) and managerial motivation (M). With the exception of 
the Mann-Whitney test which shows, as predicted by H2, a significantly (p<0.10) higher level of 
motivation in the high-(P->EP) group as compared to the low-(P->EP) group of middle-level 
managers, the rest of the correlations and group differences obtained, although always in the 
expected direction, fail to reach statistically significant levels. On the basis of this evidence, 
H2 has to be rejected. There appears to be no significant impact on the managers’ motivation as a 
result of their perceptions about how accurate the PMERS-employed performance measures are.
Perceived Dependency o f Extrinsic Rewards (EP ~^ER) and Managerial Motivation
Concerning the effect of the perceived dependency of rewards (EP->ER) on managerial 
motivation (M), Hypothesis 3 stated th a t:
H3 : Middle-level managers who believe that the rewards they receive by the organisation 
are contingent on their PMERS-evaluated performance, will experience a higher 
level o f motivation than those middle-level managers who do not.
The positive relationship predicted between the manager’s motivation and his / her perception 
about how performance-dependent the rewards that he / she receives are, is unanimously 
confirmed by all the tests run. The results which are presented in Tables 6-3 and 6-4 show a 
statistically significant (p<0.05) and positive correlation (r = 0.132, p = 0.125) between (EP->ER) 
and (M). Moreover, the Mann-Whitney and t-test results (Table 6-5) indicate that the difference 
in motivation between the high-(EP->ER) and the low-(EP->ER) group of middle-level managers 
is also significant at the 95% level, and in the expected direction. All in all, these results seem to 
support our hypothesis that the stronger the managers believe that the organisational rewards they 
receive are dependent on their PMERS-evaluated performance, the higher is their level of 
motivation to perform on their job.
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Perceived Value o f Extrinsic Rewards (EV) and Managerial Motivation
Hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between the manager’s perception about the value 
(desirability, attractiveness) of the organisational rewards that he / she receives through the 
PMERS (EV), and his / her motivation to perform (M). It formally stated th a t:
H4 : Middle-level managers who value highly the extrinsic rewards that are administered 
to them through the company’s PMERS, will experience a higher level o f  motivation 
than those middle-level managers who do not.
As shown in Tables 6-3 and 6-4, both the parametric and the non-parametric correlation 
coefficients indicate a statistically significant (at the 95% level and above) and positive 
relationship (r = 0.139, p = 0.165) between the perceived value of extrinsic rewards (EV) and 
managerial motivation (M). These results are supported by the Mann-Whitney and t-tests 
performed (see Table 6-5), as significant differences (p<0.05 and above), in the direction 
predicted, are observed in the level of motivation between high-EV and low-EV groups. 
The high-EV group of middle-level managers appears to consistently exhibit a higher level of 
motivation than the low-EV group. On the whole, these findings provide support to Hypothesis 4, 
illustrating the importance of the managerial perceptions about the value of the PMERS- 
administered rewards to the managers’ motivation.
Perceived Value o f Intrinsic Rewards (IV) and Managerial Motivation
Hypothesis 5 proposed a positive relationship between the manager’s motivation and the value 
that he / she assigns to the intrinsic rewards that he / she identifies with his / her job. H5 formally 
stated:
H5 : Middle-level managers who value highly the intrinsic rewards that are associated 
with their job in the organisation, will experience a higher level o f  motivation than 
those middle-level managers who do not.
The results obtained provide full support to Hypothesis 5. Both the Pearson and the Spearman 
correlation coefficients calculated in order to test the hypothesis reveal a statistically significant 
(at the 95% level and above) positive relationship (r = 0.167, p = 0.156) between the perceived
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value o f intrinsic rewards (IV) and managerial motivation (M). Furthermore, statistically 
significant differences (p<0.05) in the predicted direction are detected in the motivation levels of 
the high-IV and the low-IV group o f middle-level managers, both by the M ann-W hitney and the 
t-tests run (see Table 6-5). Clearly in conformity with our expectations, the data suggest that the 
more a manager values the intrinsic rewards that are associated with his / her job role, the higher 
his /  her level o f  motivation is expected to be.
Figure 6-9 presents a graphical depiction o f the high-versus-low group comparisons for 
hypotheses 1 to 5. As indicated by the upward slope o f the lines in the graph, for all the 
independent variables / determinants o f managerial motivation examined, the high (EV, E->P, 
P->EP, EP->ER, IV) group o f middle-level managers exhibits consistently - as predicted by the 
hypotheses posed - a higher level o f motivation than the low (EV, E->P, P->EP, EP->ER, IV) 
group respectively.
Figure 6-9 : High vs. Low Group Comparisons - Hypotheses 1 - 5
PMERS-related Perceptions & Managerial Motivation
Low Group High Group
Low vs. High Group Comparison
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Motivation and Manaserial Performance
With regard to the effect of the manager’s motivation on his / her subsequent performance, 
Hypothesis 6 predicted th a t:
H6 : Middle-level managers who experience a high level o f  motivation, will exhibit a 
higher level o f job performance than those middle-level managers who experience a 
low level o f motivation.
As expected, Hypothesis 6 is overwhelmingly confirmed by the results of the analysis conducted. 
Both the parametric and the non-parametric correlation coefficients calculated (Tables 6-3 and 
6-4) show a very strong, positive (r = 0.506, p = 0.445), and significant (at the 99% level) 
relationship between managerial motivation and managerial performance. These findings are 
supported by the Mann-Whitney and t-test results, which unanimously indicate - as predicted 
by H6 - a significantly (p<0.01) higher level of performance in the high-motivation group as 
compared to the low-motivation group of middle-level managers (see Table 6-5). Overall, this 
evidence unambiguously supports the hypothesis put forward, that managers who are highly 
motivated are much more likely to be high performers. Additional correlation analysis, conducted 
both at a parametric and at a non-parametric level (see Appendix L), reveals also that managers 
who experience high motivation tend to exhibit not only significantly higher overall job 
performance but also significantly (p<0.01) higher performance in every individual dimension of 
their everyday managerial work (i.e., planning, investigating, co-ordinating, evaluating, 
supervising, staffing, negotiating, representing, etc.), a result that further reinforces the argument 
about a very strong relationship between motivation and subsequent performance.
6.3.2.2 The intervening effect o f environmental uncertainty (H7. H8 and H9)
This second section examines the last three hypotheses that refer to the intervening effect of 
environmental uncertainty, directly on some of the manager’s PMERS-related perceptions, 
and indirectly on his / her motivation and subsequent performance.
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Perceived Environmental Uncertainty and Perceived Attainability o f  Standards (E  ~^P)
Hypothesis 7 predicted a negative relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and 
the manager’s perception about how attainable the PMERS-identified performance standards are 
(E->P). It formally stated th a t:
H7 : Middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a high level o f 
environmental uncertainty, will regard the PMERS-defined standards o f 
performance as less attainable, than those middle-level managers who believe that 
they are faced with a low level o f environmental uncertainty.
The test results supporting this hypothesis are substantial. Both the Pearson and the Spearman 
correlation coefficients indicate strong, negative (r ranging from -0.264 to -0.382, p ranging from 
-0.129 to -0.248), and significant (p<0.01) relationships between the perceived attainability of 
standards (E->P) and each of the two measures of perceived environmental uncertainty employed 
in the study (that is, EU measuring the uncertainty the manager feels he encounters in his external 
environment, and TU measuring the uncertainty the manager sees evident in his everyday task 
(internal) environment). This dual relationship between (E->P) and EU, and (E->P) and TU 
is hardly surprising, especially given the significant (p<0.01) and high positive correlation 
between the two measures of perceived environmental uncertainty (see Tables 6-3 and 6-4). 
The Mann-Whitney and t-test results further validate the correlations obtained. Fairly large, in the 
direction predicted, and statistically significant at the 99% level differences in the managers’ 
perceptions about how attainable the standards of performance are, are evident between the 
high-uncertainty and the low-uncertainty group of middle-level managers. All in all, these results 
leave little doubt that the manager’s perception about the level of uncertainty in his / her 
environment has an effect on his / her perception about the attainability of the performance 
standards set within the PMERS. Hypothesis 7 is therefore supported.
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty and Perceived Accuracy o f  Measures (P ~^EP)
In the same vein with H7, Hypothesis 8 predicted a negative relationship between perceived 
environmental uncertainty and the manager’s perception about how accurate the PMERS- 
employed performance measures are (P->EP), stating th a t:
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H8 : Middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a high level o f  
environmental uncertainty, will regard the PMERS-employed measures o f 
performance as less able to capture accurately and evaluate properly their actual 
performance, than those middle-level managers who believe that they are faced  
with a low level o f environmental uncertainty.
As before, the results obtained unanimously provide support to H4. Both the parametric 
(Table 6-3) and the non-parametric tests of association (Table 6-4) indicate strong, negative 
(r ranging from -0.314 to -0.425, p ranging from -0.209 to -0.32) and significant (at the 
99% level) relationships between - unsurprisingly - both measures of perceived environmental 
uncertainty (EU, TU), and the manager’s perception about the accuracy of performance measures 
(P->EP). It appears that the more uncertain the manager perceives his / her environment to be, 
the less convinced he / she is about the ability of the PMERS-employed measures to capture 
and evaluate properly his / her actual performance. These results are once again verified by the 
Mann-Whitney and t-tests run, which both show, as predicted by H8, a significantly (p<0.01) 
stronger confidence in the accuracy of performance measures in the low-uncertainty group as 
compared to the high-uncertainty group of middle-level managers (see Table 6-5). Hence, the two 
hypotheses about the alleged adverse impact of perceived environmental uncertainty on the 
PMERS-related managerial perceptions about the attainability of performance standards (E~>P) 
and about the accuracy of performance measures (P->EP) are both categorically confirmed.
The high-versus-low group comparisons for hypotheses 7 and 8 are graphically presented in 
Figures 6-10 and 6-11. In contrast to Figure 6-9, the downward slope of the lines in these graphs 
indicates that the high-uncertainty group of middle-level managers has, in every case, a lower 
level of (E->P) / (P->EP) than the low-uncertainty group, as the hypotheses predicted.
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Perceived Environmental Uncertainty and Manaserial Motivation
With regard to the direct effect of perceived environmental uncertainty on the manager’s 
motivation, Hypothesis 9 predicted :
H9 : Middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a high level o f 
environmental uncertainty, will experience a lower level o f  motivation than those 
middle-level managers who believe that they are faced with a low level o f 
environmental uncertainty.
This hypothesis is not supported by the findings of the analysis performed. Neither the Pearson 
nor the Spearman correlation coefficients show any significant relationship between either of the 
measures of perceived environmental uncertainty (EU, TU) and managerial motivation (M) 
(Tables 6-3 and 6-4). In like manner, the Mann-Whitney and t-tests carried out do not indicate 
any significant difference in the level of motivation between the high-uncertainty and the 
low-uncertainty group of middle-level managers. On this evidence, H9 has to be rejected. 
The data seem to suggest that the manager’s perception about the level of uncertainty in his / her 
environment has apparently no bearing on his / her motivation. This finding is somewhat 
unexpected, particularly given the fact that the preceding in logical order hypotheses 7 and 8 were 
overwhelmingly confirmed. Possible explanations for this result are offered in Chapter 7, where 
all the findings from the data analysis conducted are evaluated and discussed at length.
Table 6-6 below provides an overview of the nine hypotheses tested. In this table, the results of 
the different analyses carried out are summarised. For hypotheses labelled ‘supported’, 
the direction of the coefficient (or mean difference) was as expected, and the level of significance 
was sufficient (p<0.10, one-tailed).
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■ :
H1 : E->P Expectancy— ► Motivation rejected rejected rejected rejected
H2 : P->EP Expectancy ^  Motivation rejected rejected rejected supported
H3 : EP->ER Expectancy *  Motivation supported supported supported supported
H4 : Value of Extrinsic Rew ards ^  Motivation supported supported supported supported
H5 : Value of Intrinsic Rewards Motivation supported supported supported supported
H 6 : Motivation Perform ance
. , : . :
- supported supported supported supported
H7 : Perceived Uncertainty E->P Expectancy supported supported supported supported
H8 : Perceived Uncertainty P->EP Expectancy supported supported supported supported
H9 : Perceived Uncertainty Motivation rejected rejected rejected rejected
T able 6-6 : O verview  o f  R esults o f  H ypotheses T esting
6.4 Further Analysis
6.4.1 Secondary Bivariate Analysis
In an attempt to uncover relationships between the variables o f the study, other than the ones 
prescribed by the hypotheses already proposed and tested in the previous sections, 
the group comparison method was once more employed ; the total sample o f the 225 middle-level 
managers was cut into distinct groups on the basis o f a number o f variables in the research, so as 
to compare the level o f the other variables in these groups and identify latent relationships.
Initially, the total sample was split into a high-uncertainty and a low-uncertainty group on the 
basis o f the task uncertainty (TU) variable. The descriptive statistics run and presented in 
Appendix M indicate that between the high- and the low-uncertainty group - apart from the 
statistically significant differences in the levels o f (E->P) (the m anager’s perception about the 
attainability o f performance standards) and (P->EP) (the perception about the accuracy of 
performance measures) predicted by and confirmed in hypotheses 7 and 8 - differences exist also
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in the levels of (EP->ER) (the perception about the dependency of extrinsic rewards) and EV 
(the perception about the value (attractiveness) of the extrinsic rewards offered), with the 
high-uncertainty group of middle-level managers consistently exhibiting a significantly higher 
level of (EP->ER) (p<0.05) and EV (p<0.01) than the low-uncertainty group. Nevertheless, more 
detailed analysis on the middle-level managers’ specific reward preferences in the two groups 
does not reveal any particular effect of the environmental uncertainty variable on these reward 
preferences. Indeed, the pattern of preference for extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, short-term effect 
and long-term effect rewards, tightly-connected to individual performance and loosely-connected 
to individual performance rewards remains essentially the same in the two groups, although 
the managers in the high uncertainty situation seem to have a tendency to appreciate more (i.e. 
value higher) all different types of rewards than the managers in the low uncertainty situation. 
In addition, the middle-level managers in the low-uncertainty group appear to have, on average, 
significantly higher (p<0.01) position experience than the middle-level managers in the high- 
uncertainty group.
Subsequently, the total sample was divided on the basis of the managers’ position in the 
organisational hierarchy (directors - senior managers - associate directors - managers). However, 
the descriptives calculated (see Appendix M) indicate no additional real differences in any of the 
variables measured in the study between these four groups. In contrast, the segregation of the 
total sample of managers in terms of their motivational orientation (into an extrinsically 
motivated, an intrinsically motivated, and a simultaneously extrinsically and intrinsically 
motivated group), although does not reveal any significant mean differences between the 
particular groups either, it does provide some useful insights on the managers’ (extrinsic and 
intrinsic) rewards preferences. The Chi-Square tests conducted (see Appendix N) indicate that a 
highly significant number of middle-level managers are likely to value highly, and thereby be 
motivated by both the extrinsic and the intrinsic rewards that they perceive to enjoy in the context 
of their job, rather than by any one type of these rewards alone. In addition, further analysis of the 
middle-level managers’ rewards preferences, both through Friedman tests and through Kendall’s 
W tests (Appendix N), shows that there are large individual differences in the perceived value 
that different managers assign to the different (extrinsic and intrinsic) rewards available ; stated 
differently, it is evident that the managers in the sample tend to have significantly different 
preferences (perceived valences in expectancy theory terms) for the various (extrinsic and
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intrinsic) rewards that they perceived to receive in the context of their job. Together, the last two 
results seem to suggest that managers are motivated by different combinations of the extrinsic and 
intrinsic rewards that are available to them.
The implications of all the above findings are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 7.
6.4.2 Multivariate Analysis
In addition to the bivariate analysis presented in the previous section, a multiple regression 
modelling approach was utilised in order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the 
data. In general, all multivariate techniques aim to break down the dependent variable’s total 
variance due to independent variables into the variance due to each independent variable 
separately and to any interactions between these independent variables (Greene & D’Oliveira, 
1982). Particularly useful in studies such as this one, where more than one independent variables 
(here, a range of managerial perceptions about the PMERS and the level of uncertainty in the 
manager’s environment) are hypothesised to have an effect on the study’s dependent variable 
(in this case, managerial motivation), such techniques can also provide useful information 
about which of the independent variables identified has the strongest relationship with (partial 
correlation analysis), and the greatest impact on (partial regression analysis) the dependent 
variable (de Vaus, 1996).
Hence, two multiple linear regression models were initially constructed, both of them positing 
managerial motivation (M) as their dependent variable. Model 1 included only the five PMERS- 
related managerial perceptions (EV, E->P, P->EP, EP->ER, IV) that have been theorised in this 
research to jointly determine the manager’s motivation, and Model 2 included both the five 
PMERS-related perceptions / determinants of managerial motivation of Model 1, and the two 
environmental uncertainty variables (EU, TU) that have been hypothesised to moderate the 
relationship between the PMERS-related perceptions and motivation. Fundamentally, the 
intention of this analysis was to run the two multiple regression models separately, and then 
compare their results in order to come up with some insights on 
• the ability of the expectancy-theory variables of the study (EV, E~>P, P->EP, EP->ER, IV) 
to predict managerial motivation (M), with and without the contribution of the uncertainty 
variables (EU, TU)
190
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty ANALYSIS & RESULTS
• the relative impact and relationship that each independent variable has with managerial 
motivation, when the effects of the other independent variables have been removed.
The results of this multivariate analysis - presented in Appendix O - are somewhat discouraging. 
None of the two models constructed seems to fit the data particularly well. The level of explained 
variation (R ) of the dependent variable, managerial motivation (M), is found to be low in every 
case - essentially, none of the two models can account for more than 5.5% of the total observed 
variability in the dependent variable (R2 = 5.2% and 5.5% for Model 1 and Model 2 respectively). 
On top of the previous analysis, a range of different multiple linear regression models, each 
containing different combinations of the study’s independent variables, were first built either 
through the backward elimination procedure or through the stepwise variable selection approach 
and then tried out. However, none of these models results in R greater than 5.5%. Lastly, the 
total sample was split on the basis of the uncertainty variable, and the two models were separately 
run for each of the two high- and low-uncertainty sub-samples. Again, in no case the level of 
expected variation (R2) exceeds the 10.6% point. On the whole, these findings cast serious doubt 
upon the ability of the expectancy-theory model adopted in the present study to explain 
motivation variations among the managers in the selected sample. One possibility is that they 
reflect unreliability problems in the scales employed to measure the study’s attitudinal variables. 
Alternatively, they may suggest the presence of other contextual or psychological variables that 
influence the managers’ motivation and have not been included in the given model ; or perhaps 
they raise some more basic questions about the overall utility of the expectancy model of 
motivation in the organisational setting in general, and in the managerial setting in particular. 
However, other alternative explanations for these results are also possible.
One potential explanation may lie in the difficulty of the multiple linear regression technique to 
explain the variability in the dependent variable on the basis of independent variables that are 
combined in a multiplicative fashion - as is the case with the expectancy model of motivation 
underlying this research. For example, Dawes and Corrigan (1974) and Jiambalvo (1979) not 
only argue but also provide empirical evidence to show that additive expectancy models tend to 
present superior predictive ability in comparison to multiplicative ones, even when the process 
underlying the relationship between the independent and the dependent variables is not linear. 
To examine this possibility here, an alternative version of the expectancy-theory model was
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developed and tested, in which the initial five independent variables (EV, E->P, P->EP, EP->ER, 
and IV) were consolidated into two new independent variables (EM for extrinsic motivation, and 
IM for intrinsic motivation)9 that could be more readily combined in an additive fashion.10 
Nevertheless, no significant improvement in the level of the predictive ability of this revised 
additive model is recorded when the regression analyses are re-run, either for the overall sample, 
or for the high-uncertainty / low-uncertainty subgroups - in actuality, the R2 never surpasses the 
10.6% point.
Perhaps the reason for the low predictive ability of any multiple regression model constructed and 
tested can be traced to the general incompatibility of the research data collected with the 
fundamental assumptions underlying the multiple linear regression analysis. Norusis (1994, 
1998) stresses that the use of multiple regression presupposes a number of assumptions about the 
data, namely th a t:
-  all the observations for the measured variables must be independent 
(the independence assumption)
-  there must be a linear relationship between the dependent and every independent 
variable (the linearity assumption)
-  certainly the dependent variable, and preferably the independent variables as well, must 
be measured at the interval level (the interval level of measurement assumption)
-  for each combination of values of the independent variables, the distribution of the 
dependent variable must be normal with a constant variance (the normality and 
the homoskedasticity assumptions)
9 Indeed, for every middle-level manager a total score for his / her extrinsic motivation component (EM) was 
calculated, either by consolidating (i.e., adding) or by equally weighting (that is, averaging) his / her separate EV, 
E-^P, P-^EP, EP-^ER scores, whereas his / her intrinsic motivation component (IM) was taken to be his / her IV 
score. A multiple linear regression model, that combined these two new terms in an additive mode (i.e., Motivation 
= a + pi*Extrinsic Motivation + P2*lntrinsic Motivation), was then constructed and run so as, first, to assess the 
revised model’s predictive ability, and second, to examine the relative inpact and relationship of the two 
independent variables (EM), (IM) with the dependent variable of motivation (M).
10 Schmidt’s (1973) objection that the combinations (additive or multiplicative) of variables that are included in 
expectancy-type models are legitimate only to the extent that these variables are measured on a ratio scale has to be 
noted here. Nevertheless, Hackman and Porter (1968) argue that such procedures are reasonable as long as the 
scores do in fact relate to the criterion variables of interest. In addition, both Hackman and Porter (1968) and 
Galbraith and Cummings (1967) have hypothesised and found empirical support for models that employed 
combinations of expectancy theory variables, a fact that seems to argue for the validity of their variable 
measurement practices.
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-  the independent variables examined must not correlate highly with one another 
(the non-multicollinearity assumption).
A quick look at the scatter-plot matrix presented in Appendix P is enough to realise that at least 
the linearity assumption is severely violated by the data gathered in this research - evidently, 
motivation (the dependent variable in all the regression models tried out) does not appear to be 
linearly related with any of the explanatory variables identified (i.e., EV, E->P, P->EP, EP->ER, 
IV, EU, and TU).11 A second objection refers to the fact that more than one observation is 
obtained from each subject in the study, a measurement practice that clearly violates the strict 
interpretation of the independence assumption of multiple linear regression. Given also the high, 
and at times significant, correlations between some of the study’s independent variables 
(see Tables 6-3 and 6-4) which could conceivably have brought about multicollinearity problems, 
as well as the arguably ordinal nature of the collected data as was supported earlier in section 
6.3.1, it is advisable that the results of the multivariate analysis reported here are considered with 
extreme caution.
In the latter sections of the multivariate analysis shown in Appendix O, the findings of the partial 
regression and partial correlation analyses conducted are presented. All in all, these findings 
reveal that, consistently in both models, the manager’s perception about the value (importance) of 
the intrinsic rewards associated with his / her job (IV) is by far the independent variable with the 
relatively greatest impact on (b* = 0.160 and b* = 0.157 for each model respectively) and the 
relatively strongest relationship (partial r = 0.159 and 0.156) with the dependent variable, 
managerial motivation (M), closely followed by the manager’s perception about the value 
(attractiveness) of the extrinsic rewards that he / she receives through the company’s PMERS 
(EV) (b* = 0.107 / b* = 0.101 and partial r = 0.106 / 0.099, for Model 1 / Model 2 respectively). 
These results are repeated invariably for all the different multiple linear regression models run in 
this study.
11 An attempt was made to transform the data into an In- or an log 10-form so as to attain more or less linear 
relationships between the study’s dependent and independent variables, yet in no case is the linearity requirement 
possible to be met. In addition, all the alternative expectancy models cited above were tested once more, first, 
via an OSL regression analysis (both in a log-log and in an semi-log formulation), and subsequently, via a multi­
ordinal logit regression analysis, however no significant increase in the models’ predictive ability (R2) is observed.
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6.5 Summary and Overview
ANALYSIS & RESULTS
In this chapter, the statistical analysis of the data collected in the study was presented. The early 
sections of the chapter provided descriptive statistics on the sample of the 225 managers 
surveyed, as well as a diagnostic analysis of the company’s Performance-Measurement- 
Evaluation-Reward-System on the basis of the managers’ responses to the questionnaire. In the 
latter parts of the chapter, the results obtained from testing the hypotheses posed in the research 
were reported in full detail. The majority of the hypotheses proposed, both with regard to the 
determinants of managerial motivation and with respect to the intervening effect of environmental 
uncertainty, were confirmed. In sum, the findings seem to indicate, first that at least some of the 
PMERS-related perceptions / hypothesised determinants of managerial motivation can be found 
to have a strong, positive, and significant relationship with the manager’s motivation, and second 
that perceived environmental uncertainty seems to have a significant adverse effect on some of 
these managerial perceptions that appear to determine in the final analysis the manager’s 
motivation and subsequent performance.
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Chapter Seven: 
Discussion of Results & Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
The objective of this study was essentially twofold : First, to investigate the impact of 
the Performance Measurement, Evaluation and Reward System (PMERS) on 
middle-level managers’ behaviour (motivation and performance), and, second, to 
examine the moderating effect of environmental and task uncertainty on the PMERS’s 
ability to affect managers’ motivation and subsequent performance. This final chapter 
provides an overview and discussion of the empirical findings presented in the 
previous chapter. In its early sections, an effort is made to first review the basic 
strengths and weaknesses of the study, through the prism of which the reader should 
consider the obtained findings and their implications. Subsequently, the study’s results 
are summarised and discussed within the context of the two relevant bodies of 
literature - i.e., management control theory and applied organisational psychology - 
that provided the theoretical foundation of this research. The way in which these 
findings compare with and contribute to our existing store of knowledge in this area is 
specifically addressed here. The latter sections of the chapter initially attempt to 
discuss some relevant implications - both on a practical, as well as on a more 
theoretical and methodological level - and, finally, close the chapter by highlighting 
some directions for future research.
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7.2 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Study
Before we proceed to the discussion of the study’s findings and their implications, it is considered 
necessary to first briefly refer to the main strengths and weaknesses of the study. Although these 
strengths and weaknesses - primarily associated with choices in method and methodology - have 
already been addressed in some detail in the Research Method and Methodology chapter 
(see Chapter 4, section 4.3 Assessing the Research Method and Methodology Choices), they are 
briefly reviewed at this point in order to enable the reader to evaluate the study’s findings in 
the light of these advantages and limitations. Overall, the strengths and weaknesses of 
questionnaire-based studies are well known and documented in the literature. In essence, they 
reflect trade-offs between internal and external validity, providing data in a form that is suitable 
for statistical analysis (Campbell & Stanley, 1966 ; Kidder, 1981). The following sections discuss 
in more detail the study’s main advantages and limitations on the basis of the four fundamental 
evaluation criteria (i.e., internal validity, external validity, construct validity, and reliability) which 
both Gill and Johnson (1991) and Abemethy et al. (1999) suggest that ought to be considered 
when one assesses the results of any research endeavour.
7.2.1 Internal Validity
All in all, the level of internal validity of this research is high. This is fundamentally a study of a 
more positive nature, which is structured upon
i) the a priori construction and statement of hypotheses that derive from a given theoretical 
model (i.e., the expectancy theory of work motivation),
ii) the explicit identification, operationalisation and measurement of carefully selected 
dependent, independent and intervening variables, and
iii) the collection of data through the use of a highly structured, standardised data-collection 
method (that is, the pre-coded analytic questionnaire).
It is this structured nature, along with the statistical control over the identified variables in the 
stage of data analysis that essentially render this study with a relatively high degree of confidence 
that the conclusions regarding the hypothesised relationships among the designated variables are 
warranted. However, one should note here the inability of the study to support conclusions 
regarding the existence and direction of causality between the identified variables (it can only 
provide evidence of association between them), as well as its difficulty to control for the possible 
effect of other extraneous variables that are not measured but may nevertheless interact with the
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variables of interest - both a direct consequence of the correlational, cross-sectional design 
employed in this research. Essentially, the above constitute a discrepancy between the statistical 
significance and the substantive importance of the results reported here, and it is for this reason 
that special care should be taken in inferring practical implications from these findings.
Having said that, the present study relies heavily on the theoretical arguments and postulates of 
the most influential theory of work motivation (Jewell, 1998), in Nadler and Lawler’s words 
“ .. .the most comprehensive, valid, and useful approach to understanding motivation” (1977, p.27). 
Being a process theory of motivation, expectancy theory focuses on the dynamics (i.e., the 
processes) involved in initiating, directing, and maintaining the individual’s behaviour in the 
workplace, and overall offers a simple, yet compelling, explanation of how people are actually 
motivated in the organisational setting. At a first glance, the expectancy model of motivation that 
has been adopted in this research - despite its own theoretical, conceptual, empirical and 
methodological limitations (cf. Mitchell & Biglan, 1971 ; Mitchell, 1974, 1979, 1982 ; Heneman 
& Schwab, 1972 ; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976 ; Schwab et al., 1979 ; Wanous et al., 1983 ; 
Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996) - appears to provide a theoretically sound and logically convincing 
network of relationships among variables which, in a dynamic state, are hypothesised to jointly 
determine the individual’s motivation and subsequent performance in his / her job.
7.2.2 External Validity
Traditionally survey research is endowed with a high level of overall external validity 
(generalisability) (Abemethy et al., 1999). Survey-based research endeavours most usually entail 
the careful random selection of samples that enable the obtained findings to be generalised to 
wider populations with a high degree of confidence. However, to the extent that the present study 
draws data from a single research site and from a non-random (and therefore not representative of 
the entire target population) sample, its population validity - that is, its ability to generalise from 
the sample of managers involved in the study to the wider managerial population - is necessarily 
limited. At best then, the results of this study can be extrapolated to apply to a particular cohort of 
managers, i.e., those highly motivated and highly performing managers operating at the middle- 
level of the organisation’s hierarchy.
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As far as the study’s ecological validity is concerned (that is, its ability to provide results that can 
be readily generalised from the actual social context in which the research has taken place to other 
contexts and settings (Gill & Johnson, 1991)), the high degree of standardisation and structure of 
the instrument used to collect data is likely to have created a relative lack of naturalism that may 
have thereby adversely affected the study’s overall ecological validity. Although the present 
research employed an observational, on-the-field method to gather data from respondents who 
were real organisational participants acting within their actual social context (a definite advantage 
in terms of ecological validity), the - almost - exclusive emphasis on closed-response, pre-coded 
questions in the analytic questionnaire used in the data-collection stage is possible to have 
prevented the managers surveyed from articulating the ways in which they themselves personally 
conceptualise and understand the matters of interest.
Acknowledging this threat to the study’s ecological validity which principally results from the 
artificiality of the main data-collection method, an attempt was made to gather additional data 
from secondary sources within the participant company which could enrich and provide 
triangulation for the findings that emerged from the questionnaire survey. These more qualitative 
data that were collected in two separate instances - first, in a focus-group discussion with a team of 
top executives, and, later, in a forum-like event with a larger group of middle managers, where the 
quantitative results from the survey were fed back and extensively discussed with participants 
and non-participants in the research - provided, together with the open-ended questions in the 
questionnaire, additional insights into the issues under investigation, and certainly lent a ‘flavour’ 
of naturalism to the study, extending thereby its external validity. All things considered, however, 
the overall external validity of the present research is held to be relatively low for the reasons 
discussed earlier, and therefore its findings should only be generalised to different populations and 
settings with caution.
7.2.3 Construct Validity
With regard to the construct validity of the study, the fact that all dependent, independent and 
intervening variables were measured with instruments drawn from the literature, which have been 
previously developed and extensively tested in practice, gives some confidence about the extent to 
which the constructs of theoretical interest have been successfully operationalised and measured 
here. Although it is not realistic to claim that the fairly abstract theoretical concepts of this
198
PMERS, Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
research have been perfectly operationalised and measured by the instruments employed, the wide 
recognition that the particular instruments enjoy from researchers in the field, as well as the results 
of the item- and factor-analyses run where appropriate to assess the psychometric properties of the 
particular scales used, provide some assurance of the questionnaire’s and the overall study’s 
criterion and construct validity.1
Nonetheless, a number of potential limitations associated with the mode of measurement of the 
variables in the study still need to be noted. To start with, while considerable care was taken to 
collect valid and reliable data, the measurement of some of the variables identified in the study 
was somewhat crude and may have influenced the findings. For example, variables such as the 
standards’ attainability, the measures’ accuracy, and the managers’ motivation were effectively 
measured through a single questionnaire item in each case, making thereby the assessment of the 
reliability of these measures difficult. The measurement of managerial job performance - although 
performed on a more sophisticated and detailed composite scale - may also be deemed as 
problematic, as simply asking survey participants to rate their overall and role-specific job 
performance has its own interpretation difficulties (Briers & Hirst, 1990). Respondents had 
absolute discretion in judging the relative importance of the different dimensions of managerial 
performance, the standard or benchmark level for assessing performance on each dimension, as 
well as the time horizon over which the rating was made, a fact that potentially makes the 
comparability of responses questionable, and the relation of these responses to other variables in 
the study clearly ambiguous. On a related issue, the use of common method for measuring all 
variables (i.e., the exclusive reliance on self-report measures) may have led to overstatements of 
the identified relationships between variables as a result of consistency effects. The ‘common- 
method’ problem is associated with the use of a single questionnaire using self-reporting measures 
and originates in the respondents’ tendency to provide ‘consistent’ and ‘socially desirable’ answers 
which may cause the relationships to be overstated or even to be artificial (e.g., Collins, 1978 ; 
Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977 ; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). To the extent that such hidden biases and 
random errors - generally regarded as serious sources of inflated associations between variables in
1 The idea to include in the questionnaire two alternative measures for every key variable in the study, so that to enable 
the direct assessment of the criterion validity of the instruments used, was seriously considered. It was nevertheless 
abandoned for practical reasons, as the length of the questionnaire and the time required to complete it far exceeded 
the acceptable standards, as these were prescribed both by the participant company and the previous research 
practice.
199
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty___________________DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
questionnaire-based research (Bagozzi et al., 1991) - cannot be systematically controlled for in the 
present study, particular caution should be exercised in interpreting the obtained results.
Furthermore, the promise for strict response anonymity and confidentiality (considered essential 
given the nature of the questions asked and the answers required), made impossible to assess 
directly the presence and significance of non-response bias in the data collection process. 
Nevertheless, and although non-response bias is not considered to be a serious validity threat in the 
case of response rates over 30% (Alreck & Settle, 1985) - a percentage comfortably exceeded in 
this study -, it is worth mentioning that the indirect tests suggested by Oppenheim (1966) and 
performed here to test for non-response bias (i.e., comparison of the mean scores on the key 
research variables for early and late responders in the sample of the questionnaires returned) 
overall showed little evidence of systematic bias from non-response (see Appendix Q).
On a more positive note, the results of the validity and reliability tests carried out and discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4 (Research Method & Methodology) leave room for some optimism concerning 
the accuracy of the instrument used to measure the variables in the study. In terms of instrument 
reliability, although neither test-retest (intraobserver) nor altemate-form reliability could be 
actually estimated - no access to the initial sample of middle-level managers for the administration 
of a second questionnaire was granted by the participant company -, the Cronbach alphas 
(Cronbach, 1951) calculated for the three composite measures employed for the measurement of 
the managerial performance, the task uncertainty and the external environmental uncertainty 
variables (0.67, 0.75 and 0.64 respectively) compare favourably with the a-scores reported in 
previous studies in the literature, and generally argue for sufficient confidence in the inter-item 
reliability (i.e., internal consistency) of these scales. Nevertheless, the subsequent item and factor 
analyses - basically performed to examine the homogeneity of the three composite measures - 
revealed that, in every case without exception, the questionnaire items loaded on at least two 
(in the cases of managerial performance and external environmental uncertainty on three) factors,
2 The underlying logic of this indirect method of testing for non-response bias lies in the assumption that 
non-respondents show a greater similarity to late respondents than to early respondents (Oppenheim, 1966 ; 
Brownell, 1995). In effect, what is assumed is that if no significant mean score differences exist between the two 
groups, this would support the contention that no bias from non-response is present in the sample. This alternative, 
comparison-type, approach is preferred to the method of trying to directly obtain additional information about non­
respondents from the organisation and compare it with information on respondents, particularly when the promise of 
anonymity needs to be kept.
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providing conclusive evidence of a lack of unidimensionality of the scales employed. Finally, 
as far as the face and content validity of the questionnaire is concerned, the consultation with a 
team of executives from the company at the initial stages of developing the instrument, as well as 
its subsequent pilot testing first by a small number of academics in the University of Glasgow 
and later by a larger group of middle-level managers in the company, can be seen to have 
contributed to the improvement of the overall validity of the questionnaire eventually used for the 
data-collection purposes of the study.
7.2.4 Reliability
Lastly, the reliability of the study is also considered to be fairly high. The use of a highly 
structured method for collecting data in a form that is quantitatively analysable, as well as the 
emphasis on the statistical control over the variables identified in the research, provide a relatively 
high degree of confidence about the consistency of the results obtained. Overall, mainly owing to 
the high level of structure and rigour maintained in the stages of data collection and analysis, the 
present study is regarded as easily replicable for similar research endeavours in the future, and 
hence as highly reliable.
Overall, the previous sections have gone a long way deconstructing the present study, essentially 
detailing all of its (actual and potential) weaknesses. Having gone through that, one should not 
overlook the fact that this is indeed one of the few empirical studies in the area of management 
control and motivation that has collected attitudinal data (perceptions) from real managers 
who were actually operating at the middle level of the organisation’s hierarchy. And despite 
the positivist approach that was employed here in order to analyse the collected data, an attempt 
was made throughout this research to collect (both in the focus-group discussion and in the forum 
organised with the participant company) additional, more qualitative data about the organisation’s 
PMERS, data that could provide a different angle on the findings that emerged from the 
questionnaire survey.
With these in mind, the subsequent sections discuss next the study’s main findings and their 
implications.
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7.3 Overview and Discussion of Empirical Findings
In sum, the findings of the study can be diagrammatically depicted as in the figure below.
0.14*
0.13*-0.38
-0.43’
(H8)
M l. 0.51**
(H6)
-0.26
-0.31**
(H8) 0.17*
(H5)
Managerial
Motivation
Managerial
Performance
Perceived Value of 
Intrinsic Rewards
Perceived Accuracy 
of Measures
Perceived Dependency 
of Extrinsic Rewards
Perceived Attainability 
of Standards
Perceived Value of 
Extrinsic Rewards
Perceived
Task
Uncertainty
Perceived
Environmental
Uncertainty
Note : In the figure above, the relationships between the variables are expressed in Pearson correlation coefficients. 
Significance levels for the obtained correlations are shown as : * significance at 95 %, ** significance at 99 %.
Figure 7-1 : Diagrammatic Representation of the Study’s Findings
On the whole, this study attempted to investigate the motivational role of the PMERS in the 
organisational setting by effectively exploring the following three main lines of inquiry :
(1) The effect of Managerial Motivation on Managerial Performance
(2) The effect of the PMERS on Managerial Motivation
(3) The effect of Environmental and Task Uncertainty on the PMERS.
The sections that follow seek to summarise the findings of the study in each of these areas of 
inquiry, and, further, discuss them within the context of the relevant literature that provided the 
theoretical basis for this research.
7.3.1 Managerial Motivation and Performance
With respect to the relationship between managerial motivation and performance, the results of the 
study indicated that managers who experience high motivation tend to exhibit not only 
significantly higher overall job performance but also significantly higher performance in every 
individual area of their managerial job (i.e., planning, investigating, co-ordinating, evaluating,
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supervising, staffing, negotiating, representing, etc.) than managers who experience a 
comparatively low motivation. This finding is consistent with the theoretical propositions put 
forward within the expectancy theory of work motivation in general, and the Porter and Lawler 
(1968) model of job behaviour in particular (the micro-behavioural frame of reference of this 
research), which both underscore the significant role of motivation in the determination of the 
individual’s performance. According to the expectancy model of human behaviour within 
organisations, motivation is certainly not the only factor that causes people to perform at different 
levels. However, although other factors such as the individual’s ability (that is, his / her training, 
experience, talent, and aptitude), his / her understanding of his / her role (i.e., his / her role 
perception), as well as a number of situational and environmental factors, all have been theorised 
to exert some influence on the way individuals perform in the organisational setting, motivation 
still seems to be the single most important determinant of individual job performance (Lawler, 
1994).
From a more empirical point of view, the results of this research are in agreement with the findings 
of numerous studies that have attempted to investigate the behaviour of managers in the field. 
In the first place, they provide support to the findings of a positive relationship between motivation 
and performance that have repeatedly been reported in the management accounting and control 
literature (e.g., Ferris, 1977 ; Rockness, 1977 ; Brownell & Mclnnes, 1986). Furthermore, they 
add to the substantial amount of empirical evidence about a positive motivation-performance 
relationship that can be found in the organisational behaviour literature, and are particularly 
relevant to studies such as those of Lawler and Porter (1967), Porter and Lawler (1968), Schuster 
et al. (1971), and Lawler and Suttle (1973), which have been conducted on managerial samples. 
In a series of extensive literature reviews of the work in this area, Mitchell (1974, 1979, 1982) 
concludes that the majority of the studies in the field of organisational psychology conclusively 
demonstrate a positive relationship between motivation and performance, a result that was 
categorically confirmed in the present study.
7.3.2 PMERS and Managerial Motivation
7.3.2.1 Performance Standards and Motivation
The hypothesised positive relationship between the perceived attainability of standards and the 
managers’ motivation was not confirmed in this research. No evidence was found here to support
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the intuitively logical proposition that the standards of performance that are perceived to be more 
attainable become more ‘internalised’, and, consequently, result in higher levels of managerial 
motivation and subsequent performance. Prima facie, this finding appears to be at odds with the 
assertion found in the organisational behaviour literature that the conscious setting of specific, 
challenging goals - given goal commitment - has a strong positive impact on individual work 
motivation and performance (Locke & Latham, 1990). It also seems to contradict the large amount 
of studies in both the management control and the organisational psychology literature that 
unanimously recommend the setting of challenging but not impossible to attain performance 
targets in the PMERS for maximum motivation (e.g., Frank, 1959 ; Becker & Green, 1962 ; 
Locke, 1968 ; Dunbar, 1971 ; Lawler, 1973 ; Hopwood, 1974 ; Porter et al., 1975 ; Sillinglaw, 
1982 ; Homgren & Foster, 1987 ; Homgren & Sundem, 1987 ; Otley, 1987b ; Newman et al., 
1987 ; Locke et al., 1988 ; Merchant, 1989 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990 ; Simons, 1995 ; Lyne, 1995 ; 
Drury, 1996).
Empirically speaking, this result contradicts also the findings of a substantial body of empirical 
research, which has consistently indicated that there is a relationship between motivation and the 
perceived difficulty of standards. More specifically, this study appears to be inconsistent both 
with the numerous (mostly experimental) studies in the field of applied organisational psychology 
(see Locke et al., 1981 and Locke & Latham, 1990 for comprehensive reviews of this literature), 
as well as with the - more relevant, but less in number - empirical studies in the area of 
management control (for example, Stedry, 1960 ; Stedry & Kay, 1966 ; Hofstede, 1968 ; Carroll & 
Tosi, 1973 ; Rockness, 1977 ; Kenis, 1979 ; Chow, 1983 ; Waller & Chow, 1985 ; Hirst & Lowy, 
1990 ; Lindquist, 1995) which in their great majority have shown that both the motivation to 
perform and the subsequent job performance tend to be higher when performance standards are 
perceived to be demanding (i.e. moderately difficult) yet attainable.
A possible explanation for this unexpected result, that clearly contradicts “ ...one of the most 
robust and replicable findings in the psychological literature” (Locke et al., 1981, p. 145), may lie 
in the synchronous effect of other contextual factors, which have been either found or theorised to 
play together with the setting of challenging goals equally significant roles in the performance 
evaluation context. Flamholtz (1983) rightly argues that the target setting system is not a system 
in itself, but rather comprises only one part of the company’s overall control package,
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and therefore its effect on the manager’s behaviour cannot and should not be examined in isolation 
from other critical PMERS-related issues such as the measurement and evaluation of managerial 
performance, the system of allocating financial and other rewards, or the organisation’s structure. 
The failure to examine in the present study the whole range of the complementary and 
compensating relationships among these various control system elements as they are interacting 
within the organisation’s wider control context may potentially explain the inability to confirm 
empirically the importance of the standard setting function - or, as discussed in the following 
section, the importance of the performance measurement function - of the PMERS on the 
manager’s motivation and subsequent performance.
73.2.2 Performance Measures and Motivation
The hypothesis about the positive relationship between the managers’ motivation and their 
perception about the accuracy of measures was not supported in this study either. Essentially, the 
statistical analysis conducted showed that the managers’ perception about how accurate the 
performance measures are was not related in any way with the managers’ motivation. Again, this 
finding is in contrast to the prescriptions found in both the management control and the related 
organisational psychology literature about the need to employ accurate performance measures 
within the PMERS if they are to have any discernible positive effect on the managers’ motivation 
(e.g., Dalton, 1971 ; Porter et al., 1975 ; Lawler, 1976 ; Lawler & Rhode, 1976 ; Ivancevich et al., 
1977 ; Homgren, 1982 ; Magee, 1986 ; Merchant, 1989 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990 ; Simons, 1995).
The inability to diagnose any kind of relationship between the managers’ perceptions about the 
accuracy of the measures used within the PMERS and their job behaviour (i.e., their motivation 
and subsequent performance) is also problematic on the empirical level, as it is at variance with 
the case evidence provided by the early behavioural management control research. Empirical 
studies such as those of Argyris (1952), Hofstede (1968), Likert and Seashore (1968), Lowe and 
Shaw (1968), Schiff and Lewin (1968), Hopwood (1972, 1973), Onsi (1973) and Kenis (1979) 
have uniformly concluded that both the perceived technical imperfections of the performance 
measures employed, as well as the way these measures are used within the PMERS, have various 
negative psychological consequences on managers’ individual and social behaviour such as 
resentment and deterioration in interpersonal relationships with supervisors and peers, increased 
job-related tension, frustration, social withdrawal and apathy, absenteeism, anxiety, stress, fear of
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failure and dissatisfaction with the job, which eventually can influence adversely managerial 
motivation and effectiveness or even lead to dysfunctional behaviour in the form of invalid data 
reporting and dysfunctional decision making. Contrary to these findings, the analysis conducted in 
the present study failed to reveal any significant relationship between the perceived inadequacies 
of the performance measures used and the managers’ motivation and performance.
Two critical observations need to be made with regard to this result. First, it has to be noted that 
in the present study no attempt was made to distinguish, measure, and examine as a separate 
variable what is termed in the management control literature “style of use” (of the PMERS). Yet 
most of the research into the behavioural effects of management control systems has, implicitly or 
explicitly, recognised that the effect of performance measures in the evaluation situation depends 
not only on the measures’ technical characteristics but also on the extent and manner in which 
supervisors use them (Briers & Hirst, 1990). Thus, it is possible that the failure to consider, 
measure and examine differences in the way the PMERS is used is the underlying reason - or one 
of the reasons - why the hypothesised effect of the PMERS on managerial motivation was not 
confirmed in this study. In essence, one significant explanatory factor has been omitted here, one 
that could potentially account - either independently, or interactively with the independent variable 
identified in the study (i.e., the perceived accuracy of measures) - for a large portion of the 
variation in managers’ motivation and performance.
A second point worth making with respect to the analysis conducted in the present study, is that it 
exclusively concentrated on the effect of the PMERS on the two main behavioural variables 
prescribed by the expectancy-theory framework adopted in this research, that is, managerial 
motivation and performance. However, this research choice to ‘reduce’ the complex concept of 
managerial behaviour into the - much easier to measure and quantify - dependent variables of 
motivation and performance, has admittedly restricted somewhat the depth and breadth of the 
investigation into the behavioural outcomes of the performance measurement and evaluation 
process. Prior empirical work in the area of management control has shown that, apart from their 
potential impact on motivation and performance, systems of performance measures and related 
reward schemes can under certain circumstances give rise to a wide range of worth examining 
behavioural responses from individuals in the organisational setting. Managers engaging in 
dysfunctional bureaucratic behaviour to influence the performance measures (e.g., Berliner, 1961 ;
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Dearden, 1961, 1962, 1969 ; Simons & Weston, 1990 ; Yin, 1992), withholding data or 
alternatively transmitting invalid or misleading data about their planned or / and actual 
performance (e.g., Read, 1959 ; Dalton, 1959 ; Tannenbaum, 1962 ; Williamson, 1964 ; Argyris, 
1964, 1971 ; Mumford & Banks, 1967 ; Pettigrew, 1970, 1972, 1973 ; Umapathy, 1987), or even 
tampering with the performance measures themselves (e.g., Keller, 1989) in order to attain a 
favourable performance evaluation, are commonly cited examples of such behavioural responses 
to the PMERS, which, with the given emphasis on managerial motivation and performance, 
were not considered in the present study.
7.3.2.3 Organisational Rewards and Motivation
As far as the effect of organisational rewards on the managers’ motivation is concerned, this study 
provided evidence to support the theoretical predictions that managers
i) who value highly the extrinsic rewards they receive through the company’s PMERS,
ii) who perceive these extrinsic rewards they receive within the company’s PMERS as 
performance-dependent,
iii) who value highly the intrinsic rewards that are associated with their job in the organisation, 
tend to experience a significantly higher level of motivation than those managers who do not. 
Again, these findings are in line with the basic tenet of expectancy theory of motivation which 
emphasises the important role of (both extrinsic and intrinsic) rewards in the determination of 
work motivation, asserting that people within organisations will be motivated to perform an action 
only when they believe that this action will actually provide them with rewards / outcomes that 
they themselves need and, therefore, value (Vroom, 1964). There are also consistent with the 
prescriptions in the management control literature (e.g., Ronen & Livingstone, 1975 ; Porter et al., 
1975 ; Kopelman & Reinharth, 1982 ; Merchant, 1989) about the importance of incorporating in 
the PMERS rewards which are, first, sufficiently valuable (attractive) to the managers they are 
supposed to motivate, and, second, performance-dependent, i.e., administered on the basis of the 
managers’ individual performance within the PMERS, as well as with the relevant normative 
implications of “agency theory” (see, for example, Demski & Feltham, 1978 ; Holmstrom, 1979).
From an empirical point of view, the study’s results are in general terms supportive of the 
evidence found in the relevant literature. More specifically, the positive relationship between 
managerial motivation and the perceived dependency of rewards found here is in accordance with
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a considerable amount of correlational studies in the field of applied organisational psychology 
which have demonstrated that the more a manager believes that his / her job performance 
influences the organisational rewards (pay, as well as other) that he / she receives, the more 
motivated and effective he / she is in his / her job (see, for instance, Lawler, 1966 ; Lawler & 
Porter, 1967 ; Porter & Lawler, 1968 ; Gavin, 1970 ; Schuster et al., 1971 ; Wofford, 1971 ; 
Lawler & Suttle, 1973). The hypothesis that when an individual’s rewards are seen as effectively 
tied to his / her performance along certain criteria, his / her behaviour will be guided by the desire 
to optimise performance with respect to those criteria has been consistently supported also by a 
large number of experimental studies as well (e.g., Locke et al., 1968 ; Graen, 1969 ; Jorgenson 
et al., 1973 ; Pritchard & DeLeo, 1973 ; Pritchard & Curts, 1973 ; Terborg & Miller, 1978), 
although one should consider these findings with caution as they come from studies most 
usually conducted in settings and with samples that bear little or no resemblance to managers. 
Overall however, the findings of this study appear to be consistent with the general conclusion 
reached by the great majority of the empirical studies in the field of organisational psychology 
(see Campbell & Pritchard (1976) for a review of this literature), that the individual’s motivation 
is positively related to his / her perception about the performance-dependency of the rewards that 
he / she receives. They are also in line with the empirical research in the area of management 
control on the effects of standard-based incentives on managers (see, for instance, Rockness, 1977; 
Chow, 1983 ; Waller & Chow, 1985 ; Dillard & Fisher, 1990 ; Kren, 1990) and on lower-level 
employees (for thorough reviews of this somewhat dated literature, see Viteles (1953) and Marriott 
(1957)) which has uniformly concluded that performance-related incentive plans tend to increase 
individual motivation and performance.
With reference to the positive association identified between the managers’ perception about how 
valuable the (extrinsic and intrinsic) rewards associated with their job are and their level of 
motivation, the present study seems to be in agreement with Campbell and Pritchard who, after 
carefully reviewing the relevant literature, concluded that it would be unwise to underestimate the 
effect of the anticipated value of reward on motivation, particularly since “ ...the literature in 
experimental psychology is quite clear in showing the significant influence of reward magnitude 
on subsequent behavior” (1976, p. 87). On the whole, however, the research results obtained here 
as to the valence of reward-motivation relationship appear to confirm some of the previous 
empirical studies in the field of organisational psychology (see, for example, Porter & Lawler,
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1968 ; Pritchard & Sanders, 1973 ; Pecotich & Churchill, 1981 ; Nakanishi, 1989), while 
contradicting some others that have identified very weak positive (e.g., Hackman & Porter, 1968) 
or even negative correlations among these two variables (e.g., Jorgenson et al., 1973).
Specifically with regard to the motivational effect of intrinsic rewards, the results of this study 
lend support to the theoretical models of Porter and Lawler (1968), Ronen and Livingstone (1975) 
and Jiambalvo (1979), which all postulate the parallel existence of and the explicit 
dichotomisation between extrinsic and intrinsic rewards in the work setting in general, and 
in the performance evaluation situation in particular. Although the secondary statistical analysis 
conducted here indicated - in agreement with Ewen et al. (1966), Graen (1969), Mitchell and 
Albright (1972), House and Wahba (1972), and Turney (1974) - that the valence of intrinsic 
rewards has a relatively stronger relationship with, and a relatively greater impact on motivation 
than the valence of extrinsic rewards, it has to be noted that both variables were found to be 
significantly correlated with motivation and subsequent performance. In addition, the finding that 
the great majority of the managers in the sample examined were shown to be motivated both by 
the extrinsic and the intrinsic rewards that were available to them in their work environment - 
more accurately, by different combinations of these extrinsic and intrinsic rewards available -, 
suggests a complementary role of extrinsic and intrinsic rewards in the motivation of middle-level 
managers. Clearly, this last result contradicts the arguments and the pertinent empirical evidence 
presented by the proponents of the cognitive evaluation theory (see, for instance, Deci, 1971, 
1972 ; Lepper et al., 1973 ; Calder & Staw, 1975 ; Notz, 1975 ; Condry, 1977 ; Lepper & Greene, 
1978 ; Deci & Ryan, 1980, 1987) that these two types of motivators are antagonistic per se, as well 
as the theoretical position taken by Herzberg (1966, 1968) that only intrinsic job factors should be 
viewed as motivators. Indeed, it is much closer to the theoretical assertions of Barnard (1938), 
Mahoney (1964), and Etzioni (1988) who maintain that the extrinsic incentives provided by outer 
sources (the organisation, the supervisor, etc.) and the powerful social and moral forces embedded 
in every individual (such as the sense of duty, the sense of identity, the feeling of self-worth, 
and the need for self-actualisation) are best seen as complimenting each other in determining the 
motivation of most human beings.
7.3.3 Environmental Uncertainty and PMERS
The contingency hypotheses, examining the impact of the perceived environmental uncertainty on
I
209
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty___________________DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
the managers’ perceptions about the accuracy of the performance measures and the attainability of 
performance standards, were unambiguously confirmed in the present study. In essence, 
the analysis conducted indicated that the perceived degree of accuracy of the measures, as well as 
the perceived degree of attainability of the standards employed within the PMERS is related to the 
manager’s perception of how uncertain his / her internal and external environment is ; managers 
operating in environments of high uncertainty tend to perceive the performance measures as less 
accurate and the performance standards as less attainable than managers who are operating 
in environments of relatively lower uncertainty. This result is in line with the theoretical 
propositions of the proponents of the ‘environment-evaluation system contingency’ school of 
thought within the management control literature (e.g., Khandwalla, 1972 ; Gordon & Miller, 
1976 ; Hayes, 1977 ; Amigioni, 1978 ; Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978 ; Otley, 1978 ; 
Ewusi-Mensah, 1981 ; Hirst, 1981 ; Gordon & Narayanan, 1984 ; Govindarajan, 1984 ; Chenhall 
& Morris, 1986 ; Brownell, 1985 ; Merchant, 1990 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990 ; Ross, 1995 ; 
Hartmann, 1997), who hypothesise a significant effect of environmental uncertainty on the 
PMERS : In environmental conditions of high uncertainty, where the ability of the organisation to 
predict future circumstances and make decisions about activities in advance of their execution is 
necessarily limited (Galbraith, 1977 ; Govindarajan, 1984) and the perceived knowledge about 
cause-effect relationships is - by definition - incomplete (Thompson, 1967), the volume and 
frequency of non-programmed decision making is expected to be high (Emmanuel et al., 1990), 
the extent of task and process interdependency broad (Hirst, 1981), and the scope for task and 
procedure specification and standardisation narrow (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978). Under these 
circumstances, the - comparatively simpler in more predictable environments - task of providing 
perceived unambiguous, a priori performance targets, as well as relevant measures that can 
accurately reflect and evaluate ex-post managerial performance, is a formidable project to carry 
out.
Regrettably, as noted in the literature review presented in Chapter 2, there is a lack of empirical 
studies examining the direct effect of environmental uncertainty on the perceived characteristics of 
the PMERS, which clearly makes the comparison of this study’s findings with the existing body of 
empirical work in the area of management control somewhat problematic. In the only research 
endeavour to the author’s knowledge that the effect of uncertainty on managerial perceptions about 
the PMERS was specifically examined, Hayes (1977) concluded, in a manner consistent with this
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study, that the same performance measures, while perceived as appropriate by managers operating 
in low-uncertainty environments, they were deemed as much less appropriate (even totally 
inappropriate) by managers operating under more uncertain environmental conditions.
In contrast to the present study, however, the majority of the empirical studies available treat 
environmental uncertainty as a moderator variable (i.e., as a variable that is theorised to affect 
(moderate) the relationship between the PMERS and the manager’s motivation or / and 
performance), and not as an independent variable directly affecting some critical intermediate 
PMERS-related perceptions, which in turn are seen as determining managerial motivation and 
performance. If we would like, nevertheless, to place the results of this research in the context of 
the existing empirical literature, these appear to be in line with a considerable number of empirical 
studies (e.g., Merchant, 1984 ; Brownell, 1985 ; Brownell & Hirst, 1986 ; Imoisili, 1985, 1989 ; 
Brownell & Dunk, 1991 ; Lau et al., 1995 ; Ross, 1995) which have failed to provide supportive 
evidence to the theoretical propositions and empirical findings of Otley (1978), Hirst (1981, 1983), 
Brownell (1987), Govindarajan (1984, 1988) and Mia and Chenhall (1994) about a significant 
two-way interaction between environmental uncertainty and the PMERS affecting both managerial 
performance as well as job-related tension.
7.4 Implications of the Findings
7.4.1 Implications for Practice
7.4.1.1 The Importance o f Motivation
A number of authors in the area of management control argue that, particularly in the context of 
the contemporary multidivisional decentralised company, the overall effectiveness and eventual 
survival of the organisation passes through the individual motivation and subsequent performance 
of managers operating at the middle level of the organisation’s hierarchy (e.g., Donaldson, 1984 ; 
Merchant, 1989 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990). Merchant (1989) goes a step further to suggest that 
in the multidivisional decentralised setting, where the critical distance between the organisation’s 
top- and lower-level management and the consequent information asymmetry makes the direct 
monitoring and control of the actions of middle-level managers expensive and, occasionally, 
infeasible, the increase of the manager’s effectiveness is strictly connected with his / her 
motivation.
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This study provided conclusive evidence about a significant strong positive relationship between 
the manager’s motivation and his / her performance. This finding comes to confirm the 
propositions of many theorists in the field of organisational psychology and in that of human 
resource management (see, for instance, Lawler (1994) or Buchanan & Huczynski (1997)) who 
maintain that, although job performance is clearly affected by a wide variety of idiosyncratic 
factors (such as the individual’s abilities, skills, and personal traits) and environmental parameters 
(i.e., situational variables such as the size, structure and culture of the organisation, the 
management, control, and leadership systems and styles within the organisation, etc.), the 
individual’s motivation - that is, the amount of effort (energy) he / she is willing to put into his / 
her job - has a very significant impact on his / her subsequent job performance, and warrants, 
therefore, special attention and consideration. Hence, one of the central lines of argument that the 
present study puts forward is that, given the ever-tightening constrains placed on contemporary 
organisations by a highly competitive and rapidly changing environment, the understanding and 
management of the complex phenomenon - more accurately in expectancy-theory terms, of the 
process - of motivation, can provide the organisation with additional tools and processes to 
increase its level of organisational effectiveness - particularly so in the context of the increasingly 
critical middle management level where, unavoidably, managerial control and motivation are 
almost indiscernible concepts.
7.4.1.2 On the Determination o f Motivation : Individual Perception versus Objective Reality 
The evidence from this study clearly support the view that the individual’s behaviour is primarily 
shaped by the individual’s own perception of the reality in which he / she exists and operates, 
rather than by the actual objective reality itself. Indeed, the present research indicated that the 
manager’s motivation and subsequent performance were significantly related to a number of 
managerial perceptions about the system that measured, evaluated, and rewarded his / her 
performance, as well as about the uncertainty of the environment in which he / she was working - 
in essence, offering support to Nadler’s and Lawler’s (1977) argument that “ .. .it is the perceptions 
of people that basically determine their motivation, not reality” (p. 32).
In the particular context of managerial performance evaluation and reward, the implication of the 
above finding is that the actual effectiveness of the PMERS to motivate the organisationally 
desirable behaviour lies not as much on the objective technical characteristics of the system itself,
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but rather on the perceived characteristics of the system as these are realised by those the system is 
expected to motivate. If we accept that control is fundamentally a behavioural issue, and that the 
ultimate criterion by which any system of control (such as the PMERS) should be assessed is 
behavioural (Emmanuel et al., 1990) - i.e., to what degree does such a system succeed in 
influencing managers to behave in desirable ways -, then we ought to change our focus of attention 
from the objective properties of the control system to the way these properties are individually and 
subjectively interpreted (perceived) by the managers subject to this system. Of course, it is 
self-evident that in the formation of these critical - from a motivation point of view - managerial 
perceptions about the PMERS (for instance, about how attainable the performance standards are, 
how accurate the performance measures are, or how valuable and performance-related the rewards 
are) both the actual technical design of the system and the way in which the PMERS is used play a 
decisive role, - perhaps just as decisive as the individual’s personality, prior experiences, and 
preferences. In the final analysis, however, as Porter et al. (1975) consider, what actually exists 
does not really matter as far as the motivation of managers is concerned ; essentially, managers 
respond to what they think it exists, to use Weick’s (1969) terminology, they respond to their own 
individually “enacted” (perceived) PMERS rather than to the “objective” PMERS.
The above notion is implicitly recognised in the management control literature, although one 
should mention that when it comes to empirically investigating the behavioural effects of the 
PMERS on organisational members, most researchers tend to overlook such critical intermediate 
psychological stages (e.g., perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, etc.) and basically hypothesise and test 
direct relationships between objective, presumably pivotal, PMERS characteristics and human 
behaviour. One of the main contentions of the present study, however, is that such psychological 
angles cannot be disregarded either by the researchers in the field who want to gain a deeper 
understanding of the why and how the PMERS impacts on the individual’s motivation and 
performance, or by the practitioners responsible for the design and implementation of PMERSs 
that can effectively fulfil their motivational role and potential.
7.4.1.3 The Design and Management o f the Company’s Reward System :
Motivational Considerations 
The conviction that the allocation of rewards by organisations to managers differentially - on the 
basis of their evaluated performance - can have a strong motivational effect on the managers’
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motivation and subsequent performance is widespread in the management control literature 
(e.g., Merchant, 1989 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990 ; Simons, 1995 ; Drury, 1996). The significance of 
rewards in the process of motivation is also captured by expectancy theory, whose basic postulate 
with regard to the motivational function of rewards is that individuals within organisations will be 
motivated to perform at higher levels in their job if they believe that they will receive valued 
rewards that are contingent on their individual job performance (Corbo & Kleiner, 1991). 
This central proposition was empirically tested in the present study and, as mentioned earlier, 
was fully confirmed:
Managers who
i) valued highly the rewards that were administered to them by the company’s PMERS,
ii) perceived these rewards as being administered in relation to their individual PMERS- 
evaluated performance,
were found to experience a significantly higher level of motivation than those managers who did 
not.
In addition, secondary analysis conducted on the managers’ reward preferences provided 
supporting empirical evidence to show that
iii) apart from the perceived value of the extrinsic rewards, the value the managers attached 
on the intrinsic factors associated with their jobs in the organisation had an equally 
significant impact and relationship with their motivation,
iv) the great majority of managers appeared to be motivated both by the extrinsic and the 
intrinsic rewards that were available to them,
v) the managers in the sample showed significantly different preferences for the various 
(extrinsic and / or intrinsic) rewards they perceived to receive in the context of their job 
in the organisation.
On the whole, the findings of the study seem to indicate that, from a motivational point of view, 
the design and management of the company’s reward system revolves around the two principal 
questions addressed in the following sections :
- What rewards will be administered ?
- How will these rewards be administered ?
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What rewards will be administered ?
With regard to the first question, if we accept as our starting point that the motivational influence 
of any reward comes about only as a result of the value the receiver places on it, it makes sense to 
suggest that a motivationally effective PMERS should be offering the rewards which are widely 
desired (valued) by its particular managerial staff. To the extent, however, that the perceived 
value and the consequent motivational impact of each of the various reward forms available, as 
this study showed, vary substantially and in meaningful ways among individuals - and, more likely 
than not, will not remain static for the whole of the manager’s life in the company (Porter et al., 
1975) -, the task of designing a reward package which offers rewards that are diachronically 
valuable to and, thereby, motivationally effective for every single manager in the organisation 
becomes insurmountable.
The key point here is to recognise that different people have different needs and are therefore 
likely to desire, value, and be motivated by different rewards. While some managers may assign 
high importance to extrinsically administered rewards such as monetary incentives, promotion, or 
fringe benefits, others may be more interested in more subtle aspects of their job, inherently 
rewarding in themselves, such as the opportunity to do an interesting and challenging work, the 
verbal recognition for a job well done, or the sense of accomplishment that follows from having 
carried through a difficult task successfully. Indeed, this was clearly demonstrated in the present 
research where it was revealed that, although the manager’s motivation was in most cases 
triggered both by the perceived value of the extrinsic rewards administered to him / her and by the 
perceived value of the intrinsic factors associated with his / her job in the organisation, different 
managers tended to assign a high value to - and be motivated by - different (extrinsic and / or 
intrinsic) rewards. In this sense, the motivational effectiveness of the PMERS becomes more than 
anything else a matter of the system’s ability to recognise both the individual differences factor 
as well as the dynamics in people’s needs and preferences over time, and accommodate them 
appropriately.
Practically speaking, the latter implies that the typical reward system design needs to be expanded 
so as to be able to respond to the different individual needs and reward preferences of the 
company’s managers - in other words, be re-engineered so that it can ‘fit’ the motivational profile 
of each individual manager in the organisation. One way to do this is to complement the
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company’s formal reward system with a process that will, first, identify - rather than assume - 
the managers’ personal needs and tastes, and then provide the rewards each manager desires at the 
lowest possible cost. Within this context, the systematic measurement of the managers’ 
reward attitudes - either through some structured or semi-structured data collection method 
(a questionnaire, a personal interview, etc.), or through the direct observation of the managers’ 
responses to different situations and / or rewards - is deemed necessary, and can provide both top 
management and the designers of the company’s reward package the with a potential tool to 
confirm their assumptions about which rewards motivate, or will motivate, various groups and 
individuals in the work place. If the manager is identified by the system as one who values more 
extrinsic forms of rewards such as salary raises, year-end bonuses, and promotion, then the 
PMERS should aim to motivate him / her by offering such type of rewards. In the case of a 
manager who is seen as being driven by rewards of a more intrinsic nature such as feelings of 
achievement, recognition, and self-actualisation, the emphasis should be on the continuous 
enrichment and enlargement of the context of the manager’s job, for he / she is likely to respond 
well to and be motivated by such things as increased autonomy and responsibility, challenging and 
varied work, and meaningful performance feedback. In the final analysis, however, what needs to 
be stressed here is that with respect to what is valuable and motivating for people, companies need 
not and should not assume and generalised - particularly without sufficient evidence. Russell and 
Black’s (1972) assertion about the three fundamental principles underlying human motivation - 
“people are different ; people are different ; and people are different” (p. 160) - is somewhat 
simplistic, but nevertheless needs to be taken seriously. The bottom line is that if organisations can 
tailor their reward packages to their managers’ individual preferences, they can provide 
meaningful, and thus effective in motivating performance, rewards at the lowest possible cost 
(Merchant, 1989) ; failure to do so is likely to lead them trying - with low chances of success - 
to motivate their managerial staff with rewards they (the managers) do not value, that is, rewards 
that are costly, and from a motivational point of view, irrelevant. Of course it is unrealistic to 
suggest the complete ‘individualisation’ of the company’s reward system, because - to the extent 
that each person is virtually unique in his / her needs and preferences - this would ideally demand 
that a unique reward package be created for each of the company’s managers. What is more, since 
people’s needs and tastes are continually changing and developing, true ‘individualisation’ would 
require that the reward package of each manager be constantly changing. Instead, another - more 
practical and cost-effective - way to arrive at a good individual / reward package fit is to build
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within the company’s formal reward system the opportunity for managers to make their own 
choices about the kind of rewards they themselves value and want from a range of rewards 
available to them, rather than oblige them to take - the most usually expensive but often unwanted- 
rewards which are universally provided by the organisation to everyone (Nadler & Lawler, 1977).
The above prescription draws parallels with the “compensation cafeteria” approach put forward by 
Hettenhouse (1971), an approach that essentially refers to a reward system within which the choice 
of reward mix is placed in the hands of the individual whose performance the rewards aim to 
motivate - in our case, the middle-level manager. Although Hettenhouse (1971) proposes the 
“compensation cafeteria” system with top-level executives in mind, there is practically no reason 
why it can not be implemented at lower levels of the organisation’s hierarchy ; the underlying 
logic of this alternative approach stems from the realisation that managers of different age, marital 
status, and educational background, and within different personal, family, and tax circumstances, 
most probably have different needs for cash and other rewards, and therefore should be offered 
options as to the forms in which they receive their compensation. To do this, companies must first, 
on the basis of a cost / benefit analysis (Hettenhouse, 1970) and after examining the managerial 
attitudes towards the different rewards available, develop a ‘menu’ of alternative payment 
packages. These alternative packages - choices in the company’s reward menu -, if  designed 
carefully will not vary significantly in cost from the company’s point of view, and at the same time 
can have an enhanced motivational value in the eyes of the recipient manager who will be able to 
make his own personal choice among current or deferred, cash or equity, extrinsic or intrinsic 
rewards, from the compensation packages available.3 In essence, what Hettenhouse (1971) 
proposes is a contingency approach to the design and choice of the company’s reward system, 
contingent upon the individual preferences and personal circumstances of the company’s 
managers.
As to the popular question of whether the company should concentrate on administering valuable 
extrinsic rewards or, rather, on fostering intrinsically motivational work situations in order to
3 Indeed, a number of companies have recently realised the potential motivational benefits of reward systems that 
incorporate by design the element o f choice for employees, and have attempted to put such systems in practice. 
Royal Bank of Scotland’s RBSelect that was launched in October 1998, a total reward benefits package which gives 
employees a wide choice of benefits; and almost complete flexibility in how they allocate the overall value of their 
remuneration package, is representati ve of such attempts (Blackman, 1999).
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maximise its managers’ motivational force, this study provided evidence to show that the majority 
of the managers are basically motivated both by the extrinsic and the intrinsic rewards that they see 
evident in their job environment. In light of this evidence, it appears that there are multiple and 
differing motivational drivers affecting human behaviour (Herzberg et al., 1959), which essentially 
complement each other and combine in determining the individual’s motivation and subsequent 
performance. Thus, particularly in the managerial setting where apart from the always readily 
available extrinsic rewards (e.g., monetary incentives, promotion, fringe benefits, etc.) 
a number of intrinsic motivators - such as chances for achievement and self-fulfilment, for 
competence and self-determination, and opportunities for increased power, decision autonomy, 
status, recognition and self-esteem - come into play, organisations are obviously better-off trying 
to motivate their managers both through extrinsic and intrinsic avenues. Extrinsically this can be 
attained through the identification and allocation of valuable rewards to the company’s managers 
in the way prescribed in the previous paragraphs. Increasing the manager’s motivation 
intrinsically is somewhat more complicated as it basically calls for a restructuring of the manager’s 
job environment with the intention to increase the inherent value of the tasks and activities the 
manager carries out daily in the context of his / her job (Berry & Houston, 1993). One way to 
enrich a manager’s job is to enlarge it horizontally, i.e., to include a number of different work 
activities so that to reduce the repetition and increase the variety and challenge of the tasks 
performed in the job, making it thereby much more interesting and worthwhile. The manager’s 
job can also be enlarged vertically, that is, by allowing the manager to take more responsibility for 
and control over his / her work, by allowing him / her the authority to make important decisions, or 
even participate in the planning of how the job should be carried out. On the whole, both the 
horizontal and the vertical redesign of the manager’s work can make the everyday tasks and 
activities he / she performs more interesting and challenging, and increase in them the 
opportunities for responsibility and achievement, thereby enhancing their intrinsic motivational 
potential. Furthermore, if this is supported by management control systems and leadership styles 
that promote a climate of reward equity, recognition for worthwhile accomplishment, and positive 
performance feedback, then the possibilities of creating the ideal job conditions within which the 
manager can experience personal growth, high self-esteem, and, hence, intrinsic motivation are 
considerable.
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How will the rewards be administered ?
As far as the second question is concerned, the results of the present study indicated that the 
motivational effectiveness of any given set of rewards, apart from their perceived attractiveness, 
depends also on the managers’ perception about whether or not these rewards are tied to the 
performance they (the rewards) are intended to motivate. In this sense, it appears that the offering 
of rewards by the organisation acquires additional motivational properties to urge managers 
towards effective performance, the more the managers perceive that the only way to obtain the 
rewards offered is by attaining the organisationally required level of performance upon which 
these rewards are contingent. The obvious implication is that, from a motivational point of view, 
the better the PMERS succeeds in establishing and reinforcing the manager’s belief that the 
rewards available are administered on the basis of his / her evaluated performance, the more likely 
it is to have a significant positive impact on the manager’s motivation.
This last realisation carries a number of practical recommendations for the design of the 
company’s reward system, all of them presumably aiming at strengthening the manager’s 
perception that there is a direct link between his / her evaluated performance and the rewards he / 
she receives. First and foremost, the rewards administered by the system should be, to the extent 
possible, performance-dependent. As Lawler (1971) points out, the obvious means of creating the 
perception that rewards are tied to performance is, first, to actually relate the rewards closely to job 
performance and, second, to make this relationship as visible as possible. At the outset, then, the 
PMERS needs to be designed to allocate the available rewards differentially, on the basis of the 
individual manager’s performance as compared to some predefined objective or standard. 
In essence, this calls for a system of reward equity within which the differences in the managers’ 
performance are reflected and recognised clearly, and good performers end up been awarded 
more - and more desired - rewards than poor performers are. Reward equity, however, should not 
be confused with a system of inconsequent reward equality, where all managers are rewarded 
equally with no regard to their performance. Such a system of equality, that fails to differentiate 
clearly and reward proportionately good and poor performance and rewards all people the same, 
is more likely to undermine its motivational potential, encouraging, at best, only average 
performance levels (Nadler & Lawler, 1977). On the one hand, it is expected to discourage, 
frustrate, and eventually demotivate the high-performing managers who see themselves, in spite of 
their high performance, receiving the same level of rewards with their low-performing peers,
j
i
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whereas, on the other hand, it is more likely than not to strengthen the behaviour of average- and 
poor-performing managers through the positive reinforcement of the rewards offered. In contrast, 
a merit-based reward plan that distributes the organisational rewards available on the basis of 
attained performance stands a much better chance to be seen by the company’s managers as fair 
(equitable), and to positively influence and direct their motivation.4
Having a differential reward system that is based upon merit is certainly a necessary condition for 
the establishment of the motivationally critical perception that reward depends on individual 
performance ; however, it is not a sufficient condition for it. Equally - if  not more - decisive for 
establishing a perceived close performance-reward connection is also the openness of the 
company’s reward system. Stated differently, unless the managers in question are informed and 
aware themselves of the way in which rewards and performance are related within the system, no
4 In practice, it seems that the use of performance-dependent rewards has gained some momentum in the last two 
decades. In the U.K., there has been an increasing trend during the late 1980s to include a performance-related 
element into the remuneration package of middle-level managers (Murlis, 1988). For example, the Incomes Data 
Service reported that in June 1988, 50% of manufacturing organisations and 40% of service organisations had some 
form of performance-related pay scheme - although some of these schemes applied at the most senior managerial 
levels only, and others only to shop floor employees (Emmanuel et al., 1990). A study by Vemon-Harcourt (1987) 
of 155 U.K. companies found that performance-related bonuses were available to over 80% of directors and to over 
70% of senior managers. Similar trends are also evident in the U.S. and in Canada. A survey by the Conference 
Board revealed that 92% of the manufacturing firms in the United States had annual pay-for-performance incentive 
plans for their managers (Tharp, 1986). In a similar survey in the Canadian context (Compensation Planning 
Outlook 1984), 91% of the respondents answered affirmatively when asked : “do you link pay or increases to 
performance ?” (Luce, 1983). Other studies that have been conducted in a U.S. context also provide evidence that 
confirms this intention on the behalf of the companies to tie rewards to individual performance. For instance, Vancil 
(1979) discovered that 90% of his sample of 317 profit-centre managers received annual bonuses, while somewhat 
later, Merchant (1989) found that all 12 firms that he studied promised profit-centre managers annual bonuses on the 
basis of their performance. A more recent salary survey by Curtis (1998) revealed that at least one out of two middle 
managers surveyed received a performance-related bonus ; a slightly smaller percentage (almost 40%) were found to 
be on a profit-share scheme. Similar conclusions come from Kaplan (1982), who reports that more than 90% of the 
top managers of decentralised profit centres in large U.S. corporations are eligible for an annual performance-related 
bonus. Notwithstanding this general trend, comparative, cross-cultural studies indicate that performance-based 
reward systems differ among different countries. For example, Pennings (1993), based on data from over 200 firms, 
concluded that bonus payment schemes at the managerial level are much more explicit, much bigger and more 
variable in the U.S., as compared with those in Europe - although this tendency was found to be more pronounced in 
certain industries. Other studies comparing U.S. and Japanese management reward practices show that bonus 
payments and salary increases in Japan are less likely to vary sharply, particularly when compared with U.S. samples 
(e.g., Bass & Burger, 1979) ; in the Japanese context, even more than in European countries, other factors such as 
seniority and long-term attachment to the firm are the basis of merit. Clearly, the concept of performance-related 
reward, although it is becoming increasingly popular, does not yet constitute a universal compensation culture. In 
another recent trend in the area of managerial compensation highlighted in the literature, the increasing 
implementation of market-based reward schemes is noted - a trend that basically reflects a conscious effort to align 
more closely the interests of managers with those of shareholders. According to Johnson (1999), stock options have 
become the primary long-term incentive device used in the U.S., in Western Europe, and increasingly in other parts 
of the world. Rappaport (1999), for example, reports that stock options account today for about 30% of the total pay 
that managers at the middle management level of the largest U.S. companies receive.
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positive effect should be expected on their motivation. After all, as the present study showed, it is 
the manager’s perception of the PMERS’s characteristics (in this case, his / her perception about 
the performance-dependency of the rewards that he / she receives) and not the actual reality of 
these characteristics that determine the manager’s motivation and subsequent performance. 
Making therefore performance-related reward information public so that all managers identify a 
strong connection between high performance and high reward is, from a motivation point of view, 
at least as important as actually having a merit-based reward system in operation (Lawler, 1981).
In this sense, the results of this research strongly support the case for a fully disclosed 
performance-based reward plan. From a motivational perspective, it is generally hard to argue 
with the idea of letting individual managers know what are the rewards available and how they are 
distributed within the PMERS. This is precisely the kind of information individuals need in order 
to understand how they are treated by the performance-based reward system, and to establish the 
motivationally crucial belief that the available rewards are obtainable from good performance. 
Research suggests that one of the effects of keeping the rewards individuals receive secret is to 
reduce the ability of these rewards to motivate (Lawler, 1965 ; Lawler, 1967). The argument that 
has been mainly presented against reward secrecy is that it makes accurate reward comparisons 
among employees impossible, wiping out, as such, much of the motivational force of the 
differential reward system that may actually be in place (Porter et al., 1975). The practice of 
reward secrecy then makes it more difficult to conclusively and visibly establish that good 
performance and high reward are related in the organisation, and therefore, at least on a prima 
facie basis, it is to be avoided.
In effect, openly communicating reward information can help enhance the PMERS’s credibility 
and develop faith and trust in the fact that rewards and performance are actually related within the 
company’s formal system of performance evaluation and reward. Just as it is the case with every 
other system of management control and motivation, a high level of trust on the part of those 
subject to the system is required in order for a performance-based reward system to work. 
In the absence of trust, there is a high likelihood that individuals will either not respond to the 
reward system (loss of motivation), or that they will respond to it in a dysfunctional, 
counterproductive manner, possibly bargaining for lower performance standards or, in extreme 
cases, attempting to ‘cheat’ the system (Lawler, 1981). Needless to say here, that making the
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reward-plan information widely known within the organisation will not itself establish the 
all-important belief that rewards are based upon merit, unless of course the administration of 
the organisational rewards available is in fact related to the individuals’ actual performance. 
To the extent that this condition does not exist, revealing reward information will only serve to 
emphasise even more dramatically that the organisational rewards are not tied to performance, 
thereby further reducing the power of these rewards to motivate (Porter et al., 1975).
It is important to note at this point that the necessary precondition for performance-dependent 
reward is that individual performance can be assessed accurately and equitably before it is 
rewarded, and although this may be relatively easier for simple repetitive tasks, when it comes to 
the evaluation of managerial performance at an individual level, things become more complicated. 
Particularly in the case of managerial jobs that are performed within highly uncertain and 
unpredictable environmental conditions, the high level of complexity and task interdependence, 
as well as the subsequent difficulty in developing reliable, valid and controllable performance 
assessment tools in practice, makes both the design of performance-contingent reward plans and 
their implementation problematic (see the following section for a discussion on the impact of 
environmental uncertainty on the design of the PMERS). In such circumstances, the measures of 
managerial performance that are most usually at the organisations’ disposal - on the basis of which 
the rewards are to be assigned - are not sensitive enough to discriminate between above- (and 
below-) average performers, do not reflect the whole range of the manager’s performance, or are 
significantly influenced by factors that are beyond the manager’s control (Merchant, 1989). 
To arrange, therefore, the distribution of the organisational rewards available on the basis of such 
performance evaluations may be, in the best case scenario, a waste of money, as such incentives 
schemes should not be expected to cause managers to work any harder (Chief Executive, 1979 ; 
Nelson, 1999, 1999a ; Sanchez, 1999); at worst, argue a number of authors, they could bring more 
undesirable than desirable motivational effects (e.g., Hamner, 1975 ; Pearce, 1987 ; Kohn, 1987). 
In the same line of argument, Emmanuel et al. (1990) point out that the motivational effectiveness 
of any results-dependent reward plan is bound to be conditioned by the completeness, accuracy 
and controllability of the measures of performance on the basis of which the rewards are assigned. 
Moreover, they argue that the rewards are likely to act as positive reinforcement of whatever 
behaviour - functional or dysfunctional - the measures draw attention to: “ ...it seems clear [that] if 
communications to the managers about what it is important are not correct [that is, the role of
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performance measures], that error is compounded if the communications are reinforced with 
promises of large incentive awards” (Emmanuel et al., 1990, p. 268). Similar cautions are made 
by Lawler (1994) who identifies potential unintended side effects of tying rewards to individual 
performance such as i) the neglecting of certain aspects of performance, which albeit crucial for 
organisational success, are neither measured or rewarded by the company’s PMERS and are 
therefore ignored by the managers, ii) the reporting of invalid data on the behalf of the managers in 
order to make their performance look better than it actually is, and iii) the lack of co-operation and 
the creation of an antagonistic climate among peers who are competing for the same rewards. 
To the extent then that such performance-contingent reward schemes are - particularly in a 
managerial performance evaluation context - so easy to misdesign and mismanage, and can equally 
easily result in the displacement and / or misdirection of managerial motivation, the concerns that 
are expressed about their motivational efficacy are, at least to some degree, justified. Perhaps it is 
such considerations about the pitfalls associated with performance-related rewards that in many 
case has led companies to leave the terms of the motivational contracts purposely implicit, 
sometimes even unwritten. Keeping the contract terms about the reward promise more implicit 
and flexible may compromise the potential motivational advantages arising from a close 
connection between individual performance and received rewards, but at the same time can also 
help avoid adverse behavioural consequences related to performance measures and standards that 
are either inherently insufficient to properly direct the managers’ behaviour towards the right 
directions in the long run, or have simply been set for other than motivational purposes 
(Merchant, 1989).
7.4.1.4 Considering the Effect o f the Environmental Factor on the PMERS Design 
The present study provided evidence that offer empirical support for the contingency theory 
argument advanced in earlier chapters, i.e. that, from a motivational point of view, different 
performance evaluation systems may be more appropriate than others in different environments. 
Indeed, in the context of the present research, despite the fact that the PMERS that was used to 
evaluate and reward managerial performance was essentially the same for the whole sample of the 
middle managers surveyed, the managers who considered themselves operating in environments of 
relatively higher uncertainty and unpredictability tended to perceive the performance standards set 
within the PMERS as significantly less attainable, and the performance measures employed as 
significantly less accurate, than did the middle-level managers who thought they were working
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under more certain and predictable conditions. Hence, it seems that the managers’ perceptions 
about pivotal PMERS characteristics such as the accuracy of measures and the attainability of 
standards - in essence, their perceptions about the ability of the PMERS to capture their 
performance accurately and evaluate it equitably - are apparently contingent on the relevant 
features of the organisational environment within which both they (the managers) and the system 
have to interact.
All in all, at the level of practice the above findings hold the greatest relevance for controllers and 
other executives responsible for the design and implementation of management control systems in 
organisations, especially in terms of helping them differentiate the performance appraisal system 
according to variations in the manager’s job environment. Fundamentally, these results suggest 
that the environmental uncertainty variable is critical for the design of the company’s PMERS and 
furthermore imply that the search for a universally appropriate system that can be uniformly 
applied with the same success in every job environment is probably futile ; instead, the design of 
the company’s performance evaluation system is better seen as situationally specific (Dermer, 
1977), as contingent on the relevant (actual and perceived) conditions of the organisational 
environment for which it is intended (Otley, 1980). To the extent that the PMERS’s actual and 
perceived equity - and thereof its potential motivational effectiveness - is likely to depend not only 
on the system’s absolute technical characteristics, but also on its relative (actual and perceived) 
compatibility and level of fit with the particular environmental circumstances within which it 
operates, the recommendation to design the company’s formal performance evaluation system so 
that it can appropriately adapt to the specific environmental and task requirements of the 
manager’s job appears justified.
More specifically, in conditions of relative certainty and environmental stability, middle-level 
managers are expected to be involved in programmed decision making about largely static, 
more or less well-defined, independent, structured and repetitive tasks (Emmanuel et al., 1990). 
In such environments, where i) the main key variables can be more precisely identified, ii) the 
results of given managerial actions can be more accurately predicted (March & Simon, 1958), 
and therefore iii) the information asymmetry between top and middle management regarding 
means, ends, and means-ends relationships is comparatively small, the generation of objective and 
verifiable data for control and performance evaluation is fairly straightforward. With a relatively
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accurate and detailed predictive model at its disposal, top management can in this context design 
and administer centrally a PMERS that can, first, successfully narrow down managerial 
performance into a complete set of measures / dimensions essential for the organisation’s success, 
and, further, assess the middle-level manager’s performance in relation to clearly defined, 
attainable standards set in advance in all the critical performance areas identified by the measures. 
Essentially, in the programmed decision making scenario, where the given environmental 
circumstances allow top management to establish measures and targets of managerial performance 
that are - and, perhaps more importantly, are perceived by the middle-level managers in question 
to be - accurate, complete (for measures) and unambiguously clear (for targets), the typical 
PMERS is more likely to be seen as an equitable mechanism for managerial performance 
evaluation, and thereby as a more relevant tool for extrinsic motivation and behaviour 
modification.
However, as this study indicated, in more complex and dynamic environmental circumstances, 
such performance evaluation mechanisms may be of limited relevance from a control and 
motivation point of view. In more uncertain and unpredictable job environments, middle-level 
managers will typically have to contend with an increasing number of unexpected and novel 
events, which will essentially force them to engage, on a daily basis, in a fair amount of 
non-programmed decision making about largely interdependent and overlapping tasks and 
activities that, as a rule, are difficult as well as impractical to specify and document in advance of 
their execution (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978). In this setting, where, by definition, i) the critical 
success factors are difficult to identify and constantly changing, ii) the knowledge regarding the 
outcomes of given managerial actions (i.e., knowledge about cause-effect relationships) is implicit 
and incomplete (Thompson, 1967 ; Watson, 1975), and iii) the information asymmetry between 
top and middle management about the means (managerial actions) necessary to achieve the - 
anyway unclear - organisational ends (purposes) is high (Emmanuel et al., 1990), the top 
management’s ability to establish accurate ex-post performance measures and explicit a priori 
targets for managerial performance evaluation is bound to be limited (Govindarajan, 1984 ; 
Brownell, 1985). Further, as the present study indicates, an even more challenging task than 
actually building an equitable PMERS under such environmental conditions will be for top 
management to convince the company’s middle-level managers - i.e., reinforce their perceptions - 
about the accuracy and equity of the particular system.
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Middle-level managers operating in highly uncertain environments are likely to be fully aware of 
the high incidence and high impact of unexpected and novel events in their job, of the 
non-programmed decision making context within which their everyday tasks are performed, 
as well as of the resulting inability both to anticipate the conditions that will exist in the future and 
to predict with accuracy the consequences of given managerial actions taken today. They are also 
expected to be fully alert to the objective difficulties involved in establishing in advance clear and 
specific targets as well as measures that are accurate enough to capture all the critical dimensions 
of good performance under these environmental conditions (Hirst, 1981). Attempts therefore on 
the part of a - centrally located and critically distanced from the realities of the middle-level 
manager’s job and task environment - top management team to superimpose and rigidly 
implement performance measures, which, as this study showed, will most probably be perceived 
by the middle-level managers in question as inadequate to reflect the whole range of their work 
effectiveness, are bound to be deemed imperfect and ultimately unfair. Similarly, if the standards 
of desirable performance on these measures are established in an autocratic fashion during the 
standard setting process, with top management simply dictating the next period’s targets to the 
middle-level managers responsible for achieving them, chances are that these targets will be seen 
as unattainable, and therefore unjust, by the middle-level managers involved. In all likelihood, 
such rigid performance evaluation mechanisms will not be ‘internalised’ (i.e., will not be accepted 
and perceived as equitable and relevant by those subject to them) and, furthermore, under certain 
circumstances, they may be the underlying cause of what is termed in the management control 
literature dysfunctional behaviour. For example, both Porter et al. (1975) and Emmanuel et al. 
(1990) argue that the strong and direct linking of rewards that the managers value and want with 
ambiguous performance evaluations of this kind are more likely than not to instigate opportunistic 
behaviour - such as biasing and manipulation of performance evaluation data and reports, 
tampering with performance measures, etc. - on the part of the middle-level managers in question. 
In essence, in the face of high environmental and task uncertainty, and given the significant 
amount of non-programmed decision making, the resulting high level of information asymmetry 
between top and middle-level management about means, ends, and means-ends relationships, 
and the subsequent difficulty to centrally monitor and control the actions of these middle-level 
managers, such non-neutral behaviour may be seen as an anticipated reaction on the part of 
self-interested individuals, who, given the opportunity within their particular organisational
226
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
environment, respond in a rational manner to a perceived imperfect, rigidly used, and thus unfair 
performance evaluation system.
There are nevertheless potential avenues through which the acceptance and ‘internalisation’ of the 
PMERS can be accomplished, even in the case of middle-level managers who are operating within 
the high uncertainty, non-programmed decision-making situation. At a first level, the participation 
of the middle-level managers in the standard setting process can provide a means of addressing the 
target-acceptance problem. Allowing middle-level managers to take active part in and negotiate 
the setting of the targets against which their future performance will be assessed is allegedly a 
useful strategy that top management can employ so as to ensure that these targets will be fully 
accepted by the subordinate managers involved as their own personal targets. Indeed, there is a 
considerable body of literature on the positive behavioural effects of participation in the standard- 
setting process, basically supporting the view that such participation by the managers to whom the 
final targets eventually apply may be instrumental in gaining full acceptance of the targets set 
(see, for example, Argyris, 1972 ; Hofstede, 1968 ; Collins, 1978 ; Brownell & Hirst, 1986). 
Particularly in the high uncertainty, non-programmed decision making scenario, where the 
lower-level managers are believed to possess more detailed, up-to-date and valid predictive 
models than the top management, and it is essentially their experience, intuition, judgement, 
innovation and skill that is required to provide solutions to largely unique problems (Emmanuel et 
al., 1990), such managerial participation in the process of defining next period’s targets is 
considered beneficial, if not imperative, so that the performance standards set are (and, further, 
are accepted by the middle-level managers in question to be) realistic and relevant.
The high level of information asymmetry between top and middle-level management as to the 
likely outcomes of given managerial actions - a ‘necessary evil’ in the uncertain and unpredictable 
environment - gives, however, the middle-level manager the opportunity either to intentionally 
bias his / her forecasts in the standard-setting process, or, at a later stage of the performance 
evaluation process, to manipulate (misrecord and / or misreport) his / her actual performance data 
if he / she believes that this is in his / her own best interest. There is empirical evidence in the 
management control literature showing that participation in the setting of next period’s standards 
may lead managers to present false estimates of what is possible and reasonable in terms of their 
future performance, especially when they have a powerful incentive to do so (Argyris, 1952 ;
227
PMERS. Managerial Motivation and Environmental Uncertainty DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Lowe & Shaw, 1968 ; Schiff & Lewin, 1968 ; Hofstede, 1968). Thus, particularly in the high 
uncertainty situation where plenty of opportunities for such dysfunctional behaviour exist, it is 
essential that the PMERS is designed and implemented in a way that - at the very least - will not 
encourage middle-level managers to engage in non-neutral actions (i.e., incorporate ‘slack’ into 
targets or manipulate actual results) which essentially are contrary to the organisation’s overall 
short- and long-term objectives.
At a second level then, the removal of such PMERS-related incentives for opportunistic 
behaviour, as well as the definitive acceptance of the PMERS by the company’s middle-level 
managers, pass through the de facto recognition on the part of the top management, first, 
of the multidimensionality and complexity of the middle-level manager’s task performance within 
the more unpredictable und uncertain conditions, and second, of its own inability to accurately 
measure, evaluate and further reward the middle-level managers’ effectiveness through any one 
performance measure under these conditions. Potentially fruitful avenues toward this direction 
may include the adoption of a more flexible and subtle, but at the same time, broad performance 
evaluation and reward style that could be based on
(i) the de-emphasis of the absolute role of the - in any case incomplete and ambiguous in the 
high uncertainty situation - measures and standards, and their conscious use in a more 
sensible and ‘tolerant’ way in the performance evaluation process,
(ii) the utilisation of a multitude of quantitative and qualitative, financial and non-financial, 
historic- and forward-looking, short- and long-term oriented performance indicators5,
5 Evidence from the field indicates an increasing trend towards the use of qualitative, non-financial measures in 
managerial performance evaluation and compensation practice within the current highly uncertain and dynamic 
business reality. For example, Lavin (1994) reports that Chrysler Corporation pays bonuses to its 200 top managerial 
staff based on the attainment of vehicle quality and customer satisfaction targets in addition to measures 
of profitability. Anthony et al. (1992) discuss the use of additional non-financial performance measures 
by General Electric and McDonald’s, providing the following summary of their measures : “When General 
Electric decentralized in the 1950s, it identified multiple measures of divisional performance : profitability, 
market position, productivity, product leadership, personnel development, employee attitudes, and public 
responsibility...McDonald’s evaluate its store managers on product quality, service, cleanliness, sales volume, 
personnel training, and cost control” (p. 651). In like maimer, Ford Motor Company recently announced a 
management compensation plan, similar to the plans used by General Motors and Chrysler, which includes non- 
financial customer satisfaction and operational measures (New York Times, 1998). A recent study of management 
compensation practices at 1,400 companies conducted by William Mercer, Inc. found that many companies used 
non-financial measures in determining incentive compensation both at the top and at the middle management level. 
Thirty-five percent of the companies used customer satisfaction measures in the incentive payment formula and 
another 33% planned to do so. The rate of on-time delivery of products or services was used in the programs of 33% 
of the companies and was being considered by 24% of those polled (Journal o f Accountancy, 1993). Other studies 
on Japanese and British companies also indicate an expansion of performance measurement systems and an
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which will complement each other in the process of the assessment of the manager’s 
effectiveness, and will extend the actual and the perceived scope (i.e., the accuracy and 
completeness) of the PMES both in terms of the dimensions measured and the time 
periods covered,
(iii) the (explicit or implicit) detachment of the organisational rewards administered to the 
middle-level managers from this performance evaluation process, with the intention of 
convincingly signalising that in the given uncertain and unpredictable conditions, where 
the manager’s effectiveness is recognised to be significantly influenced by a number of 
unforeseen factors beyond the manager’s control, it is not the achievement of specific 
results on the selected performance measures, but rather the overall positive decision 
making and action taking towards the firm’s best interest that is highly valued and 
rewarded.
This more flexible performance evaluation and reward style is more likely to neutralise the 
possible negative motives the middle-level manager may have in the high uncertainty / high 
information asymmetry situation to misuse his / her opportunities for participation both in the 
standard setting and in the ex-post performance appraisal process. Particularly if coupled with a 
long-term, multi-dimensional orientation, and an emphasis - to the extent possible - on the 
responsibility-controllability principle, it may be able to increase the manager’s confidence on the 
controllability, accuracy, completeness, and overall relevance of the performance measurement 
system, and ultimately to induce the manager to use the PMERS for self-control. Overall, the 
underlying argument here is that, the recognition that any PMERS has inherent, unavoidable 
inadequacies when it comes down to the evaluation of managerial performance in the high 
uncertainty scenario, does not necessarily mean that it should be abandoned altogether ; with some 
adjustments in the way it is used and interpreted, it can avoid potential dysfunctional side effects 
and play a positive role in motivating the organisationally desirable behaviour (Drury, 1996).
In sum, what is put forward here is a contingency approach to the design of the company’s 
PMERS. As illustrated in next page’s Figure 7-2 (a diagrammatical representation of the 
contingency approach, largely adopted by Emmanuel et al., 1990, p.368), when environmental and 
task uncertainty is low, the decision-making is mostly programmed and repetitive in accordance
increasing use of non-financial measures in performance appraisal practices (e.g., Hiromoto, 1988 ; Rees & Sutcliffe, 
1994).
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with a specific well-known plan, and the relationship between actions and results can be clearly 
specified and measured, centrally designed and administered systems of carefully selected 
performance measures, standards and performance-related rewards can be an effective tool for 
performance evaluation at the middle management level. In conditions of higher environmental 
and task uncertainty, where the organisational objectives are less clear, the model of predicting 
the results of alternative courses of action is imperfect, the decision-making is largely unique and 
non-programmed, and the measurement of actual outcomes is problematic, a less rigid and more 
‘involving’ performance appraisal and reward system, that centres around 
-> the participation of middle-level managers in the standard-setting process,
—> a less strong link between rewards and managerial performance, and 
-> performance evaluation being conducted in a more flexible manner with a longer 
time horizon 
is highly recommended.
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Figure 7-2 : Environmental Uncertainty and Contingent PMERS Design
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On the whole, as strongly emphasised at the beginning of the present study, this research 
endeavour was structured upon the fundamental premise that control is basically a behavioural 
issue, and, thereof, that the ultimate criterion by which any system of control (such as the PMERS) 
should be assessed is, in any case, behavioural; that is, to what extent does such a system succeed 
in influencing managers to behave in organisationally desirable ways. If we take this basic 
assumption to be our starting point, then it follows that the challenge - as well as the main PMERS 
design consideration - both in the high and in the low uncertainty situation, is to design and 
implement systems of performance measures, standards and related incentive schemes that will 
encourage (or, at the very least, will not discourage) the specific managerial behaviour that is 
necessary in every case for the attainment of the organisation’s objectives. In the low uncertainty / 
programmed decision-making condition, therefore, the PMERS should be designed so as to 
concentrate and direct - through the use of appropriate performance measures and valuable, 
performance-dependent rewards - the middle-level managers’ attention, energy, and actions 
towards the accomplishment of the organisation’s objectives as these are clearly identified 
within the PMERS. In the same spirit - but not in the same manner -, in the high uncertainty / 
non-programmed decision-making condition the PMERS should be structured and implemented in 
a way that will motivate middle-level managers to use their intuition, judgement, experience, 
and superior knowledge of their immediate internal and external environment in order to make 
the best possible decisions the particular environmental conditions allow.
7.4.2 Implications for Theory
7.4.2.1 Substantiating Contingency Theory : The Effect o f Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
One of the primary intents of this exploratory study was to examine the moderating effect 
of perceived environmental uncertainty on a number of - theoretically presumed as critical 
from a motivational point of view - managerial perceptions about the Performance Measurement 
Evaluation Reward process. As highlighted in section 7.3.3, the study’s findings indicated that the 
manager’s perceptions about the level of uncertainty in his / her external and task environment 
seem to have a highly significant influence on these PMERS-related managerial perceptions 
that were theorised to determine the manager’s motivation and subsequent performance. 
More specifically, it was hypothesised and found that middle-level managers who considered 
themselves encountering high uncertainty and unpredictability in their job environment tended to 
perceive the performance standards set within the company’s PMERS as significantly less
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attainable, and the performance measures employed as significantly less accurate, than did 
middle-level managers who thought they were operating within more certain and stable working 
conditions. On these empirical grounds, the recommendation to custom-design and implement the 
company’s formal performance evaluation system differentially, so that it can appropriately match 
the specific environmental and task requirements of the manager’s job, was put forward.
Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the primary relevance of this study lies clearly in its 
demonstration of environment as a source of contingency for the design of the company’s PMERS, 
as well as in its extension of the contingency theory of organisation from the interfirm to the 
intrafirm context. It continues the theory development efforts initiated by such authors as 
Khandwalla (1972), Gordon and Miller (1976), Tomassini (1976), Hayes (1977), Ansari (1977, 
1979), Ouchi (1977), Amigioni (1978), Gordon et al. (1978), Hopwood (1978), Sathe (1978), 
Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978), Otley (1978), Pfeffer (1978), Banbury and Nahapiet (1979), 
Otley (1980), Ewusi-Mensah (1981), Gordon and Narayanan (1984), Govindarajan (1984) and 
Emmanuel et al. (1990) who have advanced contingency frameworks for the design of 
management control systems. Moreover, by fundamentally focussing on the importance of 
individual perception, attempts to go a step further, stressing the point that from a motivational 
perspective the company’s PMERS needs to be specifically tailored to suit, not as much the actual 
work environment within which the company’s managers perform their everyday tasks, but more 
critically the managers’ perception of that specific work environment and of the (external and 
task) uncertainty they perceive to face in it.
Emmanuel et al. (1990) insightfully point out that the contingency theory approach firmly places 
the design of the PMERS in the context of organisational responses to the wider environment 
within which the organisation has to operate, and further relates the PMERS’s effectiveness to the 
system’s ability to be adaptive to changes in the given external circumstances. Admittedly, the 
contingency framework adopted for the needs of this research is presently based on an 
insufficiently articulated model, limited and weak empirical support, and vague practical 
recommendations (Otley, 1980 ; Schoonhoven, 1981) ; its conceptual and related methodological 
clarity is still less than absolute (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978). Nevertheless, it was deliberately 
chosen, first, to underline the fact that there can be no PMERS readily applicable to and equally 
effective in all organisations and circumstances, and second, to emphasise the paramount
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importance of achieving an appropriate matching - in Macintosh’s (1981) terminology, a rational 
technical and organic alignment - of the organisation’s PMERS and the environment within which 
the system and those subject to it have to interact. In essence, it brings to the fore perceived 
environmental and task uncertainty as factors of paramount importance that have the potential to 
influence directly intermediate, motivationally critical, PMERS-related attitudes, and therefore 
need to be taken into account in the process of designing and implementing the PMERS.
Overall, the central underlying notion of the contingency theory model employed in the present 
study is that the optimal way to structure and manage the company’s PMERS - as with any other 
management control system - is situationally specific, essentially depending on the (actual and 
perceived) uncertainty associated with the activities the PMERS is intended to evaluate, reward 
and motivate.
7.4.2.2 Extending the Contingency Theory Perspective: Human Resources as a Contingent Factor 
The present research provided also evidence to support the view that different managers tend to 
value highly and be motivated by different (extrinsic and / or intrinsic) rewards, and thereof went 
on to offer as a recommendation the ‘tailor-making’ of the company’s reward package on the basis 
of its managers’ individual reward preferences and personal circumstances. On the theoretical 
level, the above point of view essentially represents an extension of the contingency approach 
to the design and choice of the company’s reward system, specifically contingent upon the nature 
and specific characteristics of the company’s managerial workforce.
As mentioned in the previous section, management control theorists have long moved away from 
the view that there is one universally appropriate management control system design which can be 
effectively applied to all organisations in all circumstances with equally positive - motivational 
and other - results. Instead, based on what is termed in the management control systems literature 
a ‘contingency theory perspective’, they maintain that the eventual effectiveness of any 
management control system - and thereby a central design consideration - is how well the system 
fits in each case the particular set of environmental, technological, strategic, structural, and 
cultural circumstances within which the given system has to operate (Otley, 1980). Despite, 
however, the widespread recognition of the need to specifically tailor the PMERS - as any other 
management control system, for that matter - to the needs and specific circumstances of the
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organisation for which it is intended, most of the prescriptions about the design of the company’s 
reward system are implicitly structured upon a universalistic spirit about the nature of man, 
basically propounding that there is a single right way to deal with all people in all organisations. 
Under the assumption that all employees are basically similar in their make up, such approaches 
are most usually based on ‘one best way’ rules and principles that can and should apply to the 
design of reward systems in general, fail to take sufficiently into account the significant 
differences in personalities, needs, personal circumstances and reward preferences, and, as a result, 
are often in difficulty to explain the phenomenon of individuals - even within the same 
organisation - reacting differently to virtually identical reward practices.
Expectancy theory - which provided the conceptual foundations of this study - appears to offer an 
adequate answer to such dead ends by explicitly introducing the individual differences factor, and 
by basically postulating thereof that human behaviour is better seen as a process through which 
each individual makes his / her own conscious decisions among alternative courses of action on 
the basis of his / her own personal needs and expectations of whether or not given behaviours will 
lead him / her to desired outcomes (rewards). On the premises of this notion of ‘individualisation’ 
(Lawler, 1974, 1994) we maintain that not only individuals in different organisations, but also 
members of the same organisation are likely to vary significantly in their preferences and 
responses to reward schemes and other organisational policies and practices regarding, for 
example, performance measurement and evaluation systems, leadership styles, job and task design 
methods, selection and training procedures, and so on. We further argue that this ‘individuality’ 
of the company’s managerial staff represents a specific feature of the organisation’s context, 
an additional contingent factor whose ‘fit’ with the company’s management control system is 
bound to critically affect the overall effectiveness of that system, and therefore needs to be 
seriously considered and accommodated when the system is being designed.
All in all, in an attempt to synthesise the individual differences approach and the contingency 
theory framework previously outlined, this study proposes an extension of the traditional 
contingency perspective, incorporating into it the view that, in designing and implementing their 
management control systems, organisations should consider - apart from the already mentioned in 
the literature environmental, technological, strategic, structural, and cultural factors - the specific 
characteristics of the company's human resources.
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7.4.3 Implications for Research
7.4.3.1 The Importance o f Method and Research Design
On a more methodological level, the practical difficulties encountered in this research, first, 
to measure variables that basically referred to human perceptions, and second, to consider the 
multiplicity of the potential extraneous variables pertaining to the phenomenon of interest (that is, 
the motivation of middle-level managers through the company’s PMERS) is perhaps indicative of 
the inadequacy of purely positivistic methods to unravel complex behavioural research issues of 
this kind. The present study has taken such a positive approach, and by gathering cross-sectional 
data of a more snapshot nature, attempted to answer questions regarding the type of relationships 
(in terms of direction, strength and frequency) that exist among the organisation’s environment, 
PMERS, and its middle-level managers’ behaviour. And although, this is one of the few empirical 
studies in the area of management control with real middle-level managers providing attitudinal 
data (i.e., perceptions) about the company’s PMERS and its effect on behaviour, it has to be 
admitted that the choices made with respect to the study’s research method and design have 
somewhat restricted its scope both in terms of the type of the questions asked and answered, 
as well as in terms of the number and dimensions of the variables examined. For example, 
the complex abstraction of managerial behaviour was conceptualized, operationalised and 
conveniently narrowed down into - the much more ‘tangible’, measurable and quantifiable 
dependent variables of - managerial motivation and managerial performance, which, further in the 
process, were measured through the use of a single, self-reported measure in each case. 
In the same ‘reductive’ spirit, a large number of (allegedly pivotal in the relevant literature) 
intervening variables that could enhance our understanding of the intricate relationships involved 
in the influence and direction of managerial behaviour through the PMERS, (e.g., the extent and 
manner in which the PMERS is actually used, the level of participation and active involvement in 
the process of designing and implementing the PMERS, or the cultural background of the 
managers expected to function within it) were omitted for merely practical reasons. In essence, 
the study inevitably focused on only a few dependent and independent variables pertaining to the 
expression of managerial behaviour (that is, managerial motivation and performance) and the 
PMERS’s design characteristics (i.e., the accuracy of performance measures, the attainability of 
performance standards, and the value and performance-dependency of organizational rewards), 
as well as on the effect of a single, two-dimensional, moderating variable, namely the (task and 
external) environment within which both the PMERS and the middle-level managers subject to it
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have to operate. Overall, all the largely unavoidable and well documented in the literature ‘sins’ 
of the so called “method-driven” - as opposed to the “phenomenon-driven” - studies, that 
fundamentally reflect an inherent inconsistency between theory statement and empirical 
verification (Briers & Hirst, 1990) and basically refer to
i) the use of surrogate measures for obscurely defined constructs
ii) the range restriction in variable measures
iii) the omission of variables that could offer alternative possible explanations for the obtained 
findings
iv) the inability to provide evidence for causal relationships among the designated variables, 
and
v) the general use of hypothesis testing procedures that are only indirectly related to the 
theory-derived propositions,
are certainly evident in this research.
Gordon and Narayanan (1984) inspiringly advocate the view of organizations as a dynamic field of 
innumerable interaction patterns at the individual, organizational and environmental level, and 
insist that the role management control systems play in facilitating organizational success and 
survival affects, and is affected by, these various interaction patterns. Otley (1980, 1994) and other 
researchers in the area of management control (e.g., Govindarajan & Gupta, 1985) argue on the 
same matter that particularly in situations where a complex pattern of interaction among a large 
number of variables exists - or perhaps because of it -, it is unrealistic to expect survey methods of 
data collection and purely statistical approaches to data analysis to provide adequate answers. 
The exclusive use of cross-sectional, questionnaire-based research designs, they point out, 
essentially limits the type of phenomena and relations that are amenable to investigation, and this 
is surely a lesson well learned in the context of the present research.
On the other hand, more phenomenological methodologies that are “ ...anthropological in 
nature...involve [the in-depth examination of] a small number of carefully selected cases...the 
close involvement of the researcher with the organizations over a period of time.. .and are intended 
to be illuminative rather than being concerned with the rigorous testing of pre-determined 
hypotheses” (Otley, 1980, pp. 424-425), may be proven more useful in eliciting valid information 
about the causes and consequences, the interactions and dynamics of phenomena that are intricate,
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confidential or sensitive in their essence. Particularly in research endeavours such as this one, 
where the focus of attention is on internal human processes that admittedly have a temporal 
dimension, in-depth case studies - preferably with a longitudinal scope - may provide a clearer 
perspective of why and how given control systems (such as the PMERS) impact on the 
individual’s motivation and performance, thereby improving our understanding of the way in 
which these system ought to be designed and implemented in different environments in practice.
7.5 Suggestions for Further Research
Having evaluated the results and implications of this study, as well as its main strengths and 
weaknesses, this last section offers a number of directions for further research that appear 
worth exploring.
To start with, future research endeavours could consider replicating the present study in different 
environmental and cultural settings, at different organizational levels, and with different 
populations. Abemethy et al. (1999) rightly point out that, particularly in the area of management 
accounting and control, “...there is a need for a stronger tradition for replication studies” (p. 23). 
Especially in the context of the present study where data were drawn from a single research site 
and from a non-random (and therefore not representative of the entire target population) sample, 
constructive replication - i.e., theory-led replication work rather than mere repetition motivated by 
the need to fill ‘gaps’ (Otley, 1980 ; Briers & Hirst, 1991) - across populations and settings, 
and / or over different time periods would certainly add to the generalisability (external validity) 
of the findings.6
Another worthwhile avenue for future research would be to consider theoretically and examine 
empirically the role of a number of factors (moderators) that have been consistently hypothesised 
in the management control literature to exert a critical intervening effect on the motivational 
effectiveness of the PMERS. This study essentially failed to confirm the expectation that
6 Indeed, the idea of extending the present study longitudinally, by possibly administering the existing questionnaire 
for a second time in the participant company to examine the managers’ perceptions (and the development of these 
perceptions in the course of time) about the company’s new formal PMERS has been seriously considered. 
This possibility is currently being explored and negotiated with executives from Bank Sigma.
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perceived PMERS design features (i.e., the performance measures’ accuracy and the performance 
standards’ attainability) are related to the managers’ motivation and performance. Thus, further 
research work along this line, specifically examining,
(i) on the one hand, the moderating effect of contextual variables (such as the size, structure 
and culture of the organisation, the nature and style of use of other management, control, 
information, and leadership mechanisms in operation within the organisation, or the level 
of trust in the supervisor’s impartiality and assessment ability),
(ii) and on the other, the effect of more idiosyncratic parameters (e.g., the manager’s abilities, 
skills, and personal traits, his / her cultural and educational background, personality type, 
and cognitive style, etc.),
may provide alternative plausible explanations for the given set of results obtained here about the 
motivational effect of performance measures and performance standards.
On a related issue, the findings reported here suggest that the manager’s motivation is primarily 
affected by the extrinsic and intrinsic rewards that he / she perceives to enjoy in the context of 
his / her job environment. Given the importance of rewarding from a motivational point of view, 
future research initiatives may consider focusing on issues relating to the design of effective 
reward systems. For instance, investigating the role and nature of the relationship between 
extrinsic and intrinsic rewards in the determination of managerial motivation (antagonistic or 
synergistic) is a research question that was not fully addressed in the present study and surely 
warrants special attention and consideration. Also, examining the motivational effectiveness of 
team reward packages in the context of the modem N-form organization (Hedlund, 1994) is 
another potentially fruitful and intriguing research area. Within these ‘flatter’, more decentralised 
organizational forms and structures, where the performance of and interaction between 
cross-functional, small-size teams is considered to be a key element for the achievement of the 
overall organizational objectives (McBain, 2000 ; McClurg, 2001), the examination of the design 
and actual impact of the reward systems that are utilized to motivate such team performance 
presents increased interest.
Advances can also be made in terms of a further exploration of the variables considered 
in the present study. For example, given that the PMERS’s features variable is clearly 
multi-dimensional, opportunities exist for further analysis of the effect of different (actual and
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perceived) performance measures’ and performance standards’ design characteristics (e.g., 
congruence, responsiveness, completeness, objectivity, verifiability, specificity, time of setting, 
internalization) on managerial behaviour. The scope of the present study could also be extended 
by examining the impact of the PMERS on - or its relationship with - a multitude of dependent 
(outcome) variables, essentially a number of psychological and behavioural responses that present 
particular interest from a micro-behavioural point of view, such as the creation of tension, 
resentment and conflict on the job, or the incidence of dysfunctional (e.g., invalid data reporting, 
non-neutral decision making, rigid bureaucratic behaviour, etc.), competitive, or cooperative 
behaviour on the part of the managers involved. With regard to the uncertainty variable, future 
studies may also explore different and / or alternative dimensions of environmental and task 
uncertainty (i.e., hostility, competitiveness, restrictiveness, complexity, dynamism, heterogeneity, 
unpredictability, instability, variability, etc.), or may focus more on the relationships of the 
objective and physical characteristics of the manager’s job and environment with critical 
managerial job attitudes such as the manager’s work satisfaction, motivation and performance. 
These developments are seen as especially important when the aim is to design, rather than to 
explain, contextually appropriate management control systems (Hartmann, 1997).
On the methodological level, the adoption of a multi-disciplinary perspective (Otley, 1980 ; 
Vagneur et al., 1995) that will enable the integration of recent advances and well-tested theories 
from the behavioural literatures, the identification of critical constructs and variables that need to 
be considered, and the refinement of the measurement instruments used, seems to be a highly 
desirable research strategy in the investigation of the motivational role of management control 
systems. Such a theoretical and conceptual pluralism, especially if coupled with multi-method, 
multi-rater research designs that have the potential to balance out their relative strengths and 
weaknesses (Govindarajan, 1984 ; Bimberg et al., 1990 ; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991 ; Lindsay & 
Ehrenberg, 1993), can be expected to yield particularly fruitful results and enhance our 
understanding of the intricate relationships and processes involved in the influence and direction 
of managerial behaviour through the PMERS. Gaining additional insights into the process of 
motivation within the performance evaluation and reward situation still remains a critical research 
and practical issue, particularly given the significant relationship that the manager’s motivation is 
presumed - and shown in this study - to have with his / her short- and long-term job performance.
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Lastly, we are inclined to agree with Hartmann (1997) that further developments in management 
control research should eventually be directed toward integration of individual findings and the 
development of a ‘more cohesive body of knowledge’ (Young, 1996). As Otley (1980), 
Emmanuel et al. (1990), Briers and Hirst (1990) and other scholars in the area of management 
control point out, the PMERS is only but one of the means that organizations employ to influence 
and control the behaviour of their members, and, accordingly, its role and effect need to be 
understood and examined within the overall context of the other administrative, social and self 
control mechanisms which are also operative at the same time in the organization. The integration 
therefore of all the latest conclusions of contemporary management control research into a wider 
framework of cumulative knowledge will allow the identification and further examination of the 
entire network of relationships between all the different variables to take place - variables and 
relationships that have, to date, been considered only individually in the management control 
research -, and is likely to facilitate the understanding of the management control phenomenon in 
all its holistic quality.
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The above theoretical model of managerial behaviour represents a synthesizing attempt to merge 
the work of Vroom (1964) and Porter and Lawler (1968) in the area of expectancy theory with the 
traditional management control literature on managerial motivation through the company’s formal 
PMERS (e.g., Hopwood, 1973 ; Merchant, 1989 ; Emmanuel et al., 1990). It is not proclaimed to 
be either complete or final, or to provide for a total explanation of the relationships existing 
between the variables it identifies. Rather, it may be better seen as a conceptual scheme that is 
developed to guide thinking with regard to the phenomena of work motivation, performance and 
satisfaction at the managerial setting. In this sense, the model is a vehicle to be used in :
-  conceptualising the aforementioned phenomena of interest by identifying a number of 
key variables
-  generate hypotheses about possible cause-effect relationships between these key variables
-  generally stimulate additional theory building and empirical testing work in the area of 
human behaviour and management control systems design.
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Appendix B : Author’s Letter to Potential Participant Companies
< Name of recipient >,
< Position of recipient >,
< Name of company >,
< Address >
UNIVERSITY
GLASGOW
o f
Department of Accounting 
and Finance
Glasgow, 18 June 1999
Dear Sir,
Subject: A Research Project on Managerial Motivation
I am sending you this letter in order to explore the opportunity of your company taking part in a 
research project on management control systems and managerial motivation. This is the focus of my 
doctoral research and I am now seeking a corporate partner to conduct fieldwork.
The primary aim of the above mentioned research project is to examine whether middle level managers 
are equally well motivated when they face differing degrees of environmental and task uncertainty. The 
study has implications for the design of performance measurement and incentive systems, in particular, 
whether these need to be tailored to the individual or position.
Your co-operation would enable this question to be addressed and data to be collected. The benefits to 
your company are:
a) an independent evaluation of how current performance measurement and incentive systems 
influence managerial motivation and performance
b) potential insights to improve the design of current systems.
Total confidentiality can be guaranteed for your company and the participating managers
To give a clear indication of the project, a draft of the questionnaire that is intended to be utilised in the 
study is enclosed. This questionnaire takes no more than 15 minutes to complete and can be 
administered either in a hard-copy form or through the e-mail. A meeting to discuss the questionnaire’s 
format and content, as well as the most appropriate means to administer it would be very much 
appreciated, but if you would prefer to contact me prior to this, my addresses are at the foot of this 
letter. My supervisor, Professor Clive Emmanuel, is also happy to answer any queries you may have.
I thank you in advance for your time and interest.
My contact address at the University of Glasgow is :
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George Kominis,
University of Glasgow,
Department of Accounting & Finance, 
65-71 Southpark Avenue,
Glasgow, G12 8LE,
Scotland, United Kingdom.
whereas my telephone number, fax, and e-mail at the University are :
Tel.: 0141-330 5667 
Fax:0141-330 4442 
E-Mail: 9609037k@studentgla.ac.uk
Professor Clive Emmanuel: Tel.: 0141-330 5575 / 5566
Fax:0141-330 4442
E-Mail: C.Emmanuel@accfin.gla.ac.uk
Yours sincerely,
George Kominis
Ph.D. Student, Glasgow University.
Letter also sent to : < Name of recipient >
< Position of recipient >
< Name of company >
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Appendix C : Cover-letter Accompanying the Questionnaire
Department of Accounting 
and Finance
65-71 Southpark Avenue, 
Glasgow, G12 8LE. 
Telephone : 0141-3305667 
Fax : 0141-3304442
Prof Clive Emmanuel 
Mr. George Kominis
27 August 1999
Dear Participant,
In co-operation with the < Name of Company > and as part of a Ph.D. programme at Glasgow 
University, this research project has been set up to investigate the impact of Management Control 
Systems on the Motivation and Performance of managers who are operating within diverse 
environments. The present study seeks firstly to assess the effectiveness of these systems, and 
secondly to offer recommendations for the improvement of their design.
We are contacting a cross-section of managers within the < Name of Company >, asking them to 
give us their opinions on these issues. In order to be sure that all points of view have been taken 
into account, it is critical that we get a reply from all the managers that have been selected to 
participate in the study, so clearly your individual response is highly appreciated.
Please note that, in accordance with the Bank’s specific request, all the information provided 
will be treated in the strictest confidence, will be used only for the purposes of the project, 
and will be published later only in summary, statistical form. Although < Name of Company > 
is giving us its full support and co-operation, this research is organised and administered 
completely independently from the Bank. The Bank will not see the responses of individuals to the 
questionnaire, and respondents will not be identified in any way. Furthermore, in order to preserve 
anonymity, the questionnaire does not ask for your name. So please help us by answering the 
questions to the best of your ability. A summary of the results of this research project will be 
made available to you, on request, from the Bank in due time.
Please fill in and return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed reply-paid envelope - if 
possible by the 10th of September 1999. If you have any queries about the questionnaire or the 
study in general, please do not hesitate to contact us in Glasgow University either by telephone 
(0141-330 5667 or 0141-334 0226), fax (0141-330 4442), or through the e-mail 
(9609037k@student.gla.ac.uk). We will be happy to help.
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Thank you for your assistance.
Yours sincerely,
George Kominis
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Appendix D : The Data-Collection Instrument: An Analytic Questionnaire
UNIVERSITY
GLASGOW
o f
Department of Accounting 
and Finance
Questionnaire on:
The Impact of the Performance-Measurement- 
Evaluation-Reward System  on Managerial 
Motivation.
A Research Project administered by George Kominis 
and supervised by Professor Clive R. Emmanuel,
Department of Accounting and Finance,
University of Glasgow.
Glasgow, August 27th, 1999
The Impact of the PMERS on Managerial Motivation Introduction
Section 1: Introduction
A Study in Management Control Systems and Managerial Motivation
Initially, we would like to thank you for your support and participation in this study. As part of a Ph.D. 
programme at Glasgow University, this research project is interested in examining the impact of 
Performance Measures and related Rewards on managers' Motivation and Performance.
The questionnaire that follows includes a number of questions that basically attempt to capture your 
personal perceptions about the formal Performance-Measurement-Evaluation-Reward System (PMERS) 
of the company in which you are working. Although we know that you may find some of the questions 
repetitive, please make an effort to answer all of them.
In the following questionnaire, we are particularly interested in your own personal beliefs, opinions, and 
experiences. At this point it is important to stress once more that all the information you provide in 
the next sections is strictly confidential and will be used only for the purposes of the project. The
company will not have access to individual questionnaires, and you will not be identified in any way.
You will find useful instructions of how to answer the relevant questions at the beginning of each 
section. If, however, you have any queries about the questionnaire, you can always contact us in any of 
the ways indicated (telephone, fax or e-mail) in the covering letter. We will be there to help.
Before you start completing the questionnaire, please spend some time to provide us with some personal 
details. You are to fill in the cells provided below with the information required.
Personal Details
Company’s Name
Position in the Company
No. of Years in the Position
Please move on to the next section
The Impact of the PMERS on Managerial Motivation Section 1: Value of Job Outcomes-Rewards
Section 2 : Value of Job Outcomes-Rewards
It is well accepted that managers can be found to enjoy a wide range of rewards, provided by the 
companies in which they work for the managerial services that they deliver.
Different companies, however, provide different rewards for different managerial positions, whereas, at 
the same time, managers themselves are quite often found to differ widely in their judgements about the 
value of these rewards.
Please identify as many as possible Outcomes-Rewards associated with your own job. (Examples of such 
job outcomes may include tangibles such as cash bonus, stock options, promotion, and/or fringe benefits 
etc., as well as intangibles such as opportunity to develop your skills and abilities, opportunity to enjoy 
more authority and responsibility, opportunity for independent thought and action, and/or feelings of 
security, accomplishment, personal growth and development, etc.). Then rate these Job Outcomes- 
Rewards on the basis of how important (desirable) each of them is to you.
You are to fill in as many of the cells provided below as you can with the outcomes-rewards which you 
believe are related to your job. Subsequently, rate each outcome-reward by circling on the rating scale 
provided the number that represents your own evaluation of how important (desirable) each job outcome 
is. If you think that a job outcome is extremely desirable (important) to you, you would circle number 7. 
If you think that a job outcome is moderately important (desirable) to you, you would circle number 4, 
and so on.
For each job outcome, circle only one number.
Form of Rewards
a.
Rating Scale
1 2 3
unimportant moderately
desirable
extremely
desirable
—    . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
b. J  unimportant moderately extremely
desirable desirable
---------------------------------------------------------- 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
C. J  unimportant moderately extremely
desirable desirable
j Please turn to the next page
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Form of Rewards
d.
e.
f.
g-
Rating Scale
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unimportant moderately extremely
desirable desirable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unimportant moderately extremely
desirable desirable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unimportant moderately extremely
desirable desirable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unimportant moderately extremely
desirable desirable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
unimportant moderately extremely
desirable desirable
Generally speaking, which type of job Outcomes-Rewards do you think you value more, and why ?
Please move on to the next section
The Impact of the PMERS on Managerial Motivation Section 2 : The PMERS
Section 3 : The Performance-Measurement-Evaluation-Reward-System (PMERS)
In this section of the questionnaire you will be required to express your personal beliefs about the 
company's formal Performance-Measurement-Evaluation-Reward System (PMERS), that is, the formal 
process known as Appraisal and Development Review (ADR) and used by the company in order to 
measure, evaluate, and reward your performance.
Below there are a number of questions concerning this formal System of Measuring, Evaluating, and 
Rewarding your Performance. You are to read carefully each of these questions and answer them by 
circling on the corresponding scale the number that represents your opinion.
Please do not omit any of the questions.
How often do you feel that you can actually reach the 
standards of performance as these are defined by the PMERS
of the company, if you put a great deal of effort into your job 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Questions about the PMERS Rating Scale
? never sometimes almost
always
Would you consider the Environmental Uncertainty that you 
are facing in your job to be a critical factor affecting your 
ability to reach these PMERS-defined standards of 
performance ? somewhat very much
How often do you feel that your actual performance is 
captured and reflected properly by the PMERS of the 
company ? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
never sometimes almost
always
Would you consider the Environmental Uncertainty that is 
associated with your job to be a critical factor affecting the 
PMERS's ability to properly capture and reflect your 
performance ? somewhat very much
Please turn to the next page
The Impact of the PMERS on Managerial Motivation Section 2 : The PMERS
ATTENTION:
i Please answer the rest o f the questions o f this section relative to 
your answers in Section 1. Transfer in the cells provided below, 
the Outcomes-Rewards you identified in Section 1 before you 
answer the questions.
Questions about the PMERS Rating Scale
How often do you feel that the award of 
a.
actually depends on your evaluated performance as
this is assessed by the PMERS of the company ? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
never sometimes almost
always
How often do you feel that the award of 
b.
depends on your evaluated performance as 
assessed by the PMERS of the company ?
actually
this is
1 2
never
4 5 6
sometimes almost
always
How often do you feel that the award of 
c.
actually depends on your evaluated performance as
this is assessed by the PMERS of the company ? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
never sometimes almost
always
How often do you feel that the award of 
d.
actually depends on your evaluated performance as 
this is assessed by the PMERS of the company ? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
never sometimes almost
always
Please turn to the next page
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Questions about the PMERS Rating Scale
How often do you feel that the award of
actually depends on your evaluated performance as
this is assessed by the PMERS of the company ?  ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
never sometimes almost
always
How often do you feel that the award of 
f. J actually
depends on your evaluated performance as 
assessed by the PMERS of the company ?
this is
1 2
never
4 5 6
sometimes almost
always
How often do you feel that the award of
g. jactually
depends on your evaluated performance as this is
assessed by the PMERS of the company ? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
never sometimes almost
always
How often do you feel that the award of,r
depends on your evaluated performance as 
assessed by the PMERS of the company ?
Jactually
this is
1 2
never
4 5 6
sometimes almost
always
All in all, how would you comment on the overall effectiveness of the company's PMERS to measure, 
evaluate, and reward your performance ?
Please move on to the next section
The Impact of the PMERS on Managerial Motivation Section 3 : Job Performance
Section 4 : Job Performance
The purpose of this section of the questionnaire is to determine how you rate yourself, relative to others 
in your organisation with similar management duties, on a number of aspects/functions relating to your 
Job Performance.
You are to circle on the rating scale provided the number that represents where you believe you stand 
on each different aspect of your job, compared to others with similar management duties. If you think 
you are low on an aspect, you would circle number 1. If you think that you are a little less than average, 
as compared to others with similar management duties, you would circle number 3, and so on.
Please do not omit any scales.
Aspects / Functions of your Job Rating Scale
Planning 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
Investigating 1 2
low
4 5
average high
Co-ordinating 1 2
low
4 5
average high
Evaluating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
Supervising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
Staffing
(Recruiting, Placing, Transferring, and Promoting employees in the unit)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
Please turn to the next page
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Aspects / Functions of your Job 
Negotiating
Rating Scale
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
Representing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
Overall Quality of your Job Performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
Amount of Effort you expend on your Job 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
low average high
On the whole, how would you comment on your Motivation and overall Performance on the job ?
Please move on to the next section
The Impact of the PMERS on Managerial Motivation Section 4 : Environmental Uncertainty
Section 5 : Environmental Uncertainty
Managers, working under different environmental conditions, are faced with varying levels of 
uncertainty. In this last section of the questionnaire you are required to provide answers to a series of 
questions that will allow the level of Uncertainty you associate with your job to be gauged. Please note 
that the term Uncertainty here refers to the level of Unpredictability and Instability of the environment 
surrounding your unit.
Please read carefully each of the following statements/questions and circle on the corresponding scale 
the number that represents your opinion.
Please provide answers to all statements/questions.
Statements / Questions about the Uncertainty Rating Scale
How intense is each of the following in your industry ? 
a. Bidding for purchases or raw materials
of negligible 
intensity
moderately
intense
extremely
intense
b. Competition for manpower
of negligible 
intensity
moderately
intense
extremely
intense
c. Price competition of negligible 
intensity
moderately
intense
extremely
intense
How many new products and/or services have been 
marketed during the past 5 years by your industry ? 1 2 3 4 5
none some many
Please turn to the next page
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Statements / Questions about the Uncertainty Rating Scale
How stable/dynamic is the external environment 
(economic and technological) facing your unit ?
a. Economic environment
b. Technological environment
very stable 
(changing slowly)
very stable 
(changing slowly)
How would you classify the market activities of your 
competitors during the past 5 years ? becoming more 
predictable
During the past 5 years, the tastes and preferences of your 
customers have become : much easier 
to predict
During the past 3 years, the legal, political and economic 
constraints surrounding your unit have : remained about 
the same
How often do new scientific discoveries emerge in your 
industry ?
1 2 3 4 5 6
seldom sometimes
To what extent would you say that your work in your unit 
is routine ? to a great 
extent
to some 
extent
7
very dynamic 
(changing rapidly)
7
very dynamic 
(changing rapidly)
7
becoming less 
predictable
7
much harder 
to predict
7
have proliferated 
greatly
7
frequently
6 7
to a small 
extent
Please turn to the next page
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Statements / Questions about the Uncertainty Rating Scale
How many of your tasks in your unit are the same from 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
day-to-day ? most of some of very few
them them
How repetitive are your duties in your unit ? 1 2 3  4 5 6 7
very much somewhat very little
"People in my unit do about the same job in the same way \  2 3 4 5 6 7
most of the time . to a  great to some to a small
extent extent extent
"Basically, members of my unit perform repetitive activities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
in doing their jobs . to a great to some to a small
extent extent extent
To what extent is there a clearly defined body of knowledge 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of subject matter which can guide you in doing your work in t0 a great t0 some t0 a smal|
your unit ? extent extent extent
To what extent is there an understandable sequence of steps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
that can be followed in carrying out your work in your unit ? t0 a great t0 some t0 a sma)|
extent extent extent
To what extent is there a clearly known way to do the major 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
types of work you normally encounter in your unit ? t0 a great t0 some to a small
extent extent extent
Please turn to the next page
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Statements / Questions about the Uncertainty Rating Scale
To do your work in your unit, to what extent can you 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
actually rely on established procedures and practices ? to a great t0 some t0 a smal,
extent extent extent
In general, what would you say about the effect of the Environmental Uncertainty on your job ?
Thank you very much for your co-operation.
Please return the completed questionnaire in the reply-paid envelope 
to the following mail address:
ACCFIN, 
Publicity Services, 
University of Glasgow, 
FREEPOST SCO 1727, 
Glasgow, G12 8QQ, 
Scotland, 
United Kingdom.
Thank you once again for your time and effort.
George Kominis 
Clive R. Emmanuel
J
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Appendix E : Test for Instrument Reliability and Validity
Tables E -l to E-4 below present the results o f the tests performed to assess the reliability and 
validity o f the instruments used in the present study. For each o f the composite scales used here to 
measure the managerial performance-, the task uncertainty-, and the environmental uncertainty- 
variable, coefficients-a were estimated to assess the scales’ reliability, and factor analyses were 
run to examine the scales’ unidimensionality and subsequent homogeneity.
HiH§gi
Managerial Performance 221 9 ,6675 0 ,1 2 1 6 -0 ,5 5 7 5
Task Uncertainty 224 9 ,7512 0,1033 - 0,4769
Environmental Uncertainty 213 10 ,6404 0,1481 -0 ,7 3 5 4
Table E -l : Instrument Reliability Analysis
Factor
1 2,7047 30,0520 30,0520
2 1,8010 20,0113 50,0633
3 1,1732 13,0354 63,0986
4 ,7721 8,5785 71,6772
5 ,6535 7,2612 78,9384
6 ,6014 6,6827 85,6211
7 ,4917 5,4637 91,0848
8 ,4109 4,5650 95,6499
9 ,3915 4,3501 100,0000
Table E-2 : Factor Analysis of the ‘Managerial Performance’ scale
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Factor
■
.
I - y . ' l y  kTjwjBPp
1 1 ; 170 47,9664 47,9664
2 1,4157 15,7301 63,6965
3 ,8990 9,9889 73,6854
4 ,5800 6,4445 80,1299
5 ,4959 5,5100 85,6399
6 ,3846 4,2735 89,9134
7 ,3604 4,0040 93,9173
8 ,3146 3,4959 97,4132
9 ,2328 2,5868 100,0000
Table E-3 : Factor Analysis o f the ‘Task Uncertainty’ scale
Factor
1 2,5609 25,6090 25,6090
2 1,3568 13,5678 39,1768
3 1,1403 11,4030 50,5799
4 ,9309 9,3092 59,8891
5 ,8312 8,3120 68,2011
6 ,7871 7,8710 76,0721
7 ,7212 7,2120 83,2841
8 ,6922 6,9215 90,2056
9 ,5313 5,3125 95,5182
10 ,4482 4,4818 100,0000
Table E-4 : Factor Analysis o f the ‘Environmental Uncertainty’ scale
P articu larly  w ith  regard  to the instrum ent used  to m easure  the m an ag eria l perfo rm ance-variab le , 
a m u ltip le  linear regression  m odel w as co n stru c ted  in o rder to assess the ex ten t to w h ich  the 
overall effec tiveness d im ension  sign ifican tly  reflects the varia tion  in  m anageria l p erfo rm an ce  on 
each o f  the eigh t d im ensions included  in th e  scale. T he resu lts o f  th is  test are p re sen ted  in the 
fo llow ing  tab les.
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Dependent
* * • aMethod
Representing, 
Planning, 
Supervising, 
Investigating, 
Negotiating, 
Co-ordinating, 
Staffing, 
Evaluating
Overall 
Performance
Enter
a - All requested variables entered.
Table E-5 : The Multiple Linear Regression Model o f  Overall M anagerial Performance
M H I m m
,6565a | ,4310 ,4095 ] ,5373 |
3 .  Predictors: (Constant), Representing,
Planning, Supervising, Investigating, Negotiating, 
Co-ordinating, Staffing, Evaluating
b. Dependent Variable: Overall Performance
Table E-6 : Summary Statistics
M IS
1 Regression 46,366 8 5.796 20,074 ooo •
Residual 61,209 212 ,289
Total 107,575 220
a- Predictors: (Constant), Representing, Planning, Supervising, Investigating, 
Negotiating, Co-ordinating, Staffing, Evaluating
c- Dependent Variable: Overall Performance
Table E-7 : ANalysis-Of-VAriance
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Appendix F : BANK SIGMA - Summary Financial Data
APPENDICES
Group Ten Year Financial Summary
Year rncleil 2 H t l h  li'bnwry
1990 1991 m 2 19931 1994 1935 1996 1997 1999 *999
Operating Profit before Provisions 297 335
£  Iff DHOTI
393 488 569 650* 6601* 826 9541* 1,097
Profit before Tax 194 134 141 125 269 450 545 664 742 1,012
Profit attributable to Proprietors 117 85 89 77 161 280 332 404 511 557
Ordinary Dividends 34 39 50 53 59 68 81 98 120 144
Preference Dividends 9 13 19 19 19 19 28 28 40 37
Retained Profit 74 33 20 5 83 193 223 278 351 376
Called Up Share Capital
Ordinary 189 191 287 289 291 293 296 299 307 310
Preference 100 200 200 200 200 200 300 300 400 400
Reserves 607 658 774 766 813 1.011 1,155 1,444 1.821 2,261
Proprietors' Funds 896 1,049 1,261 1,255 1,304 1,504 1,751 2,043 2,528 2 971
Minority Interests 6 7 4 4 7 8 125 131 123 133
Subordinated I iabilities
Dated Loan Capital 301 357 555 610 579 672 894 815 716 682
Undated loan Capital 327 287 312 387 570 547 763 929 1,071 1,088
Capital Resources 1,530 1.700 2.132 2,256 2.460 2.731 3.533 3,918 4,438 4,874
Total Assets 18.394 22,095 24,741 29,013 30.748 34.104 44,099 47,275 54.697 69.796
Total Deposits 16,376 19,899 22.064
Deposits by banks, customers
and debt securities in issue 25,24/ 26,693 29,637 38,400 40,872 47,614 61,422
Total Advances 14.364 17,269 18,996
Loans and advances to banks
and customers 24,828 25.343 27,733 36,153 40,230 47,625 51,395
—  Puree p « i  Qnsnory Slock unit
Earnings (basic)'* 11.4 7.6 64 5.0 12.2 22-3 25.8 31,6 38.9 42.1
Dividends "* 3.6 4.1 4.4 4.6 5.1 5.8 6.9 8.2 9.9 11,6
Net Assets ** 83.9 B8.6 92.4 91.2 94.8 111.3 122.6 145.6 173.4 207.4
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - A v e r a g e  N u m b e r - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Staff
UK 15,050 15,945 16,140 15,720 15,245 15.110 15,775 15,905 16.607 18,060
Overseas 150 155 160 1,430 1,454 1,510 2,331 5,195 5,247 4,644
From 1993, as a result of the modification* to tfia Group Accounts consequent on the enactment of the Companies Act 
1985 (Rank Accounts) Regulations 1991, certain items are not directly comparable with earlier years.
l Restated.
'  Includes non-rccurnng profits (net of losses) of £14.0 million in 1996 and £37.6 million in 1995,
' Before write-down of leases or £37.1 million.
*' Adjusted for the capitalisation and rights issues in 1991.
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Em 
2.200 
2.000 
1 .800  
1 .600  
1*100 
1.200 
1.000 
BOO 
6 0 0  
•100 
200
His tor ic  T r e n d s
95 9 6  97  0 8  9 «
Em £m  £rri £m  Em
Nat I nearest 
income 8 9 9 .B 997 .7 1 ,218 .0 1 .385.6" 1,529.4
N on-irileiest
income 394.4 430 .9 54 4.2 569.7 623.1
Total income 1,294.2 1.42B.6 1 762.2 1,934.2 2.152.5
O perating
ftipensas 6 4 4 .? 7 6 8 .8 9 2 5 .2 980 .4 1,(k5S.9
Revaluation
derftcrt 1 1 .5
Operating proftt . ■
(before bad
de4>l proviwo™*) 660 .0  66 9 .8  625 .5  9 5 3 .8 *  1 .W 6 .6
RaOurt % % % % X
Coat: Incom e 4 9 .B 5 3 .B 52 .5 50 .7  49.1
N o n  i n t e r e s t
Incom e to  exp an ses 6 1 .2  5 6 .0  541 ft 5 9 .0  5 9 .0
Tier 1 6.1 6.1 6  4 6 .8  6 .8
Total capital 11.4 1 1 .9  11 ft 11.7 11.1
*C /^ore> tvrits-ctown of  it^ses
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Appendix G : Comparative Analysis - BANK SIGMA vs. Top 5 UK Competitors
Bank Sigma Lloyds TSB 
2.22% 6.90% NatWest Bank
6.38% Barclays 
6.17%
bey National 
4.90%
Other
68.83%
Halifax
4.60%
Figure G -l : BANK SIGMA vs. Top 5 Participants - U.K. M arket Share Analysis (1998)
1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998 1997 1998
Ratios
PROFITABILITY
Profit Margin % 
Return on Equity %
23.0
46.4
20.9
34.1
7.5
8.8
15.1
21.5
13.2
15.5
14.4
17.6
14.7
21.9
14.4
22.5
19.7
15.8
17.3
16.2
16.1
25.9
15.9
27.0
EFFICIENCY
Turnover / Assets 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08
PERFORMANCE
Earnings / Equity %
Cap. Employed / Equity 
Tax charge / PBT % 
PB1T / Cap. Employed %
37.3
20.1
25.7
2.8
28.4
17.7
29.3
2.6
8.0
18.9
31.7
1.0
19.0
18.0 
23.4
1.7
14.8
24.4
31.6
1.5
16.8
22.0
28.1
2.0
18.0
27.6
25.5
1.1
17.3 
28.9
30.4 
1.1
15.1
15.2 
33.1
1.6
16.4
16.8
31.3
1.6
20.2
20.7
28.4
1.7
18.7
19.1
42.6
2.0
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Total debt / Equity %
Net debt / Equity %
Long debt / Total debt % 
Interest cover ratio
259.6
49.0 
27.7
11.0
212.4
19.0
28.8
10.4
287.2
-108.4
31.1
2.9
243.7
-112.0
35.3
5.6
84.3
-533.0
20.8
2.5
87.5
-468.5
30.4
2.3
874.7
537.6
40.0
7.6
856.7
519.8 
39.6
8.1
221.0
192.9
41.0
10.9
255.2
217.9
36.8
10.9
534.5
429.3
32.8
6.9
621.6
554.8
27.6
8.3
1 Source : W orldscope / Extel D atabase
Table G -l : BANK SIGMA vs. Top 5 Participants - Comparative Ratio Analysis (1997/1998)
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Bank Sigma (25p Ord. Stock) vs FT-SE All Share
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1100
1000
900
800
~  700Q.
LU
u  600
ce:
c l
500
400
300
200
100
HGH 312 606 793 934 712.5
228 296 459 656 505.5LOW
Legend
 = Share Price (adjusted where necessary for capital changes)
= Share Price movement relative to the FT-SE All Share Index 
------------- = Share Price Movement relative to the company’s Sector
Source : hemscott.NET Limited 2000
F igure G-2 : BANK SIGMA - Share Price Graph (1996-2000)
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Appendix H : Test for Bias from Inexperience
Table H -l below presents the comparison o f means t-test and its non-parametric alternative 
M ann-W hitney test that were run between the group o f the less experienced managers (position 
experience < 1 year, n = 42) and the rest o f  the sample (position experience > 1 year, n = 183) for 
all the variables measured in the study. The tests were performed to assess the possibility that the 
inclusion o f the less experienced managers in the sample introduced any systematic bias in the 
analysis conducted and in the results obtained, however, to the extent that no statistically 
significant differences are identified in any o f the study’s variables between the two groups, such a 
possibility has to be ruled out.
P ]
— — 2J|;|
j f f l
* < ; •- - \ f
E~>P Expectancy 34 , 1 3(3) 5 14 (1,661 .098 401 .689 3 8 3 7 . 5 0 0 ,988
P~>EP Expectancy 4,11 (1,45) 4,29 (1,58) -,176 -.698 ,486 3415,000 ,250
EP->ER Expectancy 4,09 (1,22) 4,13 (1,18) -,040 -.602 ,510 3481,000 ,313
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 5,56 (0,79) 5,60 (1,03) -.038 -.266 ,791 3624,000 ,564
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 5,89 (0,65) 5,97 (0,61) -,081 -.731 ,466 3454,000 ,629
Motivation 5,95 (0,95) 6,10 (0,79) -.150 -,951 ,342 3570,500 ,444
Performance 5,59 (0,70) 5,76 (0,66) -,172 -,743 ,350 3525,500 ,422
External Environmental
Uncertainty 4,82 (0,84) 4,84 (1,05) -,024 -.161 ,873 3703,500 ,714
Task Uncertainty 4,49 (1,03) 4,67 (1,20) -,173 -,644 ,442 3513,500 ,343
Table H-l : Analysis o f bias from inexperience
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Appendix 1: Test for Bias from the Uneven Distribution of Subjects in the Sample
Table 1-1 below presents the results o f the tests performed to assess the potential bias from the 
large number o f directors in the sample (see Table 6-1 : Segmentation o f Sample over Product / 
Functional Areas & Hierarchical Roles, Chapter 6). Neither the t-tests nor the (non-parametric 
equivalent) Mann-Whitney tests that were run between the group o f the directors (n = 94) and the 
rest o f  the sample (n = 131) reveal any significant differences in any o f study’s variables, a result 
that is taken as an indication that no particular bias has been introduced in the collected data from 
the large number of directors in the given sample.
r v, :.r
E—>P Expectancy 5,17 (1,43) 5,26 (1,42) -,089 .4 65 “ '^■48 Voo ,655
P—>EP Expectancy 4,15 (1,40) 4,14 (1,53) ,012 ,058 ,954 6105,000 ,912
EP~>ER Expectancy 4,24 (1,23) 4,15 (1,23) ,087 ,521 ,603 5841,500 ,512
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 5,61 (0,87) 5,54 (0,82) ,074 ,648 ,518 5843,500 ,514
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 5,95 (0,60) 5,87 (0,67) ,078 ,891 ,374 5460,500 ,441
Motivation 5,97 (0,91) 5,98 (0,93) -,009 -,072 ,942 6088,000 ,878
Performance 5,66 (0,70) 5,68 (0,69) -,017 -.156 ,847 5994,500 ,778
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 4,86 (0,93) 4,79 (0,85) ,072 ,602 ,548 5727,500 ,372
Task Uncertainty 4,53 (1,07) 4,59 (1,08) -.053 -,368 ,713 5914,500 ,614
Table 1-1 : Analysis of bias from uneven distribution of subjects
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Appendix J  : The Company’s Reward Package
In this appendix, we provide additional information on the com pany’s reward package. On the 
basis o f the managers’ perceptions as they were reported in the questionnaire, Figure J-l and 
Tables J-l and J-2 below present descriptive statistics about the popularity, perceived value and 
perceived dependency o f the extrinsic rewards that are distributed by the organisation, through the 
formal PMERS, to its appointed managerial staff.
Popularity of Rewards - Extrinsic Rewards
300 ------------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- --------------- ----------------------------
250 ■
Extrinsic Rewards Identified
Figure J - l  : M ost frequently  m entioned Extrinsic R ew ards
1_ _
Value of Profit Sharing 6 4 , 0 0 7 . 00 84 0 3 3
Value of Promotion 1 7 0 3 , 0 0 7 , 0 0 5 , 9 2 1 , 0 4 - , 0 1 1
Value of Salary Increase 9 3 3 , 0 0 7 , 0 0 5 , 8 9 1 , 1 2 - . 3 4 4
Value of Executive Stock Options 1 4 0 2 , 0 0 7 , 0 0 5 , 8 4 1 , 0 5 , 4 7 2
Value of Stock Options 51 1 , 0 0 7 , 0 0 5 , 6 9 1 , 2 6 3 , 5 7 6
Value of Cash Bonus 2 0 6 2 , 0 0 7 , 0 0 5 , 6 7 1 , 1 3 - . 1 3 0
Value of Company Benefits 
Valid N (listwise)
1 1 7
0
1 , 0 0 7 , 0 0 4 , 5 6 1 , 2 5 , 3 3 9
T able J - l  : Descriptive Statistics - Value o f Extrinsic Rewards
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.. a— ;
E P ->C ash  Bonus Expectancy 206 1,00 7,00 5,26 1,64 -,327,
EP-->Salary Increase Expectancy 93 1,00 7,00 4,97 1,58 -.449
EP~>Promotion Expectancy 170 1,00 7,00 4,86 1,36 -,153
E P->Executive Stock Options 
Expectancy
140 1,00 7,00 4,64 1,71 -1,133
Ep~>Profit Sharing Expectancy 63 1,00 7,00 2,48 1,82 -.036
EP->Fringe Benefits Expectancy 117 1,00 7,00 2,31 1,59 ,845
EP~>Stock Options Expectancy 50 1,00 7,00 1,66 1,12 11,235
Valid N (listwise) 0
Table J-2 : Descriptive Statistics - Dependency of Extrinsic Rewards
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Appendix K : The Intrinsic Rewards Identified
The descriptive analysis that follows provides statistics on the intrinsic rewards that the 225 
managers in the sample identified with their jobs in the organisation. Specific details about the 
type and the perceived value o f the most popular intrinsic rewards, as these were designated by the 
managers themselves, are presented in Figure K-l and Table K-l below. Just as with the extrinsic 
rewards in Appendix J, since the majority o f the respondents reported more than one intrinsic 
reward associated with their job, the total number o f intrinsic rewards identified exceeds the 
sample size.
Popularity of Rewards - Intrinsic Rewards
300 • 
250 ■ 
200  ■
Intrinsic Rewards Identified
Figure K -l : M ost frequently  m entioned Intrinsic R ew ards
■ B
Value of Work Enjoyment 4.00 7 00 6.41 70 1,401
Value of Recognition 63 4,00 7,00 6,21 ,81 ,077
Value of Accom plishm ent 59 4,00 7,00 6,19 ,88 -,048
Value of Responsibility / Autonorr 145 4,00 7,00 5,90 ,82 -,444
Value of Personal Developm ent 170 3,00 7,00 5,89 ,92 ,477
Value of Job Security 75 2,00 7,00 5,76 1,36 ,192
Value of Companionship 14 3,00 7,00 5,64 1,28 1,132
Valid N (listwise) 0
T able K -l : Descriptive Statistics - Value o f Intrinsic Rewards
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Appendix L : Additional Correlation Analysis - The Motivation-Performance Relationship
Tables L-l and L-2 below present the results o f the additional - parametric and non-parametric - 
correlation analysis conducted to explore further the relationship between managerial motivation 
and managerial performance. As shown below, both the parametric and the non-parametric 
correlation coefficients calculated, all unanimously indicate a positive and statistically significant 
(at the 99% level) relationship between the manager’s motivation and his / her performance on 
each o f the eight separate sub-dimensions o f managerial activity (planning, investigating, co­
ordinating, evaluating, supervising, staffing, negotiating, and representing) identified and 
measured in this study.
M atrix of Pearson's r Correlations
Motivation i 000
Overall Performance ,506*’ 1,000
Planning ,241*' ,405*’ 1,000
Investigating ,201*' ,344*’ ,125* 1,000
Co-ordinating ,257*’ ,320*’ ,376*’ ,062 1,000
Evaluating ,167*’ ,341*’ -,035 ,558*’ -.001 1,000
Supervising ,247*’ ,201*’ ,104 -,122* ,238*’ -.033 1,000
Staffing ,269*’ ,188*’ ,163*’ -,093 ,254*’ -,049 ,503*’ 1,000
Negotiating ,334*’ ,354*’ ,023 ,245*’ ,180*’ ,336*’ ,160*’ ,107 1,000
Representing ,358*’ ,428*’ ,081 ,211*’ ,211*’ ,322*’ ,205*’ ,164*’ ,355*’ 1,000
“  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
‘•Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).
Table L -l : Pearson’s r Correlations - The Motivation-Performance Relationship
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Matrix of Spearman Correlations
Motivation 1,000
Overall Performance ,445** 1,000
Planning ,254** ,423** 1,000
Investigating ,198** ,323** ,071 1,000
Co-ordinating ,194** ,316** ,367** ,070 1,000
Evaluating ,155** ,344** -.043 ,544** ,000 1,000
Supervising ,238** ,180** ,130* -,116* ,234** -,033 1,000
Staffing ,280** ,186** ,207** -.093 ,274** -.052 ,465** 1,000
Negotiating ,279*' ,315*’ ,020 ,258** ,179** ,307** ,145* ,100
Representing ,293** ,400** ,067 ,211** ,227** ,309** ,214** ,179**
1,000
,331* 1,000
•Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed). 
■Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).
Table L-2 : Spearman Correlations - The Motivation-Performance Relationship
275
PMERS- M anagerial M otivation and Environmental Uncertainty__________________________________ APPENDICES
Appendix M : Secondary Analysis - Group Comparisons for latent Bivariate Relationships
This appendix presents the summary statistics for all the sub-samples used in the secondary 
analysis that was conducted in order to bring to light further bivariate relationships and trends 
between the variables o f the study. Tables M -l through M-9 below report full sets o f  descriptive 
statistics for each o f the sub-samples formed and used in the group comparisons that were 
attempted.
Controlling for Task Uncertainty
j^ n
Position Experience 46 .50 i 5 00 3 07 2,90 5,70 4
E-->P Expectancy 46 2,00 7,00 5,35 1,37 -,482
P-->EP Expectancy 46 2,00 7,00 4,48 1,43 -,813
EP-->ER Expectancy 46 1,00 7,00 4,02 1,44 -,585
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 46 2,50 7,00 5,55 1,00 ,925
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 45 4,50 7,00 5,94 .67 -,304
Motivation 46 3,00 7,00 5,87 ,98 1,556
Performance 46 3,00 7,00 5,61 ,80 1,531
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 46 2,00 6,40 4,26 1.17 -1,000
Task Uncertainty 46 1,89 3,67 3,06 ,49 -,445
Valid N (listwise) 45
Table M -l : Descriptive Statistics - Low Task Uncertainty Group
| . ,
Position Experience 41 ,50 5,00 1,68 1,19 ,303
E~>P Expectancy 41 2,00 7,00 4,34 2,04 -1,731
P->E P Expectancy 41 1,00 6,00 3,29 2,04 -1,650
EP->ER Expectancy 41 2,00 7,00 4,68 1,34 -1,005
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 41 4,83 7,00 6,02 ,69 -1,161
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 40 4,50 7,00 6,05 ,61 -,085
Motivation 41 3,00 7,00 6,00 ,97 1,460
Performance 41 4,00 7,00 5,76 ,62 ,673
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 41 3,50 7,00 5,72 ,78 ,255
Task Uncertainty 41 5,56 7,00 6,12 ,43 -,930
Valid N (listwise) 40
T able M-2 : Descriptive Statistics - High Task Uncertainty Group
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Controlling for Position in the Organisational Hierarchy
APPENDICES
mu
Position Experience 94 ,50 33,00 2.78 4.29 28,942
E-->P Expectancy 94 2,00 7,00 5,17 1,43 ,180
P->E P Expectancy 94 1,00 7,00 4,15 1,40 ,050
EP-->ER Expectancy 94 1,50 7,00 4,24 1,23 -,689
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 94 2,50 7,00 5,61 ,87 ,816
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 93 4,50 7,00 5,95 ,60 -,361
Motivation 94 4,00 7,00 5,97 ,91 -,299
Performance 94 4,00 7,00 5,54 ,70 -,071
External Environmental
Uncertainty 94 2,20 7,00 4,86 ,93 ,755
Task Uncertainty 94 2,00 6,89 4,53 1,07 -.293
Valid N (listwise) 93
Table M -3 :: Descriptive Statistics - Directors
M B
Position Experience 32
_ _ _
3,95 5,52 9,565
E~>P Expectancy 32 2,00 7,00 5,59 1,29 2,021
P-->EP Expectancy 32 1,00 7,00 4,50 1,46 ,236
EP~>ER Expectancy 32 2,00 6,00 4,13 1,04 -.253
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 32 4,00 7,00 5,53 ,67 ,302
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 30 4,00 7,00 5,90 ,71 ,784
Motivation 32 3,00 7,00 5,81 1,09 -.051
Performance 
External Environmental
32 3,00 7,00 5,56 ,88 3,151
Uncertainty 32 2,70 6,20 4,88 ,74 1,463
Task Uncertainty 
Valid N (listwise)
32
30
1,89 7,00 4,74 1,11 ,973
Table M-4 : Descriptive Statistics - Senior Managers
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m i -
Position Experience 56 .50 23,00 3,13 3,95 12,549
E-->P Expectancy 56 2,00 7,00 5,29 1,45 -,101
P-->EP Expectancy 56 1,00 7,00 4,18 1,55 -,609
EP-->ER Expectancy 56 2,20 7,00 4,17 1,28 -.311
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 56 2,33 7,00 5,42 ,95 ,917
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 54 4,50 7,00 5,82 ,67 -,659
Motivation
. ■ - . ■
56 3,00 7,00 6,12 ,88 2,273
Performance 56 4,00 7,00 5,77 ,66 -.014
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 56 2,30 6,90 4,68 ,95 ,242
Task Uncertainty 56 2,33 6,89 4,44 1,09 -.433
Valid N (listwise) 54
Table M-5 : Descriptive Statistics - Associate Directors
-HU ■31ICM
Position Experience 43 ,50 T“ 2,76 1.99 2,533
E-->P Expectancy 43 2,00 7,00 4,98 1,44 ,041
P-->EP Expectancy 43 1,00 6,00 3,81 1,53 -,967
EP-->ER Expectancy 43 1,00 7,00 4,15 1,31 ,193
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 43 4,00 7,00 5,70 ,72 ,027
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 41 4,67 7,00 5,91 ,65 -,736
Motivation 43 3,00 7,00 5,91 ,87 1,859
Performance 43 4,00 7,00 5,65 ,57 ,265
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 43 2,00 6,40 4,86 ,80 3,052
Task Uncertainty 43 2,33 6,78 4,65 1,03 -,263
Valid N (listwise) 41
Table M-6 : Descriptive Statistics - Managers
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Controlling for Motivational Orientation
• m m • t? .
Position Experience 23 .50 8,00 1,87 1,69 7,180
E-->P Expectancy 23 4,00 7,00 5,48 1,04 -1,085
P-->EP Expectancy 23 2,00 7,00 4,48 1,41 -,575
EP-->ER Expectancy 23 1,33 6,33 4,40 1,09 1,667
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 23 5,00 7,00 6,26 ,62 -,972
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 16 4,00 5,75 5,03 ,49 -,262
Motivation 23 3,00 7,00 5,78 1,13 ,155
Performance 23 4,00 7,00 5,78 ,74 1,789
External Environmental
23 2,20 4,91 ,88 3,311Uncertainty 6,40
Task Uncertainty 23 2,56 6,63 4,61 1,07 -,583
Valid N (listwise) 16
Table M-7 : Descriptive Statistics - Exlrinsically Motivated Group
0C;:; DtT: 7 Bum
Position Experience 54 ,50 17,00 2 44 3.00 15,08 3
E-->P Expectancy 54 2,00 7,00 5,35 1,18 1,742
P-->EP Expectancy 54 1,00 6,00 4,37 1,26 ,280
EP->ER Expectancy 54 2,00 7,00 4,10 1,15 -,006
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 54 2,33 5,80 4,67 ,73 1,66 2
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 54 4,50 7,00 6,30 ,54 1,244
Motivation 54 4,00 7,00 6,06 ,81 -,814
Performance 54 4,00 7,00 5,69 ,58 1,123
External Environmental
Uncertainty 54 2,60 6,90 4,60 ,87 ,650
Task Uncertainty 54 2,22 6,89 4,50 1,10 ,090
Valid N (listwise) 54
Table M-8 : Descriptive Statistics - Intrinsically Motivated Group
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Position Experience 
E-->P Expectancy 
P~>EP Expectancy 
EP-->ER Expectancy 
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 
Motivation 
Performance 
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Task Uncertainty 
Valid N (listwise)
m
.
Minimum Maximum Mean
ip fF  std
148 ,50 33,00 3,42 4,60
148 2,00 7,00 5,14 1,54
148 1,00 7,00 4,01 1,55
148 1,00 7,00 4,19 1,28
148 4,33 7,00 5,79 ,64
148 4,50 7,00 5,85 ,58
148 3,00 7,00 5,97 ,93
148 3,00 7,00 5,57 ,73
148 2,00 7,00 4,88 ,88
148
148
1,89 7,00 4,58 1,07
17,981 
-,317 
-,591 
-,549 
-,628 
-,379 
,704 
1,203
,892
-,391
T able M -9 : Descriptive Statistics - Intrinsically & Extrinsically M otivated Group
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Appendix N : Secondary Analysis - Examining the Managers’ Reward Preferences and 
Motivational Orientation
This appendix presents the analysis conducted to specifically examine the motivational orientation 
(extrinsic and / or intrinsic) and the reward preferences o f the middle-level managers in the 
sample. The trend of the Chi-Square statistic and o f its p-value in the tests reported in Tables 
N -l through N-3 indicates a high probability o f  the majority o f managers being motivated both by 
the extrinsic and by the intrinsic rewards that are available to them. Next, both the Friedman tests 
and the Kendall’s W tests presented in Tables N-4 through N-9 provide evidence to show that 
managers tend to have significantly different preferences (perceived values) for the various 
rewards that they perceived to enjoy in the context o f their job, irrespective o f the way these 
rewards are classified (extrinsic vs. intrinsic rewards, hygiene vs. motivators rewards, short- vs. 
medium- vs. long-term effect rewards, etc.)
. . : i - r. jigBSD
Extrinsicaily OR Intrinsically 
Motivated Group 77 112,5 -35,5
Extrinsicaily AND Intrinsically 
Motivated Group 148 112,5 35,5
Total 225
Test Statistics
Chi-Square a 22,404
df 1
Asymp. Sig. ,000
a 0 cells (,0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 112,5.
Table N -l : Chi-Square Test - M otivational Orientation (1:1 Expected Proportion)
Extrinsicaily OR Intrinsically 
Motivated Group 77 90,0 -13,0
Extrinsicaily AND Intrinsically 
Motivated Group 148 135,0 13,0
Total 225
Test Statistics
Chi-Square3 3,130
df 1
Asymp. Sig. ,077
3 0 cells (,0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 90,0.
Table N-2 : Chi-Square Test - Motivational Orientation (1:1.5 Expected Proportion)
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• HI
Extrinsicaily OR Intrinsically 
Motivated Group 77 75,0 2,0
Extrinsicaily AND Intrinsically
Motivated Group
Total
148
225
150,0 -2,0
Test Statistics
Chi-Squarea ,080
df 1
Asymp. Sig. ,777
a 0 cells (,0%) have expected frequencies less than 
5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 75,0.
Table N-3 : Chi-Square Test - Motivational Orientation (1:2 Expected Proportion)
Value of Promotion 4,10
Value of Responsibility/Autonomy 3,88
Value of Cash Bonus 3,74
Value of Stock Options 3,62
Value of Persona! Development 3,46
Value of Company Benefits 2,20
Test Statistics
N 25
Chi-Square a 20,938
Kendall's W b ,168
df 5
Asymp. Sig. ,001
a Friedman Test
b Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance
T able N-4 : Friedman & Kendall’s W Tests - Reward Preference 
(Most Popular Rewards)
Test Statistics
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 
Value of Intrinsic Rewards
1,39
1,61
N 218
Chi-Square a 11,712
Kendall's W b ,054
df 1
Asymp. Sig. ,001
a Friedman Test
b. Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance
T able N-5 : Friedman & Kendall’s W Tests - Reward Preference 
(Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Rewards)
Test Statistics
WfflSUM
Value of Hygiene Rewards 1,32
Value of Motivators Rewards 1,68
N 223
Chi-Square a 29,861
Kendall's W b ,134
df 1
Asymp. Sig. ,000
a. Friedman Test
b. Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance
Table N-6 : Friedman & Kendall’s W Tests - Reward Preference 
(Hygiene vs. Motivators Rewards)
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Value of Self-Actualisation Rewards 
Value of Growth Rewards 
Value of Esteem Rewards 
Value of Affiliation Rewards 
Value of Safety Rewards 
Value of Physiological Rewards ____
3.91 
3,22 
3,80 
4,33
2.91 
2,83
T est S tatistics
N 23
Chi-Square a 14,170
Kendall's W & ,123
df 5
Asymp. Sig. ,015
a - Friedman Test
b Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance
T able N-7 : Friedman & Kendall’s W Tests - Reward Preference 
(Hierarchy-of-Needs Rewards)
Value of Existence Rewards 1,65
Value of Relatedness Rewards 2,37
Value of Growth Rewards 1,98
T est S tatistics
N 71
Chi-Square a 20,693
Kendall's W b ,146
df 2
Asymp. Sig. ,000
a Friedman Test
b- Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance
T able N-8 : Friedman & Kendall’s W Tests - Reward Preference 
(Existence vs. Relatedness vs. Growth Rewards)
T est S ta tistics
Value of Short-Term Effect Rewards 
Value of Medium-Term Effect Rewards 
Value of Long-Term Effect Rewards
2,07
1,76
2,18
N 211
Chi-Square 3 22,734
Kendall's W b ,054
df 2
Asymp. Sig. ,000
a Friedman Test
b. Kendall's Coefficient of Concordance
T able N-9 : Friedman & Kendall’s W Tests - Reward Preference 
(Short- vs. Medium- vs. Long-Term Effect Rewards)
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Appendix O : Secondary Analysis - Multiple Linear Regression Modelling
The tables below present the results o f the multivariate analysis conducted. Initially, Tables 0-1 
through 0 -3  provide information about the combinations o f dependent and independent variables 
tested, as well as the summary statistics and the analysis-of-variance for each o f the two multiple 
linear regression models constructed. Next, Tables 0 -4  and 0 -5  present the results o f  the partial 
regression and partial correlation analyses carried out.
VxiiJfi'
1 1 .
1 Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV), 
E-->P Expectancy,
P-->EP Expectancy,
EP->ER Expectancy,
Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV)
Motivation (M) Enter
2 Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV),
E-->P Expectancy,
P-->EP Expectancy,
EP-->ER Expectancy,
Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV),
External Environmental Uncertainty (EU 
Task Uncertainty (TU)
Motivation (M) Enter
a - All requested variables entered.
Table 0 -1  : The two M ultiple Linear Regression M odels
■ i M l
1 ,228a ,052 ,029 ,9091
2 ,235b ,055 ,024 ,9118
a- Predictors: (Constant), Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV), 
E~>P Expectancy, P->EP Expectancy,
EP->ER Expectancy, Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV)
b- Predictors: (Constant), Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV), 
E~>P Expectancy, P-->EP Expectancy,
EP->ER Expectancy, Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV), 
External Environmental Uncertainty (EU),
Task Uncertainty (TU)
Table 0 -2  : Summary Statistics - Model 1 vs. M odel 2
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Sum Of r :;i t , ' - t —  .C rv -V  . Mean
Regression
Residual
Total
9,566
175,210
184,775
5
212
217
1,913
,826
2,315 ,045a
2 Regression 10,199 7 1,457 1,753 ,098b
Residual 174,576 210 ,831
Total 184,775 217
a- Predictors: (Constant), Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV), E-->P Expectancy, 
P-->EP Expectancy, EP->ER Expectancy, Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV)
b- Predictors: (Constant), Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV), E-->P Expectancy, 
P-->EP Expectancy, EP~>ER Expectancy, Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV), 
External Environmental Uncertainty (EU), Task Uncertainty (TU)
c - Dependent Variable: Motivation (M)
Table 0 -3  : ANalysis-Of-VAriance - Model 1 vs. Model 2
A i r  m  i i  m  ••
r  , v  ^ M
i (C onstant) ,760 4,713 ,000
Value of Extrinsic R ew ards (EV) ,116 ,075 ,107 1,544 ,124
E -> P  Expectancy ,002 ,056 ,003 ,030 ,976
P-->EP Expectancy ,033 ,054 ,053 ,607 ,545
EP-->ER Expectancy ,056 ,052 ,074 1,063 ,289
Value of Intrinsic R ew ards (IV) ,230 ,098 ,160 2,345 ,020
2 (C onstant) 3,332 ,851 3,914 ,000
Value of Extrinsic R ew ards (EV) ,110 ,076 ,101 1,441 ,151
. E—>P Expectancy ,006 ,056 ,010 ,112 ,911
P -> E P  Expectancy ,044 ,057 ,070 ,773 ,441
EP-->ER Expectancy ,050 ,053 ,066 ,936 ,351
Value of Intrinsic R ew ards (IV) ,226 ,099 ,157 2,291 ,023
External Environmental Uncertainty (EU) ,007 ,093 ,007 ,076 ,939
T ask  Uncertainty (TU) ,051 ,072 ,060 ,710 ,478
a. D ependent Variable: Motivation
Table 0 -4  : Partial Regression Analysis - Model 1 vs. Model 2
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1
— - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ _ _
V r  /  ■ ... '
Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV)
E~>P Expectancy 
P-->EP Expectancy 
EP-->ER Expectancy 
Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV)
, 1 0 6
, 0 0 2
, 0 4 2
, 0 7 3
, 1 5 9
c ' lv  • -
2 1 2
2 1 2
2 1 2
2 1 2
2 1 2
.
' i ;■
, 0 6 2
, 4 8 8
, 2 7 2
, 1 4 5
, 0 1 0
2 Value of Extrinsic Rewards (EV) , 0 9 9 2 1 0 , 0 7 6
E-->P Expectancy , 0 0 8 2 1 0 , 4 5 5
P-->EP Expectancy , 0 5 3 2 1 0 , 2 2 0
EP-->ER Expectancy , 0 6 4 2 1 0 , 1 7 5
Value of Intrinsic Rewards (IV) , 1 5 6 2 1 0 ,0 1 1
External Environmental Uncertainty (EU) , 0 0 5 2 1 0 , 4 7 0
Task Uncertainty (TU) , 0 4 9 2 1 0 , 2 3 9
a ' Dependent Variable: Motivation (M)
Table 0-5 : Partial Correlation Analysis - Model 1 vs. Model 2
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Appendix P : Secondary Analysis - Scatter-plot Matrix of Bivariate Relationships
Figure P-l below presents a scatter-plot matrix o f the variables identified in the research. 
This matrix displays separately the relationships between all the study’s variables, dependent, 
independent and intervening. O f particular interest is the last row o f the matrix, where the 
relationships between managerial motivation (M) and all the other variables (EV, E P, P EP, 
EP ER, IV, EU, and TU) are shown.
Extrinsic V
Jb+ -dt+ _± +
■ mu ■ lyiMifji
rr -mate
_LJL. ± ±_ jtdL
I l f  I I"TlJ  ai■i i
E~>P
m x
m f t UHLill—T
44
-Hit
+4 IHt- fETT T T w + + +  + +
£
4
P->EP
m
n«t
44+4+
EP—>ER
14* Intrinsic V
External Un'W r
4^4 *
Task Unce
• m4 + + ? 3
IIWWHII 4 f T
4 If  III
144-t-l 1 
4—t i l lI I II II 
4 4444 
4 4
II I I I I I  
II I I I H-
I II I l-l 
4 4444 
4 4 4
4=***
i iniiim
II I I B  I M i ljxnn hi ii u mum
i h m i
4 44
I MU I 
4 44
IIH Ml 4 
4 4ff4f
44  4
Motivation
F igure P - l  : Scatter-p lo t M atrix  - R elationships betw een V ariables
287
PM ERS, M anagerial M otivation and Environmental Uncertainty APPENDICES
Appendix Q : Test for Bias from Non-Response
Table Q -l below presents the results o f the test performed to assess the potential bias from 
non-response. The test was conducted as follows. First, for each questionnaire the date of both 
distribution and return were recorded. Second, the total sample o f respondents was split at the 
median response time into early (below the median) and late (above the median) respondents. 
Finally, a comparison o f means t-test, and its non-parametric equivalent, the M ann-W hitney test, 
were run for differences between the two groups for each o f the study’s designated variables. 
As shown in Table Q -l, no statistically significant differences in the mean scores between the 
early and late responses were found, a result that suggests that little or no response bias exists in 
the present sample.
E~>P Expectancy 
P->EP Expectancy 
EP-->ER Expectancy 
Value of Extrinsic Rewards 
Value of Intrinsic Rewards 
Motivation 
Performance 
External Environmental 
Uncertainty 
Task Uncertainty
h i f j j l l
i  m
- ! i lP | If
f i l l PjflJwi S B w £ :
5,12 (1,45) c 54 (1 38) 213 -1,121 263 5770,500
4,09 (1,51) 4,20 (1,44) -.111 -,562 ,575 6098,000
4,15 (1,27) 4,24 (1,18) -.097 -,591 ,555 5992,500
5,51 (0,87) 5,63 (0,81) -.116 -1,035 ,302 5708,500
5,95 (0,65) 5,85 (0,63) ,095 1,085 ,279 5719,500
5,92 (0,97) 6,04 (0,86) -,121 -,984 ,326 5954,000
5,68 (0,67) 5,56 (0,72) ,120 1,089 ,299 5817,500
4,87 (0,92) 4,77 (0,84) ,098 ,834 ,405 5860,500
4,54 (1,13) 4,59 (1,01) -,041 -.288 ,774 6131,500
Asymp. Sig. 
Vlann-Whitne; 
(2-tailed)
Table Q-l : Analysis o f bias from non-response
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